En ce qui concerne la seconde affaire (Document B), la décision fut contraire à MM. G. A. Le More & Cie., qui en appelèrent à la Cour Suprême des États-Unis.

Or, il ressort du dossier déposé à la Cour Suprême que, dans ce cas, les décisions adverses de ce même tribunal et de la cour de district reposent toutes deux sur une erreur de fait; le jugement et l'arrêt qui le confirme supposent à tort que Léon Queyrouze, qui avait vendu les 830 balles, était domicilié à la Nouvelle-Orléans au moment où MM. Le More & Cie. les avaient acquises de lui. Cette erreur ayant été reconnue, tant par la comparaison du dossier "manuscrit" avec le dossier "imprimé" que par les documents ultérieurs mentionnés au mémoire, la justice ne demande-t-elle pas que la seconde réclamation de MM. G. A. Le More & Cie. soit envisagée au même point de vue que la première déclarée bonne et valide?

En d'autres termes, dans la première de ces affaires la cour établit en faveur de MM. G. A. Le More & Cie. des principes de droit et d'équité qui son également applicables à la seconde et qui lui eussent été assurément appliqués sans l'erreur commise à l'égard de la résidence de Léon Queyrouze.

En effet, ainsi que le dossier le constate, les deux lots de cotons ont été acquis dans "des conditions identiques" de temps, de localité, de paiement, de possession, de déplacement, etc. La seule différence consiste en ce que MM. Le More & Cie. achetèrent les 323 balles de Lazare et Pargoud, tandis qu'ils achetèrent les 830 balles de Léon Queyrouze.

Agréez, etc.,

BERTHEMY.

Letter of Mr. Fish.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, 29th June, 1870.

SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your note of the 23d of last month in relation to the claim of Messrs. G. A. Le More & Co. That note refers to a previous one addressed to this Department by the Count de Faverney, under date of the 21st of May, 1869. It appears from the latter and its inclosures that the claim of Messrs. Le More had been adjudged by the Supreme Court of the United States to be unfounded and inadmissible at its December term of 1867. That decision proceeded upon the assumption that one Léon Queyrouze, from whom the Messrs. Le More acquired their alleged title to 830 bales of cotton, was, at the time of his purchase of such cotton from an agent of the late rebellion in Texas, himself a citizen of Louisiana and a resident of New Orleans, where the authority of this Government had been reestablished. It was adjudged upon this assumption, and in view of the acts of Congress prohibiting commercial intercourse with the inhabitants of the States in insurrection, that Queyrouze could not acquire and could not transmit to the claimant any valid title to the cotton in question.

It further appears that at the December term of 1868 the claimants brought to the notice of the Supreme Court that, by an error in printing the transcript of evidence, the sworn statement of Queyrouze, that he was residing in Mexico at the time of selling the cotton to the claimants, was left out of the record upon which the court founded its judgment. The court, however, assuming the correctness of this statement, did not think it proper to rehear the cause or take any other step towards reversing its previous judgment; and accordingly, on the 22d of March, 1869, made an order denying the petition of the claimants.

The only new fact brought under consideration by the note to which this is in reply, is that the same district court of the United States for the southern district of Illinois, which in the first instance denied the right of the claimants to the 830 bales of cotton now in question, has given judgment in their favor for the proceeds of 323 bales of cotton, which it is said were acquired under the same conditions of time, locality, possession, removal, &c., the only difference being that the 323 bales were purchased from Lazare and Pargoud, while the 830 bales were purchased from Queyrouze.

All that can be properly inferred from this statement is that Messrs. Lazare and Pargoud were under no such disability of trafficking with the rebels as were assumed to affect Queyrouze.

