eight months can be appropriated to printing the evidence, to making and printing the briefs, and to the investigation of the evidence, and the decision of the cases by the commissioners. The eight months will be sufficient to dispose of all the claims, and to completely fulfill the objects of the Commission.

Of the 745 claims before the Commission, 203 have been disposed of, leaving 542 yet to be disposed of. Of these 542 there are 94 which may be disposed of without briefs or argument, leaving 448 to be decided upon hearings. Evidence is still being taken by the claimants and by both Governments and must continue to be taken till April next and, in some cases, probably longer. One can not tell how much longer. You will see that it is impossible to finish the work by the 1st of July, even if no oral arguments are had; and the parties have the right by the terms of the original convention, to be heard orally in every case. There may be, and probably will be, some oral arguments, but we do not expect very many. An extension of the term for eight months is plainly necessary. If there should be no extension, probably nearly 300 cases of the French claimants against the United States and about one-half of the American claims against France will fail for want of time.

If the two Governments would at once authorize Mr. Roustan and Mr Frelinghuysen, as their respective plenipotentiaries to make a convention for the purposes above indicated, the President would be able to send a message with the convention to the Senate in a few days, and so probably secure its ratification.

I am, &c.,

No. 49.

A. O. ALDIS.

Mr. Aldis to Mr. Frelinghuysen.

FRENCH AND AMERICAN CLAIMS COMMISSION,

1518 H STREET, Washington, April 16, 1883.

SIR: At the request of my colleagues, and in accord with them, I have the honor to transmit to you a statement of the commissioners of the French and American Claims Commission as to the charges of the French counsel in regard to the dispatch of the business of the Commission; to which I respectfully invite your consideration. I inclose also the statement of the French counsel.

I have, &c.,

A. O. ALDIS.

STATEMENT OF THE COMMISSIONERS OF THE FRENCH AND AMERICAN CLAIMS COMMISSION AS TO THE CHARGES OF THE FRENCH COUNSEL IN REGARD TO THE DISPATCH OF THE BUSINESS OF THE COMMISSION.

At the meeting of the 15th of March the president of the Commission made the following statement:

"Since the 22d of January last only fourteen cases have been submitted to the Commission for its judgment. At this time there are no briefs awaiting our consideration. In view of this fact my colleagues, as well as myself, wish to urge it upon counsel to present more briefs, and that as soon as possible; and that this may be properly enforced the secretaries are requested to enter this statement upon the record.""

The counsel and assistant counsel of the French Republic on the 20th of March presented a paper suggesting "some of the causes which have largely contributed, if they have not produced, the results of which the commissioners complain."

Under this pretense the French counsel and assistant counsel have made an attack upon the conduct of the Commission, alleging:

I. The commissioners by delaying the decisions in

(a) The Chourreau case, "so-called territorial jurisdiction; ".

(b) The de Laureal and Bleze Mott cases, as to the "ownership of slaves question"; (e) The Henri Dubos case, "arrest and imprisonment question;"

have prevented claimants from preparing their cases.

II. That the commissioners have multiplied orders, "inconsistent and incoherent," "utterly impossible to be understood or carried out," "creating confusion and embarrassing instead of facilitating the dispatch of business," and "setting aside some of the most vital rules of the Commission." They refer to the orders of May 6 and November 20.

III. That the decisions of the Commission are inconsistent, and to illustrate this they cite five cases.

This paper was read by the counsel in public meeting, with the request that it be entered on the records, and this to the surprise of the commissioners, and before its tone, language, and substance were fully appreciated. We declined to have it then entered upon the records, and took it under consideration.

That it is disrespectful and an unprovoked attack upon the general conduct of the Commission is obvious. It is improper and discourteous both in the manner of its introduction and in its language and substance. In any ordinary court of justice such misconduct of counsel would be promptly punished. We may exclude it from our records, for it is obvious that our proces verbal is not to be the receptacle and record of such accusations. But it has been published in French and English, and is no doubt intended for the ears of the French minister of foreign affairs and the American Secretary of State.

