the judgment on behalf of another defendant, who did not appeal.-Sullivan v. Doyle, 194 S. W. 136.
See Appeal and Error,
ARBITRATION AND AWARD.
1175(3) (Tex.Civ.App.) In action on a fire policy where court should have instructed a verdict for defendant because plaintiff did not show See Insurance, 563-574. an insurable interest, held, that the appellate court will render judgment for defendant.-St.
Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. McQuary, 1943 (Ky.) Where fiscal court ratified contract
1180(3) (Tex. Civ.App.) Reversal on appeal by a defendant from judgment for plaintiff in trespass to try title affects only them and those parties to the suit, who were interested in the issues in litigation between them.-Ketchum v. Boggs, 194 S. W. 201.
There is no jurisdiction on appeal by a defendant in trespass to try title from judgment for plaintiff to even affirm for nonappeal judgment on a cross-bill by another defendant making others parties, and raising different issues from those between plaintiff and the appealing defendant.-Id.
of unauthorized agent for extras in building of county courthouse, claim for such extras was proper subject of arbitration.-Carter v. Krueger & Son, 194 S. W. 553.
6 (Ky.) Submission to arbitration of “differences in settlement of accounts between county fiscal court and (a contractor) arising over building of a new courthouse for said county" held not void for uncertainty.-Carter v. Krueger & Son, 194 S. W. 553.
73 (Tex.Civ.App.) In view of Rev. St. 1911, arts. 56-70, held that, when an award is entered, party cannot appeal unless the right is reserved in the agreement to arbitrate.-Eubank v. Bostick, 194 S. W. 214.
78 (Tex.Civ.App.) Where it is sought to set aside an award by arbitrators on grounds of fraud, partiality or mistake, the facts constituting objection to award must be specifically aver
(E) Rendition, Form, and Entry of Judg- red.-Eubank v. Bostick, 194 S. W. 214.
1185 (Ky.) An intervener whose appeal was inadvertently affirmed on the opinion rendered on the hearing of plaintiff's appeal is entitled to have the order of affirmance as to her appeal set aside.-McCoy v. Carran, 194 S. W. 344.
(F) Mandate and Proceedings in Lower
195(1) (Ark.) Opinion on former appeal is law of case, binding on trial court.-Watkins v. Special School Dist. of Lepanto, 194 S. W. 32.
195(1) (Ky.) The opinion on appeal, on reversal for errors in instructions, states the law of the case on subsequent trials, under the same pleadings and substantially the same evidence. Title Guaranty & Surety Co. v. Hay, 194 S. W. 922.
1199 (Tex. Civ.App.) Bill of review will lie in district court after judgment of an appellate court and after mandate has been issued for observance, without leave granted by appellate court.-Houston E. & W. T. Ry. Co. v. Cavanaugh, 194 S. W. 642.
II. ON CRIMINAL CHARGES.
63(2) (Tex.Cr.App.) It was city marshal's duty to arrest prostitute if her conduct on street was contrary to law, but he had no authority to assault her when she remarked that she thought "he had it in for her."-Hudley v. State, 194 S. W. 160.
ASSAULT AND BATTERY.
19(3) (Ark.) Where defendant moved to quash the service he did not waive objection to the court's jurisdiction of his person by there- See Homicide, 257, 310. after filing an answer in which he preserved such protest, and by cross-examining plaintiff's witnesses. Cox Inv. Co. v. Major Stave Co.,
See Damages, 206-221; Insurance,
Municipal Corporations,
tion, 362-494.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS.
20 (Tex.) Where one defendant entered his appearance in the main cause, he was before the court for all purposes, and another defendant, who brought a cross-action, was entitled to judgment against him without the necessity of See Appeal and Error, ~719–747. citation. Sullivan v. Doyle, 194 S. W. 136.
APPLICATION.
See Banks and Banking, 134.
APPROPRIATION.
See Eminent Domain, 47.
See Assignments for Benefit of Creditors; Insurance, 215; Landlord and Tenant. 76-802; Mortgages, 258, 270; United States; Vendor and Purchaser, 261.
