(640) (641) (642) Second count. Conspiracy to defraud the underwriters, and as overt acts in pursuance thereof, loading a vessel with a sham cargo, exhibiting her to the underwriters, and fraudulently representing to them that the vessel contained specie, etc. Third count. Conspiracy to defraud the underwriters by falsely representing to them that a vessel loaded with a sham cargo was loaded with specie, and was the property of defendants. Fourth count. Conspiracy to procure the insurance, in a particular company, of certain boxes of hay as boxes of dry goods, and then afterwards to cause the vessel to be burned; and in pursuance of the conspiracy, as an overt act, inducing an agent of the underwriters to negotiate for them an insurance. (643) Conspiracy to defraud a railway company by travelling without a ticket on some portion of the line, obtaining a ticket at an intermediate station, and then delivering it up at the terminus, as if no greater distance had been travelled over by the passenger than from such intermediate station to the terminus. (643a) Conspiracy to defraud railroad company by fraudulently filling and uttering blank passes. (644) Against A., B., C., and D., for a conspiracy to rise upon a vessel, and carry her to a port occupied by an enemy; with an overt act, and against E. for comforting and abetting them, etc. (645) Conspiracy to disturb a party in the possession of his lands, and to deprive him of them. (646) (647) Second count. Similar, without overt acts. Third count. To cut down timber trees. Fourth count. Exactly the same, without overt acts. Fifth count. To cheat tenants of rent, by false claim as landlord. Exactly similar, but without overt acts. Sixth count. (648) Conspiracy to obtain goods upon credit, and then to abscond and defraud the vendor thereof. (649) Conspiracy to defraud an illiterate person, by falsely reading to him a deed of bargain and sale, as and for a bond of indemnity. (650) Conspiracy to induce a person of unsound mind to sign a paper authorizing the defendants to take possession of his goods. (650a) Conspiracy to abduct a child. (651) Conspiracy to procure the elopement of a minor daughter from her father. First count, charging the conspiracy with an overt act, aver ring that, in furtherance of the conspiracy, the defendants aided the said minor to elope. (652) Second count. Conspiracy to procure the elopement of the said minor, with intent to marry her to one C. K.; and overt act, charging the defendant, etc. (653) Conspiracy to inveigle a daughter from the custody of her parents, for the purpose of marrying her (in substance). (653a) Conspiracy to bring about a sham marriage. (654) Conspiracy to procure the defilement of a female. (655) Conspiracy to incite J. N. to lay wagers, etc.; overt act actually cheating. (656) Conspiracy at common law, among workmen, to raise their wages and lessen the time of labor. (657) Conspiracy by workmen, etc., in the employ of A. and B., to prevent their masters from retaining any person as an apprentice. (657a) Conspiracy to compel the reinstatement of a discharged workman. (6576) Conspiracy to obstruct workmen. (658) Conspiracy by parties engaged on the public works, to increase the rate of passage money and freight. (659) Conspiracy to charge a man with a crime. (660) Conspiracy to charge a man with receiving stolen goods knowing them to be stolen, and obtaining money for compounding the same. (661) Conspiracy to charge a man with receiving stolen goods, and thereby obtaining money for compounding the same, and causing him to lay out a sum of money for the entertainment of the conspirators at one of their houses. (662) Conspiracy to charge a man with an unnatural crime, and thereby to obtain money. (663) Conspiracy to extort money generally by criminal prosecution. First count, charging a conspiracy to extort, by commencing and continuing a prosecution. (664) Second count, charging a prosecution already commenced, and a conspiracy to extort money by proposing to suppress it. (665) Third count, charging a conspiracy to extort, by promising to compromise a then pending prosecution. (666) Conspiracy to impoverish the prosecutor, and hindering him from exercising his lawful trade as a tailor, with an overt act, setting forth the consummation of the conspiracy. (667) Conspiracy to defame a public officer. First count, conspiracy to defame by charging corrupt conduct. (668) (669) Second count. Same, setting out the matter charged. Third count. By charging the prosecutor with having been guilty of corruption in a particular case. (670) Conspiracy to defeat public justice by giving false evidence, and sup pressing facts, on a charge of felony. (671) Conspiracy to indict a person for a capital offence, who was acquitted on the trial. (672) Conspiracy to induce a material witness to suppress his testimony. (673) Same as last, in another shape. (607) First count. Unexecuted conspiracy. That A. B., late of, etc., yeoman, and C. D., late of, etc., yeoman,(b) being persons of evil minds and dispositions, together with divers other evil disposed persons, whose names are to this inquest as yet unknown [see note (b)], wickedly devising and intending to (setting out the intent),(c) on, etc., at the county aforesaid,(d) and within the jurisdiction of the said court, fraudulently, maliciously, and unlawfully did conspire, combine, confederate, and agree together,(e) between and amongst themselves, by(ƒ) (setting forth the means), unlawfully to(g) (setting forth the party to be injured, or the object to be obtained), against, etc. (Conclude as in book 1, chapter 3.) R. v. (b) A conspiracy must be by two persons at least; one cannot be convicted of it, unless he has been indicted for conspiring with persons to the jurors unknown. 