APPENDIX A

REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON RAILROAD SAFETY SUBMITTED TO THE SECRETARY OF TRANSPORTATION, JUNE, 30, 1969, WASHINGTON, D.C.

At the request of the Secretary of Transportation, we, the representatives of the railroad industry, railroad labor organizations, and State regulatory commissions, met as a task force to examine railroad safety and to advise the Secretary. The task force began meeting May 1, 1969, and concludes with this report. There has been a free exchange of information and open discussion. Data supplied by the Federal Railroad Administration and its Bureau of Railroad Safety were used for purposes of analysis of problem areas. The agreed upon time limit did not permit additional outside research.

REVIEW OF THE PROBLEM

Railroad operations involve inherent dangers. Movement of large, heavy equipment at high speeds characterizes the industry. Daily, some 2 billion ton-miles of freight of all types move on the Nation's railroads. Hundreds of railroad yards receive, classify, and dispatch the 1.8 million freight car fleet on an around-the-clock, 7-day-a-week schedule. About 600,000 passengers daily commute to work and 200,000 travel intercity by rail; 630,000 railroad workers average 3.5 million man-hours of work per day.

It is logical to assume that operations of such magnitude will generate accidents, Thus, standards, procedures and rules are necessary to provide for safety. The bulk of existing railroad safety practices were developed over the years by the industry itself. For many years they met the safety requirements and produced the present safety record.

Grade crossing accidents rank as the major cause of fatalities in railroad operations. They account for 65 percent of the fatalities resulting from all types of railroad accidents, and rank second only to aviation mishaps in severity. Annually, about 4,000 accidents produce approximately 1,600 deaths which is also a matter of major public concern. The yearly totals of crossing accidents, and accident casualties, in the 1920-1967 period, can be related very closely to the combined amount of rail and highway miles travelled and to the effects of major crossing safety improvement programs. The trend in both accidents and casualties up to 1958 was generally downward. The situation has been reversed since 1958, however, with a disturbing general trend upward in both categories. Only 20 percent of the total 225,000 grade crossings are protected with automatic devices.

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Grade crossing safety receives attention from highway authorities as well as railroad organizations. Under existing law, Federal-aid highway funds may be used on grade crossings on the Federal-aid highway system. This includes interstate, primary and secondary roads which together account for slightly more than 20 percent of the total number of crossings. However, Federal funds may not be used to reduce hazards at railroad crossings of city streets and on many State supplementary highways and local roads which are not on the Federal-aid system and which represent the remaining 80 percent of the total. A certain number of safety improvements are being made currently by the carriers and State and local agencies on crossings not on the Federal-aid system. There is an imperative need for an expanded public program to cover these crossings in order to reduce immediately this extremely high fatality rate.

The most obvious trend in any recent examination of railroad safety is the large and steady increase in the number of train accidents. The 8,028 train accidents recorded in 1968, represents a significant increase, by any yardstick, over the 4,148 recorded in 1961. Derailments account for two-thirds of the total.

General causes of train accidents are almost evenly divided among human error, defects in or failure of equipment and defects in or improper maintenance of track and roadbed. Derailments are largely attributable to track and equipment problems while collisions are mostly caused by human error.

Employee safety in railroad operations is of continuing concern. In 1968, there were 146 employees killed and 17,993 injured. Employees involved in rail operations and track and roadbed maintenance are more exposed to the inherent hazards of the industry and, therefore, represent a major portion of the employee casualty figure. Contributing factors to the employee casualty rate include inadequate training programs, human errors, equipment defects, poor housekeeping, and non-compliance with safety and operating rules.

The need for transporting ever increasing quantities and varieties of hazardous materials-chemicals, gases, explosives and fuel-creates the possibility of serious accidents that have become a matter of major public concern. Thus, causal factors affecting train accidents--track, equipment, human factors and train-motor vehicle collisions—take on added significance when dangerous commodities are transported.

RAILROAD SAFETY REGULATIONS

Government involvement in railroad safety regulation came early. In 1893, Congress passed the first Safety Appliance Act. Then and in later years various Federal statutes granted varying degrees of Federal authority over locomotives, signalling systems, hours of service limitations on certain employees, air brakes, couplers, hand brakes, grab irons, running boards, sill steps, and draft gears on rolling stock, and accident reporting. The Federal authority to regulate shipment of hazardous materials is applied largely to the packaging of these commodities, although some rules governing handling in transit have been adopted.

Federal statutes do not cover the trucks, wheels and axles of railroad cars nor their design, construction or maintenance. Bridges and tunnels are not subject to Federal regulations and no Federal author

ity governs track and roadbed. There is no general authority to promulgate standards for employee qualifications, physical requirements and training, nor to prescribe uniform railroad operating rules. Almost all States have entered the field of rail safety regulation. However, there is no uniform pattern of involvement. Some are quite active in general rail safety matters, but most consideration is on grade crossing safety regulation. Certain States feel they are adequately equipped by statute or existing regulations to deal with any rail safety problem that may arise.

Rules and regulations issued under present Federal and State authority cover only the specific areas reached by the legislative acts. The limitation imposed on the regulatory process by specific, rather than general scope legislative authority, results in only minimal public agency involvement in some problem areas of safety.

PRIORITIES

Railroad safety is wide in scope and requires a more comprehensive national approach. Of first priority is treatment of total rail safety by relating all its various facets to definite goals. This demands a coordinated approach by industry, labor, State and Federal Govern

ments.

To continue as the major transportation mode, railroads will require more innovation, advanced equipment and higher speed capabilities. Achievement of these advanced capabilities calls for parallel advancement in safe, dependable, operation. Therefore, major safety research is essential to guarantee that tomorrow's railroads will not only be more efficient but more safe.

