quire and does not require all suits under Rev. Stat. § 2326, to be
actions at law and to be tried by jury. Ib.
A statement of facts by the court in a recapitulation of the evidence,
based on uncontradicted testimony, no rule of law being incorrectly
stated, and the facts being submitted to the determination of the
jury, is not open to exception. Wiborg v. United States, 632.
1. Fees allowed by the court to the district attorney for his services in
defending habeas corpus cases, brought to release from the custody of
masters of vessels Chinese emigrants, whom the collector of the port
had ordered detained, should be accounted for by him in the returns
made by him to the government of the fees and emoluments of his
office. Hilborn v. United States, 342.
2. It would require a strong case to show that services, for which the dis-
trict attorney is entitled to charge the government a fee, are not also
services for the earnings of which he should make return to the
government in his emolument account. Ib.
FINDING OF FACTS.
See JURISDICTION, A, 21;
PRACTICE, 3, 4.
1. The treaty of February 23, 1867, 15 Stat. 513, with the Ottawas and
other Indians, introduced the limit of minority upon the inalien-
ability of lands patented to a minor allottee, in that respect chang-
ing the provisions of the treaty of July 16, 1862, 12 Stat. 1237; and
this limitation was applicable to lands then patented to ininors under
the treaty of 1867, and cut off the right of guardians to dispose of
their real estate during their minority, even under direction of the
court of the State in which the land was situated. Wiggan v. Con-
nolly, 56.
2. The crime of murder committed by one Cherokee Indian upon the
person of another within the jurisdiction of the Cherokee nation is
not an offence against the United States, but an offence against the
local laws of the Cherokee nation; and the statutes of the United
States which provide for an indictment by a grand jury, and the
number of persons who shall constitute such a body, have no appli-
cation. Tallon v. Mayes, 376.
3. The Fifth Amendment to the Constitution does not apply to local legis-
lation of the Cherokee nation, so as to require all prosecutions for
offences committed against the laws of that nation to be initiated
by a grand jury in accordance with the provisions of that amend-
ment. Ib.
4. The question whether a statute of the Cherokee nation which was not
repugnant to the Constitution of the United States or in conflict with
any treaty or law of the United States had been repealed by another
statute of that nation, and the determination of what was the exist-
ing law of the Cherokee nation as to the constitution of the grand
jury, is solely a matter within the jurisdiction of the courts of that
nation, and the decision of such a question in itself necessarily in-
volves no infraction of the Constitution of the United States. Ib.
5. The provision in the treaty of February 24, 1869, with the Bannock
Indians, whose reservation was within the limits of what is now the
State of Wyoming, that "they shall have the right to hunt upon the
unoccupied lands of the United States so long as game may be found
thereon," etc., does not give them the right to exercise this privilege
within the limits of that State in violation of its laws. Ward v.
Race Horse, 504.
6. On the trial of a Choctaw Indian for the murder of a negro at the
Choctaw Nation in the Indian country, the status of the deceased is
a question of fact, to be determined by the evidence, and the burden
of proof is on the government to sustain the jurisdiction of the court
by evidence. Lucas v. United States, 612.
7. Statements alleged to have been made by the negro in his lifetime that
he did not belong to the Indian country are not admissible for that
purpose. lb.
The rule in cases of tort is to leave the question of interest as damages
to the discretion of the jury; but as it is evident from the record that
the jury did not allow interest, but based their verdict entirely upon
the number of tons of hay destroyed at the market value per ton,
this court acquiesces in the disposition made by the Circuit Court
of Appeals of the question made in respect of the instruction of
the trial court on the subject of interest. Eddy v. Lafayette, 456.
A decree or judgment by the Circuit Court of Appeals, affirming a decree
or judgment of a Circuit Court, without specifying the sum for which
it is rendered, is a final decree or judgment, from which an appeal or
writ of error will lie to this court. Texas & Pacific Railway Co. v.
Gentry, 353.
A. JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME COURT.
1. In a suit in a state court to quiet title, two claims to title were set up
by the plaintiff. The first was that his title had been acquired by ad-
verse possession, sufficient under the local law. On this point the trial
court found that, in 1862, the plaintiff's grantor entered into posses-
sion of the land in question, and that he and the plaintiff had since
been continuously and then were in actual, notorious and adverse pos-
session thereof, under color and claim of title. The second claim was
under a deed from husband and wife, executed by the former under
an alleged power of attorney from the latter which had been lost with-
out having been recorded. On this point the trial court found that
the existence and validity of the power of attorney was established.
It entered a decree that the plaintiff was entitled to the possession of
the land, that the defendant was not the owner of it, that the cloud
be removed, and that the power of attorney be established. On ap-
peal to the Supreme Court of the State this decree was affirmed. The
case being brought here by writ of error the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court of the State certified that the question had been duly
raised in the trial court whether the said power and the deed made
under it, which, by the law at the time of its making were absolutely
void, were made valid by the territorial act of February 2, 1888, and
whether, if so made valid, it was not in violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the Constitution. Held, that, as it was settled in the
State that actual, uninterrupted and notorious possession, under claim
of right, was sufficient without color of title, and that a void deed,
accompanied with actual occupancy, was sufficient to set the statute
of limitations in motion, the judgment could be sustained on the first
point, which raised no Federal question, and that consequently this
court was without jurisdiction. Dibble v. Bellingham Bay Land Co.,
63.
2. If the record discloses that a question has been raised and decided ad-
versely to a party claiming the benefit of a provision of the Constitu-
tion of the United States, and another question not Federal has also
been raised and decided against such party, and the decision of the
latter question is sufficient notwithstanding the Federal question to
sustain the decision, this court will not review the judgment. Ib.
3. If it appears that the court did in fact base its judgment on such inde-
pendent ground, or, where it does not appear on which of the two
grounds the judgment was based, if the independent ground on which
it might have been based was a good and valid one, sufficient in
itself to sustain the judgment, this court will not assume jurisdiction.
Ib.
4. This result cannot be in any respect controlled by the certificate of the
presiding judge, for the office of the certificate, as it respects the Fed-
cral question, is to make more certain and specific what is too general
and indefinite in the record, but it is incompetent to originate the
question. Ib.
5. If the conflict of a state law with the Constitution and the decision by
the state court in favor of its validity are relied on, this must appear
on the face of the record before the decision can be reëxamined in
this court, and this is equally true where the denial of a title, right,
privilege or immunity under the Constitution and laws of the United
States, or the validity of an authority exercised under the United
States, is urged as the ground of jurisdiction. Ib.
6. No rule is more firmly established than that this court will follow the
construction given by the Supreme Court of a State to a statute of
limitations of a State, and there is no reason for disregarding it in
this instance. Ib.
7. In order to give this court appellate jurisdiction under the act of
March 3, 1891, c. 517, § 5, upon the ground that the case "involves
the construction or application of the Constitution of the United
States," a construction or application of the Constitution must have
been expressed or requested in the Circuit Court. Cornell v. Green,
75.
8. A decree of the Circuit Court, dismissing on general demurrer, for want
of equity, a bill filed by a grantee of land, praying that proceedings
for foreclosure, to which his grantor was made a party as executor
and as guardian, but not individually, be set aside for the alleged
reason that the grantor was not a party to or bound by those proceed-
ings, does not "involve the construction or application of the Consti-
tution of the United States," within the meaning of the act of March 3,
1891, c. 517, § 5. Ib.
9. The scheme of the judiciary act of March 3, 1891, c. 517, 26 Stat. 826,
precludes the contention that certificates of division of opinion in
criminal cases may still be had under Rev. Stat. §§ 651 and 697.
United States v. Rider, 182.
10. Review by appeal, by writ of error or otherwise, must be as prescribed
by that act, and review by certificate is limited by it to the certificate
by the Circuit Courts, made after final judgment, of questions made
as to their own jurisdiction; and to the certificate by the Circuit
Courts of Appeal of questions of law in relation to which the advice
of this court is sought as therein provided; and these certificates are
governed by the same general rules as were formerly applied to cer-
tificates of division. lb.
11. No appeal lies to this court from a decree of a Circuit Court of the
United States, ordering that the decree of the Circuit Court of Appeals
in a suit for a perpetual injunction against infringement of a copy-
right be made a decree of the Circuit Court to which it was sent down
with a mandate after hearing on appeal from the Circuit Court.
Webster v. Daly, 155.
12. In this case application was made by the defendants below, after
judgment, to the Supreme Court of Texas for a writ of error to the
Court of Civil Appeals for the second district for the purpose of re-
viewing the judgment of that court, and the application was denied.
Held, that this court has jurisdiction to reëxamine the judgment on
writ of error to the Court of Civil Appeals. Bacon v. Texas, 207.
13. In case of a change of phraseology in an article in a state constitution,
it is for the state courts to determine whether the change calls for a
change of construction. Ib.
14. Where there are two grounds for the judgment of a state court, one
only of which involves a Federal question, and the other is broad
enough to maintain a judgment sought to be reviewed, this court will
not look into the Federal question. Ib.
15. When a state court has based its decision on a local or state question,
and this court in consequence finds it unnecessary to decide a Federal
question raised by the record, the logical course is to dismiss the writ
of error. Ib.
16. The objections of a creditor to the discharge of a bankrupt being dis-
missed for want of prosecution, the creditor filed his petition for re-
vision in the Circuit Court of the United States. Issues were made up
and the case heard. The Circuit Court held that the petition must
be dismissed and an order to that effect was entered. Thereupon the
creditor appealed to the Circuit Court of Appeals, which court dis-
missed the appeal for want of jurisdiction. Appeal was taken to this
court. Held, that this court had jurisdiction of such an appeal, when
it appeared affirmatively that the amount in controversy exceeded
$1000, besides costs, which did not appear in this case. Huntington v.
Saunders, 319.
17. The ruling of the Supreme Court of Illinois, on the issues in this
case that the statutes of Illinois contain both a prohibition and a
penalty, that the prohibition makes void pro tanto every contract in
violation thereof, and that while section 11, prohibiting corporations
from pleading the defence of usury, may prevent any claim to the
benefits of the penalty, it does not give to the other party a right to
enforce a contract made in violation of the prohibition, brings the
case within the settled law that, where the record discloses that a
question has been raised and decided adversely to a party claiming
the benefit of a provision of the Constitution or laws of the United
States, and another question, not Federal, has been also raised and
decided against such party, and the decision of the latter question is
sufficient, notwithstanding the Federal question, to sustain the judg
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