on. Obfervati prove every matter of Fact into a Maxim will abound in contrary Obfervations, that can be of no other ufe but to perplex and pudder him if he compares them; or else to mifguide him, if he gives himself up to the Authority of that, which for its Novelty, or for fome other Phanfy, best pleases him. Bias. $13. 13. Next to these we may place those who fuffer their own natural Tempers and Paffions they are poffefs'd with to influence their Judgments, efpecially of Men and Things that may any way relate to their prefent Circumstances and Intereft. Truth is all fimple, all pure, will bear no mixture of any thing else with it. 'Tis rigid and inflexible to any bye Interests; and fo fhould the Understanding be whofe Ufe and Excellency lies in conforming itself to it. To think of every thing juft as it is in it felf, is the proper business of the Understanding, though it be not that which Men always imploy it to. This all Men at first hearing, allow is the right use one fhould make of his Understanding. No body will be at fuch an open defiance with common Senfe, as to profess that we fhould not endeavour to know, and think of things as they are in themselves, and yet there is nothing more frequent than to do the contrary; and Men are apt to ex every cufe cufe themselves, and think they have rea- Bia. fon to do so, if they have but a pretence that it is for God, or a good Caufe, that is, in effect for Themselves, their own Perfuafion, or Party: For to thofe in their turns the feveral Sects of Men, efpecially in matters of Religion, entitle God and a good Cause. But God requires not Men to wrong or misuse their Faculties for him, nor to lie to others or themselves for his fake; which they purpofely do who will not fuffer their Understandings to have right Conceptions of the things proposed to them, and defignedly reftrain themselves from having just Thoughts of every thing, as far as they are concern'd to enquire. And as for a good Caufe, that needs not fuch ill Helps; if it be good, Truth will fupport it, and it has no need of Fallacy or Falfhood. 14. Very much of kin to this is the Argument hunting after Arguments to make good one fide of a Question, and wholly to neglect and refuse those which favour the other fide. What is this but wilfully to mifguide the Understanding, and is fo far from gi ving Truth its due value, that it wholly debases it: Efpoufe Opinions that best comport with their Power, Profit, or Credit, and then feek Arguments to fupport E 2 them Arguments. them. Truth light upon this way, is of no more avail to us than Error; for what is so taken up by us, may be falfe as well fo as true, and he has not done his Duty who has thus ftumbled upon Truth in his way to Preferment. There is another, but more innocent way of collecting Arguments, very familiar among Bookish Men, which is to furnish themselves with the Arguments they meet with Pro and Con in the Questions they ftudy. This helps them not to judge right, nor argue ftrongly, but only to talk copioufly on either fide, without being steady and fettled in their own Judgments: For fuch Arguments gather'd from other Men's Thoughts, floating only in the Memory, are there ready indeed to fupply copious Talk with fome appearance of Reason, but are far from helping us to judge right. Such variety of Arguments only distract the Understanding that relies on them, unlefs it has gone farther than fuch a fuperficial way of examining; this is to quit Truth for Appearance, only to ferve our Vanity. The fure and only way to get true Knowledge, is to form in our Minds clear fettled Notions of things, with names annexed to thofe determin'd Ideas. These we are to confider, and with their feveral Relations and Habitudes, and not amufe Our our felves with floating Names, and Words Arguments. of indetermined fignification, which we can ufe in feveral Senfes to ferve a turn. 'Tis in the perception of the Habitudes and Refpects our Ideas have one to another, that real Knowledge confifts; and when a Man once perceives how far they agree or difagree one with another, he will be able to judge of what other People fay, and will not need to be led by the Arguments of others, which are many of them nothing but plaufible Sophiftry. This will teach him to ftate the Question right, and fee whereon it turns ; and thus he will stand upon his own Legs, and know by his own Understanding. Whereas by collecting and learning Arguments by heart, he will be but a retainer to others; and when any one questions the Foundations they are built upon, he will be at a Nonplus, and be fain to give up his implicit Knowledge.. $15. Labour for Labour fake is against Hafte. Nature. The Understanding, as well as all the other Faculties, choofes always the fhortest way to its end, would presently obtain the Knowledge it is about, and then fet upon fome new Enquiry. But this whether Laziness or Hafte often misleads it and makes it content it felf with improper ways of fearch, and fuch as will not ferve the E 3 turn Hafte turn. Sometimes it refts upon Testimony, when Teftimony of right has nothing to do, because it is easier to believe than to be scientifically inftructed. Sometimes it contents it felf with one Argument, and refts fatisfied with that, as it were a Demonstration; whereas the thing under proof is not capable of Demonftration, and therefore must be submitted to the trial of Probabilities, and all the material Arguments Pro and Con be examined and brought to a Balance. In fome Cafes the Mind is determin'd by probable Topicks in Enquiries where Demonftration may be had. All these, and feveral others, which Laziness, Impatience, Cuftom, and want of Ufe and Attention lead Men into, are mifapplications of the Understanding in the fearch of Truth. In every Queftion the Nature and Manner of the proof it is capable of should first be confider'd to make our Enquiry fuch as it fhould be. This would fave a great deal of frequently mifimploy'd Pains, and lead us fooner to that discovery and poffeffion of Truth we are capable of. The multiplying variety of Arguments, efpecially frivolous ones, fuch as are all that are meerly verbal, is not only loft labour, but cumbers the Memory to no purpose, and ferves only to hinder it from feizing and holding of the Truth in all thofe Cafes |