Railroad operating personnel will continue to be the group most involved with rail safety, or the lack of it. New equipment and higher speeds will place great demands on employee skills and railroad operating practices. It is recognized that employee training is inadequate today, and could become more critical as new technology reshapes the industry. It seems imperative that formal, intensive training programs be given high priority along with human factors research. At the same time, railroad rules and practices must be kept responsive to change so that a high level of safety may be maintained.

The modern industrial economy is dependent upon hazardous materials that are shipped throughout the country. Consequently, the entire transportation network, particularly the railroads upon which a large share of chemicals, explosives, fuels, and the like travel, must have the capacity to transport them safely. A top priority should be the complete evaluation of all factors related to the transportation of these commodities. Particularly, container standards for hazardous materials must take into account impact and stress requirements commensurate with today's longer, heavier and faster trains.

The motoring public is part of the safety problem at the grade crossing. Drivers must be educated to accept the meaning of warning devices and be required to heed them. Compliance must be enforced. Because this is a matter of public safety, public programs must be immediately initiated and properly funded to provide the motorist with positive, uniform and adequate information about the hazard at the crossing. More emphatically, firm and prompt consideration must be given to better use of existing funds and the making available of ad

ditional public funds to meet the increasing costs of crossing protec tion and grade separation, and to increase the number of grade crossings with automatic protection. There should be a long range, public commitment to eliminate this unnecessary and tragic loss of life.

Other improvements in railroad safety must necessarily involve substantial commitment of public and private resources. For Government, a major commitment should be toward research; for industry, upgrading and maintenance of plant should be foremost. Management and labor should cooperate to reduce human error. The economic restraints on the railroad industry make it essential that public policy be directed toward the development of financial incentives to support rail safety.

SUMMARY CONCLUSIONS

Recognizing that there have been longstanding differences among the three groups represented on the Task Force, the parties sought to emphasize areas of agreement rather than disagreement plus their mutuality of interest in railroad safety. The consensus view of the Task Force is as follows:

Railroad safety is a problem, national in scope, of concern to Federal and State Governments, as well as labor and management and which has been accented in recent years by the increase in the number of train accidents, particularly derail

ments.

Fatalities resulting from railroad accidents occur mostly at grade crossings. Trespassers rank second in the number of fatalities, and employees third.

Transportation of hazardous materials-chemicals, gases, explosives and fuels-is an economic necessity. Involvement of these materials in train accidents creates a new dimension of public concern over railroad safety.

Reported causes of train accidents are almost evenly divided among defects in or failure of track and roadbed, defects in or failure of equipment, and human error.

Existing Federal and State rail safety regulations do not, in most instances, provide standards for track, roadbed, equipment, employee training and qualifications or rules governing safe railroad operations.

Accident reporting and investigation practices are inadequate. Available statistics do not relate sufficiently to determination of primary and contributory causes.

Research into factors affecting railroad safety is inadequate because it has been sporadic and not coordinated.

Present Federal, State and industry programs to reduce hazards at railway-highway grade crossings are extremely narrow an inadequately funded.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Regardless of the difference in the views of the parties, it is recognized that the safety experience of the American railroads during the past few years is at a point where some effective steps must be taken to bring the problem under control. It is also recognized that the pub

lic and Congress will demand definite assurance that safety will be improved. Solutions short of broad Federal regulation may not adequately meet the situation. Therefore, even though further regulation creates some problems for each of the parties, the Task Force agrees that legislation authorizing broad Federal regulatory powers should be enacted with certain safeguards. It is further recommended that a permanent advisory committee be established, by law, representing management, labor, and State regulatory commissions, to guide and assist in the development of safety standards and other related matters. The specific recommendations of this task force are:

1. That the Secretary of Transportation, through the Federal Railroad Administration, have authority to promulgate reasonable and necessary rules and regulations establishing safety standards in all areas of railroad safety, through such notice, hearing and review procedures as will protect the rights of all interested parties.

2. In order to strengthen the administration of Federal rail safety regulations, there should be established a National Railroad Safety Advisory Committee to advise, consult with, and make recommendations to the Secretary on matters relating to the activities and functions of the Department in the field of railroad safety. The Committee would be chaired by the Federal Railroad Administrator with the remaining members appointed by the Secretary to represent equally the State regulatory commissions, railroad management and labor. The Secretary would submit to the Committee proposed safety standards and amendments and afford it a reasonable opportunity to prepare a report on the technical feasibility, reasonableness, and practicability of each such proposal prior to adoption. The Committee may propose safety standards to the Secretary for his consideration.

3. Existing State rail safety statutes and regulations remain in force until and unless preempted by Federal regulation. Administration of the program should be through a Federal-State partnership, including State certification similar to the certification principles set forth in the Federal Natural Gas Pipeline Safety Act of 1968.

4. The Advisory Committee be directed to study the present delegation of authority to the Association of American Railroads' Bureau of Explosives in certain areas of the Transportation of Explosives and Other Dangerous Articles Act.

5. A research program be initiated by Government and industry into railroad safety technology, which should be funded immediately for an initial 3-year period, over and above existing research programs.

6. Formal employee training programs be expanded by railroad management, with the cooperation of labor and government, for the purpose of insuring compliance with safe operating practices and reducing the impact of human error in the accident experience.

7. An expanded, concerted program of grade crossing safety be undertaken utilizing established Federal and State agenices and advisory groups to set uniform procedures and standards. Early attention must be given to the development of improved crossing protection at lower cost plus greater emphasis placed on driver