thorized a municipal corporation to issue bonds, and to exercise the power of local taxation in order to pay them, and persons bought and paid value for bonds issued accordingly, this power of taxation is part of the contract, and cannot be withdrawn until the bonds are satisfied; that an attempt to repeal or restrict it by statute is void; and that unless the corporation imposes and collects the tax in all respects as if the subsequent statute had not been passed, it will be compelled to do so by mandamus.1 And it has also been held that a statute repealing a former statute, which made the stock of stockholders in a corporation liable for its debts, was, in respect to creditors existing at the time of the repeal, a law impairing the obligation of contracts.2 In each of these cases it is evident that substantial rights were affected; and so far as the laws which were held void operated upon the remedy, they either had an effect equivalent to importing some new stipulation into the contract, or they failed to leave the party a substantial remedy such as was assured to him by the law in force when the contract was made. In Pennsylvania it has been held that a statute authorizing a stay of execution on contracts in which the debtor had waived the right was unconstitutional; but it seems to us that an agreement to waive a legal privilege which the law gives as a matter of State policy cannot be binding upon a party, unless the law itself provides for the waiver.4

Where, however, by the operation of existing laws, a contract cannot be enforced without some new action of a party to fix his liability, it is as competent to prescribe by statute the requisites to the legal validity of such action as it would be in any case to prescribe the legal requisites of a contract to be thereafter made. Thus, though a verbal promise is sufficient to revive a debt barred by the Statute of Limitations or by bankruptcy, yet this rule may be changed by a statute making all such future promises void un

1 Von Hoffman v. Quincy, 4 Wall. 535; Murray v. Charleston, 96 U. S. 432; Loumand v. New Orleans, 102 U. S. 203; Wolff v. New Orleans, 103 U. S. 358; Nelson v. St. Martin's Parish, 111 U. S. 716, 4 Sup. Ct. Rep. 648; Beckwith v. Racine, 7 Biss. 142. The liability cannot be escaped by turning a city into a mere taxing district. Mobile v. Watson, 116 U. S. 289, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 398; O'Connor v. Memphis, 6 Lea, 730. See also Soutter v. Madison, 15 Wis. 30; Smith v. Appleton, 19 Wis. 468; Rahway v. Munday, 44 N. J. L. 395; Seibert v. Lewis, 122 U. S.

284, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1190. For a similar principle, see Sala v. New Orleans, 2 Woods, 188.

2 Hawthorne v. Calef, 2 Wall. 10. [Upon individual liability of stockholders for debts of corporation, see note to 40 L. ed. U. S. 751.]

3 Billmeyer v. Evans, 40 Pa. St. 324; Lewis v. Lewis, 47 Pa. St. 127. See Laucks' Appeal, 24 Pa. St. 426; Case v. Dunmore, 23 Pa. St. 93; Bowman v. Smiley, 31 Pa. St. 225.

4 See Conkey v. Hart, 14 N. Y. 22; Handy v. Chatfield, 23 Wend. 35.

less in writing. It is also equally true that where a legal impediment exists to the enforcement of a contract which parties have entered into, the constitutional provision in question will not preclude the legislature from removing such impediment and validating the contract. A statute of that description would not impair the obligation of contracts, but would perfect and enforce it. And for similar reasons the obligation of contracts is not impaired by continuing the charter of a corporation for a certain period, in order to the proper closing of its business.3

State Insolvent Laws. In this connection some notice may seem requisite of the power of the States to pass insolvent laws, and the classes of contracts to which they may be made to apply. As this whole subject has been gone over very often and very fully by the Supreme Court of the United States, and the important questions seem at last to be finally set at rest, and moreover as it is comparatively unimportant whenever a federal bankrupt law exists, we content ourselves with giving what we understand to be the conclusions of the court.

1. The several States have power to legislate on the subject of bankrupt and insolvent laws, subject, however, to the authority conferred upon Congress by the Constitution to adopt a uniform system of bankruptcy, which authority, when exercised, is paramount, (a) and State enactments in conflict with those of Congress upon the subject must give way.

