Commissioners of Silver Bow County v. Davis. taxed at a greater rate than the mining claims of other corporations in the Territory. (3) It is not shown that any deductions were denied in taxing the bank shares that were allowed to other corporations of the Territory. (4) It is not shown but what the taxation of bank shares is just equivalent to the taxation of other corporations whose entire capital stock is invested in assessable property in the Territory. (5) It does not appear that money invested in bank shares is subjected to any higher or greater rate of taxation than any other moneyed capital invested in the Territory. (6) On the contrary it does appear that if the entire capital stock is assessable in the Territory, the shares which represent such stock ought to be exempt, and that if the capital stock is exempt for any reason, the shares, in order that there may be no discrimination in their favor, ought to be taxed. (7) If money invested in a National banking association or other corporation is taxed at the same rates as other property, it is immaterial whether the tax is levied upon the shares which represent the capital stock, or upon the capital stock itself. In either case the same result is arrived at and the money invested is subject to the same and equal taxation. (8) The right to form banking associations being a privilege of great value, by means of which large profits. are earned for the shareholders, this right or privilege is property, and the shares become subject to taxation though the capital stock is exempt; and so a banking association has the same relation to the statute of the Territory as would any other corporation whose capital stock was not invested in assessable property in the Territory, in which case the shares would be subject to taxation. The judgment is affirmed, with costs. First National Bank of Tecumseh v. Overman. FIRST NATIONAL BANK of TECUMSEH V. OVERMAN. (22 Neb. 116.) Jurisdiction — penal actions. --- Actions and proceedings against any National bank may be brought in any State, county or municipal court in the county or city in which such association is located, having jurisdiction in similar cases, to enforce a penalty under section 5198, U. S. R. S. MAXWELL, C. J. The defendant in error brought an action in the District Court of Johnson county against the plaintiff in error, under section 5198 of the Revised Statutes of the United States, to recover $100 as a penalty under said section. The plaintiff in error demurred to the petition upon two grounds: First, that the court did not have jurisdiction of the subjectmatter; second, that the petition did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. The demurrer was overruled, and judgment for $100 rendered in favor of the defendant in error. The only error assigned in this court is the want of jurisdiction of the trial court. Section 5198 of the Revised Statutes of the United States provides "that suits, actions and proceedings against any association under this title may be had in any circuit, district or territorial court of the United States, held within the district in which such association may be established, and in any State, county or municipal court in the county or city in which said association is located, having jurisdiction in similar cases." This section removes the impediment to the exercise of jurisdiction created by the act of 1789 (U. S. R. S., § 711), and expressly confers jurisdiction on the State courts, as above specified, concurrent with the Federal courts in "suits, actions and proceedings against any association under the Banking Act." The stat First National Bank of Tecumseh v. Overman. utes of the United States extended over every State as a part of its laws; and although exclusive jurisdiction may be given to the Federal courts, yet if it is not so given, either expressly or by necessary implication, the State courts having a competent jurisdiction in other respects may be resorted to. Hade v. Mc Vay, 31 Ohio St. 236; 2 Nat. Bank Cas. 353; Kinser v. Bank, 58 Iowa, 728; Ordway v. Bank, 47 Md. 217; 28 Am. Rep. 455; 1 Nat. Bank Cas. 559; Claflin v. Houseman, 93 U. S. 130; Gruber v. Bank, 87 Penn. St. 468; 30 Am. Rep. 278; 2 Nat. Bank Cas. 382; 19 Alb. L. J. 137; Pickett v. Bank, 32 Ark. 346; 2 Nat. Bank Cas. 209; Dow v. Bank, 50 Vt. 112; 28 Am. Rep. 493; 2 Nat. Bank Cas. 421; Bletz v. Bank, 87 Penn. St. 87; 30 Am. Rep. 343; 2 Nat. Bank Cas. 366. Authority is expressly conferred on the State courts having jurisdiction in similar cases. It is very strenuously contended on behalf of the plaintiff in error that Congress cannot impose duties on the State courts, and that therefore they had no authority to act in the premises. But Congress has not sought to compel the State courts to act in a case like that under consideration, nor has it sought to impose duties upon them. It simply confers the authority in effect permits them to hear and determine such cases, but without compulsion. 