to be given to the testimony of the defendant's expert. The observations, just referred to, called upon counsel to direct the court's attention to points omitted. The plaintiffs' counsel called the court's attention to some things. Counsel for the Company said:

"In the first period we do not dispute the lost tonnage, only the cost. In the second period we dispute the correctness both of plaintiffs' cost figures and also the tonnage. We ask that the court so charge."

The Court responded: "Now, gentlemen, I want to make that clear. In the first period there is no question of the tonnage raised. The defendant concedes the amount of the tonnage, and the difference is all over the cost. So you need not trouble yourselves there with any other question than the cost question. In the second period the claim is questioned in two respects, the cost, just as it is in the first period, and the tonnage is also questioned. So of course you cannot determine the amount of damage until you have settled both of those questions.

1

"I understand that the parties have agreed that their respective statements of their positions may be sent out in order to save the jury the labor of making calculations? Is that correct?"

Counsel for the plaintiffs and for the Company each answered, "Yes, sir."

The Court: "So, gentlemen, you will have the benefit of the figuring of the parties on each side, which will present their respective views. You will take the case and dispose of it.

"Counsel for the defendant excepted to the refusal of the learned trial judge to charge as requested by them in such points as were not affirmed. (Exception noted for defendant by direction of the court.)"

We have then this situation: After a charge, dealing with the general questions in the case, with numerous

special requests to charge "points," as they are called, the presiding judge expressed the view that he thought he had gone over the subjects embraced in the requests submitted. That he had omitted some is not surprising, for the court was dealing with an exceedingly difficult and complicated situation of car distribution, concerning which the Interstate Commerce Commission, the body primarily entrusted with the determination of such matters, had long deliberated before announcing the rule upon which it finally acted and made its award in the series of cases of which those now before us are a part. Upon the invitation of the trial judge the Company's counsel made the request which we have quoted, and the judge at once complied with it, and charged, as counsel desired, upon that particular subject, adding that he understood that the parties had agreed that the respective statements of their positions might go to the jury to save it the labor of making calculations. In this way the parties got before the jury the calculations showing their respective claims. This may have been and probably was the reason for the failure of counsel to call attention to the omission to answer the particular points requested concerning the effect to be given to the testimony of the defendant's witness, if credited by the jury. Apparently counsel were satisfied when the jury had before it the table showing the basis of their claims in the case. But, whatever the reason, the court after a careful and painstaking charge, thinking he had answered the "points" of both sides, called upon counsel to suggest omissions as to particular points; then followed the proceedings already recited. We think counsel should have directed attention to the omission which it is evident was inadvertent. The case, in this aspect, is entirely unlike the Jacoby Case, where a specific request was made and refused, and a recovery had upon an award of the Commission which the testimony tended to show. was made upon a wrong basis:

This court has repeatedly held that objections to the charge of a trial judge must be specifically made in order that he may be given an opportunity to correct errors and omissions himself before the same are made the basis of error proceedings; this is the only course fair to the court and the parties. McDermott v. Severe, 202 U. S. 600, 610; Norfolk & Western Ry. Co. v. Earnest, 229 U. S. 114, 120; United States v. U. S. Fidelity Co., 236 U. S. 512, 529; Jacobs v. Southern Ry. Co., 241 U. S. 229, 236; Guerini Stone Co. v. Carlin Construction Co., 248 U. S. 334, 338. Parties may not rest content with the procedure of a trial, saving general exceptions to be made the basis of error proceedings, when they might have had all they were entitled to by the action of the trial court had its attention been seasonably called to the matter.

The trial court and the Court of Appeals have refused to disturb the amounts awarded by the jury as compensation for the clear violation of the Interstate Commerce Act, which these records disclose, and which were very much less than the sums awarded by the Commission when the allowance of interest is considered which under the court's instructions entered into the verdicts. We think the only serious ground upon which reversal may be asked is found in the failure to give the points, to which we have referred, and as to them, we are of the opinion that such failure was waived by the course of proceeding to which attention has been, directed.

