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INDEX.

ABANDONMENT.

See HUSBAND AND WIFE.

ABORTION.

The statute providing that whoever by means of any instrument, medicine,
drug or other means whatsoever causes any pregnant woman to mis-
carry or attempts, etc., shall be punished, extends only to an inten-
tional use of such means for such purpose. Therefore a husband who
beats his wife, which beating results in a miscarriage which he never
intended to produce, is not guilty under the statute. Slattery v. Peo-
ple, p. 1.

To constitute a crime under the New York statute (Laws 1869, ch. 631), in
causing the death of an unborn child in attempting to produce a mis-
carriage, "quickening" of the child must be averred and proved. Evans
v. People, p. 4.

One can not be convicted of statutory manslaughter, in attempting to pro-
cure an abortion, on an information charging him simply with man-
slaughter, which does not recite the facts which constitute the crime
under the statute. People v. Olmstead, p. 7.

An instruction on a trial for abortion, that if the fact of the pregnancy and
the time and place of the alleged crime are fully and clearly proven,
and it is proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the prisoner adminis-
tered drugs or introduced instruments with intent to produce a mis-
carriage, he should be convicted, is erroneous. State v. Stewart, p.

14.

What is "quick with child," p. 93.

Not abortion to expel dead fœtus, p. 93.

What is not a "noxious thing," p. 93.

Necessity to save life of mother, p. 93.

Proof required on charge of abortion, p. 93.

ACQUITTAL.

See CONSPIRACY.

"ADJOINING."

Construed, p. 820.

ADULTERY.

See, also, FORNICATION.

Adultery, fornication and the like were not indictable at the common law.

Anderson v. Com., p. 16.

(955)

ADULTERY- Continued.

Offenses contra bonos mores are punished by the courts, but the jurisdiction
in such cases should not be extended beyond the limits established by
the adjudicated cases. Id.

Adultery at common law is intercourse with a married woman by one not
her husband. Illicit carnal intercourse by a married man with an un-
married woman is not adultery. State v. Lash, p. 19.

In order to be guilty of living together in open adultery, the parties must
reside together publicly, in the face of society, as if the conjugal rela-
tion subsisted between them, and their illicit intercourse must be ha-

bitual and not occasional. State v. Crowner, pp. 25, 96.

Living in adultery not indictable at common law, p. 94.

Not adultery unless woman is married, p. 94.

Living in adultery, acts must be frequent, p. 95.

Proof of adultery required, pp. 96, 97.

Evidence held insufficient, p. 97.

AFFRAY.

See RIOT.

"AGENT."

Construed, pp. 889, 934, 935.

"AMOUNT OF £5."

Construed, p. 602.

ANIMALS.

See CRUELTY TO ANIMALS; MALICIOUS MISCHIEF.

"AND PROPERTY."

Construed, p. 599.

ARSON.

Where a sailor on board a ship entered a part of the vessel where spirits
were kept, for the purpose of stealing rum, and, while tapping a cask
of rum, a lighted match, held by him, came in contact with the spirits
which were flowing from the cask tapped by him, and a conflagration
ensued, which destroyed the vessel; held, per curiam (KEOGH, J. dis-
sientiente), that a conviction for arson of the ship could not be upheld.
R. v. Faulkner, p. 801.

A prisoner who burns a hole in the floor of a prison for the purpose of
making his escape through a hole so made is not guilty of arson.
Delaney v. State, p. 811.

The remains of a wooden dwelling-house after a previous fire which left
only a few rafters of the roof, and injured the sides and floors so as to
render it uninhabitable is not a "building" within the statute. R. v.
Labadie, p. 815.

Arson defined, p. 818.

Intent must be to destroy property or injure owner, p. 818.

ARSON Continued.

Burning essential; what not sufficient burning, p. 818.

Must be "house of another," p. 818.

Must be a "dwelling house; " uncompleted house not, p. 819.
"House" construed, p. 820.

Meaning of "adjoining," p. 820.

Meaning of "building erected," p. 820.

Meaning of "building or room," p. 820.

Meaning of "building other than a dwelling-house," p. 820.

Meaning of "outhouse," p. 820.

Meaning of "person lawfully in dwelling-house,” p. 821.

Meaning of "part of a wood," p. 821.

Meaning of "person being therein," p. 821.

Meaning of " stack," p. 821.

Meaning of "stack of straw," p. 821.

Meaning of "stack of wheat," p. 821.

Meaning of "stack of wood," p. 821.

Meaning of "vessel," p. 821.

Burning insured property; distinction between burning and procuring to
be burned, p. 821.

ATTORNEY.

See EMBEZZLEMENT.

AUCTIONEER.

See EMBEZZLEMENT.

"BAILEE."

Construed, p. 935.

BARBER SHOP.

Keeping open on Sunday not a nuisance, p. 781.

BARRATRY.

What is not, p. 416.

BAWDY HOUSE.

See DISORDERLY HOUSE.

"BEAST."

Construed, p. 104.

"BEGINNING TO DEMOLISH."

