that several months previously, she had informed her mother and her
paramour of her pregnancy. She also testified that while sitting in
the privy the child came from her involuntarily, and dropped into the
vault below; and that as it made no stir or outcry, she supposed it was
dead, and consequently told no one of its birth. Held, that prisoner
was not guilty of concealing her pregnancy and the birth of her child,
nor guilty of concealing its death. State v. Conover, p. 810.

Concealment by mother essential, p. 88.

Secret disposition necessary, p. 108.
Child must be born alive, p. 108.

CONSPIRACY.

To constitute a conspiracy, a mere passive cognizance of the illegal actions
of others is insufficient. Active participation of the defendant is nec-
essary. Evans v. People, pp. 524, 616.

Where A. procured B. to convey a lot to C., and C. to give A. his three
promissory notes for $2,778, each of the same date and rate of interest,
and maturing on the same day, secured by three separate deeds of trust
on the lot, one for each note, and caused the deed to C. and one deed
of trust to be recorded, so that the record would show only one in-
cumbrance for $2,778, and by means of false pretenses, sold two of
the notes as first liens on the property, and then disposed of the other
to D. as collateral security for the loan of $2,500 by means of similar
false pretenses, the proof failing to show bad design or intent on the
part of B. or C. in making the conveyances of notes and deeds of trust or
knowledge of the use A. intended to make of them, or that they had any
connection whatever with his fraudulent acts subsequently done, it was
held, that a conviction of A. for a conspiracy with B. and C., to defraud
D. by means of false pretenses, could not be sustained. Id.

An indictment for conspiracy, to cheat and defraud, must set forth the par
ticular means intended to be used by the conspirators, to compass the
alleged fraud. March v. People, p. 530.

To constitute the offense of conspiracy, there must be a conspiracy to
cheat and defraud some person of his property. Although there may
have been an intention to defraud, yet if the means used could not
possibly have that effect, the offense is not complete. Id.

On an indictment against two for a conspiracy to cheat, the judgment
should be against each defendant, severally, and not against them
jointly. Id.

Commissioners of charity were indicted for conspiring together to omit, re-
fuse and neglect to advertise for supplies, as required by statute. It
was proved they had purchased the articles specified without advertis-
ing; but evidence was given that they had acted in good faith and in
ignorance of the statute. Held, that to constitute a conspiracy the
agreement must be entered into with a criminal intent. People v.
Powell, p. 534.

The general rules of the common law, making conspiracy an indictable
offense were used and approved in Massachusetts before the adoption

CONSPIRACY- Continued.

of its Constitution, and are, therefore, in force here; but the English
statutes regulating the settlement of paupers, and the wages of labor-
ers, and making it penal for any one to engage in a trade to which he
had not served a full apprenticeship, and not being adapted to our col-
onial condition, were not adopted or approved and are not, therefore,
in force here. Commonwealth v. Hunt, p. 537.

An indictable conspiracy must be a combination of two or more persons, by
some concerted action to accomplish some criminal or unlawful pur-
pose, or to accomplish some purpose not in itself criminal or unlawful,
by criminal or unlawful means. Id.

An unlawful agreement is the gist of the offense of conspiracy, and it is,
therefore, unnecessary to charge the execution of such agreement.
The execution is merely proof of the intent or an aggravation of the
criminality of the unlawful combination. Id.
Where criminality of conspiracy consists of unlawful agreement of two or
more persons to compass or promote some criminal or illegal purpose,
that purpose must be fully and clearly stated in the indictment; and if
the criminality of the offense charged consists in the agreement to
compass or promote some purpose, not of itself criminal or unlawful,
by the use of criminal or unlawful means, such means must be set out in
the indictment. Id.

An imperfect averment, in an indictment of facts constituting description
of the offense, is not aided by the introductory matter therein, nor by
the qualifying epithets attached to the facts, nor by the alleged injuri-
ous consequences of such facts. Id.

The purpose of a society organized under an agreement not to work for any
person who should employ any journeyman or other person not a mem-
ber of such society, after notice given him to discharge such workman,
is not unlawful. Id.