1 Hawk. c. 72; Turpin v. State, 4 Blackf. 72; People v. Howell, 4 Johns. 296; State v. Allison, 3 Yerg. 428; R. v. Kinnersley, 1 Štra. 193; Ld. Raym. 484; Ludbury, 12 Mod. 262; 13 East, 412; 2 Salk. 593; Wh. Cr. L. 8th ed. § 1388 et seq. So in an indictment for conspiracy against two, the acquittal of one is the acquittal of the other. State v. Tom, 2 Dev. 569; Wh. Cr. L. 8th ed. §§ 1391, 1407. But where three persons were engaged in a conspiracy, and one was acquitted and the other died before trial, it was held that the third could nevertheless be tried and convicted. R. v. Nichols, 2 Str. 1227; R. v. Kennedy, 1 Str. 193; People v. Olcott, 2 Johns. Ca. 301. A man and his wife, being in law but one person, cannot be convicted of the same conspiracy, unless other parties are charged; Wh. Cr. L. 8th ed. § 1392; but where the defendant is charged with conspiracy with persons unknown, it is good, notwithstanding the names of the persons unknown may have transpired to the grand jury. People v. Mather, 4 Wend. 231; Wh. Cr. L. 8th ed. § 1392. The jury may find all or some of the defendants guilty of conspiring to effect one or more of the objects specified upon a count charging one conspiracy, and one only, against all the defendants therein named, to effect several illegal objects. O'Connell v. R., 11 Cl. & Fin. 155; 9 Jur. 25. In other words, the allegations of objects in each count are divisible. But the verdict must find two or more guilty of a specific conspiracy, or the prosecution fails. Wh. Cr. L. 8th ed. § 1407. It is not necessary that the same co-conspirators should be continued through all the counts. If the proof should make the change prudent, the names may be varied. That co-conspirators may be alleged to be unknown, see Wh. Cr. L. 8th ed. § 1392. All contributing to the common design may be joined. Wh. Cr. L. 8th ed. § 1390. (c) The subject of scienter and intent has been already generally noticed. (Supra, notes to form 2, vol. i. p. 26.) It is not necessary specially to designate the persons whom the defendants, in a conspiracy to cheat, intended to defraud. It will be enough to say that they intended to defraud all persons with whom they should deal; or all persons in a particular trade. It is clearly enough to charge them with intending to defraud a particular person, though such person may be only one of several (e. g., one of a firm) whom they intended to defraud. But when the allegation is made, it must be proved. It may, therefore, at common law, be fatal to charge an intent to defraud à non-existing person, or a wrong person. Wh. Cr. L. 8th ed. § 1226. (d) The venue may be laid in the county in which the act was done by any of the conspirators, in furtherance of their common design. R. v. Brisac, 4 East, 164; Wh. Cr. L. 8th ed. § 1397. (e) This is better than conspired together." 557; 1 A. & E. 706. See R. v. Stewart, 3 N. & M. (f) Conspiracies in reference to this part of the indictment may be classed under the following heads : I. Conspiracies to commit an indictable offence. Wh. Cr. L. 8th ed. § 1342. 1st. Conspiracies to commit felonies. Ib. §§ 1343 et seq. 2d. Conspiracies to commit misdemeanors, under which division will be treated : (1) Conspiracies to violate the false pretence laws. Ib. § 1348. (2) Conspiracies to violate the laws making it penal in a debtor to secrete his property with intent to defraud his creditors. Ib. § 1351. (3) Conspiracies to violate the lottery laws. Ib. § 1352. (4) Conspiracies to commit breaches of the peace. Ib. § 1353. (6) Conspiracies to utter forged notes. Ib. § 1357. II. Conspiracies to make use of means themselves the subject of indictment, to effect an indifferent object. Ib. § 1358. III. Conspiracies to do an act the commission of which by an individual is not indictable, but the commission of which by two or more in pursuance of a previous combination, is calculated to effect either of the following objects: 1st. To defraud an individual by fraudulent and indirect devices. Ib. § 1360. 2d. To commit an immoral act, such, for instance, as the seduction of a young woman. Ib. § 1361. 3d. To prejudice the public generally, as, for instance, by unduly elevating or depressing the price of wages, of toll, or of any merchantable commodity, or endeavoring to defraud the revenue. Ib. § 1366. 4th. To falsely accuse another of crime, or use other improper means to injure his reputation, or to extort money from him. Ib. 1376. 5th. To impoverish another in his trade or profession. Ib. §§ 1368 et seq. 6th. To prevent the due course of justice. Ib. § 1380. I. Conspiracies to commit an indictable offence. 