Construed, p. 602.

"BETS."

Construed, p. 755.

BIGAMY.

Marriages in Ohio, contracted by male persons under the age of eighteen
and female persons under fourteen, are invalid unless confirmed by
cohabitation after arriving at those ages respectively. Shafher v.
State, 31.

Such a marriage not thus confirmed, does not subject a party to punish-
ment for bigamy, for contracting a subsequent marriage while the first
husband or wife is living. Id.

Under a statute which provides that a divorced person "who is the guilty
cause of such divorce," shall be deemed guilty of bigamy if he marries
again during the lifetime of his divorced wife, such a one can not be
convicted of bigamy under an indictment which merely charges bigamy
in the ordinary manner. In such a case the indictment must allege the
divorce, and that the defendant was the guilty cause thereof, and all the
other facts necessary to bring the case within the terms of the statute.
Com. v. Richardson, p. 35.

A prosecution for bigamy can not be sustained without proof of a prior
valid marriage, as well as of a subsequent marriage pending the sub-
sistence of the first; and the penal code of the State enacts that "proof
of marriage by mere reputation shall not be sufficient" in a trial for
bigamy or unlawful marriage. Dumas v. State, p. 42.

A valid marriage is a marriage solemnized with the legal prerequisites of
and in accordance with the lex loci contractus. In Texas, a license is a
legal prerequisite, and the rites of matrimony must be performed by
some one of the functionaries authorized by the statute to perform
them; and, in a prosecution for bigamy or unlawful marriage, if the
issue turn upon the validity of a marriage contracted in Texas since
these prerequisites have been in force, that issue is dependent upon
proof of them by legal evidence; which may consist of the original
license and the return thereon, or of eye-witnesses to the marriage
ceremony, or as already indicated, of general reputation in connection
with cohabitation, admissions of defendant, etc. In a trial for bigamy,
therefore, it was error for the court below to charge the jury, in effect,
that a valid marriage could be contracted by any agreement between
the parties to be husband and wife, consummated by cohabitation, etc.
Id.

In rebuttal of the State's proof of his first marriage, the defendant intro-
duced the woman alleged to be his first and lawful wife. She refused
to testify, but at the instance of the defence was compelled to do so.
Held, that she was a competent witness for the defendant, and, like any
other witness, could be compelled to testify. Id.

On an indictinent for bigamy the first marriage may be proved by the ad-
missions of the prisoner himself, but not by the evidence of the alleged
second wife. Miller v. U. S., p. 50.

Where first marriage is void, bigamy is not committed, p. 99.

Second marriage must be valid, p. 100.

Second marriage must take place where crime charged, p. 100.

Violation of decree of divorce prohibiting second marriage, p. 100.

BIGAMY-Continued.

Evidence insufficient to establish bigamy, p. 101.
Mistake as to death of first spouse, p. 102.

Marriage of infants; renunciation, p. 102.

BILLIARD ROOM.

See GAMING.

BLACKMAILING AND THREATENING.

In the course of business H. made and delivered to B. a promissory note,
without the stamp required by law. Shortly afterward B. sent to H. a
letter, as follows: "WASHINGTON COUNTY, December 2, 1865. - MR. W.
D. HALL. — Dear Sir: Upon examining the excise law, I find that note
you made me require stamp, and that you are liable to fine of two hun-
dred dollars for not stamping it. You will please call immediately and
make satisfaction, and save yourself trouble. Yours with respect. W.
A. BRABHAM." Held, that this was not the sending of a letter-con-
taining threats of injury, "or with the intent of for the purpose of ex-
torting money or other valuable things" within the statute; and the
fact that at a subsequent interview between the parties threats were
orally made which did result, wrongfully or rightfully, in extorting a
valuable thing, does not alter the case. Brabham v. State, p. 824.

A threat to accuse another of crime if made for the purpose of inducing
payment of debt, is not within the statute of blackmailing. State v.
Hammond, p. 828.

K. was tried and convicted of blackmailing one H. by threatening to accuse
him of seducing a woman whom the evidence tended to show that K.
himself had seduced. The trial judge charged that the jury might con-
sider the facts as to the seduction, as bearing upon the question of
punishment, if they should find him guilty. Held, error.
Kistler v.
State, p. 830.

M. was convicted of seriously threatening to kill one T. in an altercation
between them. The witnesses concurred in testifying that the threat
was uttered while the accused was punching T. with his gun, and that
nothing prevented him from then shooting T. if he had wished to do so;
that he made no attempt to shoot, and had been since living in the
same neighborhood with T., and without molesting him. Held, that
the evidence does not sustain the conviction. March v. State, p. 832.
What are not "threatening letters," p. 834.

Letters sent in sport, p. 834.

Purpose to obtain debt justly due, p. 834.

Accusation must come from person making threat, p. 836.

Must be as to prosecutor's property, p. 836.

Threatening to take life; intent must be proved, p. 836.

BLASPHEMY.

When not indictable, p. 782.

"BREAKING."

Construed, pp. 880, 881.

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