When an association is formed for innocent purposes, and its powers are
afterwards abused by those who have the management of it, to purposes
of oppression and injustice, those guilty of such abuse, and those who
consent thereto will be criminally liable, but not the other members of
the association. Id.

When the objects of a society are lawful, it is not unlawful to seek to attain
those objects by refusing to work for any one who shall employ a
journeyman not a member of such society. Id.

An association seeking to attain its ends by means tending to impoverish
others, that is, to lessen their gains and profits, is lawful or unlawful,
according as such means are lawful or unlawful. Id.

Where the victim of a conspiracy is himself endeavoring to do an unlawful
act, there can be no conviction. State v. Crowley p. 550.
Certain persons falsely represented to A., that certain boxes contained
counterfeit money, and A. was induced to part with money to obtain
the boxes, with a view of uttering the counterfeit money, and to pre-
vent the threatened arrest of A. for having such counterfeit money.
The boxes contained only sawdust. Held, that the confederates could

CONSPIRACY- Continued.

not be convicted of a conspiracy to obtain the money of A. by false
pretenses. Id.

Section 5440 of the Revised Statutes, does not extend to a case where the
contemplated fraud depends entirely upon the passage of a future act
of Congress to make it effective. U. S. v Crafton, p. 558.

The common-law offense of conspiracy is not punishable in the Federal
courts. Under the United States statutes (Rev. Stats., sec. 5440) an
overt act as well as an unlawful agreement must be proved. U. S. v.
Walsh, p. 561.

An indictment for conspiracy, "must inform the defendant of the nature
and cause of the accusation" as required by the Constitution of the
United States, and must set forth the offense with clearness and cer-
tainty. Id.

In order to constitute a conspiracy under the laws of the United States, two
or more persons must agree to do an unlawful act, and one or more of
them must do some act to effect its object. A mere discussion as to
doing the act is not sufficient; some act must be actually done. U. S.
v. Goldberg, p. 565

When two persons are indicted for conspiracy in one indictment, both must
be acquitted or both convicted. R. v. Manning, 578.

Overt act essential, 616.

Responsibility of one for act of another, 616.

Object must be illegal, 616.

Striking workmen not guilty, when, 616.

Forcing workmen to leave employment, 618.

Conspiracy to suborn perjury, 619.

Conspiracy to obtain goods by false pretenses, 619.

Insufficiency of evidence to sustain conviction, 621.

CONSTRUCTION.

See STATUTES.

COUNTERFEITING.

When a coin is duly issued from the mint and a hole is made in it so as that
a portion of the metal is abstracted, and the hole is plugged with a base
metal, this is counterfeiting; but if the hole is made with a sharp in-
strument and none of the metal is abstracted, but is crowded aside, it
is not counterfeiting, though the coin is rendered misshaped. U. S. v.
Lessner, pp. 152, 258.
Counterfeiting consists in the making of coins so resembling the genuine
that they might deceive persons using ordinary caution, and a convic-
tion can not be had for uttering pieces of metal which are not in the
likeness or similitude of genuine coins. So a conviction for passing
certain pieces of metal, apparently gold, octagonal in form, on one side
of which was the device of an Indian, and on the other the inscription,
"dollar, Cal.," can not be sustained under the laws of the United
States relating to counterfeiting. U. S. v. Bogart, p. 154.

COUNTERFEITING- Continued.

A counterfeit piece of money must sufficiently resemble the genuine to de-
ceive persons of ordinary caution, or the crime is not committed. U.
S. v. Morrow, p. 156.

Counterfeiting an indorsement of a post note of the United States Bank is
not an offense. U. S. v. Stewart, p. 157.

Under the twelfth section of the act of March 3, 1825, an indictment can
not be sustained for counterfeiting a "head pistareen," it not being a
part of a dollar, within the meaning of that act. U. S. v. Gardner, p.

159.

To make spurious coin to use in magical performances and not to circulate
as money is not counterfeiting. U. S. v. King, p. 163.