International commissions must rely for security for orderly and respectful proceedings before them upon the sense of professional duty and propriety, and upon the courtesy of counsel appointed by the Governments. If, instead of these, discourteous language and groundless complaints appear, and unfounded charges, defaming the conduct, the orders, and the decisions of the Commission, are made in a public meeting, and sought to be put upon our records, it seems to be the duty of the commissioners to report such misconduct of counsel to the Government that appointed them. We regret that this necessity has arisen. Our duty to preserve good order and respectful proceedings in the meetings of the Commission, and to protect our conduct from unjust aspersions, as well as our respect for the French Republic (than which no nation is more observant of all the proprieties and courtesies in the conduct of public tribunals), whose counsel has attacked the Commission, make this duty necessary. If we take no notice of these charges the authorities of France might think them true, and that therefore we do not answer them.

One member of this Commission is the commissioner on behalf of the French Republic. Shall he be thus assailed by the counsel of his own Government and remain silent, and thus be subject to the imputation that these accusations are true!

For this occasion and under these circumstances we decide to notice the accusations of the French counsel; and as this statement will be entered upon our records, and transmitted to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of France and to the Secretary of State of the United States, we allow the paper of the French counsel to go with it, and to be entered upon our records.

We take up these charges in the order in which they were presented.

I.

THE CASE OF CHOURREAU, AS TO TERRITORIAL JURISDICTION.

This case was submitted on the 28th of January, 1882, not on the 10th of January, as incorrectly stated by the French counsel.

It was decided on February 28, just one month after.

The United States counsel contended that the property was destroyed on the theatre of war, in a place alternately overrun by the troops of both armies, and so was not in the territorial jurisdiction of the United States. The claimant contended that it was within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States. Both counsel in their briefs used the phrase "territorial jurisdiction," as used in the English text of the convention, and no reference to the French text and no intimation of any difference in the texts were made.

The majority of this Commission thonght the act was not committed within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States. From the 28th day of February to the 29th day of March nothing more was done with the case, but on the 29th of March

the counsel for France moved the Commission to reconsider its decision, stating that the words "territorial jurisdiction" were used in the English text, but that the word “territoire" was in the French text; that a conflicting construction was given to these differents texts of the treaty, and that the meaning of the two Governments in using these different words in the two texts of the treaty should be left to the Governments to settle.

M. de Geofroy, the French Commissioner, on the 1st of April, expressed his convictior that the French text rendered exactly the intention of the two Governments, and that the difference was caused by an error in transcribing the English text.

Immediately, on the 1st of April, the Commission referred the question to the two Governments to determine what they meant by using these different words, and announced that the Commission would not decide any cases depending on the question till the decision of the Governments was received.

Notwithstanding this announcement, the French counsel, on the 13th of April, declined to submit any business whatever, though not affected by this question, stating that clainants representing the majority of claims declined to proceed with the submission of their cases, even though they may not fall within the scope of the so-called limitation of the expression “territorial jurisdiction," and moved the Commission to adjourn to the day of May to await the decision of the two Governments. So unreasonable a delay, so wholly unjustifiable, could not be tolerated. We denied the motion, and between the 13th of April and 13th of May (when the decision was received) held seven public meetings and transacted a large amount of business.

It will be seen that the Commission was prompt in deciding the case in the first instance; that when the difference in the two texts of the treaty appeared we immediately referred it to the two Governments; that we did all we could to go on with business; and that the French counsel, assuming to act for a majority of claimants, did his best to delay all business and prevent any from being done for a whole month.

II.

THE OWNERSHIP OF SLAVES QUESTION.

By the law of France a French citizen who owns slaves any where forfeits his French eitizenship. But to this general law there are some exceptions. If the owner of slaves had owned them before the 29th of April, 1848, or owned them by succession, inheritance, by gifts testamentary, or inter vivos, or by marriage agreements, such ownership did not work a forfeiture of citizenship.

As this law created a penalty, we required the United States to prove strictly that the claimant did not come within the exceptions; and in this way a few cases in which the United States claimed a loss of citizenship by slaveholding were allowed, because there was nothing to show but that the claimant held the slaves under the exceptions and lawfully.

The charge which the French counsel make is that owing to our delay in deciding the question presented in the Bléze Mote case "from the 14th of February, 1882, to the 3d of January, 1883, a majority of the claimants were left in absolute ignorance and doubt whether the Commission would take jurisdiction of their cases. Meanwhile the counsel of the French Republic was urging a decision."