1 Kent Com. 400. The State courts do not exercise a new jurisdiction conferred upon them, but their ordinary jurisdiction, derived from their Constitution under the State law. Claflin v. Houseman, 93 U. S. 130. The State tribunals therefore have jurisdiction. There is no error in the record and the judgment is affirmed. The other judges concur. A notary public, who is clerk of an attorney, may administer an oath to verify a pleading prepared by such attorney. Where several causes of action are set forth in a petition without being separately stated and numbered, it is error for the court to overrule a motion of the defendant to require the plaintiff to separately state and number his causes of action. This is a statutory right which, unless the defendant has waived, he may insist upon. When an action is brought to recover a penalty under sections 5197 and 5198 U. S. R. S., for taking, receiving, reserving or charging a rate of interest greater than is allowed by law, it is necessary to allege in the petition that the act was "knowingly done." An action to recover a penalty under section 5198 may be brought in any court in the city or county in which such bank is located, having jurisdiction in similar cases. ERRO RROR to District Court, Colfax county, MARSHALL, J. Action under Revised Statutes United States, sections 5197, 5198, to recover double the amount of usurious interest, by Hector C. Bollong against Schuyler National Bank. From a judgment for the plaintiff, defendant brings error. E. T. Hodsdon, for plaintiff in error. C. J. Phelps and J. A. Grimison, for defendants in error. MAXWELL, J. This action was brought on the 19th day of March, 1887, by the defendant in error against the plaintiff in error, in the District Court of Colfax county, to recover, under sections 5197 and 5198 of the Revised Statutes of the United States, double the amount of interest paid on certain usurious contracts. On the trial of the cause the court found that the defendant in error had paid to the plaintiff in error "the sum of $912.42, and that the same was usurious, as in said petition al Schuyler National Bank v. Bollong. leged." The court thereupon rendered judgment in favor of the defendant in error, and against the plaintiff in error, for the sum of $1,824.84, "being double the amount so as afore said charged, taken and received." The first ground of error assigned is the overruling of the motion of the plaintiff in error to strike the petition from the files, on the ground that the record shows "that the affidavit verifying the petition was made before one Clifton C. Sabin, a clerk of C. J. Phelps, one of the attorneys of record in the above-entitled action." Section 118 of the Code, as it existed at the time the verification was made, authorized any person "before whom a deposition might be taken" to administer the oath. The statute does not seem to prohibit a notary in the office of an attorney from administering an oath verifying a pleading prepared by such attorney. The motion therefore was properly overruled. In this decision we do not intend to qualify what has been said by the court in Payne v. Briggs, 8 Neb. 79, as under our Code the verification of a pleading is to a great extent a matter of form. 2. The petition contains a large number of causes of action. These several causes are not separately stated and numbered as required by section 93 of the Code. The defendant below (plaintiff in error) filed a motion to require the plaintiff below (defendant in error) to separately state and number his causes of action. This motion the court overruled, to which the plaintiff in error excepted, and now assigns the same for error. The motion to separately state and number the causes of action should have been sustained. A large number of the causes of action had accrued more than two years before the bringing of this suit, and had they been separately stated and numbered, would have been subject to demurrer. This right the defendant below was deprived of by the ruling of the court. A plaintiff cannot jumble his causes of action together, and in answer to an erroneous overruling of a motion to separately state and number, say that no injury has resulted from such ruling. Section 93 provides "that where the petition contains more than one cause of action, each shall be separately stated and numbered." Each cause of action set out in a petition must show that the defendant is liable to the plaintiff upon the matter stated in that count, and where |