The opposition, both inert and active, to a genuine and vigorous national authority, appeared most uniformly in the local legislatures, and among men who were not personally engaged in the war. They transferred their opposition towards alien English control to alien American control; for they still regarded the other colonies, in some proportion to the distance of their territory, as aliens and strangers to their respective commonwealths. Their confederation itself, therefore, was little more than a treaty between forced allies, who were jealous of each other, and would each retain a veto upon the acts of all, except in those few points where the immediate danger from Europe controlled their fears of domestic rivalry.

Nor was human nature a century ago free from those imperfections which to-day mark the characteristics of our public life. Personal envies and jealousies and competitions were too rife for the best expedition of public affairs. Personal criticisms were violent and often reckless. In a time of war, when all the instruction of history enforces the necessity of a concentration of power in a vigorous, decisive, central authority, thirteen authoritative heads were interposed, which, in turn, were subject to thirteen other widely separated heads. No presiding officer could remain in his place more than one year in three, lest one man or one State

should offer talents and furnish experience which might lead to an excessive influence for himself or his State. From the perusal of the records of that epoch we rise with amazement at the unshaken patience, moderation, and firmness of Washington, who persistently sought the establishment of confidence and concord, and kept himself unsullied and faithful amidst the virulence, jealousies, and passions of the time.

IV

PRELIMINARIES OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1787

THE abler men among the patriots then in military and civil life were not deceived by any fond hopes flowing from the adoption of this instrument. They clearly foresaw the difficulties and embarrassments still interposed against the successful administration of government, alike in war and peace. Hardly had the announcement of the ratification of the Confederation reached the various state capitals before the letters and pamphlets of the time disclosed its defects and insufficiency. Again was heard a call for a constitutional convention. Within a few months from the approval of the Confederacy by Maryland the dissatisfaction found wide and emphatic expression. Washington, whose efforts to secure the organization of a vigorous union and government were as constant as his devotion to his weighty military duties, showed a painful consciousness that the Confederate constitution was wholly inadequate to the demands of the time. He regarded it as chiefly important in completing the formal alliance of the States. "If the

powers granted to the head of the States," he said, "are inadequate, the defects should be considered and remedied. Danger may spring from delay. The present temper of the States is friendly to the establishment of a lasting union; the moment should be improved; if suffered to pass away it may never return; and, after gloriously and successfully contending against the usurpations of Britain, we may fall a prey to our own follies and disputes. . . A nominal head, which at present is but another name for Congress, will no longer do. That honorable body... must dictate, and not merely recommend. Without a controlling power in Congress it will be impossible to carry on the war." Hoping that public affairs would now put on a different aspect, he added, "but not unless Congress is vested with, or will assume, greater powers than they exert at present, and will dispense them freely, upon general principles, to the ministers of State." He addressed himself in this sense, and with urgency, to leaders in different States.

In the mean time Congress itself had appointed a second and able committee to examine the Articles, "to prepare an exposition of the Confederation," a plan for its complete execution, and supplemental articles. This committee reported a series of subjects upon which laws should be framed for the

execution of the Articles, but declined to make an "exposition" of the Articles for the significant reason, among others, that "the omission to enumerate any Congressional powers would become an argument against their existence, and it will be early enough to insist upon them when they shall be exercised and disputed." So early did questions of constitutional construction arise; and so promptly was the necessity for "supplemental articles" made apparent. They proposed seven distinct recommendations for increasing the powers of Congress. All this was made known to the States, but apparently without producing a movement for their adoption.

Such incomplete measures encountered a double opposition. The States were in large part unwilling to have any force applied to their delinquency, and equally unwilling to diminish their reserved powers. The friends and advocates of a strong national government, on the other hand, were indifferent to these half-measures, knowing how far they failed of affording relief to the country. Of the latter class Hamilton expressed the sentiments when he published these words: "There is hardly a man who will not acknowledge the Confederation unequal to a vigorous prosecution of the war, or to the preservation of the Union in peace. The