I need not remind your excellency that in order to justify a reclamation against the final decision of a court of last resort it must be shown that there has been a manifest failure of justice in a case admitting of no reasonable doubt. Every presumption is in favor of the judgment, and he who assails it lies under the burden of proving positive error. It is not sufficient that from any mischance or inadvertence the opinion of the judges has declared an inadequate reason for their judgment, if any good reason can be found to support it. In the case under consideration I must believe it to have been the judgment of the Supreme Court that the little scrap of evidence which appears to have escaped its notice on the original hearing would not, if it had then been before the judges, have affected their conclusions. It is not incumbent upon me to trace the line of argument which the court would have pursued if the facts had been

presented at the original hearing in the same form they are now submitted to me, and as they were submitted to the court on the application for a rehearing. They were in substance that Léon Queyrouze, a native of France, but naturalized citizen of the United States, a major in the militia of the State of Louisiana, and subsequently in the rebel army, was wounded and captured at the battle of Shiloh; that while under detention at New Orleans he repeatedly refused to take the oath of allegiance, and was finally discharged by the order of Major-General Butler under condition of his absenting himself from the United States. He went to Havana, and from thence, after remaining about four months, to Matamoros, in Mexico, from whence he made occasional incursions, as pleasure or interest dictated, into those parts of Texas and Louisiana which for the time were occupied by the rebel forces. Upon one of these journeys he purchased the cotton in question from a public agent of the organization which controlled the rebel operations and usurped the title and functions of a gov

ernment.

Upon these facts I think it may be justly argued that Léon Queyrouze, banished in effect from the United States because of his stubborn disloyalty, obtained no exemp tion from the restriction against commercial intercourse with the rebels which rested upon citizens of unstained patriotism. If he could, it would convert a punishment into a privilege. It would open to a person known to be hostile to the Government a free avenue to a traffic so seductive and corrupting that the common judgment of civilized nations has denied it to the most loyal and deserving.

If the phraseology of our statutes be construed as failing to reach Queyrouze because he had not his local habitation in a loyal district, it is to be observed that these statutes are simply in affirmance of the well-recognized rule of public law which, in the language of Chancellor Kent, "has put the sting of disability into every kind of voluntary communication and contract with the enemy made without the special permission of the Government."

It can scarcely be necessary to remark that a citizen of the United States, whether within or without their territorial jurisdiction, can never be recognized as having the character or right of a neutral. The obligations of his allegiance cling to him, however he may affect to disregard or endeavor to evade them.

Impressed by such considerations, the Executive Department cannot address to Congress, which alone has the power to compensate the Messrs. Le More, any recommendation of their claim.

Accept, sir, &c.,

HAMILTON FISH.

On another occasion the fallacy of the argument contained in the foregoing communication of Mr. Fish-particularly that portion of it which relates to the true meaning and proper interpretation of the so-called "non-intercourse act" of Congress of July 13, 1861-will be discussed and combated at length, but it may not be amiss to call the attention of the Commission at this point to the singular and illogical position assumed by the Secretary of State in the sentence we have italicized, so far as it denies to Queyrouze the same rights and privileges accorded to the millions of other residents of the Confederate States who had been citizens of the United States. If a citizen of the United States, whether within or without their territorial jurisdic tion, can never be recognized as having the character or right of a neutral" and "the obligations of his allegiance cling to him, however he may disregard or endeavor to evade them," how does it happen that the judicial and other departments of the Government have recognized in hundreds of instances-among others, in the case of the purchase by Jules Le More of 59 bales of cotton from Alexander Lazare-the perfect right of individuals who had renounced their former citizenship and their allegiance to the United States and had embraced the cause of the Confederacy to trade with that Government and other individuals similarly circumstanced, and with nentrals? The gist of Mr. Fish's argument is that Queyrouze, having been once a citizen of the United States, could not, under the law of nations, lose such citizenship either through banishment by the French authorities or by voluntary expatria tion. This assumption, besides being in direct conflict with the principle of the liberty of self-expatriation so strenuously insisted upon by the Government of the United States since its foundation, seeks to establish, in reference to the claim of your memorialists, a rule of construction and decision as to the status and acts of Queyrouze different from that which the various departments of the American Governments have long since adopted as to the status and acts of other persons affected by the American civil war.

