ELECTION-BRIBING QUALIFIED VOTER UNITED STATES v. HENDRIC. [2 Sawy. 479.] In the United States Circuit Court, District of Oregon, 1873. The Offense of Bribing a qualified voter is not proved by showing an attempt to bribe a person who claims a right to vote. DEADY, J. The indictment in this case contains two counts. The first one charges that at an election held on October 13, 1873, at South Portland precinct, in the county of Multnomah and State of Oregon, for representative in the Congress of the United States, the defendant did there and then, knowingly, etc., offer to give one Robert Bruce (he the said Robert Bruce claiming a right to vote at said election), the sum of $2.50 as a gift, bribe, and reward to him, the said Bruce, to vote at said election for representative, etc., to prevent said Bruce from exercising the right of suffrage, contrary to statute, etc. The second count is similar to the first, except that it alleges that the defendant gave said Bruce the sum of $2.50 for the purpose and with the effect aforesaid. The defendant demurs to the indictment, because it does not appear therefrom that said Bruce was a qualified voter of the State of Oregon. The indictment is found under section 19 of the act of May 31, 1870,1 which defines quite a number of crimes in relation to elections. The crime intended to be charged in the indictment is defined in these words: "That if at any election for representative of the United States, any person shall * in the Congress by * bri prevent any qualfrom freely such person shall be deemed Assuming that this provision was intended to prohibit the giving or offering of any bribe or reward to induce or procure a voter to vote one way or the other, or at all, or not to vote, as I think it was, because such reward or offer thereof, if accepted and acted upon by the voter, necessarily prevents him from exercising his right of suffrage freely, still this indictment is insufficient because it does not charge in either count 1 16 Stat. 144. that said Bruce was a qualified voter a person qualified to vote at the election in question- but only that he claimed a right to vote thereat. It does not follow, because Bruce claimed a right to vote, that he was entitled to it. The one expression is not the equivalent of the other. The act provides in a separate clause for the offense of voting by a person not entitled to vote, or for aiding, procuring, counseling or advis ing any such person to vote, which includes hiring him to do so. But it can not be said that any one is prevented by any act from exercising his right of suffrage freely, unless he has such a right at the time; and that fact must be averred, by stating in the language of the act or other equivalent terms that such person was then and there a qualified voter. The demurrer must be sustained. COUNTERFEITING-ABSTRACTING METAL. UNITED STATES v. SISSNER. [12 Fed. Rep. 840.] In the United States Circuit Court, District of Massachusetts, 1882. Counterfeiting - Debasing Coin. - When a coin is duly issued from the mint and a hole is made in it so as that a portion of the metal is abstracted, and the hole is plugged with a base metal, this is counterfeiting; but if the hole is made with a sharp instrument and none of the metal is abstracted, but is crowded aside, it is not counterfeiting, though the coin is rendered misshaped. LOWELL, J. The defendant was convicted upon two indictments charging him with passing counterfeit silver coins of the denomination of quarter dollars and half dollars, knowing them to be counterfeit. The coins in question had small holes made in them, and these holes had been filled with some base metal and passed by the defendant, with knowledge of their condition. Some of the holes had been punched with a sharp instrument, involving no loss of silver; others were made by drilling out a part of the silver, though not with any intention of using the silver drilled out. Silver coins with small holes made in them are not fully current, some persons refusing and others accepting them. We understand that the defendant bought the coins at a slight discount and passed them for their nominal value. He probably did not consider himself guilty of passing counterfeit money; but he was guilty of doing an act which the law is to characterize. The point was a new one, and the learned judge, having much doubt upon it, ruled, for the purposes of the trial, that a coin which had been regularly coined at the mint and afterwards punched or mutilated and thereafter restored to the similitude of a genuine coin by the insertion of any metal (meaning base metal), was counterfeit. To this ruling an exception was taken. Silver coins of the denominations of quarter dollars and half dollars are required to be made of a certain weight and fineness, and are lawful tender in payment of debts to the amount of $101 and are to be received by the treasury in exchange for lawful money in sums of $20 or any multiple thereof.2 In case of gold coins the law is that, when reduced in weight below the standard, they are a good tender at a proportionate valuation. We find no such provision made for silver coins. If such a coin has had an appreciable amount of silver removed from it, we can not say that it remains a good coin for its original value, or even for a proportionate value. If, then, the hole is plugged with base metal, or with any substance other than silver, this act is an act of counterfeiting, because it is making something appear to be a good coin for its apparent value which was not so before. 