purchase of cotton within the rebel lines. Under this permission an agent of the bank passed through the United States lines into Upper Louisiana, and purchased the cotton in question of a subagent of McKee, in August, 1863. And in March, 1864, the bank sold the cotton to Grieff & Zunts.

4. Early in March, 1864, Leon Queyrouze, a naturalized citizen of the United States, residing in New Orleans, purchased the cotton of Buckner, an agent of the Confederate States. And later in that month Queyrouze sold the cotton to G. A. Le More & Co., citizens and residents of France.

5. Section 5 of the act of Congress of July 13, 1861, among other things, provides that "it may and shall be lawful for the President, by proclamation, to declare that the inhabitants of such State, or any section or part thereof, where such insurrection exists, are in a state of insurrection against the United States, and thereupon all commercial intercourse by and between the same and the citizens thereof and the citizens of the rest of the United States, shall cease and be unlawful so long as such condition of hostility shall continue."

The same section also contains this proviso: "That the President may, in his discretion, license and permit commercial intercourse with any such part of said State or section, the inhabitants of which are so declared in a state of insurrection, in such articles and for such time, and by such persons, as he, in his discretion, may think most conducive to the public interest, and such intercourse, so far as by him licensed, shall be conducted and carried on in pursuance of rules and regulations prescribed by the Secretary of the Treasury."

On the 17th of August, 1861, the President issued a proclamation declaring "that the inhabitants of the said States of Georgia, South Carolina, Virginia, North Carolina, Tennessee, Alabama, Louisiana, Texas, Arkansas, Mississippi, and Florida (except the inhabitants of that part of the State of Virginia lying west of the Allegheny Mountains, and of such other parts of that State and the other States herein before mentioned as may maintain a loyal adhesion to the Union and Constitution, or may be from time to time occupied and controlled by forces of the United States engaged in the dispersion of said insurgents), are in a state of insurrection against the United States, and that all commercial intercourse between the same and the inhabitants thereof, with the exceptions aforesaid, and the citizens of other States, and other parts of the United States, is unlawful, and shall remain unlawful, until such insurrection shall cease or has been suppressed."

We do not entertain a doubt as to the true intent and meaning of the act of July 13, 1861. Indeed, the language is so clear and explicit as to render discussion unnecessary. The act interdicts all commercial intercourse between the loyal and insurrectionary parts of the Union during the existence of the rebellion, except what may be licensed by the President, and conducted under regulations to be prescribed by the Secretary of the Treasury. It expressly declares all commercial intercourse, not within the exception, to be unlawful. Prohibition is the rule, and license the exception. The inhabitants of the loyal and disloyal districts are rendered incapable of dealing with each other so long as the rebellion continnes. Every contract between them not founded on a license is simply void. It neither passes title nor gives a right

of action.

The act invests the President with the power to put the prohibition into operation, and define the limits of insurgent territory. This power was exerted by the procla mation of August, 1861, and from that date the prohibition had all the force of positive

law.

It is clear that the contract between Withenbury & Doyle and the Confederate agent was within the prohibition. It was an act of commercial intercourse between the citizens of Ohio and of that part of Louisiana in insurrection, in violation alike of the letter and spirit of the statute. The contract was therefore null and void. The claimants acquired no title to the cotton. The question of ownership remained unaffected by the transactions between the parties. They had no legal capacity to trade with each other. While the rebellion continued, it was not in the power of these claimants to acquire title to this property except through a license from the President. It is equally clear that the Louisiana State Bank was within the prohibition. It is true that the city of New Orleans was originally within insurgent territory; but, on its capture and permanent occupation by the United States forces, it fell within the last exception in the President's proclamation, and ceased to be in a state of hostility to the United States. Such was the ruling of the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of "The Venice" (2 Wallace, 258). And the President, in his proclamation of March 31, 1863, in again defining the limits of the insurrection, expressly excepts New Orleans. And this act of the President was prior in date to the purchase by the bank. It follows that, after the 6th of May, 1862, the prohibition extended to the inhabitants of New Orleans, and they had no more right to trade with Upper Louisiana than had the inhabitants of Ohio or Illinois. Nor can the purchase of the bank be sustained under the permission of the commanding general. The President alone could authorize commercial dealing within the Confederate lines. As the bank

1

acquired no title, it had none to transfer to Grieff & Zunts. The latter have, therefore, no interest in the property in dispute.