I. REQUISITES AND VALIDITY. (B) Mode and Sufficiency of Assignment. 58 (Tex.Civ.App.) Where, in acceptance of an order drawn upon it, defendant school district agreed to pay plaintiff what was due con
tractor on completion of work to satisfaction of building committee, plaintiff could not recover where contractor had not completed building according to agreement.-Lyon-Gray Lumber Co. v. Wichita Falls Brick & Tile Co., 194 S. W. 1167.
ber must exhaust the remedies provided by the associations itself through its constitution and by-laws before applying to a court of equity for relief.-Brown v. Harris County Medical Soc., 194 S. W. 1179.
ASSUMPSIT, ACTION OF.
129 (Tex.Civ.App.) Though plaintiff has as- See Account Stated; Work and Labor. signed to his attorneys an interest in his cause of action for personal injury, they need not be made formal parties plaintiff; they filing a pleading that they are representing plaintiff on the trial, and agree to be bound by any judgment; as though formal parties.-Missouri, K. & T. Ry. Co. v. Hicks, 194 S. W. 1145.
See Master and Servant,
295.
See Exemptions; Garnishment; Homestead;
Justices of the Peace, 86.
I. NATURE AND GROUNDS.
(B) Grounds of Attachment.
40 (Mo.App.) The statutory ground for at-
tachment relating to property fraudulently as-
signed refers only to written assignments, and
is inapplicable to a verbal sale of goods, espe-
cially as another ground for attachment covers
property fraudulently disposed of.-Douglass
Candy Co. v. Shenk, 194 S. W. 754.
VI. PROCEEDINGS TO SUPPORT OR
ENFORCE.
211 (Ky.) Where defendant did not deny allegation in affidavit that she and her codefendjudgment, or that collection would be endangerants did not have property in state to satisfy ed by delay and return of no property found, court properly sustained attachment as against defendant.-Daugherty v. Bell Nat. Bank, 194 S. W. 545.
VIII. CLAIMS BY THIRD PERSONS. 308(2) (Ky.) Burden is on claimant of attached property to prove superiority of title.Daugherty v. Bell Nat. Bank, 194 S. W. 545.
ATTORNEY AND CLIENT.
See Appeal and Error, 207, 1060; Assignments, 129; Constitutional Law, ~276; Criminal Law, 719-730, 1037, 1055, 1171; District and Prosecuting Attorneys; Judges, 47; Trial, 120-133; Trusts, 103.
I. THE OFFICE OF ATTORNEY. (A) Admission to Practice.
340(3) (Ky.) To perfect a lien for supplies furnished to a company which made an assignment for benefit of creditors, no notice need be filed with the county clerk as provided by Ky. 7 (Tenn.) The question as to whether an St. § 2494, but some proceedings to enforce the lien must be begun within the 60-day period fixed by section 2491.-Rockcastle Lumber Co. v. Burns, 194 S. W. 95.
The filing of a verified claim for a lien for supplies furnished with the assignee for benefit of creditors within 60 days after the assignment is sufficient to protect the lien.-Id.
A stipulation in the contract appointing a creditors' committee that the property might be sold and the proceeds should stand in lieu of the property, and that none of the rights of creditors should be prejudiced thereby, does not excuse a lien claimant from taking the necessary legal steps to perfect his lien.-Id.
See Insurance, 718-819; Physicians and
Surgeons, 9.
25 (Tex.Civ.App.) When persons form voluntary associations, and adopt rules, under which members may be admitted and expelled, such rules are articles of agreement to which all who have become members are parties.-Brown v. Harris County Medical Soc., 194 S. W. 1179.
10 (Tex.Civ.App.) Where voluntary association under its rules expels a member, such mem
applicant alleged to be in the practice of soliciting lawsuits and dividing fees is a proper person to be admitted as an attorney is for the determination of the state board of law examiners under Acts 1903, c. 247, § 5.-In re Bowers, 194 S. W. 1093.
9 (Tenn.) Acts 1903, c. 247, § 5, relating to the admission of attorneys to practice, contemplates that the Supreme Court shall issue the license if the applicant is qualified as shown by the certificate of the state board of law examiners.-In re Bowers, 194 S. W. 1093.
(C) Suspension and Disbarment. 44(2) (Ky.) In order to make out a case under Ky. St. § 104, it is only necessary to show that attorney wrongfully neglected or refused after demand made of him in county of his resito pay over a client's money collected by him dence.-Denny v. Commonwealth, 194 S. W. 330. A disagreement between attorney and client as to costs and amount of his fee held not to justify retention by attorney of whole sum collected.-Id.