1 Joy v. Thompson, 1 Doug. (Mich.) 373; Kingley v. Cousins, 47 Me. 91.

2 As where the defence of usury to a contract is taken away by statute. Welsh v. Wadsworth, 30 Conn. 149; Curtis v. Leavitt, 15 N. Y. 9. And see Wood v. Kennedy, 19 Ind. 68, and the cases cited, post, pp. 535-537. [But the validation, of an invalid contract cannot be made to relate back so as to take precedence of a lien which attached after the invalid contract was created, but before it was validated. Merchants' Bank of Danville v. Ballou, 98 Va. 112, 32 S. E. 481, 44 L. R. A. 306.]

3 Foster v. Essex Bank, 16 Mass. 245. [Upon the protection of contracts by the constitution, see article in 36 Am. L. Rev. 70.]

4 Sturges v. Crowninshield, 4 Wheat. 122; Farmers' & Mechanics' Bank v. Smith, 6 Wheat. 131; Ogden v. Saunders, 12 Wheat. 213; Baldwin v. Hale, 1 Wall. 223; [Brown v. Smart, 145 U. S. 454, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 958, aff. 69 Md. 320, 17 Atl. 1101; Ketcham v. McNamara, 72 Conn. 709, 46 Atl. 146, 50 L. R. A. 641.]

(a) ["After an adjudication in bankruptcy, an action in replevin in a State court cannot be commenced and maintained against the bankrupt to recover property in the possession of and claimed by the bankrupt at the time of that adjudication, and in the possession of a referee in bankruptcy at the time when the action of replevin is begun;" and if under such attempted action in replevin, any such property is seized, "the district court sitting in bankruptcy" has "jurisdiction by summary proceedings to compel the return of the property seized." Per Gray, J, in White v. Schloerb, 178 U. S. 542, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1007. Bankruptcy law merely suspends State insolvency laws, so that when it is repealed they revive. Butler v. Gorely, 146

2. Such State laws, however, discharging the person or the property of the debtor, and thereby terminating the legal obligation of the debts, cannot constitutionally be made to apply to contracts entered into before they were passed, but they may be made applicable to such future contracts as can be considered as having been made in reference to them.1

3. Contracts made within a State where an insolvent law exists, between citizens of that State, are to be considered as made in reference to the law, and are subject to its provisions. But the law cannot apply to a contract made in one State between a citizen thereof and a citizen of another State, nor to contracts not made within the State, even though made between citizens of the same State, except, perhaps, where they are citizens of the State passing the law. And where the contract is made between a citizen of one State and a citizen of another, the circumstance that the contract is made payable in the State where the insolvent law exists will not render such contract subject to be discharged under the law. If, however, the creditor in any of these cases makes himself a party to proceedings under the insolvent law, he will be bound thereby like any other party to judicial proceedings, and is not to be heard afterwards to object that his debt was protected by the Constitution from the reach of the law.6

The New Amendments to the Federal Constitution. New provisions for personal liberty, and for the protection of the right to life, liberty, and property, are made by the thirteenth and fourteenth amendments to the Constitution of the United States; and

1 Ogden v. Saunders, 12 Wheat. 213; [Brown v. Smart, 145 U. S. 454, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 958, aff. 69 Md. 320, 17 Atl. 1101; Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U. S. 1, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 504.]

2 Ogden v. Saunders, 12 Wheat. 213; Springer v. Foster, 2 Story, 383; Boyle v. Zacharie, 6 Pet. 348; Woodhull v. Wagner, Baldw. 296; Suydam v. Broadnax, 14 Pet. 67; Cook v. Moffat, 5 How. 295; Baldwin v. Hale, 1 Wall. 223; [Hammond Beef & P. Co. v. Best, 91 Me. 431, 40 Atl. 338, 42 L. R. A. 528.]

209.

8 McMillan v. McNeill, 4 Wheat.

4 Marsh v. Putnam, 3 Gray, 551.

Baldwin v. Hale, 1 Wall. 223; Baldwin v. Bank of Newbury, 1 Wall. 234; Gilman v. Lockwood, 4 Wall. 409. See also Norris v. Atkinson, 64 N. H. 87, 5 Atl. 710.

6 Clay v. Smith, 3 Pet. 411; Baldwin v. Hale, 1 Wall. 223; Gilman v. Lockwood, 4 Wall. 409; Perley v. Mason, 64 N. H. 6, 3 Atl. 629.