The case of G. A. Le More & Co. is just as free from doubt. Queyrouze, through whom they claim, was clearly within the prohibition. He had no legal capacity to deal with the Confederate agent. He acquired no title to the cotton, and consequently had none to transfer to Le More & Co. The fact that they were citizens of France does not alter the case. If they had purchased directly from the Confederate agent, perhaps they would have acquired title. But it is useless to enter upon the discussion of that question. It is enough, for all the purposes of this case, to say that they received no title to the cotton, for the reason that Queyrouze had none to impart. All of the claims must be dismissed.

The honorable commissioners perceive, from the reading of this opinion, that the point upon which the decree of the court in the claim for 830 bales rests is that Léon Queyrouze was a resident of New Orleans-a loyal district-at the time when he acquired the cotton from the Confederate Government, and that, therefore, under the provisions of the act of July 13, 1861, prohibiting all intercourse between the inhabitants of the "loyal" and "disloyal" districts of the United States, he acquired no valid title to the cotton by his purchase from or exchange with the agent of the Confederate Government, and could impart none to the agent of G. A. Le More & Co. Against this proposition your memorialists have always protested, and do now protest. It embodies a grave error of fact (as to the political status of Queyrouze) and an error of law (as to the effect of the provisions of said act of Congress of July 13, 1861, upon the purchase, immediately followed by possession, by Jules Le More, the agent of a neutral foreign firm, in good faith and for a valuabl consideration, of movable property found in the possession ol a person known by him to have been for some time past a resident of Mexico and not a loyal citizen or inhabitant of the United States). But the discussion of this matter must be deferred for the present.

From the decree of the district court of the United States for the southern district of Illinois your memorialists appealed to the Supreme Court of the United States, which, at its December term of 1867, rendered its decision affirming the decree of the inferior court. The ground for this decision 18 found in the following extract from the opinion of the court, to wit: "Withenbury and Doyle being citizens and residents of Ohio; Queyrouze being a citizen of Louisiana and a resident of New Orleans, and the Bank of the State of Louisiana being a local institution of that city when they purchased, their purchases were all illegal and void, and passed no title to the vendees."

While your memorialists are not prepared to affirm that the jurisdiction of the prize courts of the United States does not extend to captures on land, they respectfully insist that, if such jurisdiction exists, the proper guide and rule of decision, in cases where the rights of neutrals are concerned, should be the public law of nations, and not mere local, municipal regulations like the act of Congress of July 13, 1861, upon which the two above-mentioned decisions were expressly based. Therefore your memorialists claim that while the proceedings in these courts were apparently regular in form, they were as irregular in essence and in fact as if they had been ab initio affected by the vice of want of jurisdiction.

Shortly after the rendition of the last-mentioned judgment the late Mr. Caleb Cushing discovered that, either through design or by inadvertence, the printed record of the case which had been prepared for submission to and the use of the judges of the Supreme Court had been garbled by the omission of the answer of Queyrouze to a question concerning his domicile at the time of his sale of the cotton to Le More-the question of Queyrouze's domicile being the most vital point in the whole case. Cushing therefore presented to the court the following motion for a bill of review, to

wit:

Supreme Court of the United States. December term, 1868.

Mr.

To the Honorable Chief Justice and Justices of the Supreme Court of the United States: The petition of Gustave A. Le More and Léontine Le More, trading and doing business in the name and style of G. A. Le More & Co., respectfully represents

That in a certain suit which was depending before your honors at the December term, 1867, entitled G. A. Le More & Co., claimants and appellants, against the United States, on appeal from the circuit court of the United States for the district of Illinois, it was adjudged and decreed by your honors that the decree of said court, adverse to your petitioners, stand affirmed.

Your petitioners further represent that said judgment of this court was formed solely and exclusively upon the assumption, as appears by the opinion of your honors in the premises, that one Léon Queyrouze, under and by sale from whom your petitioners acquired title to the property in controversy, was, at the time of purchase by

him, incompetent to have acquired or to pass title, by reason of said Queyrouze being, at the time of such purchase and sale by him, a citizen of the State of Louisiana, resident at New Orleans.

Your petitioners further represent that such assumption, touching the residence of said Queyronze, was an error in fact, as your petitioners aver and are ready to prove. Your petitioners further represent that such erroneous assumption aforesaid appears to have originated in errors and defects of the printed transcript in the hands of this court.