4 one of them make up the If that case In the English case, cited by the United States, a gold coin had been filed away until the milling was destroyed, and then a new milling had been made. A majority of the court held that this coin was counterfeit. Two able judges dissented; but said, if any base metal had been added to the coin to weight, he should not have doubted that it was counterfeit. had been like this there would we suppose have been no dissent. We do not doubt that the judgment of the court was sound, because the milling was actually a counterfeited milling. The fraudulent alteration of a bank note, to make it appear of more than its true value, and other similar acts which are held to be forgery, are analogous. We are therefore of opinion that the ruling and conviction were proper in respect to those coins which had been drilled and afterwards filled up. On the other hand we do not consider it a criminal act, whatever the intent may have been to add base metal to a good coin, and we see no ground for holding that a hole punched through a coin with a sharp instrument, crowding the silver into a slightly different shape, but leaving it all in the coin, has any effect to render it less valuable or less lawful tender than before. The statutes above cited are silent upon this exact question; but we think it clear that a silver coin duly issued from the mint, remains of full value so long as it retains all the appearance of a coin, and does besides contain all its original weight and fineness. This be 1 Rev. Stats., secs. 3513, 3586; Stat. June 9, 1879, ch. 3; 21 Stat. 7. 2 Stat., June 9, 1879, ch. 12, sec. 1;21 Stat. 7. 3 Rev. Stats., sec. 3585. Reg. v. Hermann, L. R. 4 Q. B. D. 284. ing so, we can not regard the addition of something to it as a criminal act of counterfeiting. Passing such a coin works no injury to the person to whom it is passed. The pleadings and evidence reported do not enable us to discriminate between the counts which apply to the one and to the other kind of alteration. We must, therefore, order new trials. Counsel will probably be able to arrange for a default upon such count or counts as relate to what we hold to be counterfeited coin. Verdict set aside. COINS MUST DECEIVE AND MUST BE SIMILAR UNITED STATES v. BOGART. [9 Ben. 314]. In the United States Circuit Court, District of New York, 1878. Counterfeiting Consists in the Making of Coins so resembling the genuine that they might deceive persons using ordinary caution, and a conviction can not be had for uttering pieces of metal which are not in the likeness or similitude of genuine coins. So a conviction for passing certain pieces of metal, apparently gold, octagonal in form, on one side of which was the device of an Indian, and on the other the inscription" “༔ dollar, Cal.," can not be sustained under the laws of the United States relating to counterfeiting. WALLACE, J. This case presents the question, whether a conviction can be sustained, under section 5461 of the Revised Statutes of the United States, where the defendant passed certain pieces of metal, apparently gold, octagon in form, on one side of which was the device of an Indian, and on the other the inscription" dollar, Cal." The section under which the indictment is found was originally in an act passed June 8, 1864, and entitled "An act to punish and prevent the counterfeiting of coin of the United States," and read as follows: "Every person who, except as authorized by law, makes or causes to be made, or utters or passes, or attempts to utter or pass, any coins of gold or silver or other metal, or alloys of metals intended for the use and purpose of current money, whether in the resemblance of coins of the United States or of foreign countries, or of original design, shall be punished by a fine of not more than $3,000, or by imprisonment not more than five years, or both." On first impression, this language seems sufficiently comprehensive to cover the present case; but, giving it that strict construction which is always to be applied to penal statutes, my conclusion is that the language is satisfied by a much narrower application. 1. The pieces of metal passed by the defendant do not purport to be coins, in the legal definition of the word, but are tokens. 2. If it should be held that the section makes it a crime to make or utter any pieces of metal, with the intent that the piece shall serve as a substitute for money, an offense is created which is new and foreign to the law of counterfeiting. A coin is a piece of metal stamped and made legally current as money. A counterfeit coin is one in imitation of the genuine. The coins known to the law are those authorized to be issued from the mints of the United States, and those of foreign countries current here. The pieces in question are not in imitation of our own coin or of any foreign coin. They are calculated to impose upon the ignorant or unwary, and, if this purpose is effected, the utterer may be guilty of false pretenses. If they were passed upon the sole representation that they were issued by the State of California, it is doubtful if a conviction for false pretenses could be had, because every person is bound to know that the State of California can not issue coins. If, instead of the pieces in question, the defendant had pieces purporting to bear the stamp of Plato's republic, he would have been equally as guilty of a criminal offense as he now is. One of the rules applicable to the offense of counterfeiting is, that the resemblance of the spurious to the genuine coin must be such as that it might deceive a person using ordinary caution, and a conviction can not be had for uttering pieces of metal which are not in the likeness or similitude of genuine coins. It is not to be presumed that Congress overlooked these familiar rules, when legislating "to punish and prevent the counterfeiting of coin ;" and the title of the act is inconsistent with the idea that an offense radically differing from that of counterfeiting was the subject of legislative consideration. Full effect can be given to the language used without indulging in such a conclusion; and that is, by limiting it to meet cases which frequently occurred, where persons making or uttering coins which purported to be in imitation or similitude of current money of the country could not be convicted because the designs or devices were not those which the law prescribes as the devices or legends which shall be stamped upon the coin issued from the mints of the United States. These devices or legends are made by statute the authentic evidence of the genuineness of the coins. Where different ones were substituted, the utterer often escaped because the spurious coin was such that it ought not to have deceived, and, theoretically, could not have deceived, a person using ordinary prudence. The act in question remedies this difficulty, and, if the spurious piece purports to be coin of the United States, or of foreign countries, it is one within the statute, although the devices with which it is impressed are so far from a similitude to the genuine as to be of original design. |