carrying on the business of a distiller, without having paid a special tax. From the evidence it appeared that though defendant had not paid the tax, he had given due notice of his intention to distil spirits, given a proper bond, etc., and that in pursuance of this the tax had been assessed against him and returned to the collector in the monthly list for December-such list having been put in the latter's hands on the 20th of December, less than ten days prior to the commission of the offense charged. Upon trial had defendant was convicted, whereupon he moved for a new trial and arrest of judgment. BENEDICT, J. Upon consideration of the various provisions of the internal revenue law, I am of the opinion that the point raised on the evidence introduced in defence is well taken. The various provisions of the law in regard to special taxes, as set forth in sections 20, 28, and 73, as amended in the act of 1869, and elsewhere, and which seem to make no substantial difference, as regards the particular defence in question, between the business of distilling and other kinds of business subject to a special tax, must, when taken together, be considered to import, that a distiller is not in default for the mere non-payment of his special tax of one hundred dollars, until ten days after the receipt by the collector of the assessment list, in which the special tax is to be inserted, and that he can not be held to be guilty of the offense created in the twenty-third section, unless it appears that he carries on the business after he is in default for the non-payment of the tax. The words of the act are, "without having paid the special tax, as required by law," and these words, "as required by law," must be considered to refer to the time and place of payment, as well as to the amount. Therefore, the distiller can not be said to carry on business without payment of the special tax, as required by law, so long as he has taken all necessary steps towards the ascertainment and payment of his special tax, and stands ready to pay it in the manner required by law, that is, within ten days after the assessor shall have returned to the collector the assessment list in which such tax is required to be inserted. This construction of the provisions of the act seems reasonable, and to be necessary to prevent infinite confusion and injustice in the collection of the taxes, as a consideration of the effect of similar provisions made applicable to various trades will show. Although it is true that, under this construction, a distiller may carry on his business a short time without having actually paid his special tax of one hundred dollars, as may persons in other kinds of business, yet he has given security for its payment when due, while the various other provisions in regard to his distillery, etc., all necessary to be complied with before commencing business, put the distillery fully within the observation of the government and enable it to enforce compliance with the law. According to this view of the law, the facts proved by the defendant amount to a perfect defence to an indictment framed on this one section, and he is entitled to be discharged. REVENUE LAWS-HAVING POSSESSION OF CANCELED STAMPS. UNITED STATES v. LOUP. [1 McCrary, 168.] In the United States Circuit Court, Eastern District of Missouri, 1880. The Offense of Having in Possession internal revenue stamps which had been preriously used and canceled under section 3376,1 includes only the possession of whole stamps and not fragments of stamps though they may be capable of being used again. TREAT, D. J. The question presented involves the construction of the United States statutes pertaining to internal revenue, and particularly section 3376. The defendant is charged in the indictment with having had in his possession internal revenue stamps that had been theretofore used and canceled. It appears from the arguments and statements of counsel, rather than otherwise, that the facts are that defendant did have in his possession parts or halves of several stamps which had theretofore been used, which could readily be placed on a package in such a position as to give them the appearance of a complete stamp; but no complete, unbroken or unmutilated stamp. Under the stipulation of counsel this court is asked to determine whether, on such a statement of facts, the defendant can be found guilty of the offense charged under section 3376. Reference has been made to many other sections of the statute, supposed to be in pari materia; and, on the other hand, the rules of construction as to criminal statutes have been invoked. Where a statute containing many provisions as to distinct subjects, each of which has its own peculiar requirements, is presented for interpretation, the requirements and penalties of one can not, in a criminal proceeding, be imported into another. Stamps, according to the law and regulations, are to be placed on packages of snuff in a prescribed manner, whereby the opening of the package will destroy the stamp. As to brewer stamps, the statute is very specific as to the mode of placing them on carrying on the business of a distiller, without having paid a special tax. From the evidence it appeared that though defendant had not paid the tax, he had given due notice of his intention to distil spirits, given a proper bond, etc., and that in pursuance of this the tax had been assessed against him and returned to the collector in the monthly list for December-such list having been put in the latter's hands on the 20th of December, less than ten days prior to the commission of the offense charged. Upon trial had defendant was convicted, whereupon he moved for a new trial and arrest of judgment. BENEDICT, J. Upon consideration of the various provisions of the internal revenue law, I am of the opinion that the point raised on the evidence introduced in defence is well taken. The various provisions of the law in regard to special taxes, as set forth in sections 20, 28, and 73, as amended in the act of 1869, and elsewhere, and which seem to make no substantial difference, as regards the particular defence in question, between the business of distilling and other kinds of business subject to a special tax, must, when taken together, be considered to import, that a distiller is not in default for the mere non-payment of his special tax of one hundred dollars, until ten days after the receipt by the collector of the assessment list, in which the special tax is to be inserted, and that he can not be held to be guilty of the offense created