and, secondly, that as to Eugene Rochereau, he was then in France, and was not cognizant of the purchase, and, if the act were inhibited as to the resident partners, their conduct in the matter could not be imputed to him.

It was also claimed by the counsel for the memorialist that alien residents, and all other parties, had a right to carry on their legitimate business, and that the payment of taxes to the insurrectionary State or the usurping Government had been held by the Supreme Court of the United States as fully justifiable. Further, it was claimed that the right to trade within the limits of either belligerent gave the alien resident the right to buy or invest in the securities of either without a violation of his neutrality; that the purchase of the bonds of the city of New Orleans, in open market, was not a violation of law at the time of the act, and the success of the United States, and the conquest of New Orleans, did not convert what was lawful at the time the act was committed, into an offense and crime. Finally, that General Butler had no right to punish parties for trading with the Confederates, when the United States had no power to enforce its authority, and protect alien residents.

The counsel for the United States called the attention of the Commission to the bond, which set forth on its face that it was "issued in conformity with ordinance No. 5949 of the city council, approved 3d of March, 1862."

He maintained that the reference to the ordinance was notice, both in law and in equity, to everybody to whom the bonds were offered, and that they were bound to make an examination of the authority by which they were issued; and that if Rochereau & Co., when these bonds were presented to them, had performed their duty, they would have examined the ordinance of the 3d of March, 1862, as specified and numbered upon the bond, and they would have seen that the purpose for which the money was asked and the loan offered was for the defense of New Orleans against the enemy of the Confederate States, which enemy was no other than the United States.

In support of the position that the purchaser is bound, upon suggestion of record, to examine the title to property that he proposes to purchase, and if he neglects to make the examination he has no remedy over against the vendor, the counsel for the United States cited the case of Brush v. Ware (15 Peters, 93), the case of Oliver v. Price (3 Howard, 409), and the case of Hanover v. Woodruff (15 Wallace, 439-442).

The Commission rendered an opinion as follows:

WASHINGTON, December 15, 1883.

The claimant was in France when the bonds for the defense of New Orleans were issued and purchased by the partners of his firm in New Orleans.

He had no knowledge thereof till he was informed that General Butler had imposed the assessment on his firm.

We think the claimant was not guilty of giving aid and comfort to the enemies of the United States, as he knew nothing of the purchase.

In the judgment of the majority of the Commission General Butler had the right as an act of military necessity and in time of war to levy the assessment on the enemies of the United States and on those giving aid and comfort to the enemies of the United States.

The commissioner on the part of France does not concur in the view of General Butler's power as regarded by his colleagues.

We allow the claimant the amount of his share of the assessment paid August 11, 1862, being $714.28. with interest at 5 per cent. from August 11, 1862, and the further sum of $714.28, with interest at 5 per cent. from September 7, 1864.

CHARLES J. DUBOIS v. THE UNITED STATES, No. 723.

This claim rested upon the same facts as that of Eugene Rochereau v. The United States, No. 220, with the exception that the memorialist was a resident of the city of New Orleans, and there purchased the bonds. issued by said city.

The claim of Dubois was disallowed.

The decision of the Commissioners in the two cases justify the conclusion that the purchase of the bonds of the city of New Orleans, issued in the manner and for the purpose set forth in the record, was an act of aid and comfort to the enemies of the United States, but that those purchasers only were responsible who had knowledge of the transaction at the time, and whose circumstances were such that they were bound to make an examination of the record of the city of New Orleans.

ARTEMIS DREZ . THE UNITED STATES, No. 503.

This case is distinguishable from the cases of Eugene Rochereau v The United States, No. 220, and Charles J. Dubois v. The United States, No. 723, in the fact that the claimant, a resident and citizen of France, had an agent in New Orleans with whom he had placed funds for investment. That agent made a purchase of the New Orleans bonds issued under the ordinance of the 3d of March, 1862. When Drez received information from his agent that the purchase had been made he instructed him to sell the bonds. It does not appear from the record whether his instructions were due to the opinion that the investment was an unsafe one or to the opinion that the bonds were not a proper subject for investment.

It was claimed by the counsel for the memorialist that the decision in the case of Rochereau v. The United States, No. 220, justified and required an award in favor of the claimant.

On the part of the United States, it was claimed that the agents of Drez were clothed with general power to act, and that the principal was bound precisely as he would have been if present.

The Commission made an award to the amount of the assessment imposed by the military authorities.

JOSEPH BRUGERE v. THE UNITED STATES, No. 318.