The transcript of the record of said circuit court, as certified to this court, contains the deposition of Léon Queyrouze.

In the printed copy of said deposition, which was before the court in the argument and decision of this case, is found the following passage:

"Interrogatory 10. Of what country are you a native; where were you residing at the time you sold the cotton to Le More?

"Interrogatory 11. Have you any reason to know that Le More believed you were neutral in the civil war then raging in the United States?

"Answer to 11th interrogatory. Yes; from my declarations to him, and from the fact of my being a Frenchman."

Your petitioners further represent that the answer to the 10th interrogatory is wanting in said printed transcript, by mistake of the printer or otherwise, but is found in the authentic written transcript, in the words following, namely:

"I am a native of France. I was residing in Mexico at the time I sold this cotton to Le More." (Tr., p. 231.)

By which answer it appears that said Queyrouze was not, at the time in question, a resident of New Orleans or of the State of Louisiana.

Your petitioners further represent that nothing contrary to this appears in the record, and that said Queyrouze in fact was not at that time a resident of New Orleans or the State of Louisiana.

Your petitioners further represent that, owing to the time occupied in the discussion of other parts of the case, this particular question of fact does not appear to have been specifically discussed by counsel or brought to the attention of the court; its decisive importance becoming apparent only in and by the opinion of your honors. In verification of the main fact your petitioners annex hereto a deposition of said Queyrouze, testifying and showing in full that at the time of the transactions in question he was not a resident of New Orleans or of Louisiana.

Wherefore your petitioners respectfully pray the court to have before it the record and proceedings in said cause, to inspect the same, and, for the correction of the error aforesaid, to do whatever of right and according to the laws and custom of the United States should be done.

By C. CUSHING,

Counsel.

This motion the court, for purely technical reasons, declined to allow, as appears. from the following order, to wit:

This is a petition that the court will cause to be brought before it the record and proceedings in a cause which was argued and disposed of by decree at the last term, in order to correct an error in the printed transcript of the record.

To make the allowance of the prayer of the petitioners available to them, through the correction of the alleged error, it would be necessary to recall the mandate sent to the inferior court, to set aside the decree rendered at the last term, to rehear the cause, and make a new decree. This cannot be done without reversing the settled and uniform practice of the court, and the petition must, of course, be denied.

Thus your memorialists, having patiently pursued and exhausted every remedy afforded them by the judicial tribunals of the United States, were compelled to have recourse again to the intervention of their own Government through its diplomatic representative to obtain a correction of the denial of justice, which, in consequence of the imperfect presentation of their claim and a vital error of fact, they had suffered at the bands of one branch of the Government of the United States.

The evidence in the case will show with what persistency successive ministers of France at Washington, moved by a profound sense of the equity and justice of the claim of G. A. Le More & Co., for the restitution of their property unjustly taken from them, or its equivalent in money, pressed the claim before the American Department

of State. With the permission of the Commission the memorialists will, as both the most succinct and comprehensive mode of exhibiting the views and reasoning of the representatives of the two Governments upon this matter, present here, in the langnage in which they were written, the communications of the Comte de Faverney, of the 21st of May, 1869, and of Mons. Berthémy of May 23, 1870, to the Secretary of State, and the letter of the Hon. Hamilton Fish of June 29, 1870, in response to both of these communications:

Letter of the Comte de Faverney.

Monsieur HAMILTON FISH, ETC.:

WASHINGTON, 21 mai 18

M. de Geofroy, à cette époque chargé d'affaires de France à Washington, a eu, à plusieurs reprises, et notamment le 13 juin 1864, l'honneur d'appeler l'attention du secrétaire d'état, M. Seward, sur une réclamation formée par des sujets français, MM. Le More & Cie., à la suite d'une saisie de cotons opérée au mois d'avril de la même année, par le capitaine Foster, de la marine fédérale, sur les bords de la rivière Ouachita, en Louisiane.

Son excellence M. Seward répondit à cette communication en date du 19 août suivant; dans cette note le secrétaire d'état exposait à M. de Geofroy l'impossibilité où se trouvait le Gouvernement des Etats-Unis d'accepter aucune responsabilité pour ce fait de guerre, "tant que les intéressés," disait-il," n'auraient pas fait constater devant l'autorité judiciaire le titre en vertu duquel ils revendiquaient les marchandises confisquées."

