CUSTOMS- Continued.

An indictment under section 3324 of the United States Revised Statutes
for failure to obliterate the stamp upon a cask of spirits, after it had
been emptied, can not be sustained in a case in which it appeared that
the cask was removed from the place where it had been while the sale
of its contents was going on, as soon as the spirits had ceased to run
from the faucet, with the intention, when assistance should be ob-
tained of pouring what was left out of it through the bung hole, if this
latter be done within a reasonable time after such removal.

Buchanan, p. 212.

U. S. v.

Section 3363 of the Revised Statutes provides, that "no manufactured
tobacco shall be sold or offered for sale unless put up in packages and
stamped as prescribed in this chapter, except at retail, by retail dealers,
from wooden packages stamped as provided in this chapter." Held,
that a retail dealer who, in the course of his business, sells at retail
tobacco taken by him from a wooden package duly put up and stamped,
whether taken at or before the sale, does not violate this section. U.
S. v. Veazie, pp. 215, 265.

Who not a retail liquor dealer, p. 264.

"Place where spirits are distilled" construed, p. 264.

Removing liquor from warehouse; intent must be fraudulent, p. 264.
Failure to obliterate stamp; when not indictable, p. 264.

License; tax when required, p. 265.

CUTTING TIMBER.

What not within statutes at to, p. 255.
"Timber" defined, p. 255.

"DAY OF ELECTION."

Construed, p. 765.

"DEALER."

Construed, p. 649.

DECLARATIONS.

See DYING DECLARATIONS.

DEFENCE OF PROPERTY.

See, MALICIOUS MISCHIEF; CRUELTY TO ANIMALS.

DESERTION.

Under the act of Congress of 1855, making the enticing a seaman who has
regularly enlisted, to desert, an offense, a seaman who has passed the
examination at the naval rendezvous merely, and has not been exam-
ined and passed on the receiving ship, is not enlisted. U. S. v. Thomp-
son, p. 176.

"DEVICE OR SUBSTITUTE FOR CARDS."

Construed, p. 755.

"DISFIGURING."

Construed, p. 602.

DISORDERLY HOUSE.

A ten-pin alley kept for public use in a village, is not, per se, a nuisance.
State v. Hall, p. 719.

Nor is such ten pin alley a nuisance, though kept in connection with a
lager beer saloon. Id.
Where it is one of the terms of the establishment, that the loser is to pay
for the use of the alley, such playing is not gambling. Id.

A disorderly house is a house "kept for the purpose of public prostitution,
or as a common resort for prostitutes and vagabonds." The mere
fact that a business establishment, such as a liquor saloon, was habit-
ually resorted to by prostitutes and vagabonds, as well as by good
citizens, does not constitute it a disorderly house. McElhaney v. State,
p. 735.

A house which is not in a public place, or does not affect the public, or
disturb or annoy them, can not be a disorderly house. Mains v. State,
p. 737.

Upon the trial of an indictment for keeping a bawdy-house, evidence of the
general reputation of the house is incompetent to- prove the charge.
Henson v. State, p. 739.

Under a statute making the keeping of a house of ill-fame resorted to for
lewdness a common nuisance, "house of ill-fame" means the same
thing as a "bawdy-house." And the gist of the offense being the use
of the house for lewd purposes, and not its reputation, evidence of the
reputation of the house is not admissible. State v. Boardman, p. 743.
Gist of the offense of keeping bawdy-house, p. 788.

Must be to nuisance of public, p. 789.

One act of illicit intercourse is not keeping house of ill-fame, p. 789
Reputed character of inmates insufficient, p. 790.

Insufficient proof, p. 791

DISTURBING RELIGIOUS WORSHIP.

In order to constitute this offense, the proof must show that there was
assembled, at the time of the alleged disturbance, a congregation for
the purpose of religious worship, and that the congregation was dis-
turbed in one of the ways set out in the statute; and, moreover, the
disturbance must appear to have been willful. Richardson v. State, p.

444.

Officials of a church, acting under the church discipline, as they construed
it, notified the minister that they would hold a meeting to take action
in regard to his alleged misconduct, and invited him to attend. The
minister did not attend, and the officials resolved to suspend him until
his conduct could be passed upon by superior authority; and they
delegated the accused, who was a steward of the church, to carry out
the resolution. Accused did so by approaching the stand after the
congregation had assembled, but before services had commenced, and
notifying the minister of the action of the officials, and that he would
have to quit preaching until the "elder" had passed upon his conduct.
Held, that this does not show a willful intent to disturb the congrega-
tion. Id.

DISTURBING RELIGIOUS WORSHIP

Continued.

A prosecution for disturbing a congregation assembled for religious wor-
ship will not be sustained by proof that the congregation, though
disturbed, was assembled for business purposes, even though the
proceedings were opened with religious exercises. Wood v. State, p.

448.

The gist of the offense of disturbing religious worship is that the disturb-
ance was "willful." The word "willful," when used in the penal
statute, means with evil intent, or legal malice, or without reasonable
grounds of believing the act to be lawful. The evidence here held
insufficient to support a conviction for disturbing religious worship,
inasmuch as it does not show the disturbance to have been willful.
Wood v. State, p. 452.

The disturbance of a religious congregation by singing, when the singer
does not intend so to disturb it, but is conscientiously taking part in
the religious services, may be a proper subject for the discipline of his
church, but it is not indictable. State v. Linkhaw, p. 455.

