sion. MAGEE, J., gave reasons in writing for the same conclu MAY 27TH, 1905. DIVISIONAL COURT. DOULL v. DOELLE. Attachment of Debts-Judgment against Married Woman, Payable out of Separate Estate-Proceeds of Insurance Policy on Life of Husband-Trust in Favour of Wife. Appeal by defendant, judgment debtor, from order of STREET, J., 5 0. W. R. 413, affirming order of Master in Chambers, ib. 238, in a garnishing proceeding, ordering the garnishees, the Commercial Travellers Association, to pay over to the plaintiffs, judgment creditors, certain moneys, being the proceeds of an insurance upon the life of defendant's husband, now deceased. The appeal was heard by MEREDITH, C.J., TEETZEL, J., CLUTE, J. W. E. Middleton, for defendant. F. J. Roche, for plaintiffs. TEETZEL, J.:—. The judgment debtor was named as sole beneficiary in the contract of insurance upon the life of her husband, and sec. 159 of the Insurance Act, R. S. O. 1897 ch. 103, in such cases enacts that "such contract shall (subject to the right of the assured to apportion or alter as hereinafter enacted) create a trust in favour of the said beneficiary or beneficiaries, according to the intent so expressed 01 declared; and, so long as any object of the trust remains, the money payable under the contract shall not be subject to the control of the assured," etc. The effect of this section is, therefore, to create a statutory Trast of the money payable under the policy in favour of the wife without restraint upon anticipation, but subject to be defeated upon the happening of either of two contingencies, the wife predeceasing her husband, or the revocation of her appointment as beneficiary and appointment of a child or children in her place as beneficiary under sec. 160 of the Insurance Act. Neither of these contingencies happened, and upon the death of the husband, the absolute right to the money became vested in the wife. Her original interest in the trust would, I think, be separate property within the contemplation of the Married Women's Property Act, and it necessarily follows that the fruits of the trust must also be regarded as separate property, and as such liable to satisfy the judgment obtained by plaintiffs. Appeal dismissed with costs. MEREDITH, C.J.:-I agree. CLUTE, J., took no part in the judgment owing to illness; the parties agreed to accept the judgment of two Judges. METALLIC ROOFING CO. OF CANADA v. LOCAL UNION NO. 30 AMALGAMATED SHEET METAL WORKERS' INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION. Attachment of Debts-Moneys of Unincorporated Association -Judgment against Members in Representative ActionTrust. Appeal by plaintiffs from order of Master in Chambers, 50. W. R. 709, dismissing their motion to make absolute a garnishing summons in respect of a sum of $409.85 held by the Dominion Bank, garnishees, to the credit of "The Amalgamated Sheet Metal Workers' Union No. 30: Alex. Kay, President; W. C. Brake, Recording Secretary; and R. Russell, Treasurer." Strachan Johnston, for plaintiffs. J. G. O'Donoghue, for defendants. ANGLIN, J.:-Affirming an order of a Divisional Court (5 0. L. R. 424, 2 O. W. R. 183), the Court of Appeal held that, as an unincorporated, unregistered, voluntary association, not formed for any purpose of gain or profit, "Local Union No. 30 Amalgamated Sheet Metal Workers' Inter national Association" is an entity unknown to the law, anú that its members cannot be sued by their adopted name: 9 0. L. R. 1:1, 5 O. W. R. 95. The right to proceed against the members of such a body in a representative action was in the same judgment authoritatively declared. VOL. VI O.W.R. NO. 2-4 By order of Boyd, C., made on 6th March, 1903, by consent, subject to a question of jurisdiction which was expressly left open, certain individual defendants, made parties by an earlier order, were authorized to defend this action on behalf of all other persons constituting Local Union No. 30, A. I. A., and of all other persons constituting the International Association, and it was also ordered that all such persons should be bound by the proceedings in this action. The style of cause was amended to meet the requirements of this order. From that time the individual defendants were before the Court in their representative capacity. Upon the question of jurisdiction to pronounce the order of 6th March coming before him, MacMahon, J., held that the Court had such jurisdiction as to the Local Union No. 30, A. I. A., but had not as to the American parent body, the A. I. A. itself. On appeal from this order, the Court of Appeal declared that jurisdiction existed as to both the Local Union and the parent Association: 9 O. L. R. 171, 5 O. W. R. 95. By the certificate of the judgment of that Court it was ordered that the costs of the appeal from the order of MacMahon, J., "be paid by the respondents to the appellants." These costs, after deducting certain sums set off by agreement of the parties, amount to $146.66. . For plaintiffs it is contended that, by virtue of the order for representation, all the members of the Local Union No. 30, A. I. A., are bound by the order of the Court of Appeal for payment of the costs which "the respondents" were ordered to pay; and that the money standing to the credit of Local Union No. 30 is in fact the property of those who are so ordered to make payment. Upon examining the certificate of the judgment of the Court of Appeal, I find that the "respondents are, amongst cthers, "William Jose, Richard Russell, S. Cox, W. C. Brake, J. S. Chapman, J. H. Kennedy, and James Gow, on behalf of themselves and all other persons constituting the said Local Union No. 30, A. I. A." The appeal of which they were ordered to pay the costs is in this certificate termed "the cross-appeal of the respondents." The order for representation was not itself in appeal. What would be the effect of the Court of Appeal judgment, if pronounced upon an appeal from that order, upon the liability for these costs of members of the Local Union, other than those named as defendants, may be open to some question. But representation having been provided for by the order of the Chan cellor, it follows that in all subsequent proceedings the named defendants appeared in their representative as well as their individual characters. Under the certificate of the judgment of the Court of Appeal, it is, in my opinion, clear that liability for plaintiffs' costs is imposed not only upon the Lamed defendants, but also upon all those whom they represent in this action. The Master says that the fund held by the garnishees is really a trust fund, not the property of the contributors, not under their control, not assignable by them, and therefore not attachable to satisfy their debts. I find nothing in the material before me . . which supports a finding that the fund in question is impressed with any trust, unless it be that the persons upon whose signature it is withdrawable should be deemed to hold it as trustees for their fellow memLers in the Local Union. The constitution of the Amalgamated Sheet Metal Workers' International Alliance, which counsel for the judgment debtors brought before me on the argument, does not appear to have been properly in evidence below, and should not, I think, be now admitted. But, if received, it would shew that "the funds or property of the Local Union cannot be divided in any manner among the members individually, but shall remain the funds and property of the Local Union for all legitimate purposes while 7 members remain therein:" art. VI., sec. 3. This would seem to make it reasonably clear that the money in question is the property of the Local Union No. 30, using that name to designate collectively the members composing this branch of the International Association. If the funds of the Union, that is, of the members collectively, were vested in trustees, upon adding them as parties the Court could reach such funds for payment of damages and costs. Such is Lord Lindley's view expressed in Taff Vale R. W. Co. v. Amalgamated Society of Railway Servants, [1901] A. C. 426, at p. 443. If this Local Union could be sued in its own name, I should have no doubt that a judgment obtained against it might be enforced against this fund: see language of Lord Macnaghten, S. C. at p. 437. Because unincorporated it may rot be so sued; and, while in substance this action is against the Union, in form it is necessarily brought against the individuals who are its members. But the same facts which protect it from suit render this body incapable of holding property. It follows that what stands in its name is the |