A delay for only a reasonable time to be determined by circumstances will not authorize suspension from practice.-Id.
Retention of money belonging to a client for
For cases in Dec. Dig. & Am. Dig. Key No. Series & Indexes see same topic and KEY-NUMBER
ten months after its collection and for three
months after formal demand therefor was made
upon attorney in county of his residence was an
unreasonable delay.-Id.
154 (Tex.Civ.App.) An attorney has the
right to apply money collected for his client to
payment of any valid subsisting claim he has
against her.-Doran v. Campbell, 194 S. W. 674.
165 (Tex.Civ.App.) The evidence which will
support an express contract to pay an attor-
ney's fee will not sustain recovery on a quan-
tum meruit.-G. R. Scott, Boone & Pope v.
Willis, 194 S. W. 220.
46 (Ky.) As purpose of Ky. St. § 104, is to
require attorneys to maintain a high standard of
conduct not only as trusted agents of clients,
but as officers of court, mere reparation to
client prior to commencement of proceedings un-
der statute is no ground for dismissal of pro-166(1) (Mo.App.) Where compromise was
ceeding.-Denny v. Commonwealth, 194 S. W.
~51 (Ky.) In a proceeding under Ky. St. §
104, providing for suspension of an attorney
who shall collect money of his client and on de-
'mand wrongfully refuse to pay over same, rule
held properly issued in name of the common-
wealth. Denny v. Commonwealth, 194 S. W.
330.
Collection company which forwarded account
to defendant for collection being interested in
proceeds was a proper party to proceeding as
relator.-Id.
As a proceeding under Ky. St. § 104. was
properly brought in the name of the common-
wealth on the relation of parties named, defend-
ant's motion to require the commonwealth to
elect in whose name it would prosecute pro-
ceeding was properly refused.—Id.
proven, and defendant admitted signing written
contract of compromise which would, under
contract sued on by attorneys, entitle them to
compensation, she has burden of showing that
compromise made was not in pursuance of con-
tract signed.-McCall v. Atchley, 194 S. W.
714.
166(2) (Mo.App.) In action by attorney on
contingent fee contract, testimony of defendant
that she was sick when she signed contract was
inadmissible, where she admitted having signed
with full knowledge of its provisions and coun-
terclaimed upon its breach.-McCall v. Atchley,
194 S. W. 714.
189 (Mo.App.) An attorney held to have a
valid lien, under Rev. St. 1909, § 965, to one-
half the amount paid under a contract for com-
pensation, where the client settled directly with
the defendant in the action to which the con-
tract related.-Gillespie v. American Car &
Foundry Co., 194 S. W. 1064.
52 (Ky.) That information upon which sus-
pension proceeding against an attorney
based does not proceed in name of aggrieved
client and does not comply with strict rules of
pleading with reference to the caption held im-192(2) (Ark.) Under Act May 31, 1909
material.-Denny v. Commonwealth, 194 S. W.
53(1) (Ky.) In a proceeding under Ky. St.
§ 104. to suspend an attorney, where defendant
agreed that the case should be submitted on rec-
ord, affidavits upon which information was bas-
ed which were a part of record were properly
considered.-Denny v. Commonwealth, 194 S.
W. 330.
57 (Ky.) In a proceeding under Ky. St. §
104, providing for the suspension of an attor-
ney who shall collect money of his client and on
demand wrongfully refuse to pay over same, er-
ror in making collection company who forward
account to defendant for collection a party held
not prejudicial to defendant.-Denny v. Com-
monwealth, 194 S. W. 330.
IV. COMPENSATION AND LIEN OF
(Laws 1909, p. 892), circuit court cannot en-
force lien against damages recovered for benefit
of estate of decedent in favor of attorney who
entered into contract with administrator.-Car-
penter v. Hazel, 194 S. W. 225.
ATTRACTIVE NUISANCE.
See Negligence, 39.
See Compromise and Settlement, 17: Con-
stitutional Law, 287; Damages, 188;
Highways, 184; Husband and Wife,
133, 149; Licenses, 1, 7, 14; Malicious
Mischief, 9; Railroads, 348, 350;
Statutes, 123; Trial, 252.
See Arbitration and Award, 73, 78.
BADGE OF FRAUD.
(A) Fees and Other Remuneration.