The evidence to be submitted will show that Queyrouze was banished from New Orleans and the United States, after his recovery from wounds received as a Confederate officer at the battle of Shiloh, because of his bitter hostility to the Union; that he took up his residence in the city of Matamoros, Mexico, and there established himself in commercial business; that during bis residence there the Confederate Government took possession of 415 bales of cotton which he had acquired in the course of

his business; that, by way of indemnity, he was offered double this quantity of cotton on the banks of the Ouachita River, this offer being made in pursuance of the practice which had been established of allowing two bales in an exposed situation for every bale that was taken at a place beyond the reach of the enemy, and that Queyrouze, having gone to the Ouachita region to obtain possession of these 830 bales of cotton, there received them, and shortly afterwards sold them to your memorialists, acting through their agent, Jules Le More, for a valuable consideration.

If this whole transaction was not, in the eyes of the law of nations, a perfectly legitimate one-as much so as if Queyrouze had been at the time a resident of Havrethen your memorialists are at a loss to understand how any transaction between the Confederate Government and neutrals, or between that Government and the persons acknowledging its sovereingty and giving to it their adhesion and allegiance, could have received from the United States and foreign powers the stamp of legality. Queyrouze was what had been called a "violent rebel." He not only refused, on his return from Shiloh, to take the oath of allegiance, but actually, in reponse to a proclamation of General Butler of September 24, 1862, registered himself as an enemy of the United States. He was devoted, heart, body, and soul, to the cause of the Confederacy, and had given proof of remarkable personal valor at Shiloh. But for physical disabilities resulting from severe wounds he would have continued in the military service of the Confederacy. He established himself in business at Matamoros, with a view of providing for himself a comfortable livelihood. So deep-rooted was his devotion to the Confederate cause that, after the war, he could with difficulty be prevailed upon by his friends to return to Louisiana.

Such was the career of the person whose acceptance of 830 bales of cotton from the Confederate Government by way of indemnity for 415 bales taken from him is sought to be stamped with illegality and nullity to the prejudice and ruin of a neutral firm acting in good faith and engaged in an enterprise honorable in itself and sanctioned by the law of nations. If Queyrouze's transaction with the Confederate Government was illegal and void, every act of sale, every transfer of property, every contract of marriage made within the lines of the Confederacy during its existence, was equally null and void. The mere statement of the proposition is sufficient to establish its untenability.

At the outbreak of the war between the Northern and Southern States Queyrouze renounced his allegiance to the Union and became a citizen of the Southern Confederacy. Louisiana had been his residence. By virtue of the proclamation of the President of August 16, 1861, and of several acts of the Federal Congress, the inhabitants of that State and others, so long as they remained in a state of armed hostility, were regarded and treated as enemies of the United States. By the bazard of war Queyrouze was brought to the city of New Orleans in the spring of 1862. In order to avoid and escape even the presumption of loyalty that might have attached to him upon the occupation of the city by the Federal troops he registered himself as an enemy of the United States. So far from resisting the banishment with which he was threatened, he voluntarily expatriated himself.

Thus, by every act in his power-by taking up arms, by formal self-registration as an enemy, by constant act and word, by self-expatriation, and by foreign residencehe renounced his allegiance to and citizenship in the United States, and proclaimed his devotion to the Confederacy. If these acts be not sufficient to operate a change of citizenship and domicile in the eyes of the American Government, then your memorialists respectfully submit that the American doctrine of liberty of expatriation must be abandoned, the treaties of the United States with foreign Governments on that subject should be abrogated, and the American people must renounce one of the dearest tenets of their political creed and revert to the ancient English doctrine: "Once a citizen always a citizen." Such a thing as involuntary citizenship is foreign to the spirit of American institutions. After Queyrouze's expatriation the United States Government owed him no protection, and he owed that Government no allegiance.

Your memorialists have dwelt at length upon this branch of their claim because the adverse decisions from which they have so long suffered and against which they have so often protested have been made, both by the courts and the State Department, to turn upon the political status of Queyronze. Your memorialists now respectfully submit that, having exhausted all the remedies afforded them by the power against the acts of whose authorities they complain, they are entitled to seek a redress of their grievances from the honorable Commission established to effect a peaceable settlement of claims of French and American citizens against the Governments of the United States and France respectively. They believe that they have brought themselves within the rule established by long usage and precedent as to the time when and circumstances under which a private citizen who feels himself aggrieved by the sentence of a prize court of a foreign State may apply to his own State for a remedy.

