the first formal and direct notice of our attitude on the Monroe Doctrine to an assembly of the civilized governments of the world. As such it was quoted and indorsed by President McKinley in his annual message of 1899.

President Roosevelt in his annual message of 1901 observed that the Peace Conference at The Hague" acquiesced in our statement of the Monroe Doctrine as compatible with the purposes and aims of the conference." He says also, "The Monroe Doctrine should be the cardinal feature of the foreign policy of all the nations of the two Americas, as it is of the United States." Just seventy-eight years have passed since President Monroe in his annual message announced that "the American continents are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future colonization by any European power." In other words, the Monroe Doctrine is a declaration that there must be no territorial aggrandizement by any nonAmerican power at the expense of any American power on American soil. It is in no wise intended as hostile to any nation in the Old World. Still less is it intended to give cover to any aggression by one New World power at the expense of any other. It is simply a step, and a long step, toward assuring the universal peace of the world by securing the possibility of permanent peace on this hemisphere.

"During the past century other influences have established the permanence and independence of the smaller states of Europe. Through the Monroe Doctrine we hope to be able to safeguard like independence and secure like permanence for the lesser among the New World nations. . . . We do not ask under this doctrine for any exclusive commercial dealings with any other American state. We do not guarantee any state against punishment if it misconducts itself, provided that punishment does not take form of the acquisition of territory by any non-American power. . . . Our people intend to abide by the Monroe Doctrine and to insist upon it as the one sure means of securing the peace of the western hemisphere."

It should be noted for remembrance in this connection that in 1902, before Great Britain and Germany sent their fleets to coerce Venezuela into a redress of grievances, both these great powers gave formal assurances to the United States government that there was no intention on their part to violate the principles of the Monroe Doctrine.

But, leaving the domain of authority and precedent, let us examine the Doctrine upon the grounds of reason.

What argument exists, on our part, to support an objection to Central or South Ameri

can colonization by Europe under claim of "prior discovery," which does not equally militate against colonization effected by war, or secured by a cession of territory? Our own territorial rights being untouched, in what way are we more injured by the former than by the latter? In either case it excludes or constrains our commercial interests as secured by existing treaties. In either case it creates for us a new and possibly dangerous neighbor, and new relations. If secured by one of the naval powers, it exposes us to a new military danger. If accomplished by a great power, it compels the increase of our own military or naval preparations to preserve our equality in the event of war. If near our great lines of commerce, it becomes a standing menace to our commercial relations. It touches every national interest. It is self-evident that we could not regard such an establishment, in whatever way of peace or war effected," with indifference," as the diplomatists put it. It would, and it ought to, cause serious inquietude to our government. Need we recall again the Nicaraguan dispute, which brought us to the verge of war? Do we not remember the squadron despatched to the Antilles by the British government, when they believed France was seeking to acquire Cuba by cession, and Mr. Canning's protest against that cession? Yet that could affect England

in no sense equal to the effect upon us of the acquisition by a great European power of Cuba, or of any other strong position, insular or continental, commanding either side of Central America, or the chief lines of our commercial routes along this or the southern continent.

In another respect any new European acquisition on this continent would touch very seriously our important interests. Delegated authority, exercised across distant seas, is the occasion of frequent misunderstandings and commercial embarrassments. The reparation or remedy is referred to a distant government, and is tediously obtained, if obtained at all. A supreme government in immediate contact obviates this danger of disturbance to commerce and to amicable relations. Canada and Cuba have repeatedly illustrated, and amply, the justice of this ground of objection to further colonial establishments in this hemisphere. It is not long since one of these questions in connection with Cuba cost us four millions in naval preparations to secure justice for wrongs there perpetrated. Either great or petty causes of irritation are continually arising with the colonial dominions on the north of us. Their semi-independent condition encourages a freedom of action sometimes in conflict with our rights and interests, but without the authority,

however willingly disposed, to assure us relief or remedy by treaty. Our future relations with this dominion will cause- already causeanxiety to thoughtful American statesmanship, from which there now appears no certain issue, except in its independence. Our increasing settlements and interests on the Northern Pacific coast bring British Columbia still more forcibly within the scope of these considerations.

The European critics of the Monroe Doctrine say that it is not recognized as a part of the code of international law, and does not therefore bind other nations, and is not entitled to observance by them. Was the doctrine of the " Balance of Power" a part of that code? Was it declared in that code that Russia should not seize Constantinople? or that France should not seize and appropriate to her own trade the great ports of China? Would Germany for that reason permit France or England to take permanent possession of the port of Rotterdam or of Antwerp? or acquire a strong military or naval position on the coast of Denmark? Would the European powers quietly permit the United States, because of the silence of the international code on the subject, to acquire Sicily, and establish a republican dependent government there? "Spheres of influence" are not recognized by interna