148(1) (Mo.App.) Under contract providing
that attorneys are to have one-fourth of what
is obtained by compromise or otherwise in con-
test suit, held, that fee was not recoverable un- See Fraudulent Conveyances, 15.
less compromise was of contest suit.-McCall
v. Atchley, 194 S. W. 714.
II. IN CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS.
64 (Tex.Cr.App.) An appeal bond not en-
tered of record, but merely filed, will not an-
swer the purposes of the recognizance required
to perfect an appeal.-Bennett v. State, 194 S.
W. 145.
149 (Mo.App.) Under contract providing
that attorneys are to have one-fourth of what-
ever is recovered by compromise or otherwise in
contest suit, failure of attorneys to subpoena
witness where requested by client not to do so
will not defeat their right to recover one-fourth
of whatever is obtained by client in compro-
mise of contest suit while it is pending.-Mc-72 (Tex.Cr.App.) Under Acts 29th Leg. c.
Call v. Atchley, 194 S. W. 714.
115. held, that an appellant who had entered
150 (Mo.App.) Under contract providing no recognizance below cannot be permitted to
that attorneys are to receive one-fourth of enter into and file a recognizance in the Court
whatever is recovered by them for client in said of Criminal Appeals.-Bennett v. State, 194 S.
action by compromise or otherwise, attorneys W. 145.
are entitled to recover, although client obtains
secret voluntary compromise while action is
pending.-McCall v. Atchley, 194 S. W. 714.
153 (Mo.App.) in action by attorney to re-
cover contingent fee, client is not entitled to
damages on counterclaim for breach where it
appears that she was willing that attorney
should fail to perform.-McCall v. Atchley, 194
S. W. 714.
79(1) (Tex.Cr.App.) Final forfeiture of bail
bond held erroneous under Code Cr. Proc. 1911,
art. 500, subd. 3, on evidence of sickness at time
of forfeiture and subsequent appearance.-Thod-
berg v. State, 194 S. W. 1108.
See Assignments for Benefit of Creditors.
I. CONTROL AND REGULATION IN
GENERAL.
12 (Tenn.) A bank held not subject to the
license tax imposed on pawnbrokers, though it
occasionally made loans on the pledge of per-
sonal chattels,-Provident Loan Bank v. Par-
ham, 194 S. W. 570.
III. FUNCTIONS AND DEALINGS.
(B) Representation of Bank by Officers
and Agents.
bank to payment of note already paid, evidence
held insufficient to show that note had been
paid.-Ohio Valley Banking & Trust Co. v.
Nichols, 194 S. W. 117.
154(9) (Tex.Civ.App.) In action to recover
a bank deposit, ownership of fund held a jury
question.-Cozart v. Western Nat. Bank of Ft.
Worth. 194 S. W. 644.
Evidence that money deposited with defendant
bank was credited to order of proposed bank and
that defendant's cashier so stated makes jury
question whether money was deposited for pro-
posed bank or for depositor's individual bene-
fit.-Id.
BAR.
>116(4) (Mo.App.) Fact that bank cashier
and bookkeeper were members of a partnership
will not impute knowledge of partnership's dis- See Judgment, 565-640.
solution to the bank so as to defeat recovery
from other partners for money borrowed on firm
note after dissolution.-Citizens' Trust Co. v.
Tindle, 194 S. W. 1066.
See Exchange of Property.
BENEFICIAL ASSOCIATIONS.
131 (Tex. Civ.App.) Ordinarily, where one See Associations; Insurance, 718-819.
person deposits money in bank to another's
credit, bank is debtor of designated principal,
and not of depositor.-Cozart v. Western Nat.
Bank of Ft. Worth, 194 S. W. 644.
134(1) (Tex.Civ.App.) Where plaintiff re-
covered for bank's failure to honor checks, the
bank having accepted drafts on plaintiff's pur-
chasers but applied amount on other indebted-
ness, bank should have been allowed difference
between amount of drafts and plaintiff's checks.
-First Nat. Bank v. Mangum, 194 S. W. 647.
See Municipal Corporations,
BEST AND SECONDARY EVIDENCE.
See Evidence, 157–183.
134(2) (Tex.) A bank cannot set off a de-
positor's unmatured note to it against his de-
posit merely because he is a nonresident; there See Municipal Corporations, 335.
being no proof of his insolvency.-Stockyards
Nat. Bank v. Presnall, 194 S. W. 384.