Let us turn to the record to show that this statement is wholly incorrect.

On February 16, 1882, the counsel for the United States demurred to the memorial in the cases of Bléze Mote and de Laureal, on the ground that the claimant admitted that he "was a slave owner before and during the late war." But this admission of claimant was not in the memorial, but appeared in his testimony. It is needless to say that a demurrer can only apply to facts stated in the memorial or otherwise ascertained. There was no stipulation of counsel that this slaveholding of Bléze Mote was, or was not, unlawful, though the United States counsel assumed it was admitted

to be unlawful.

In support of his demurrer, the United States counsel filed a brief on February 16, 1882, claiming that the slaveholding was unlawful; that this could be proved by any proper parol evidence; that this Commission on such evidence could find the fact, and that the judgment of a French court declaring the forfeiture was not necessary. On the 8th of May he set the case for hearing on the demurrer.

The French counsel did not join in demurrer, but on the 12th of May moved "to set aside the demurrer for the following reasons: 1. That the demurrers do not set forth any ground of defense. 2. That they are frivolous. 3. That they are speaking demurrers. 4. That they are feigned demurrers. 5. That they are pleas to the jurisdiction under the form of demurrers."

It is needless to say that upon such a motion-attempting to turn the question upon trifling technicalities-the main question could not be decided.

Nothing could have been devised more completely to obstruct the decision of the

main questions and divert the discussion to petty and frivolous technicalities than this motion of the assistant French counsel.

The assistant French counsel, though now asserting that "meanwhile" (that is, from February 14, 1882, to January 3, 1883), he "was urging a decision," admitted in court that he had never given any attention to the examination of the papers in the cases before the 8th of May-that is, had wholly neglected them for eighty-three daysand Mr. Boutwell complained that no notice was taken of the demurrer or brief for seventy-five days, "counsel having neglected to observe the rules of the Commission," and that the assistant French counsel "had no right to be heard on his motion." Upon this dispute between counsel, they agreed to postpone the discussion. On the 22d of May the assistant French counsel filed another statement in support of his motion to set aside the demurrer, and "formally declined to enter further into the argument on the merits of the grounds of the demurrer." He thus insisted upon discussing his motion to set aside, and would not argue the main question. The United States counsel, by his brief of May 22, ignored the motion to set aside, and argued the main question. Thus both insisted on different questions; and as the pleadings stood the main question, as to the effect of slaveholding upon French citizenship and what proof of it was necessary, could not be reached and decided at all. As the main question could not be decided, we left the case to await a bearing on the merits.

Thus the matters stood till October 19, 1882. Then the French counsel filed a "declaration" in support of the motion to set aside.

The United States counsel filed an answer on November 20.

On the 25th of November, 18-3, the French counsel filed a final brief, by special counsel, of seventeen pages, in which the main questions were very ably argued, and the case was then submitted to us.

Were we chargeable with delay in deciding the question when it was not finally submitted to us till November 25, 1882, and could not till then be taken for investigation and consultation, and when the whole period from February 16 to November 25 (nine months and eleven days) was wasted by the assistant French counsel in inattention to the cases, or in frivolons disputes about technicalities?

But on the 5th of December-ten days after the Bléze Mote and de Laureal cases were submitted-another case, that of Nongué, was submitted for final hearing on its merits, and in which the questions as to the forfeiture of French citizenship by slaveholding against French law, and whether the judgment of a French court is the only admissible proof, were fairly presented. This was really the first case in which these questions had properly come up.

The Commission decided upon the 3d of January that the claim should be allowed; that the only proper proof of forfeiture of citizenship was the judgment of a French tribunal.

And thus, in less than a month after the direct question was properly presented to us, it was decided.

The record proves that the statement that nearly a year's delay was caused by the neglect of the Commission to decide the point is wholly erroneous.

III.

IN REGARD TO THE CASE OF HENRI DUBOS.

1. Claims for unlawful arrest and imprisonment vary so greatly as to the facts upon which compensation is demanded, that one is scarcely ever a precedent or test for another. Probably there is not another case pending before us like Dabos'.

The acts for which the parties were arrested, the authority and mode of arrest, the mode of trial, the extent of imprisonment, the injuries suffered, and the claims for damages are so different in different cases that the preparation of each case must be by itself, and cannot depend on another.