It is to be noted that the judicial proceeding had against the claimants' cotton was in the prize court of the United States, and to enforce condemnation as marine prize, the seizure of the cotton being considered and treated exclusively as a naval capture. Wheaton, speaking upon the subject of the remedy where the property of subjects of a neutral power had been improperly condemned in a prize court, says, quoting and adopting Rutherforth:

"The imperfection of the voluntary law of nations, in its present state, cannot oppose an effectual bar to the claim of a neutral Government seeking indemnity for its subjects who have been unjustly deprived of their property under the erroneous administration of that law. # The moment the decision of the tribunal

of the last resort has been pronounced (supposing it not to be warranted by the facts of the case and by the law of nations applied to those facts), and justice has been thus finally denied, the capture and condemnation become the acts of the State, for which the sovereign is responsible to the Government of the claimant. The tribunals of a State are but a part, and only a subordinate part, of the government of the State. But the right of redress against injurious acts of the whole Government, of the supreme authority, incontestably exists in foreign States whose subjects have suffered by those acts. Much more clearly, then, must it exist when those acts proceed from persons, authorities, or tribunals responsible to their own sovereign, but irresponsible to a foreign Government otherwise than by its action on their sovereign." (Wheaton's International Law, by Dana, sec. 392.)

#

*

The captors are bound to submit to its (the prize court's) sentence, though this sentence should happen to be erroneous, because it has a complete jurisdiction over their persons. But the other parties to the controversy, as they are members of another State, are only bound to submit to its sentence so far as this sentence is agreeable to the law of nations or to particular treaties. If justice, therefore, is not done to them they may apply to their own State for a remedy." (Ibid., sec. 393.) "In conformity with these principles the United States, under the treaty of 1794 with Great Britain, obtained indemnity for her citizens in cases where there had been a final sentence of condemnation." (Ibid., sec. 395.) "So the United States obtained similar indemnities under the treaty of March 28, 1830, with Denmark.” (Ibid, sec. 397.)

"The true nature of a prize tribunal may be described by a phrase for which, indeed, I find no precedent, but which is nevertheless appropriate, an inquest by the State." (Ibid., Dana's note, 186, sec. 388.)

"The responsibility for the capture and condemnation lying upon the State, as a belligerent act, the State is not bound by a favorable decision of its own tribunal. It may, and should, notwithstanding the decree of condemnation, make restitution or compensation on the demand of the sovereign of the claimant if justice require it." (Ibid.)

From these citations we submit that the law is clear, that if the claimants have been deprived of their property by the erroneous judgment of the prize courts, the United States are bound to indemnify them.

Concerning the question of the proper time for the intervention of the claimants, Mr. Wheaton lays down the rule as follows:

*

"If justice has not been done to them (the neutral claimants) they may apply to their own State for a remedy. In order to determine when their right to apply to their own State begins, we must inquire when the exclusive right of the other State to judge in the controversy ends. As this exclusive right is nothing else but the right of the State to which the captors belong to examine into the conduct of its own members before it become answerable for what they have done, such exclusive right cannot end until their conduct has been thoroughly examined. Since, therefore, it is usual in maritime countries to establish not only inferior courts of marine to judge what is and what is not lawful prize, but likewise superior courts of review, to which the parties may appeal if they think themselves aggrieved by the inferior courts, the subjects of a neutral State can have no right to apply to their own State for a remedy against an erroneous sentence of an inferior court till they have appealed to the superior court, or to the several superior courts, if there are more courts of this sort than one, and till the sentence has been confirmed in all of them. After the sentence of the inferior court has been thus confirmed the foreign claimants may apply to their own State for a remedy, if they think themselves aggrieved." (Wheaton, sec. 393.)

*

*

But the claimants do not rest their claim exclusively upon the capacity of Queyrouze to treat with the Confederate Government. They will at the proper time request the representative of their Government to urge before this honorable Commission the proposition that the undoubted possession of the cotton acquired by Jules Le More, the agent of your memorialists, in good faith, and for a valuable consideration, was alone sufficient under the code of Louisiana, which should govern the transac tion, and also by the common and civil laws, to vest the property absolutely in the

claimants, whether Queyrouze's title was bad or good, and that its seizure by the naval forces of the United States was utterly unwarranted and illegal.