in the twenty-third section, unless it appears that he carries on the business after he is in default for the non-payment of the tax. The words of the act are, without having paid the special tax, as required by law,' and these words, "as required by law," must be considered to refer to the time and place of payment, as well as to the amount. Therefore, the distiller can not be said to carry on business without payment of the special tax, as required by law, so long as he has taken all necessary steps towards the ascertainment and payment of his special tax, and stands ready to pay it in the manner required by law, that is, within ten days after the assessor shall have returned to the collector the assessment list in which such tax is required to be inserted. This construction of the provisions of the act seems reasonable, and to be necessary to prevent infinite confusion and injustice in the collection of the taxes, as a consideration of the effect of similar provisions made applicable to various trades will show. Although it is true that, under this construction, a distiller may carry on his business a short time without having actually paid his special tax of one hundred dollars, as may persons in other kinds of business, yet he has given security for its payment when due, while the various other provisions in regard to his distillery, etc., all necessary to be complied with before commencing business, put the distillery fully within the observation of the government and enable it to enforce compliance with the law. According to this view of the law, the facts proved by the defendant amount to a perfect defence to an indictment framed on this one section, and he is entitled to be discharged. REVENUE LAWS-HAVING POSSESSION OF CANCELED STAMPS. UNITED STATES v. LOUP. [1 McCrary, 168.] In the United States Circuit Court, Eastern District of Missouri, 1880. The Offense of Having in Possession internal revenue stamps which had been preriously used and canceled under section 3376,1 includes only the possession of whole stamps and not fragments of stamps though they may be capable of being used again. TREAT, D. J. The question presented involves the construction of the United States statutes pertaining to internal revenue, and particularly section 3376. The defendant is charged in the indictment with having had in his possession internal revenue stamps that had been theretofore used and canceled. It appears from the arguments and statements of counsel, rather than otherwise, that the facts are that defendant did have in his possession parts or halves of several stamps which had theretofore been used, which could readily be placed on a package in such a position as to give them the appearance of a complete stamp; but no complete, unbroken or unmutilated stamp. Under the stipulation of counsel this court is asked to determine whether, on such a statement of facts, the defendant can be found guilty of the offense charged under section 3376. Reference has been made to many other sections of the statute, supposed to be in pari materia; and, on the other hand, the rules of construction as to criminal statutes have been invoked. Where a statute containing many provisions as to distinct subjects, each of which has its own peculiar requirements, is presented for interpretation, the requirements and penalties of one can not, in a criminal proceeding, be imported into another. Stamps, according to the law and regulations, are to be placed on packages of snuff in a prescribed manner, whereby the opening of the package will destroy the stamp. As to brewer stamps, the statute is very specific as to the mode of placing them on he would relieve him from any further care of the office, and would take the papers, etc. Certain letters directed to the postmaster, received in his absence, and others received by the last mail, and the dead letters' were handed to him; but the defendant refused to deliver the other letters, or pay over the money he had received for postage, and, seizing a gun, threatened to shoot the post-master if he did not leave the house. The postmaster retired, and left the letters he had received with his former assistant, with instructions to act as his assistant. He did so and handed out the letters in his possession as they were called for. The postmaster boarded at the house, with the assistant, at which the office was kept. In the course of two or three days after this, the defendant made oath before a justice of the peace that certain property had been stolen or fraudulently taken from him, specifying certain letters, etc., which were legally in his possession; on which a search warrant was issued; and the letters in the possession of the regular assistant taken from him, and he was arrested and taken before a justice of the peace. On examination the assistant was released, but the letters were delivered over by the justice to the defendant, who continued for some days to open the mail and hand out letters, claiming a right so to act by virtue of his appointment, The postmaster then applied to the authority of the United States, instituted a prosecution against the defendant, and, through the instrumentality of the marshal, obtained possession of the post-office, letters and papers. The defendant offered evidence to prove that the postmaster had agreed to resign the office in his favor; that he had sold him the case in which the letters were deposited; that he had removed from Shiawassee, and consequently had, under the law and instructions of the department, vacated the office. And in support of this last position the post-office act was read, which provides that no person shall hold the office of postmaster who does not reside at the place where the office is kept. But the court held that this provision was directory to the postmaster-general, and, indeed, was imperative on him; but that, until he acted, the postmaster and his sureties were responsible to the department, and to individuals who should be injured by any neglect of duty in the office; that, if the postmaster had intended to remove, about which fact there was contradictory evidence, the weight of the evidence being decidedly against the allegation that he had removed, it could constitute no justification to the defendant. The evidence being closed, the district-attorney claimed a conviction of the defendant under that part of the twenty-second section of the post-office act of 1825, which provides that, "if any person shall steal the mail, or shall steal or take from, or out of, any mail, or from, or out |