a citizen of the United States; that in 1870 he returned to France with his family and all his means, resumed his native nationality by his declaration and acts, and that he and his family have resided there continuously since, claiming to have resumed his native citizenship, and that he has been recognized as a French citizen. The certificate of reintegration as a French citizen was only the completion of all evidence on that point to meet any technical question that might be raised.

The opinion of Attorney-General Black, given in 1857, in the case of Amthor, a Bavarian naturalized in the United States, who returned to Bavaria, was cited in support of the position taken by the counsel for the memorialist. (Upinions of Attorneys-General, vol. 9, p. 63.)

Dana's edition of Wheaton (p. 144) was quoted also in the case of a Prussian subject naturalized in the United States, who had returned to Prussia when Mr. Wheaton was minister at Berlin. In that case Mr. Wheaton said:

Having returned to the country of your birth, your native domicile and national character revert so long as you remain in the Prussian dominions; and you are bound in all respects to obey the laws exactly as if you had never emigrated."

The Commission made an award to Petit in the sum of $2,865. As the Commission entertained jurisdiction notwithstanding the naturalization of Petit in the United States in the year 1868, it is to be assumed that the views of the special counsel were accepted. It is not to be inferred, however, that the Commission reached the conclusion that the reinstatement of Petit as a French citizen in the year 1881 was accepted as justifying jurisdiction, but that the jurisdiction was found in the fact that he returned to France in 1870, and had acted as a French citizen and had been accepted as a French citizen for the period of ten years and more previous to his formal reinstatement in citizenship by the duly constituted authorities.

PETER M. NICROSI v. THE UNITED STATES, No. 415.

The memorialist in this case claimed compensation for several quantities of cotton, which he alleged were "lost or destroyed by reason of the war and the acts of the military authorities of the United States."

The claimant stated in his memorial that he was born at Rogliano, Corsica, the 28th day of October, 1837. From the testimony in the case it appeared that he came to this country in the year 1855, while a minor. He also stated in his memorial that he was naturalized at Montgomery, in the State of Alabama, the 25th day of October, 1870, and admitted to citizenship in the United States; but, in connection with that statement, he also declared that he was then, at the date when his memorial was filed (May 23, 1881), "a citizen of the Republic of France." The last averment was sustained by the proofs to this extent, namely, that in the year 1871, and immediately after the decree of naturalization, the claimant returned to France, and upon his return he addressed a communication to the mayor of Rogliano, in which he stated his wish to exercise the rights of a French citizen. He remained in France till about the year 1875, and during that period he enjoyed the privileges of a citizen of the French Republic, and performed also a certain kind of military service. Upon his return to this country in the year 1875, and during the subsequent years, and until 1878, he voted and held office and pursued his business in the State of Alabama. At the date of the me morial Nicrosi was living at Rogliano, but he was engaged in business at Montgomery, Alabama.

On this statement of facts the counsel for the United States contended that Nicrosi had never been restored to citizenship in France by the act

of the authorities duly constituted to reinstate him; that his return to the United States, and the exercise of the rights and privileges of a citizen in this country, were sufficient to justify the conclusion legally that he intended to continue a citizen of the United States.

The counsel for the French Republic contended that his declaration of intention to exercise the rights of a citizen of the French Republic reinstated him in citizenship, and this in view of the fact that his name appeared upon the electoral lists of the Commune of Rogliano for the years 1875 to 1881, inclusive.

The claim was dismissed for want of jurisdiction by the unanimous opinion of the Commission. In their opinion they say:

This claimant was naturalized in the United States. He went back to France, but did not comply with the provisions of the civil code to become again a citizen of France. He came back to the United States, and there claimed the rights of an American citizen.

OSCAR CHOPIN . THE UNITED STATES, No. 592.

The memorialist in this case claimed compensation for various articles of movable property, of the value of $31,371.73, alleged to have been seized the 13th day of May, 1863, by Major Robertson, of the First Regiment of Louisiana cavalry.

The claimant was the son of Jean Baptiste Chopin, who was a citizen of France and a resident of Louisiana; where he died in the year 1870, leaving as his heirs-at-law four children, of whom the memorialist was one, and who appeared on behalf of the others in the prosecution of this claim. The wife of the said Jean Baptiste Chopin died at a time previous to the death of her husband. Eugene Chopin, a daughter of Jean Baptiste Chopin, having married a citizen of the United States named Henry, so much of the claim as otherwise would have inured to her benefit was withdrawn by the counsel for the French Republic. After the presentation of the memorial, and during the pendency of the proceedings, Oscar Chopin, the memorialist, died, leaving as his heirs-atlaw a widow and five minor children. The four children of Jean Baptiste Chopin were born in the United States, and the minor children of Oscar Chopin, grandchildren of Jean Baptiste Chopin, were also born in the United States. The record showed that the children of Jean Baptiste Chopin had visited France, and had resided in that country for brief periods of time.