The defendants were convicted, under section 5430 of the Revised Statutes,
of the offense of having in their possession an instrument engraved
and printed after the similitude of an obligation issued under the
authority of the United States, with intent to sell or otherwise use the
same. The alleged fraudulent instrument, though in the similitude of
a United States bond, was not, nor did it purport to be, executed or
signed. Held, that the words of the statute, "any obligation or other
security," mean an executed instrument, or one which on its face pur-
ports to be executed, and it appearing that the alleged fraudulent obli-
gation or security is not an obligation or security at all, within the
meaning of the statute, a conviction can not be sustained, though the
paper, in its body and general form, be made after the similitude of a
United States bond. U. S. v. Williams, p. 166.

Coin must be capable of deceiving, p. 258.

And must be current by law, p. 258.

Intent must be to pass it as money, p. 258.

Giving spurious coin in charity, p. 258.

Prisoner must know coin to be counterfeit, p. 259.

Pledging is not "passing," p. 259.

CREMATION.

Not illegal, p. 782.

CRUELTY TO ANIMALS.

Cruelty to animals to be within the statute must cause substantial and un-
necessary suffering to the animal. Without evidence of such suffering,
to keep parrots for a few hours without water is not an act of cruelty
upon which a conviction can rightly follow. Swan v. Saunders, p. 486.
Six young parrots were consigned by railway by S. from L. to a customer at
D. They were inclosed in a box, in which some Indian corn but no
water was put. About ten hours after leaving L. they were found at H.,
an intermediate place, by the respondent, in a condition which led him
to think that they were suffering from being too closely packed, and
were generally in a bad condition. The birds were alleged to have
drunk a considerable quantity of water when offered to them, and to
have seemed refreshed, and relieved from pain after the draught. S.,
the appellant, was summoned before a police magistrate having juris-

diction at H., and was convicted of cruelty to birds on the ground that
he had failed to supply them with water for their journey from L. to
D. Held, on appeal from the decision of the magistrate, that the con-
viction was wrong, that the mere non-supply of water for the birds was
not sufficient evidence upon which to found a conviction for cruelty;
and further, that in default of evidence to that effect, young parrots
were not "domestic animals" within the statutes passed to prevent
cruelty to animals. Id.

A person has the right to protect his premises against the depredations of
mischievous dogs, and for the purpose to use such means as are reason-
ably necessary, and if the depredating animal is thereby caught in a
steel trap and mutilated, it would not be needless torture or mutilation
under the statute. Hodge v. State, p. 491.

It is not within the statute making it an offense to "needlessly kill any liv-
ing creature," to shoot pigeons for sport or as an exhibition of skill as
a marksman. State v. Bogardus, p. 494.

Mere killing is not, p. 603.

"Torture" must produce pain or suffering, p. 603.

"Needlessly kill" means wanton cruelty, p. 604.

No distinction between owner of animal and stranger, p. 607.

Motive may excuse, p. 608.

Beating in training or discipline, p. 608.

Using dog on treadmill, p. 608.

CUSTOMS.

To bring into the United States, goods subject to duty without having paid
or accounted for the duties is not against law. It is the secret and
clandestine manner in which goods are brought which constitute the
gist of offense. U. S. v. Thomas, pp. 202, 264.

To constitute the offense of failing to notify the collector of the making of
a still, it must appear that the still was intended to be used within the
United States for distilling spirits, and that the defendant failed to
give such notice. U. S. v. Reed, pp. 206, 264.

A distiller is not in default for the mere non-payment of his special tax,
until ten days after the receipt by the collector of the assessment list.
U. S. v. Shea, pp. 207, 265.

The offense of having in possession internal revenue stamps which had been
previously used and canceled under section 3376, includes only the pos-
session of whole stamps and not fragments of stamps, though they may
be capable of being used again. U. S. v. Loup, pp. 209, 265.

A peddler who has duly applied to the assessor for a license in April, is not
indictable for carrying on business without payment of the special tax,
between the first and seventh days of May, before the tax was, in the
usual course of business, assessed upon him for that year, if he in-
tended during that time to pay the tax when it should be assessed, al-
though when the tax bill was presented him on the twenty-first day of
May he refused to pay it, having stopped business on the seventh. U.
S. v. Pressy, pp. 210, 265.