2. The case of Dubos was submitted June 17, 1882. Two briefs, amounting to twenty-five pages on each side, were presented, and on the 17th of June counsel on both sides argued the case orally at great length. The Commission adjourned on June 30 till October.

The record shows how diligently the Commissioners were occupied prior to the adjournment, and that there was no time for consultation or examination of that case. On October 21 all the Commissioners were again in session, and about the 1st of November began the examination of this case.

In examining the Dubos case, the questions of the authority of General Butler to declare martial law, the extent and exercise of his powers under it, its application to foreigners, the legal limitations upon its arbitrary exercise, and the measure of damages were to be considered. These were new and very important questions. They were strictly questions of law, and slightly affecting the preparation of other

cases. The time we took to examine this case was no more than was necessary, . especially as the Commissioners disagreed.

3. The French counsel complain that our award "will not probably compensate for the time, labor, and expense incurred in prosecuting the case." Why is this sug gestion made? Is it the duty of the French counsel to look after the pecuniary interests of the claim agents, and to advise the Commissioners that instead of deciding "according to public law, equity, and justice," they should shape their awards so as to secure the claim agents against pecuniary loss?

The Commissioners who allowed the claim carefully considered all the briefs, arguments, and precedents presented by the French counsel, and made such an award as they thought right, and they declined to review it on this complaint.

IV.

The 19th rule of this Commission, as originally adopted, provided: "When the time has expired for taking proofs, or the case has been closed on both sides, the proofs will be printed. The argument for the claimant shall be filed within 15 days after the papers shall have been printed; the argument for the defendant 15 days thereafter; the reply thereto in 10 days, and the case shall stand for hearing 10 days thereafter."

The rule contemplated that all the evidence on both sides might be taken before the time for taking proofs had expired; and in such case the printing of the evidence and the making of the briefs should proceed at once. But in all cases when the time

for taking evidence expired, then the printing of the evidence and the making of briefs should immediately follow as by the rule.

Of course, no briefs could be expected till the taking of evidence on both sides was closed, or till the time therefor had expired.

Under this rule we acted till November 20, 1882, nearly two years.

As the special counsel for claimants cannot appear before us or present their briefs, but are required, as in all international commissions, to present their briefs to the counsel of the Government of which they are citizens, who, if he approves them, presents them to us; and as the counsel for France must present the briefs, it was his duty under the rules to consult with the private counsel to select the cases closed on both sides, and in the first instance and within the 15 days to present the briefs of claimants. As the private counsel are numerous, the claims being scattered among a great n any lawyers, the French counsel have many to help in making these briefs, and there is no reason or excuse for not presenting the briefs in all cases within the 15 days.

The United States counsel can do nothing until the claimants' opening briefs are filed; then he must reply in 15 days.

THE FREQUENT EFFORTS OF THE COMMISSIONERS TO SPEED THE DESPATCH OF BUSINESS.

1 To ascertain the condition of the docket we ordered a call of it on the 1st day of February, 1882, and required counsel to state the condition of the pending cases, and how far they are prepared and ready for submission, and how much further time will be required to take the testimony in each case and to close the cases and submit them. The call of the docket was completed on February 6. We hoped this would have the effect of speeding claimants in presenting briefs and in the taking of their evidence.

From the tabular statement then made it appeared that 40 cases were practically closed on both sides. The French counsel moved on February 10 that they be submitted within 40 days, but as that was precisely what Rule 19 required, such special order was needless, and the cases were left to stand upon the general rule.

His duty under Rule 19 was to present his briefs in these forty cases within fifteen days. It would then be the duty of the United States counsel to file his brief within fifteen days, and the closing brief of claimant should then be filed in ten days.

Between the 9th of February and the 23d of March, 1882, ten cases only were submitted. Between the 23d of March and the 27th of April, more than a month, not a single case was submitted, although the remaining thirty cases ought to have been submitted by the 22d of March. It appears from the register that in twenty of these thirty cases no opening briefs had been filed by the French counsel up to the 6th of May, 1882, although they ought to have been filed by the 21st of March. In this state of things we felt it our duty to again call the attention of counsel to the subject of submitting cases and presenting briefs. But no allusions in our orders or requests to any neglect of counsel on either side have ever been made.