U. S. 303, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 84, aff. 147 Mass. 8, 16 N. E. 734. And upon effect of removal of a Federal bar to operation of a State statute, see Blair v. Ostrander, 109 Iowa, 204, 80 N. W. 330, 47 L. R. A. 469. That supersession of State insolvency law may be only partial, see State v. Superior Court for King Co., 20 Wash. 545, 56 Pac. 35, 45 L. R. A. 177, and upon relation of bankruptcy law to State laws upon insolvency and assignments, see note to this case in L. R. A.]

these will be referred to in the two succeeding chapters.1 The most important clause in the fourteenth amendment is that part of section one which declares that all persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. This provision very properly puts an end to any question of the title of the freedmen and others of their race to the rights of citizenship; but it may be doubtful whether the further provisions of the same section surround the citizen with any protections additional to those before possessed under the State constitutions; though, as a principle of State constitutional law has now been made a part of the Constitution of the United States, the effect will be to make the Supreme Court of the United States the final arbiter of cases in which a violation of this principle by State laws is complained of, inasmuch as the decisions of the State courts upon laws which are supposed to violate it will be subject to review in that court on appeal.3

1 See ante, pp. 14-17; post, pp. 423, before. This amendment of the Consti567.

2 The complete text of this section is as follows: "Section 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States, and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."

8 See ante, pp. 24-36. Notwithstanding this section, the protection of all citizens in their privileges and immunities, and in their right to an impartial administration of the laws, is just as much the business of the individual State as it was

tution does not concentrate power in the general government for any purpose of police government within the States; its object is to preclude legislation by any State which shall "abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States," or "deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law," or "deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws;" and Congress is empowered to pass all laws necessary to render such unconstitutional State legislation ineffectual. This amendment has received a very full examination at the hands of the Supreme Court of the United States in the Slaughter-House Case, 16 Wall. 36, and in United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U. S. 542, with the conclusion above stated. See Story on Const. (4th ed.) App. to Vol. II.

CHAPTER X.

OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTIONS TO PERSONAL LIBERTY.

ALTHOUGH the people from whom we derive our laws now possess a larger share of civil and political liberty than any other in Europe, there was a period in their history when a considerable proportion were in a condition of servitude. Of the servile classes one portion were villeins regardant, or serfs attached to the soil, and transferable with it, but not otherwise, while the other portion were villeins in gross, whose condition resembled that of the slaves known to modern law in America.2 How these people became reduced to this unhappy condition, it may not be possible to determine at this distance of time with entire accuracy; but in regard to the first class, we may suppose that when a conqueror seized the territory upon which he found them living, he seized also the people as a part of the lawful prize of war, granting them life on condition of their cultivating the soil for his use; and that the second were often persons whose lives had been spared on the field of battle, and whose ownership, in accordance with the custom of barbarous times, would pertain to the persons of their captors. Many other causes also contributed to reduce persons to this condition. At the beginning of the reign. of John it has been estimated that one-half of the Anglo-Saxons were in a condition of servitude, and if we go back to the time of

1 Litt. § 181; 2 Bl. Com. 92. "They originally held lands of their lords on condition of agricultural service, which in a certain sense was servile, but in reality was not so, as the actual work was done by the theows, or slaves. . . . They did not pay rent, and were not removable at pleasure; they went with the land and rendered services, uncertain in their nature, and therefore opposed to rent. They were the originals of copyholders." Note to Reeves, History of English Law, Pt. I.

c. 1.

2 Litt. § 181; 2 Bl. Com. 92. "These are the persons who are described by Sir William Temple as 'a sort of people who were in a condition of downright servi

tude, used and employed in the most servile works; and belonging, they and their children and effects, to the lord of the soil, like the rest of the stock or cattle upon it.'" Reeves, History of English Law, Pt. I. c. 1.

8 As to slavery among the Anglo-Saxons, see Stubbs, Const. Hist. of England, ch. V.

4 For a view of the condition of the servile classes, see Wright, Domestic Manners and Sentiments, 101, 102; Crabbe, History of English Law (ed. of 1829), 8, 78, 365; Hallam, Middle Ages, Pt. II. c. 2; Vaughan, Revolutions in English History, Book 2, c. 8; Broom, Const. Law, 74 et seq.