Conformément à cette indication, MM. Le More & Cie. ont successivement porté leur affaire devant la cour de district d'Illinois, siégeant comme cour de prises, et devant la Cour Suprême des États-Unis; leur demande fut écartée par ces deux cours. C'est dans ces circonstances que leur réclamation fut signalée une seconde fois à l'attention de son excellence M. Seward, par M. Berthémy; à la date du 3 mai 1868, il demandait au secrétaire d'état de vouloir bien, en exécution de la promesse que celui-ci avait faite dans sa note du 19 août 1864, appliquer à la réclamation de MM. Le More & Cie. le principe de droit international en vertu duquel un recours direct au Gouvernement est réservé aux étrangers contre les décisions d'un tribunal de prises. Des raisons graves et spéciales déterminaient M. Berthémy à adresser cette demande à M. Seward; MM. Le More lui affirmaient qu'ils étaient en mesure de démontrer d'une façon satisfaisante, à l'aide de documents authentiques, l'inexactitude du fait matériel sur lequel se fondait l'arrêt qui les condamnait.

En effet, le sieur Queyrouze (comme le prouvent les pièces justificatives annexées à la note de M. Berthémy en date du 3 mai), de qui MM. Le More & Cie. ont acquis directement les cotons qui font l'objet de leur réclamation, était, à l'époque où cette vente a u lieu, au service de la confédération, et non pas, comme le dit l'arrêt de la Cour Suerême, 66 un citoyen des Etats-Unis naturalisé, résidant à la Nouvelle-Orléans." Vis-à-vis des étrangers comme l'étaient les acquéreurs, M. Queyrouze se trouvait donc dans la même position légale que tout autre citoyen rebelle, et dès lors la transaction intervenue entre eux et lui constituait à leur profit un titre dont la validité ne saurait être atteinte par la section V de l'acte du 13 juillet 1861, interdisant tout commerce entre l'Union et les États déclarés en insurrection. Ce principe avait d'ailleurs été indirectement reconnu par l'arrêt de la cour de district, dont les considérants portent que, s'ils (MM. Le More & Cie.) avaient acheté directement de l'agent confédéré, ils auraient peut-être acquis un titre."

A cette demande, M. Seward répondit en communiquant officieusement à M. Berthémy une consultation du chef du bureau des réclamations, M. Peshine Smith. "Les réclamants," y disait M. Peshine Smith, "n'ont pas démontré qu'ils ont épuisé toutes les resources légales pour établir leurs droits, et, dès lors, il n'y aurait pas lieu pour eux à en faire l'objet d'une discussion diplomatique.”

M. Peshine Smith suggérait alors deux nouveaux modes de recours à la justice: 1o. l'intervention devant la cour de Springfield à l'occasion du jugement qu'elle allait rendre le mois suivant (terme de juin) pour ordonner l'attribution au trésor des fonds provenant de la vente des cotons saisis; 2o. l'introduction d'une instance devant la conr des "claims," à la condition de la présenter avant le 20 du mois d'août de la même année. En date du 19 mai M. Berthémy demanda dans une nouvelle note à M. Seward, s'il persistait dans les conclusions du rapport de M. Peshine Smith; ces conclusions soulevaient en effet dans l'esprit du Ministre de France les objections les plus sérieuses, comme le prouve sa note à la date sus-mentionnée. M. Seward répondit, cependant, le 1er juin suivant, en communiquant à M. Berthémy une nouvelle consultation de M. Peshine Smith, dans laquelle celui-ci reproduisait et maintenait les arguments de la première.

Placés en présence de ces faits, MM. Le More durent donc faire un nouvel appel aux tribunaux. Sur ces entrefaites, un examen attentif de tout le dossier de leur affaire vint leur expliquer l'erreur commise par la Cour Suprême lorsqu'elle les avait

déboutés de leur demande, en se fondant sur ce que Queyrouze était, au dire du jugement, citoyen de la Louisiane et résidant à la Nouvelle-Orléans.

Ce fait, qui servait de fondement à tout le raisonnement de la Cour Suprême, reposait sur une erreur matérielle, comme le prouve le dossier original déposé au greffe de la Cour. En effet, on lit dans l'interrogatoire manuscrit de Queyrouze:

"Question 10. Dans quel pays êtes-vous né; où résidiez vous quand vous avez vendu le coton à Le More?

