3. The most serious objection was that R. S. O. 1897 ch. 129, sec. 10, does not apply to such a case as this

This cannot succeed unless the case of Mason v. Town of Peterborough, 20 A. R. 683, can be distinguished. The very wide words of sec. 10 are limited only by the words "except in cases of libel and slander," and the rule of "mentio unius exclusio alterius seems to require that even the present action be held to come within the enabling words. It was argued that sec. 12 was to be taken as giving a test of the cases to which sec. 10 applies, and that as it could have no application to the present, so neither had sec. 10. But sec. 12 seems rather intended to facilitate the assessment of damages in cases under secs. 10 and 11, and not to have the effect now contended for.

The motion must be dismissed with costs to plaintiff in any event.

CARTWRIGHT, MASTER.

OCTOBER 13TH, 1905.

CHAMBERS.

OVEREND v. ECLIPSE MANUFACTURING CO.

for

Venue Change Patent
Action
of Invention
Infringement Statutory Venue-Corporation Defendant.

Motion by defendants to change the venue from Peterborough, where plaintiff lived, to Ottawa, in an action to restrain defendants from infringing plaintiff's patent for an invention. Defendants were an incorporated company doing business at Ottawa.

W. N. Tilley, for defendants.

Grayson Smith, for plaintiff.

THE MASTER:-The motion is made under R. S. C. ch. 61, sec. 30, and the decisions thereon in Goldsmith v. Walton, 9 P. R. 10, and Aitcheson v. Mann, ib. 253, 473. It was argued that those cases were distinguishable because the defendants here, being a corporation, could not be said to have either a definite "place of residence or of business." unless the head office was to be so considered. The defendants were incorporated either under the law of the Dominion or of this province. Following, therefore, what I said in Delap v. Codd, 2 O. W. R. 849, I think the defendants are, for the purpose of the decision of this question, to be considered as resident

at Ottawa, where it is sworn that they have their head office and only place of business in this province. See also Gold Run (Klondike) Mining Co. v. Canadian Gold Mining Co., 5

0. W. R. 411.

The order should therefore be made; costs in the cause.

It is true that in one view the defendants are resident in the whole provnce; and therefore no effect can be given to the statute, unless it is applied as is now being done, where a corporation are defendants.

CARTWRIGHT, MASTER.

OCTOBER 13TH, 1905.

CHAMBERS.

SUB TARGET GUN CO. v. SUB TARGET GUN CO.

(LTD.)

Security for Costs-Residence of Plaintiffs abroad-Property in Jurisdiction-Shares in Defendant Company.

Motion by plaintiffs to set aside two præcipe orders for security for costs.

J. W. St. John, for plaintiffs.

W. J. Clark, for defendant company.
George Ross, for defendant Jewell.

THE MASTER:-It was argued that the claim of the plaintiffs was admitted in writing, and that, therefore, the orders must be set aside, following Stock v. Dresden Sugar Co., 2 O. W. R. 896.

Without deciding this, I think the motion must prevail for the following reason. In the affidavit of Mr. Tilden, the president of the defendant company, he states that plaintiff's hold $50.000 paid up stock in his company. If this is so, there is no necessity for any further security at present.

The orders will be set aside, with costs in the cause to plaintiffs. If plaintiffs in any way affect the stock which they have in the defendant company, a motion can be made for security if defendants think it necessary.

CARTWRIGHT, MASTER.

OCTOBER 13TH, 1905.

CHAMBERS.

HUMPHREY v. JORY.

Venue-Motion to Change-County Court Action—Conveni

ence-Expense.

Motion by defendants to change the venue in a County Court action from Toronto to Port Arthur.

Casey Wood, for defendant Ross.

T. D. Delamere, K.C., for defendant Jory.

A. G. Slaght, for plaintiff.

THE MASTER:--The defendants swear to themselves and two other witnesses, all residing at Port Arthur, where the transaction took place out of which this action to recover $192.12 arose. The plaintiff's managing clerk swears to three witnesses besides himself, who are all residents of Toronto. The defendants deny the partnership, and say that the sale was made not to them but to "one McCall, an employee of the defendants," and that if defendant Jory accepted the draft (which he denies), he did not do so as a member of the firm. Unfortunately the difference in cost between a trial at Toronto and one at Port Arthur is very great in proportion to the amount in question.