The claimant in this case was the purchaser in the month of May, 1865, at public auction, of certain real estate in New Orleans which had been condemned under statutes of the United States of the 6th of August, 1861, the 17th of July, 1862, and the 3d of March, 1863, by which the courts were authorized to condemn and confiscate the property of certain persons engaged in the rebellion. The title of record to the property referred to was in the name of John Slidell; and proceedings having been instituted and a decree of confiscation made, the marshal of the district advertised the property and made sale of it at public auction. The memorialist was the purchaser. The deed contained a recital of the proceedings, and included a statement that a writ of venditioni exponas had been issued by the district court of the United States, and that notice of the sale had been published in certain newspapers. There was also a description of the premises, and a reference to the record of certain deeds and mortgages. There were no covenants as to title, and the conveyance was in these words:

Now, therefore, know all men by these presents that the United States marshal aforesaid, in consideration of the premises, and by virtue of the laws in such case

made and provided, and under the authority of the acts of Congress of 6th August, 1861, and the 17th July, 1862, and on the 3d March, 1863, in relation to confiscation, do hereby sell, transfer, assign, and set over unto the said Joseph Brugere, as aforesaid, his heirs, administrators, executors, and assigns, all and singular the abovedescribed property, with all the buildings and improvements thereon, rights, ways, privileges, hereditaments, and appurtenances to the same belonging or in anywise appertaining.

One of the acts referred to, of the 17th of July, 1862, was a joint resolution, in which it was provided that the previous acts authorizing confiscation should "not be so construed as to work a forfeiture of the real estate of the offender beyond his natural life."

Some evidence was introduced tending to show that representations were made by the marshal that the sale was of the fee of the estate, and the claimant averred that such was his understanding at the time the purchase was made.

It was contended by the counsel for the French Republic that, in view of the terms of the conveyance and the representations made, the Government of the United States should be held responsible for any failure on the part of the purchaser to maintain a title to the whole estate.

Upon the death of Mr. Slidell, which occurred in July, 1871, his heirs instituted proceedings for the recovery of the estate, and a decree was made by the supreme court of the State of Louisiana, and upon writ of error to the Supreme Court of the United States that decree was confirmed, by which the heirs were entitled to the possession of the estate. On the part of the United States it was claimed that the Government would not be bound by any representations that were made by the marshal, nor by any covenants which the deed might contain, and especially in view of the fact that the statutes authorizing the confiscation of property were public statutes, and in view of the fact that they were referred to in the deed tendered to the purchaser. Upon this state of facts it was claimed that the memorialist was put upon inquiry as to the nature of the estate which it was legally competent for the marshal to convey, and that the memorialist alone was responsible for the consequences of any misunderstanding as to the extent of the title possessed by the United States, and which the marshal was authorized to transmit. The claim of the memorialist was disallowed by the unanimous judg ment of the Commission.

LOUIS CASTELAIN AND MARIE CASTELAIN, HIS WIFE, v. THE United STATES, No. 353.

These memorialists, in the month of August, in the year 1864, were residing in the county of Alexander and State of Illinois, at a place not far distant from Cairo. The record showed that Castelain was engaged in the sale of groceries and small wares, and that his stock included a supply of spirituous liquors. On the evening of the 21st of April, 1864, a small number of soldiers belonging to the United States Army went to the house of the claimants for the purpose of obtaining, either by purchase or otherwise, a quantity of liquor. Castelain refused to furnish it, he having been warned that the sale of liquor to soldiers was contrary to the regulations of the Army. Upon the refusal of Castelain an attack was made by the soldiers, and he and his wife were seriously injured. An investigation was made by the military authori ties through a commission, who in their report say:

The commission were of opinion that the outrages were committed by United States soldiers; that they have failed to discover what soldiers were guilty of the crime, or

what officers shielded them from punishment; that they find from the evidence adduced that Castelain did not sell liquor to the soldiers; that Captain Dugger, the provostmarshal, was to blame for not taking more prompt and effective measures to identify the offenders and bring them to punishment.

Upon this report, and the recommendation of Major-General Halleck, Captain Dugger was dismissed from the service.

It was claimed by the counsel for the memorialists that this action on the part of the United States fixed its liability for the injuries to the persons and property of the claimants.

On the part of the United States it was admitted that the claimants were sufferers from a gross and unjustifiable outrage upon their persons and property; but it was contended that the injuries were not the result of any act of the civil or military authorities of the United States, and that, whatever might be the equitable claims of the family to sympathy and compensation, the Commission had no jurisdiction under the treaty to make an award in their behalf.

The claim was disallowed by the unanimous action of the Commission, and they say:

This was a cruel and malicious attack upon the claimants, probably by some soldiers, from motives of personal revenge.