138 (Tex.) Drawee bank held not entitled
to avoid liability to drawer of check made to See Exceptions, Bill of.
fictitious person, due to false representations
and a swindling scheme, on theory that drawer
intended check to be paid when signed by name
written in the check as payee.-Guaranty State
Bank & Trust Co. v. Lively, 194 S. W. 937.
A check payable to a fictitious person without
the knowledge of the maker is not payable to
bearer, and it is the duty of the bank to ascer-
tain the existence and identity of the payee,
and, failing to do so, to refuse payment.-Id.
See Banks and Banking, 138; Cancellation
of Instruments, 11; Carriers, 58; Cor-
porations, 92; Judgment, 250; Mort-
gages, 258; Partnership, 146, 286.
RIGHTS AND LIABILITIES ON IN-
DORSEMENT OR TRANSFER.
(B) Indorsement for Transfer.
154(5) (Ky.) Whether bank in applying de-
positor's funds to payment of his note diverted
funds presents issue of payment of note, since
under the circumstances there could be no di-
version if note had not been paid.--Ohio Val-301 (Tex. Civ.App.) Relation between in-
ley Banking & Trust Co. v. Nichols, 194 S. W. dorser and maker of note, even after liability
of indorser is fixed by protest or waiver, is very
similar to that of principal and surety, and
most acts which will discharge one will dis-
charge other.-Nunn v. Smith, 194 S. W. 406.
Where note and mortgage were given and
payee indorsed note, by such indorsement he
impliedly agreed that he was satisfied with
transaction, and indorsee could accept the se-
curity as tendered and rely on indorsement, on
which he could recover; though the security
was lost owing to failure to record mortgage.
--Id.
(D) Bona Fide Purchasers.
154(6) (Ky.) Where a bank applies funds
of a depositor to payment of a note, the burden
is upon it to show that the note is one upon
which depositor is liable to bank.-Ohio Valley
Banking & Trust Co. v. Nichols, 194 S. W. 117.
154(6) (Tex.Civ.App.) In action to recover
deposit in defendant bank for credit of proposed
bank, defendant has burden of proving that such
proposed bank, or its stockholders, were not en-
titled to fund in preference to depositor, where
defendant's cashier had recognized such fund as
belonging to the proposed corporation.-Cozart
v. Western Nat. Bank of Ft. Worth, 194 S. 337 (Tex. Civ.App.) That bank agreed to
W. 644.
take before they were executed the notes of per-
154(7) (Tex. Civ.App.) In action to recover sons on a list of men desirable for insurance
money deposited with defendant bank for credit given by bank to insurance agent was no evi-
of proposed bank, evidence that six days after dence of fraud and did not put bank upon
deposit depositor applied for bank charter is ad- notice of fraudulent representations made by in-
missible on question of good faith in represent-surance agent to makers of the notes.-Amthon
ing that deposit was for proposed bank.-Cozart v. First State Bank of Uvalde, 194 S. W. 1019.
v. Western Nat. Bank of Ft. Worth, 194 S. 351 (Ky.) The failure of the maker of a
W. 644.
note to demand its delivery to him when he paid
154(S) (Ky.) In an action by depositor to it does not alter the rights of a subsequent
recover funds alleged to have been diverted by holder who acquired the note after maturity and
For cases in Dec. Dig. & Am. Dig. Key No. Series & Indexes see same topic and KEY-NUMBER
after it had been paid.-Bank of Willard v. clearly against preponderance of the evidence.
Pennsylvania & Kentucky Fire Brick Co., 194-Anthony v. J. H. Ring & Sons, 194 S. W. 22.
S. W. 110.
523 (Tex.Civ.App.) In a suit on a note pay-
362 (Ky.) One who acquired a note after able to maker and indorsed in maker's name.
its maturity takes it subject to the defense of evidence held to support a finding that maker
payment at maturity, though he acquired it executed indorsement.-Amthon v. First State
from a holder before maturity who took it free Bank of Uvalde, 194 S. W. 1019.
from equities.-Bank of Willard v. Pennsyl-525 (Ky.) In a suit, on a promissory note,
vania & Kentucky Fire Brick Co., 194 S. W. evidence held to sustain the chancellor's finding
110.
that plaintiff acquired the note after maturity.
and after payment thereof.-Bank of Willard
v. Pennsylvania & Kentucky Fire Brick Co.,
194 S. W. 110.
383 (Ark.) Payment of note by maker be-
fore maturity without surrender thereof is not
a satisfaction against an innocent holder.-
Manley Carriage Co. v. Fowler & Hill, 194 S.