On these facts the counsel for the United States maintained that the Commission had not jurisdiction of the case, inasmuch as the claimants, having been born in the United States, were made citizens of the United States by the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution. This as to the children of Jean Baptiste Chopin, and with stronger reason as to the children of Oscar Chopin.

An award was made by the united action of the Commission in the sum of $2,111. There was, however, no order as to the distribution of the sum so awarded, nor any indication of opinion on the part of the Commission as to the citizenship of the children of Oscar Chopin. It may, however, be assumed fairly that the Commission were of opinion that the children of Jean Baptiste Chopin, although born in this country, were citizens of France, and that, inasmuch as the death of Oscar Chopin occurred after the ratification of the treaty and after the presentation of the memorial, his right to reclamation had become so vested that it descended to his children independently of the question of their citizenship in France.

ARTHUR DENIS, TESTAMENTARY EXECUTOR OF L. F. FOUCHER, MARQUIS DE CIRCÉ, v. THE UNITED STATES, No. 603.

This claim was preferred in behalf of the heirs of Louis Frederic Foucher, Marquis de Circé, who died in France the 22d day of November, 1869. It was alleged in the memorial that the United States troops took and destroyed property and buildings upon the Foucher plantation, in the parish of Jefferson, Louisiana, in the years 1863 and 1864, of the value of $88,449.

The facts of record were these:

Foucher was born in the year 1798 in the city of New Orleans, province of Louisiana, then a part of the dominions of Spain. He was there resident with his father, Pierre Foucher, in the year 1803, when the territory of Louisiana was transferred to the United States. Louis Frederic Foucher remained at New Orleans until the year 1836, when he removed to France, where he continued to live until his death in November, 1869. During his residence in France for a third of a century he exercised the rights and enjoyed the privileges of a citizen. He owned a chateau and he assumed the inherited title of Marquis de Circé. But there was no evidence of record that he was ever reinstated or naturalized in conformity to the code of France.

It was claimed by the counsel for the United States, upon the authority of the decision of the Commission in the case of Egle Aubry (No. 25), that Foucher became a citizen of the United States by the treaty of cession of the territory of Louisiana in 1803; that his residence in France, even with the attending circumstances, did not entitle him to be considered a citizen of that country, and that consequently the Commission could not take jurisdiction of the case. It was admitted by the counsel for the United States that the supreme court of the State of Louisiana, in a case entitled "The State of Louisiana vs. The Succession of the Marquis de Circé," had held that he was at the time of his death a French citizen within the meaning of both the French law and the law of Louisiana.

The counsel for the French Republic maintained that, inasmuch as the father of Louis Frederic Foucher was born in Louisiana when that province was within the jurisdiction of France, his descendant, Louis Frederic Foucher, was a citizen of France and not affected by the cession of the territory of Louisiana by France to Spain, then by Spain to France, then by France to the United States. It was also claimed by the counsel for the French Republic that the opinions of certain French lawyers, whose words were quoted in the brief, should be accepted as the evidence of experts in regard to the law of France. M. Harrisse, speaking of the French law, said:

Citizenship is conferred in the forms given in my first cross-interrogatory. It is evidenced by public notoriety and enjoyment and practice of certain political rights which are conferred on French citizens only, such as the registry of voting at elections or inscription on the electoral lists. But as the law does not prescribe the rules of evidence for such cases, it springs from circumstances.

The certificate of the minister of the interior was also relied upon. He said in substance that Louis Frederic Foucher, Marquis de Circé, born at New Orleans, had been, in view of the evidence produced, considered to be French and inscribed on the electoral list of the seventh arrondissement of Paris for the years 1864 to 1869, and that his inscription on that list established, until the contrary was proved, that he was

French. M. Jason, a French lawyer, who was examined as an expert, said:

I consider the French nationality of Louis Frederic Foucher, Marquis de Circé, as proved, first, by the judgment of the tribunal of the Seine of April 11, A. D. 1851, ordering the rectification of the birth certificate of his son, and the addition of the name of Circé, which had been omitted-an addition which the tribunal could order only after the Marquis de Circé had established his quality of French citizen; second, by the inscription of L. F. Foucher de Circé on the electoral lists of the seventh arrondissement on presentation to the competent municipal officers of documents establishing his quality of French citizen.

The Commission, by a unanimous decision, allowed the claim for the sum of $9,200.

This act was a recognition of the citizenship of Foucher in France; but whether the conclusion was reached upon the ground that the father of Foucher was a citizen of France, and that the son, although born in the territory of Louisiana, then a province of Spain, followed the condition of his father, or whether the Commission were of opinion that the removal of Foucher to France in 1836 and his continuous residence there for a third of a century and during his life, coupled with the fact that he was recognized as a citizen of France, although formal proceedings, as required by articles 9 and 10 of the French Code, had not been com plied with, justified the conclusion legally that he was a citizen of France, does not appear.

BLEZE MOTTE v. THE UNITED STATES, No. 282.

The claimant asked compensation for a horse and other personal property, alleged to have been of the value of $298, and to have been seized by Captain Bunker, of the Forty-first Regiment of Massachusetts Vol

unteers.