"Réponse. Je suis né en France; je résidais au Mexique quand j'ai vendu le coton à Le More."

Or cette réponse décisive était omise dans les documents imprimés.

Ces faits nouveaux changeaient l'aspect de la réclamation; en conséquence, MM. Le More se décidèrent à porter une seconde fois leur affaire devant la Cour Suprême; ils lui demandèrent donc (terme de décembre 1868) de se faire présenter les documents originaux, et de décider en conséquence (pétition présentée à la Cour Suprême par M. Caleb Cushing, conseil de MM. Le More, terme de décembre 1868). La Cour Suprême a prononce son jugement le 22 mars courant; elle a débouté les demandeurs en se fondant sur de simples fins de non-recevoir, tirées uniquement de sa pratique constante.

C'est dans ces circonstances si différentes que je soumets de nouveaux à Votre Excellence la réclamation de MM. Le More, et que je demande en leur nom que cette affaire soit examinée par le département exécutif du Gouvernement, de manière à ce que MM. More puissent obtenir enfin justice.

En effet, il résulte de cet exposé:

1. Que des faits d'une importance décisive pour le succès de leur réclamation, bien que consignés dans leur dossier déposé à la Cour Suprême, sont, pour des raisons étrangères à MM. Le More, restés entièrement inconnus à la Cour.

2. Que si la Cour les avait connus, ils eussent probablement modifié sa décision. En ce qui a trait à la nouvelle instance devant la cour de district de Springfield, que conseillait M. Peshine Smith dans ses consultations du 18 mai et 1er juin 1868, les explications que je viens de donner sur les différences entre le manuscrit et le dossier imprimé, soumis à la Cour Suprême, démontrent suffisamment qu'il n'y avait pas lieu de la former. D'ailleurs, en fait, la consultation de M. Peshine Smith fut communiquée à M. Berthémy le 1er juin, c'est-à-dire, le jour même où l'affaire eut dû être appelée à Springfield, Ill.

Quant à la cour des "claims", en admettant même, ce qui paraît infiniment douteux, que cette cour ent pu avoir jamais juridiction dans cette affaire MM. Le More me font observer qu'une question décidée souverainement par la Cour Suprême ne pourrait être portée devant la cour des "claims." Enfin je dois faire remarquer à Votre Excellence que les délais pour commencer une instance de cette sorte devant cette cour sont en tous cas expirés.

Agréez, etc.,

COMTE DE FAVERNEY.

Letter of Mr. Berthémy.

Légation de France aux ÉTATS-UNIS,
Washington, le 23 mai 1870.

Monsieur le Secrétaire d'État :

A la date du 21 mai 1869, M. le comte de Faverney, alors chargé d'affaires de France, adressa au Département d'Etat une note relative à la réclamation de MM. Le More & Cie. Il y exposait la situation dans laquelle se trouvait placée cette affaire, les réclamants, conformément à l'avis qui leur avait été donné par le Département d'État, ayant épuisé tous les moyens de recours que pourraient leur offrir les tribunaux.

Dans le courant du mois d'août suivant, MM. G. A. Le More & Cie. demandèrent à M. le comte de Faverney de vouloir bien communiquer au Département d'État un mémoire imprimé où se trouvaient exposés leurs principaux arguments. Ce mémoire vous fut également transmis. Toutefois, à cette époque, il avait été impossible à MM. G. A. Le More & Cie. de se procurer les copies authentiques de certains documents d'une grande importance pour le succès de leur cause. Aujourd'hui ils sont en possession de ces pièces, et ils me prient de vous les soumettre comme complétant les preuves précédemment communiquées par la légation à la Secrétairerie d'État.

Ces documents, dont copie authentique est ci-jointe, établissent que MM. G. A. Le More & Cie. réclamaient deux lots de coton, l'un de 323 balles et l'autre de 830 balles, qui avaient été vendus à Cairo par le Marshal des États-Unis et qu'ils obtinrent gain de cause pour le lot de 323 balles (Document A).

Dans cette première affaire, la validité du "status" de MM. Le More & Cie. comme citoyens français, acquéreurs de bonne foi, et leur droit à recouvrir le dit lot de coton furent judiciareconnus par la cour de district; le produit de la vente du coton, après déduction des frais en courus, leur fut adjugé et payé.