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reservation of a specific sovereign right at the time of the general transfer of sovereignty. It is true that Panama could still seek to renounce the treaty, or could protest a specific exercise of the defense right. But Panama could not assert that the right had not been given.

The Senate in its wisdom rejected the substitute, with its specific language, and adopted the Leadership amendment, with its evasive language. Perhaps the mood was that we should not test the will of the Panamanians on a matter which went directly to the heart of the transfer of sovereignty; perhaps some of my colleagues preferred to sidestep the issue in the hope that it would never have to be confronted in practical terms, trusting to the generosity of the treaties to provide a basis for a firm cooperative partnership with Panama. Others, perhaps, trusted in the Committee Report's optimism that sheer naked force would override Panama's sovereignty should a crisis arise.

One Senator, however, who was not satisfied was the distinguished Senator from Arizona, Mr. DeConcini. On March 16, he stated on the Senate Floor:

"For the last 3 months, I have argued that the treaties as drafted did not appear to contain sufficient safeguards for the United States... Until recently I believed that it would be possible for the Senate to make some constructive amendments to the treaty that would satisfy the needs of Panama--but not at the sole expense of the American people. However, as every member of this Chamber knows, the administration was unwilling to accept the slightest changes in the text of the agreement.

"Because of this recalcitrance, I suspect that a number of potential supporters of the treaty were lost....When it became clear that no amendments except the so-called leadership amendments would be accepted, I began to search for alternatives that would accomplish the desired objectives."

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The major problem that bothered the distinguished Senator was the problem of unilateral United States defense rights. His concerns were expressed when he introduced his reservation: "The purpose of this amendment is quite simple, Mr. President. It is designed to establish a precondition to American acceptance of the Neutrality Treaty. That precondition states that regardless of the reason and regardless of what any other provision of the Neutrality Treaty might say or what interpretation it might be subject to, if the Panama Canal is closed, the United States has the right to enter Panama, using whatever means are necessary, to reopen the Canal. There are no conditions, no exceptions, and no limitations on this right. By the terms of the amendment, the United States interprets when such a need exists, and exercises its own judgment as to the means necessary to insure that the Canal remains open and accessible."

The Senator's explanation is considerably more moderate than the assertions in the Committee Report with reference to the Leadership amendment. He was, however, expressing a very

strong sentiment of the American people, going beyond any interpretation that could be supported by the text of his own amendment. He expressed his concerns very pointedly:

"I have been...bothered by the possibility that internal Panamanian activities might also be a threat to the waterway, should we give it up. Labor unrest and strikes; the actions of an unfriendly governemnt; political riots or upheavals--each of these alone or in combination might cause a closure or the Canal."

The distinguished Senator's analysis was exactly right. He had put his finger upon the contradiction in the Administration's position in trying to distinguish between the internal affairs of Panama and threats to the neutrality of the Canal. The Administration failed to face the very real possibility that there might be no distinction between the two.

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Moreover, the Senator from Arizona also put his finger upon the crucial issue that had been sidestepped:

"The amendment contains a very specific reference to the use of military force in Panama. I believe these words are absolutely crucial because they establish the American right--which I am not convinced is adequately provided for either in the body of the treaty or the leadership amendment--to take military action if the case so warrants. further makes it clear that the United States can take military action on Panamanian soil without the consent of the Panamanian Government.

It

"The question of consent is also crucial. Since the main thrust of this amendment is directed toward situations in which the Canal is closed because of internal difficulties in Panama--difficulties like a general strike, a political uprising, or other similar events, the consent of the Panamanians to take action would not make sense. If America is to have any rights at all under this treaty, it must have the right to act independently to protect the Canal and to keep it open."

In other words, the DeConcini reservation made explicit what was only implicit before. In accepting the DeConcini reservation, the distinguished Floor Manager of the Treaty, Mr. Church, sought to minimize the scope which the Senator from Arizona had claimed by reading the language in a very restricted fashion; but he also repeated the interpretation that the leadership amendment already gave the United States the right of unilateral military action:

"Now, Mr. President, this reservation restricts the use of American military force, should that ever be necessary in the future, to two purposes: The reservation clearly reads "If the canal is closed or its operations are interfered with."

"In either of those two cases, Mr. President, the regime of neutrality, the objective of keeping the Canal open, neutral, accessible, and safe obviously would be thwarted.

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"When the leadership amendment to the treaty was adopted, the United States reserved the right to act unilaterally, in accordance with its constitutional processes, to defend the Canal against any threat to the regime of neutrality and consequently, to act against any aggression or threat directed against the Canal or against the peaceful transit of vessels through the Canal.

"Any interference with the operation of the Canal,

any stoppage, any closure, would clearly prevent the peaceful transit of vessels through the Canal and clearly contradict the regime of neutrality to which both the United States and Panama are committed.

"Therefore, this reservation must be considered, in my view, in part as a restatement, in part as an elaboration of the amendment already adopted by the Senate to Article IV of the Neutrality Treaty.

"As such, it is acceptable and I hope that the Senate will adopt it."

The

Despite the attempts of the distinguished Senator from Idaho to limit the force of the amendment, his repeated use of the adverb "clearly" did not solve the basic contradiction. circumstances surrounding the use of military force are seldom "clearly" manifested to parties on both sides of a dispute. His admission that the DeConcini reservation was an "elaboration" of the Leadership amendment is a telling admission indeed; for the first time the "unilateral"rights which had existed in self-serving interpretation only, now existed in black and white. The reaction of the Panamanians was already beginning to demonstrate that Panama did not agree with the granting of unilateral defense rights to the United States at all. It was beginning to become evident that the negotiators' handiwork was fatally flawed from the beginning.

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3.

RESPONSE TO PANAMANIAN OBJECTIONS

As early as March 16, the day on which the DeConcini reservation was passed, newspaper reports began to circulate that the Panamanians strongly objected to it. Even before the debate on the DeConcini reservation began, the distinguished Senator from Michigan, Mr. Griffin, raised the issue:

"Mr. President, I was interested to learn of a report this morning by CBS Radio--and television, I take it, about the fact that the Ambassador of Panama called at the White House on yesterday and let the President and Secretary Vance know that General Torrijos is extremely upset over Senate additions to the treaties, as I understand the report.

"I also understand, on the basis of the report that the President called General Torrijos on yesterday and attempted to calm him down and to assure him that, really, what the Senate was doing here was not making any significant changes in the treaty.

"I can only read between the lines, Mr. President, but I suspect that the concern is not only about what the Senate already has done but also what the Senate may be about to do this afternoon. I refer in particular, to an amendment to be offered by the Senator from Arizona, (Mr. DeCONCINI)....

"This, of course, would fly in the face of the Panamanian interpretation of the Neutrality Treaty, which is that the United States cannot come in with military forces to defend the neutrality of the Canal unless it is with the permission of the Republic of Panama.

"The public press reports now are that President Carter --I do not know if it is true or not--has agreed to go along with this amendment by the Senator from Arizona, which obviously would be a significant change in the treaty as it has been interpreted and understood in Panama.

"I would think that, in light of the stituation in the Senate, it would not be unreasonable to ask the White House to inform the Senate if it is true, as reported by CBS, that General Torrijos and top Panamanian officials have expressed their outrage about the action taken in the Senate and about to be taken today, and whether such an exchange of views