In the testimony given by Bleze Motte (p. 11) it appeared that he was a slave-owner before and during the late war."

The counsel for the United States filed a demurrer to the jurisdiction of the Commission, upon the ground that the said Bleze Motte had lost his citizenship in France.

There were three other cases in which demurrers were filed or arguments made, based upon the fact, either admitted or proved in each case, that the memorialist had been the owner of slaves. They were Pierre Nougué, No. 323, David de Laureal, No. 97, and Ladmirault, No. 475.

It was contended by the counsel for the United States that slaveholding, under the circumstances in the several cases specified, operated to denationalize a French citizen, the act being contrary to certain decrees of the French Government, which were cited as follows, namely: A decree of the French Government, No. 296, dated April 27, 1848, entitled “Décret relatif à l'abolition de l'esclavage dans les colonies et possessions françaises," provides in article 8 as follows:

"A l'avenir, même en pays étranger, il est interdit à tout français de posséder, d'acheter ou de vendre des esclaves, et de participer, soit directement, soit indirectement, à tout trafic ou exploitation de ce genre. Toute infraction à ces dispositions entrainera la perte de la qualité de citoyen français." (Bulletin des lois de la République Français, No. 32.)

By the act of the National Assembly of France of the 11th of February, 1851, it is provided as follows:

"Article unique. Le délai que l'article 8 du décret du 27 Avril 1848 accorde aux Français établis à l'étranger, pour affranchir ou aliéner les ésclaves dont ils sont possesseurs, est fixé à dix ans." (Bulletin des lois 1851, 10 série, lois et décrets 7-304 a 409, page 220.)

By the executive decree of the 7th of May, 1858, the 8th article of the decree of 1848 was construed as follows:

"Article unique. Le paragraphe 2 de l'article 8 du décret du 27 avril 1848 est modifié ainsi qu'il suit:

"Le présent article n'est pas applicable aux propriétaires d'esclaves dont la possession est antérieure au décret du 27 avril 1848, ou résulterait, soit de succession, soit de donation entre vifs ou testamentaire, soit de conventions matrimoniales." (Bulletin des lois, No. 607, XI series. B.)

The counsel for the French Republic interposed the following declaration in support of his motion to set aside the demurrer :

I. Article II of the Convention of January 15, 1880, contains the following provis ion:

"But no claim or item of damage or injury based upon the emancipation of slaves shall be entertained by the Commission."

This provision excludes from the jurisdiction of the Commission all and every claim growing out of the loss of slaves, in whatever form said loss may have occurred.

Unless all the processes of reasoning are unsound, this implies that Frenchmen who held slaves may make claims before this Commission for any damage done to their person or property, except as to the exclusions enumerated in the above-quoted article.

II. The assumption that this Commission has the power to denationalize Frenchmen is most strenuously resisted on behalf of the Government of the French Republic. Whatever might be the legislation of France on the question of ownership of slaves, and whatever its effects upon French citizenship, it belongs exclusively to French courts to execute it.

III. The convention is part of the law of the two countries, and its effect is to set aside and annul every act of municipal legislation in so far as the same may conflict with the provisions of this convention. The convention itself being the last expression of the will of the contracting powers, does away with any act which might be held inconsistent.

IV. This Commission has no right whatever to inquire into the question raised by the counsel for the United States. It is submitted that the pleading, by means of which this question was raised, ought to be set aside without any further argument or delay.

V. Should the Commission entertain doubts on this point, the counsel for the French Republic contends that it is not within its province to inquire further into the question; it should be referred at once to the high contracting parties.

VI. The counsel for the French Republic enters his formal protest against any further proceedings intended to give jurisdiction to this Commission over questions which tend to distort the clear, distinct, and positive meaning of a solemn compact between two great nations.

VII. Pleadings interposed to that effect are frivolous, and ought not to be countenanced.

The counsel for the United States submitted the following argument in support of the demurrer:

These decrees operated to deprive the claimants in the cases at bar of citizenship in France, without any act of the Government of France or its tribunals. The decrees of that Government and the acts of the claimants in holding slaves after the expiration of the ten years prescribed by the act of the National Assembly of France of the 11th of February, 1851, deprived them of French citizenship in France as effectually as though they had been naturalized in the United States.

In the case of a person born in France and naturalized in the United States this Commission will look only at the evidence by which his naturalization is proved. In the case of a person born in France, and holding slaves contrary to the decrees referred to, the duty of the Commission is fully performed when, upon an examination of the proofs, there seems to be no reasonable doubt that the acts of the claimant are in violation of the decrees.

The loss of citizenship in such a case is not due to the act of the Commission, but is due entirely to the circumstance that the claimant, by his own acts, violated the laws of his native country. The penalty attached to that violation operates instantly and without the agency or the decision of any tribunal. The only question before the Commission is, did the claimant hold slaves in violation of the decrees and laws of the French Government? If so, then the Commission must hold that he is not a French citizen, precisely as they would in case of his naturalization in the United States. The French Code in several of its articles, as well as in the decrees quoted, assumes