Over objection of the defendant, the State was permitted to ask a witness
if the manner in which the defendant called the witness a d-d liar
was calculated to disturb the congregation. The witness answered
that it was; to which answer the defendant also objected. Held, that
both objections were well taken, inasmuch as, under the facts in this
case, the evidence may have had material weight in influencing the jury
to convict. Calvert v. State, p. 457.

"Why was it that the defendant called you a d-d liar?" and "What had you
said and done?" were questions competent to be asked by the defence
in mitigation of punishment, But not in justification. Id.

Disturbance must be willful; mere careless act not sufficient, as slamming
church doors, p. 584.

Merely leaving church before service not, p. 584.

Disturbance must take place while congregation is assembled, p. 584.

Sunday-school celebration and Christmas tree not a religious assembly, p.
585.

Effect of license from municipal corporation to sell refreshments, p. 585.
DISTURBING THE PEACE.

Disturbing the peace of a single individual by loud and abusive language,
is not a criminal offense. State v Schottman, p. 443.

Disturbing one family not, p. 582.

Tolling bell for living person, p. 582.
Mere provoking words not, p. 583.

DIVORCE.

See BIGAMY.

"DOMESTIC ANIMAL."

Construed, p. 486.

DOMICIL.

See MISCEGENATION.

"DRUNK IN OR ABOUT THE PREMISES."

Construed, p. 765.

DRUNKENNESS.

Not indictable when, p. 791.

Meaning of "common drunkard," p. 791.

User of chloroform not, p. 791.

"DWELLING-HOUSE."

Construed, pp. 819, 883.

DYING DECLARATIONS.

On a trial for manslaughter, in attempting to procure an abortion, held, that
an exclamation by the deceased the day before she died, "Oh, Aleck,
what have we done? I shall die," was not admissible as a dying dec-
laration, p. 7.

EAVESDROPPING.

When not indictable, p. 791.

ELECTIONS.

See BRIBERY.

An intention to remove from the State alone or an absence on business with
a subsequent return, do not lose the party his residence in the State,
so as to make him guilty of illegal voting. Maddox v. State, pp. 132,
255.

G. was indicted for interfering with an officer of election during an election.
It appeared that upon G.'s father offering to vote, the officer asked him
certain questions which he declined to answer, an altercation following,
in which G. threatened the officer. Held, that the question asked by the
officer, being outside his duty, G. was not guilty. Com. v. Gibbs, p.
133.

Betting in one State on an election held in another State is not indictable in
the former. State v. McLelland, p. 135.

Betting on the result of an election after it has taken place is not indictable.
Id., p. 257.

Betting on the result of an election is not gaming. State v. Henderson, p.
136.

The statutes of a State disfranchising persons convicted of infamous crime
do not affect persons who have been convicted in the Federal courts of
statutory crimes. U. S. v. Barnabo, pp. 138, 258.

A statute of New York prohibited under a penalty the vote of a person con-
victed of an infamous crime. B. was indicted under the statute, it
appearing that B. had been convicted in a Federal court of uttering a
counterfeited security of the United States. Held, that B. was not pun-
ishable under the statute. Id.

One is not guilty of the statutory offense of refusing to give or giving false
information to supervisors of election, where the supervisors did not

ELECTIONS- Continued.

make the inquiries at the place of his residence.
p. 142.

U. S. v. Davis,

An indictment under the United States laws for unlawfully preventing a
voter from exercising the right of suffrage will lie only where the in-
terference took place at a Congressional election. U. S. v. Cahill,
pp. 143, 258.

A Governor of a State is not an "officer of election" within the United
States statute making it a crime for "any officer of election" at which
a representative or delegate in Congress was voted for, to issue, among
other things, any false or fraudulent certificate of the result of such
election. U. S. v. Clayton, pp. 146, 257.

The offense of bribing a qualified voter is not proved by showing an at-
tempt to bribe a person who claims a right to vote. U. S. v. Hendric,
pp. 151, 258.

Voting out of ward, not voting out of city or town, p. 256.

Illegal voting at meeting illegally summoned, p. 257.

Betting at election not indictable at common law, p. 257.

Betting at election, person must be candidate for office, p. 257.

EMBEZZLEMENT.

Under section 5209 of the Revised Statutes of the United States, an intent
to defraud the association, or other company or person, is an essential
element of the crime in every case. The words "with intent in either
case to injure or defraud," etc., apply as well to embezzlement, etc., of
the funds, as to the making false entries in the books. U. S. v. Voor-
hees, p. 195.

A clerk in the office of the assistant treasurer of the United States, at Bos-
ton, appointed by such assistant treasurer, with the approbation of the
Secretary of the Treasury, as authorized by the general appropriation
act of July 23, 1866, is an officer or person "charged with the safe
keeping of the public money," within the meaning of the sixteenth sec-
tion of the act of August 6, 1846, and is punishable under that section
for loaning the public moneys intrusted to him for safe keeping. U. S.
v. Hartwell, p. 197.

Section 3, of the act of June 14, 1866, providing "that if any banker, bro-
ker, or other person not an authorized depositary of the public
moneys," shall do either of the acts therein specified, every act shall be
held to be an embezzlement, and concluding with the penal sanction as
follows: "And any president, cashier, teller, director, or officer of any
bank or banking association, who shall violate any of the provisions of
this act, shall be deemed and adjudged guilty of an embezzlement of
public money," is confined to the officers of the banks and banking as-
sociations, and does not apply to a clerk in the office of the assistant
treasurer at Boston. Id.

*

Under a statute against embezzlement, which provides that "whoever em-
bezzles, etc.,
shall be deemed guilty of larceny," an indict-
ment charging simply an ordinary larceny is insufficient, and no