We do not find any act committed by the authorities creating a responsibility on the part of the United States.

We regret that we are not allowed to indulge in sentiments of pity or to extend charity to persons so cruelly injured.

SAZERAC DE FORGE ET FILS v. THE UNITED STATES, No. 458.

The memorialists were citizens and residents of France, and engaged at New Orleans in the sale of brandies by their agents, William E. Leverich & Co. From the record it appeared that they shipped by a vessel called the Baldwin twenty-five packages of brandy, and that the vessel arrived at the port of New Orleans the 11th day of March, 1861. The ordinance of secession by the State of Louisiana was adopted the 26th day of January, 1861, and the so-called Confederate Government was organized at Montgomery, Ala., the 22d day of February, 1861. Upon the capture of New Orleans in April, 1862, a portion of this consignment of brandy was in the custom-house, and came into the possession of the United States authorities. Other portions of the consignment had been taken from the custom-house during the time that the city was in the possession of the Confederate authorities, and the duties on the brandy so taken had been paid to the Confederate Government. Of the portion remaining in the custom-house a quantity had been taken by Dr. McCormack, medical director of the United States, and for the brandies so taken the memorialists claimed compensation in the sum of $22,000.

It was contended by the counsel for the United States that the payment of duties to the Confederate Government by the agents of the claimants was an act of aid and comfort to the Confederate authorities, and that the claim was barred under the first article of the treaty.

This position of the counsel on the part of the United States was not sustained by the Commission, and the claim was allowed at the sum of $10,468.22.

JEAN JEANNEAUD . THE UNITED STATES, No. 206.

The claimant demanded compensation for a quantity of cotton destroyed by the United States forces in the month of April, 1864. The proofs showed that after an engagement between the United

States forces and the Confederates, and the retreat of the latter, the troops of the United States, upon their return, burned a gin-house in which the cotton of the claimant was stored.

It was contended by the counsel for the United States that the evidence failed to show that authority was given by the officers in command for the destruction of the cotton, and that it was a wanton act on the part of the soldiers, for which the Government should not be made responsible.

The Commission held that this was a "peculiar and exceptional case," and in making the allowance they state the grounds of their action:

1. The cotton-gin in which the cotton was stored was not burned in battle or as a necessary and lawful military act. It had not furnished a shelter from which the Confederates had fired or might thereafter tire upon the United States forces.

The United States forces had driven the Confederates about three miles beyond the gin-house, and were marching back to their camp, not pursued by the Confederates, when the building was set fire to.

2. The burning was not ordered by authority in order to destroy the cotton, and so cripple the resources of the Confederates. At that time and place all the avenues to market were in the hands of the United States forces, so that the Confederates could not avail themselves of this cotton; hence the Confederates were then burning the cotton in that region, and the United States authorities were trying to save it and transport it to market. This case does not come within the line of any of the decisions of the British and American Claims Commission, referred to in Mr. Hale's report, in which claims for losses by the destruction of cotton were rejected.

The evidence shows that the burning was a wanton act of the soldiers in the excitement of the moment, as they were marching back to their camp from a successful battle with the Confederates. It was without any justifiable excuse, in violation of order and discipline, and committed when marching back to camp, under the command and in the presence of their officers, who, by the usual and ordinary enforcement of military discipline, might and could and should have prevented it, but who do not appear to have used any means whatever to prevent it. In such a case we think that an allowance should be made.

JOSEPH CHOURREAU v. THE UNITED STATES, No. 43.

In this case the memorialist asked compensation for a quantity of cotton and other articles of personal property, amounting in all to the sum of $4,000.

It was alleged and proved that the cotton was destroyed by fire, set by soldiers belonging to the First Louisiana Regiment of Cavalry. There was evidence tending to show that at the time of the destruction of the cotton the country in which it was situated was the theater of war; that it was marched over and ravaged by the forces both of the United States and of the Confederate States.

Upon these facts the counsel for the United States contended that the district of country was not at the time of the loss within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States, and, therefore, that the claim was not covered by the terms of the treaty. The same objection was raised by the counsel for the United States in the following cases, namely: Vidal v. The United States, No. 24; Petrequin v. The United States, No. 38; Lauga v. The United States, No. 39; and Odend’hal v. The United States, No. 100. In some of these cases questions of citizenship were raised, questions as to the liability of belligerents upon the theater of war, and questions as to the facts of losses as alleged; but as the main question, "territorial jurisdiction," was carefully considered, and upon it a conclusion was reached by the Commission, no further notice will be taken of other points raised in the discussion.

The views of the counsel for the United States were thus presented in an oral argument to the Commission: