545 Opinion of the Court. ness of such centrally enacted legislation as compared with the variations which may result from home rule is a matter for legislative discretion, not judicial supervision, except where there is a clear conflict with constitutional limitations. We find no such conflict here. The presumption of reasonableness is with the State." While the burden of establishing the reasonableness of the legislation was not on him, the Attorney General of Maryland has suggested here several considerations bearing appropriately upon the action of the General Assembly. Maryland lies largely between the metropolitan centers of Baltimore, in Maryland, and of Washington, in the District of Columbia. Between them are Anne Arundel County, adjoining Baltimore, and Prince George's County, adjoining Washington. In Anne Arundel lies Annapolis, the capital of the State, and considerable rural territory. Those locations suggest that, in matters related to concentrations of population, the state government might well find reason to prescribe, at least on an experimental basis, substantive restrictions and variations in procedure that would differ from those elsewhere in the State. Criminal law provides a longestablished field for such legislative discretion.10 In this 9"... It is a maxim of constitutional law that a legislature is presumed to have acted within constitutional limits, upon full knowledge of the facts, and with the purpose of promoting the interests of the people as a whole, and courts will not lightly hold that an act duly passed by the legislature was one in the enactment of which it has transcended its power." Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. v. Matthews, 174 U. S. 96, 104. "A statutory discrimination will not be set aside as the denial of equal protection of the laws if any state of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify it." Metropolitan Casualty Ins. Co. v. Brownell, 294 U. S. 580, 584. See also, Middleton v. Texas Power & Light Co., 249 U. S. 152, 157-158; Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U. S. 61, 78-79. 10 Metropolitan Casualty Ins. Co. v. Brownell, supra. The State is not bound "to strike at all evils at the same time or in the same way." Semler v. Oregon Dental Examiners, 294 U. S. 608, 610. DOUGLAS, J., dissenting. 346 U.S. connection, the Attorney General referred specifically to an increase in gambling activity in Anne Arundel County which he attributed in part to a policy adopted by the Criminal Court of Baltimore in imposing maximum prison sentences for gambling offenses, thus tending to drive gambling operations into adjoining areas. He suggested, as a justification for a legislative distinction between prosecutions for violations of state lottery laws and of the gambling laws here specified, that the former were of a more readily detected and easily proved character than the latter. We find no merit in the suggestion of appellant that the 1951 amendment to the Bouse Act affirmatively sanctions illegal searches and seizures in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. If the statute were so interpreted such a question might arise.11 However, the Court of Appeals of Maryland has not so interpreted it and nothing in its text suggests approval of illegal searches and seizures. The Act offers to offending searchers and seizers no protection or immunity from anything—be it civil liability, criminal liability or disciplinary action. We sustain the validity of the 1951 amendment to the Bouse Act and the judgment of the Court of Appeals of Maryland, accordingly, is Affirmed. MR. JUSTICE REED took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, dissenting. I am still of the view, expressed on other occasions (see Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U. S. 25, 40-41; Schwartz v. 11 66 we have no hesitation in saying that were a State affirmatively to sanction such police incursion into privacy it would run counter to the guaranty of the Fourteenth Amendment." Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U. S. 25, 28. 545 DOUGLAS, J., dissenting. Texas, 344 U. S. 199, 205), that the Fourteenth and the Fourth Amendments preclude the use in any criminal prosecution of evidence obtained by the lawless action of police officers who, in disregard of constitutional safeguards, ransack houses or places of business without search warrants issued under the strict surveillance which the Constitution commands. MADRUGA v. SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO. CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA. No. 35. Argued October 19-20, 1953-Decided January 18, 1954. Eight individuals who owned undivided interests aggregating 85% in a ship which was certificated under the maritime laws of the United States, instituted a proceeding in a California state court at San Diego, the home port of the vessel, for sale of the vessel and partition of the proceeds pursuant to a California statute. The defendant was an individual who owned a 15% interest in the vessel, and personal service was had upon him by summons. The state court's decision that it had jurisdiction was upheld by the State Supreme Court which declined to issue a writ of prohibition. Held: 1. Under the federal admiralty power, United States District Courts have jurisdiction to order vessels sold for partition. Pp. 557-560. 2. The jurisdiction of the federal courts was not exclusive; and the California court was "competent" to give this partition remedy and had jurisdiction of the cause of action. Pp. 560–561. (a) The federal admiralty jurisdiction is "exclusive" only as to those maritime causes of action begun and carried on as proceedings in rem; and the proceedings in this partition case were not in rem in the admiralty sense. Pp. 560-561. (b) The state court in this proceeding acts only upon the interests of the parties over whom it has jurisdiction in personam, and it does not affect the interests of others in the world at large, as it would if this were a proceeding to enforce a lien. P. 561. 3. The California court's taking of jurisdiction of this partition suit at the instance of the majority shipowners does not run counter to any established rule of admiralty; nor do the circumstances justify the establishment of a national judicial rule controlling partition of ships. Pp. 561-564. 4. The State Supreme Court's refusal to issue a writ of prohibition was a final judgment reviewable here under 28 U. S. C. § 1257. P. 557, n. 1. 40 Cal. 2d 65, 251 P. 2d 1, affirmed. 556 Opinion of the Court. Eli H. Levenson argued the cause and Thomas M. Hamilton filed a brief for petitioner. Northcutt Ely argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief was Robert L. McCarty. Herbert Kunzel filed an appearance for respondent. MR. JUSTICE BLACK delivered the opinion of the Court. This case for sale of a vessel and partition of the proceeds pursuant to a California statute began in the Superior Court of San Diego, the home port of the vessel. The plaintiffs were eight individuals including Edward, Anthony, and Joseph Madruga. The defendant was Manuel Madruga on whom personal service was had by summons. The defendant owned a 15% interest and the eight plaintiffs owned undivided interests aggregating 85% in a ship certificated under the maritime laws of the United States. The defendant 15% owner challenged the jurisdiction of the San Diego court on the ground that only the United States district court sitting in admiralty could take jurisdiction to consider such a case. The San Diego court decided it had jurisdiction and was upheld by the State Supreme Court which declined to issue a writ of prohibition.' 40 Cal. 2d 65, 251 P. 2d 1. Certiorari was granted to consider the state court's jurisdiction. 345 U. S. 963. . First. Article III, § 2, of the Constitution extends the judicial power to "all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction. . . ." And since the first Judiciary Act, United States district courts have had jurisdiction of all civil cases of "admiralty or maritime jurisdiction. . . . 28 U. S. C. § 1333. Whether this grants United States The State Supreme Court's judgment finally disposing of the writ of prohibition is a final judgment reviewable here under 28 U. S. C. § 1257. |