1st. Conspiracies to commit felonies. Where an indictment charges a conspiracy to commit a felony, using the same words to set forth the object of the conspiracy as would have been used to charge the commission of the offence itself, no possible exception as to form can be taken. Wh. Cr. L. 8th ed. § 1381. But this is often impracticable, and if it were not, it would be absurd to charge A. and B. with conspiring "with one knife, of the value of one shilling, which he the said A. in his right hand was then and there to have and hold, him the said C. feloniously, etc., to strike," or with conspiring to rob the prosecutor of half a dozen distinct articles which he happened to have in his pocket, but of the value and character of which it would be irrational to suppose the defendant to have been beforehand acquainted. It is enough, therefore, for the pleader to set out the offence aimed at by such apt words as will describe it as a conclusion of law. Thus it is sufficient to say, that the defendants conspired "feloniously, wilfully, and of their malice aforethought, to kill and murder," etc., without describing the weapon to have been used (State v. Dent, 3 Gill & Johns. 8); or that they conspired" certain goods and chattels of great value, etc., then belonging to and on the person of the said A. B., feloniously to steal," without going on to mention what those goods and chattels were. Com. v. Rogers, 5 S. & R. 463. See R. v. Higgins, 2 East, 5. This liberality, in fact, is extended to every case where an attempt is made to commit an offence itself indictable, whether by one or by a confederacy. Arch. C. P. 5th Am. ed. 262, 485, 487, 488; People v. Bush, 4 Hill, N. Y. R. 133; Wh. Cr. L. 8th ed. § 1343. That in Iowa it is enough to aver simply a conspiracy to steal appears by the following opinion of Beck, C. J., in State v. Sterling, 34 Iowa, 443: "The defendants demurred to the indictment on the ground that it charges more than one offence. It alleges that the defendants did unlawfully and feloniously conspire, etc., to rob and steal from one T. B. R. and divers other guests, boarders, and lodgers of the Patterson house, etc. The point made by the demurrer is that the indictment alleges a conspiracy to rob, and also a conspiracy to steal, thus charging more than one offence. The demurrer was overruled, and upon this ruling is based the first point presented in the brief of defendants' counsel. The decision of the district court upon the demurrer was correct." Whether a conspiracy to commit a felony merges in the consummated felony is elsewhere discussed. Wh. Cr. L. 8th ed. 1344. So far as concerns the pleading, it is sufficient here to say that if the felony has been consummated, it is proper to indict for the felony; though a count for conspiracy may be sustained in cases where the proof of the overt act falls short. It should be observed, however, that in those states in which it is held that a conspiracy to commit a felony merges in the felony when committed, an indictment charging the commission of a felony in pursuance of a conspiracy will not at common law sustain a conviction for conspiracy. The policy of our courts, in a kindred line of offences, has permitted a joinder of counts which, though originally discountenanced in England, can work no injustice to the prisoner, and may save great expense and loss of time. Thus, counts for robbery and for attempts to rob; for rape and attempts to ravish; for burglary and attempts to commit burglary, as has been seen, are frequently joined. Harman v. Com., 12 S. & R. 69; Burk v. State, 2 Har. & J. 426; State v. Coleman, 5 Port. 52; State v. Montague, 2 M'C. 287; State v. Gaffney, Rice, 431; State v. Boise, 1 M'M. 190. See Wh. Cr. L. 8th ed. § 1387, etc. When the defendant is tried on the two charges together, he has the advantage of bringing to bear on the lighter offence the full number of challenges awarded to him on the heavier; nor can he be said to be embarrassed in the preparation of his defence, as the same evidence which would disprove the attempt would disprove the consummation. The only difference is, that instead of after an acquittal of the felony being subjected to another binding over and trial on the constituent misdemeanor, the two charges are tried at the same time, when the evidence on each side is fresh and at hand, and when neither can take advantage of a discov ery of the antagonistic case. That this practice extends as properly to conspiracies to commit indictable offences, as to attempts or assaults with intent to commit the same, may be urged with great reason. By such a course the difficulty of merger will be avoided; for if the attempt was completed, the verdict attaches to the felony; if not, to the conspiracy. See fully Wh. Cr. Pl. & Pr. § 285. 2d. Conspiracies to commit misdemeanors. As the law is that where the object is illegal it is not necessary to set out the means at large (R. v. Eccles, in note to R. v. Turner, 13 East, 230; 2 Russ. on Crimes, 687, 691; Hazen v. Com., 23 Penn. St. 364; Wh. Cr. L. 8th ed. §§ 1345, 1348), it has been a common practice in preparing an indictment for a misdemeanor, the description of which is attended with any difficulties, to insert a count for conspiracy. Wh. Cr. Pl. & Pr. 285. When the evidence of the |