W. 708.
527(1) (Ark.) In an action by innocent pur-
chaser of note, held, that defendants failed to
sustain plea of payment.-Manley Carriage Co.
v. Fowler & Hill, 194 S. W. 708.
VII. PAYMENT AND DISCHARGE.
429 (Ark.) Where a comaker deposited one527(1) (Ky.) In a suit on promissory notes
half of balance due on a note, with understand-by a purchaser thereof after maturity, evidence
ing that payee would pay the other half in con- chancellor that the notes had been paid to the
held sufficient to sustain the finding of the
sideration of taking over the other comaker's former holder at maturity, though they were not
interest in a partnership, there is a complete surrendered to the maker.-Bank of Willard v.
satisfaction of the note, barring the payee's re- Pennsylvania & Kentucky Fire Brick Co., 194
ceiver from recovering against the first comaker. S. W. 110.
-Jones v. Little, 194 S. W. 229.
See Counties, 40-54, 113; Insurance,
14; Schools and School Districts, ~62.
452(1) (Ky.) Under Civ. Code Prac. § 27,
since owner of note may sue any or all of par-
ties liable, it is no defense for one of makers
to allege that another maker is not properly
before court.-Daugherty v. Bell Nat. Bank, See
194 S. W. 545.
474 (Ky.) In action on note, where defend-
ant fails to deny she executed it, it must be
taken as confessed.-Daugherty v. Bell Nat.
Bank, 194 S. W. 545.
489(1) (Tex.Civ.App.) In suit on
a
where defendants' contention that the balance
due represented a note given for shares of stock
sold by a private corporation contrary to law
was denied by plaintiff, testimony was admissi-
ble that the shares were purchased from an in-
dividual to whom they had in good faith been
sold by the corporation.-Witt v. Young, 194 S.
W. 1019.
497(2) (Tex.Civ.App.) In action by pur-
chaser of silo for breach of warranty, where
seller counterclaimed for notes given for pur-
chase price, and his wife set up her separate
ownership of the notes, the burden of proving
that she was a bona fide holder was not on the
defendants.-Potter v. Mobley, 194 S. W. 205.
See Bail; Corporations, 473; Criminal
Law, 1076; Guardian and Ward,
175; Mechanics' Liens, 315; Municipal
Corporations, 347; Principal and Surety;
Taxation, 568.
I. REQUISITES AND VALIDITY.
35 (Mo.App.) A bond, though voluntary
and not authorized by any statute, is valid if
it does not contravene public policy or violate
any statute.-C. A. Burton Machinery Co. v.
Ruth, 194 S. W. 526.
A bond taken by a public officer in attempt-
ed compliance with the statute is good as a
common-law bond, though it falls short of ful-
filling the requirements of the statute.-Id.
499 (Ky.) In administratrix's suit against
son of decedent on notes, burden was on son to
show, not only payments made by him on debt See Criminal Law, 439.
before a partial settlement, but that he did not
receive credit for them in settlement, and, in
absence of proof, it will be presumed that all
payments were credited in such settlement. See Evidence, 354.
Taylor v. Taylor, 194 S. W. 551.
511 (Ky.) In administratrix's suit against
son of decedent on notes, son admitting execu-
tion, but asserting additional payments, checks
of son to decedent and receipt signed by decedent
were properly received in evidence on testimony
of witness that signatures were genuine.-Tay-
lor v. Taylor, 194 S. W. 551.
517 (Ark.) In suit on notes given for pur-
chase of corporate stock, chancellor's finding
that notes were not delivered conditionally held
not clearly against preponderance of the evi-
dence.-Anthony v. J. H. Ring & Sons, 194 S.
W. 22.
518(1) (Ark.) In suit on notes given for pur-
chase of corporate stock, chancellor's finding
that notes were not without consideration, held
not clearly against preponderance of the evi-
dence. Anthony v. J. H. Ring & Sons, 194 S.
W. 22.
520 (Ark.) In suit on notes given for pur-
chase of corporate stock, chancellor's finding
that notes were not procured by fraud, held not
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