In Dods v. Longley, decided on appeal by the Chancellor on 5th April, 1904, a motion to change the venue in the County Court action from Ottawa to Rat Portage was refused, though the difference in expense was at least as great for each witness as in the present case. There the defendant swore to 8 witnesses besides himself, two of the 8 being residents of Winnipeg. The plaintiff swore to 15 witnesses, two of whom were residents of Montreal. There, as here, a draft had been accepted for payment of the goods.

In the present case the goods were sold in September, 1904, the draft was drawn on 8th October, and action was not commenced until 13th March. It is not shewn whether any negotiations took place in the meantime.

Looking at the facts of this case, as compared with those in Dods v. Longley, I think the motion cannot succeed.

If the defendants are willing to admit the acceptance and the delivery of the goods at Port Arthur, then if the plaintiff will not assent to an order as asked, the motion can be renewed.

The entire costs of trial at Port Arthur should be to plaintiff in any event if the change is made.

CARTWRIGHT, MASTER.

CHAMBERS.

OCTOBER 13TH, 1905.

Defamation

Comment

CHAMBERS v. JAFFRAY.

Fair

Pleading -Defence Justification
Particulars - Examination for Discovery

Motion to Strike out Defence-Embarrassment.

Motion by plaintiff in an action for libel to strike out certain paragraphs of the statement of defence as (1) calculated. to embarrass, prejudice, and delay the fair trial of the action, and as (2) not disclosing any defence to the action.

C. Swabey, for plaintiff.

R. McKay, for defendants.

THE MASTER:-The second ground cannot be considered. in Chambers. Such a motion must be made to a Judge in Court: see Knapp v. Carley, 7 O. L. R. 409, 3 O. W. R. 187.

This disposes of the objection to all except the paragraphs which allege that the words complained of, "so far as they consist of allegations of fact, are true in substance and in fact, and so far as they are expressions of opinion are fair comment made in good faith and not maliciously, upon facts which were matters of public interest."

The article complained of is one of 8 or 9 folios. It alleges that plaintiff is a promoter of the Western Cordage Co. for the manufacture of binder twine; that to carry out his design of getting unwary farmers in the county of Middlesex to become subscribers he had persuaded 10 prominent residents to allow themselves to be named as applicants for the charter, and that 6 of them were provisional directors. It went on to speak of the well known want of success of previous ventures of the same kind, and asked "Who is Mr. T. W. Chambers?" and stated facts as to his antecedents which, in the opinion of the writer, shewed he was not qualified to

explain the difficulties of such a risky business. It dwelt on one item in the prospectus, that the company would not grant more than 12 shares to one person. This was under a heading of "Same old bait-same old story." It stated that the phenomenal prosperity of the Brantford factory was due to the sudden advance in the price of raw material, growing out of the Spanish-American war, and ended by speaking of "the absurdity of an ex-traveller (meaning the plaintiff) for a millinery house, who has not been a success in business undertaking to launch another binder twine factory with the money of farmers," and that he and his fellow directors were so well aware of this that they would avoid all those conversant with the trade, and attack only the farmers, who would not challenge their fairy tales until the mischief is done, and the stockholder finds himself confronted with such a state of affairs as made the farmers who paid for stock in Brandon, Walkerton, and Chatham plants, gnash their teeth in impotent rage."

The innuendo is set out as follows: Meaning thereby that the plaintiff had procured certain persons named therein as directors of the Western Cordage Company Limited, to act as his tools in deceiving the farmers of Middlesex, and had combined with them to defraud the said farmers, and the defendants thereby held the plaintiff up to contempt and ridicule as a man wholly unreliable in his business transactions and as one who had failed in other lines of business and without financial standing, and accusing him of dishonest conduct in his dealings with the public."

This seems to be a sufficiently clear and distinct libel, and the innuendo shews that the plaintiff appreciates what are the statements of alleged facts of which he complains. The pleading follows that which was expressly approved of by a Divisional Court in Crow's Nest Pass Coal Co. v. Bell, 4 0. L. R. 660, 1 O. W. R. 679.

The plaintiff can, if he desires, examine the defendants for discovery, and see if they still adhere to their very serious plea of justification. If there seems, after that has been done, to be any right to particulars as asked for on the argument (though not in the notice of motion), it will be time enough to deal with that question. It is quite true that in Penrhyn v. Licensed Victuallers' Mirror, 7 Times L. R. 1, particulars of such a plea were ordered to be given. But the libel complained of there was very different from that in this action.