Affirmed.

250 U.S.

Argument for DeGanay.

DEGANAY v. LEDERER, COLLECTOR OF INTERNAL REVENUE.

CERTIFICATE FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT.

No. 319. Argued April 23, 1919.-Decided June 9, 1919.

Stocks and bonds issued by domestic corporations, and mortgages secured on domestic real estate, were owned by an alien nonresident but were in the hands of an agent in this country, empowered to sell, assign and transfer any of them and to invest and reinvest the proceeds as it might deem best in the management of the business affairs of the owner. Held, that the income was subject to tax under the Income Tax Law of October 3, 1913, c. 16, § II, A, subdiv. 1, 38 Stat. 166, as income from "property owned in the - United States by persons residing elsewhere." P. 380. Bonds, mortgages and certificates of stock are ordinarily regarded as "property"; and that term is presumed to have been used in the statute with its ordinary sense, nothing to the contrary appearing. Id.

It is well settled that such property may have a situs for taxation at a place other than the owner's domicile. P. 381.

THE case is stated in the opinion.

Mr. James Wilson Bayard for DeGanay:

Intangible personal property has its situs at the domicile of the owner and, in the absence of special statutory provisions, is not subject to taxation elsewhere. Kirtland v. Hotchkiss, 100 U. S. 491; State Tax on Foreign Held Bonds, 15 Wall. 300; Tappan v. Merchants' National Bank, 19 Wall. 490; Union Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Kentucky, 199 U. S. 194; Provident Savings Association v. Kentucky, 239 U. S. 103; Fidelity & Columbia Trust Co. v. Louisville, 245 U. S. 54; Buck v. Beach, 206 U. S. 392.

There are no special words in this statute which indicate the intent to reach any particular classes of property.

376.

Argument for Lederer.

It would follow, therefore, that the words "property owned in the United States" should be taken in their ordinary legal meaning, and that they should not be extended to include intangible property owned by an alien not resident in the United States, because such intangible personal property, under the general rule we haye above quoted, has for its situs the domicile of that alien nonresident. 30 Op. Atty. Gen. 230; id. 273. The provisions of the act should not be extended beyond the clear import of its terms. Gould v. Gould, 245 U. S. 151. See also the instructions of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue of August 12, 1914, 16 T. D., Int. Rev., 118, and December 28, 1914, id. 305, following the above opinions of the Attorney General, and the Revenue Acts of September 8, 1916, § 1, 39 Stat. 756, and February 24, 1919, § 213 (c), 40 Stat. 1057, 1066.

The plaintiff is subject to taxation in the country of her residence and the presumption is against a construction which would result in double taxation.

Mr. Assistant Attorney General Brown, with whom Mr. W. C. Herron was on the brief, for Lederer:

The brief reviewed the following cases: Savings & Loan Society v. Multnomah County, 169 U. S. 421; State Tax on Foreign Held Bonds, 15 Wall. 300; Kirtland v. Hotchkiss, 100 U. S. 491; United States v. Erie Ry. Co., 106 U. S. 327; Railroad Co. v. Collector, 100 U. S. 595; United States v. Railroad Co., 17 Wall. 322; New Orleans v. Stempel, 175 U. S. 309; Bristol v. Washington County, 177 U. S. 133; Eidman v. Martinez, 184 U. S. 578; Blackstone v. Miller, 188 U. S. 189; Corry v. Baltimore, 196 U. S. 466; Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. New Orleans, 205 U. S. 395; Buck v. Beach, 206 U. S. 392; Burke v. Wells, 208 U. S. 14; Walker v. Jack, 88 Fed. Rep. 576; Selliger v. Kentucky, 213 U. S. 200; Union Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Kentucky, 199 U. S. 194; Southern Pacific Co. v. Kentucky, 222 U. S. 63; Liver