Your memorialists further represent that it will appear from a certificate of February 16, 1870, of George P. Bowen, clerk of the district court of the United States for the southern district of Illinois, that the gross proceeds of the sale of the 830 bales claimed by your memorialists amounted to the sum of $350,726.46, and that the costs and expenses paid out of said gross proceeds, including the expenses of weighing, storage, carting, and rebaling of said cotton, and the United States taxes and assessments thereon amounted to the sum of $41,566.06.

Your memoralists have never understood how the charges upon this lot of cotton conld have legitimately amounted to so large a sum; but if they are concluded by the certificate above mentioned, then the principal of their claim amounts to $309,160.40, and upon this principal sum they claim and ask for the payment of interest at the rate of 6 per cent. per annum from June 22, 1864, the date of the sale, until the close of the official existence of this honorable Commission.

Your memorialists have for many years patiently yet unceasingly prosecuted this just claim for the value of property wrongfully seized and taken from them—at what expense of time, trouble, and money it is needless to state. They have grown gray in this prolonged battle for their rights, and they now welcome, as the means of finally obtaining that justice which is their due, but which has been so long denied to them, the opportunity furnished them by the establishment of this honorable Commission to lay their claim before an impartial tribunal commissioned to carefully examine and decide, according to the principles of public law, justice, and equity, the cases of private citizens appealing for the redress of wrongs committed, inadvertently or designedly, by powerful Governments in times of war and public disturbance, when, amid the clash of arms, the voice of the law is stilled.

Wherefore your memorialists pray, the premises considered, that an award may be made by this honorable Commission in their favor and against the Government of the United States for the sum of $309,160.40, with interest thereon at the rate of 6 per cent. per annum from June 22, 1864, until the close of the official existence of this honorable Commission. And your memorialists will ever pray.

G. A. LE MORE & CO.,

By their attorney in fact, JULES LE MORE.

Jules Le More, being duly sworn, deposes and says that by a special power of attorney, dated at Havre, France, on the 4th of November, 1880, he was constituted the attorney in fact of G. A. Le More & Co., for them and in their name, place, and stead, on account of their distant foreign residence and of his own intimate personal knowledge of the facts relating to the claim of his constituents, to make such formal verifications of documents to be laid before the Franco-American Commission sitting at Washington, D. C., as the rules of said Commission might require; that, by virtue of said power of attorney, he has signed the foregoing memorial, and that the statements contained therein are, to the best of his knowledge and belief, true and correct. JULES LE MORE.

Sworn to and subscribed before me, at New Orleans, Louisiana, on the fifth day of March, A. D. 1881.

[SEAL.]

A. ABAT, N. P.

Whereas G. A. Le More & Co., merchants, of the city of Havre, Republic of France, have a just and valid claim against the United States of America for the proceeds of the sale of eight hundred and thirty bales of cotton, which were illegally seized in the spring of 1864 by the officers of a flotilla of gunboats belonging to the Navy of the United States; and whereas, at and before the time of such seizure Jules Le More, a citizen of the Republic of France, now residing in the city of New Orleans, Louisiana, was the agent of said G. A. Le More & Co., in the United States, and was present at said seizure of their cotton, and is perfectly familiar with all the facts concerning the purchase of said cotton for G. A. Le More & Co. and its illegal seizure by United States authorities; and whereas the said G. A. Le More & Co. intend submitting their aforesaid claim for examination and adjudication to the Franco-American Commission created by the treaty of January 15, 1880, between the United States of America and the Republic of France, so soon as it shall be fully organized:

Now, therefore, be it known that for the better and the more convenient, speedy, and effective prosecution of said claim, the said G. A. Le More & Co. hereby constitute and appoint the said Jules Le More their attorney in fact, to represent them before said Franco-American Commission, specially authorizing him to execute in their name, place, and stead such formal oaths or affirmations as may be required of claimants by the rules and regulations of said Commission in the presentation of their claim; and also specially authorizing him to employ, on such terms as may be deemed proper by him, legal counsel to assist him in the presentation of their said claim to