I urge that this reservation be adopted, so that this uncertainty can be cleared up and so that the fears and doubts which many Americans have can be removed. Mr. HEINZ. Mr. President, I compliment the Senator from Oklahoma (Mr. Bellmon) on his very fine statement, and I commend the Senator from South Carolina (Mr. Hollings), as well, for his remarks regarding the reservation that is now before the Senate. The reservation is a joint effort of Senator Hollings, Senator Bellmon, and me, in order to lay to rest the issue that my colleagues have addressed at considerable length. In their statements they have pointed out the problems involved in this matter. There has been a great deal of interest in this reservation, and several other Senators have expressed a desire to join us in sponsoring it. For that reason, I ask unanimous consent that the names of Senator Cannon, Senator Brooke, Senator DeConcini, Senator Paul Hatfield, and Senator Nunn be added as cosponsors of the reservation. Mr. HOLLINGS. Has the Senator included the names of the Senator from Nevada (Mr. Cannon) and the Senator from Massachusetts (Mr. Brooke)? Mr. HEINZ. I have included both in my request. The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Glenn). Without objection it is so ordered. Mr. HEINZ. Mr. President, I offer this reservation, together with Senator Hollings and Senator Bellmon, who have had similar concerns about this treaty. The content of the reservation is similar to the amendment offered by Senator Bartlett some 10 days ago, on April 7. Since this issue was thoroughly debated at that time, and since Senator Hollings and Senator Bellmon have gone into considerable detail, I am not going to make an extensive statement at this time. Suffice it to say that I supported the Bartlett amendment because I believe it is vital that the Panama Canal Treaty be clarified with respect to the status of the $10 million per year contingency pay ment. The Bartlett amendment was tabled, but the issue is still with us. However, since it is essentially one of interpreting the existing treaty language, I believe it can be as effectively handled by a reservation or an understanding as by an amendment, so long as such a reservation, as is the case with this one, is incorporated into the text of the Resolution of Ratification. The objective of this reservation is to make clear that the $10 million contingency payment, which is to be paid only from surplus revenues, the so-called contingency payment specified in article XIII, paragraph 4(c), does not constitute-and I emphasize "not constitute"-a debt which in any way extends beyond December 31, 1999, and the expiration of this treaty, and therefore will not become an obligation to the American taxpayer. Some doubt arose about this point because of ambiguities in the Treaty language and alleged statements by Panamanian officials indicating contrary expectations. Some of that confusion has since been cleared up. First, our Government has made clear its policy will continue to be to set tolls at break-even levels so as not to guarantee an annual surplus which would then be paid to Panama. Second, the Panamanian Government has made clear that its interpretation of the treaty parallels our own with respect to the status of these payments. The statement of the Panamanian minister of planning and economic development, Nicholas Barletta, in his February 28 speech in San Francisco has already been printed in the Record and those remarks have been cited in debate on several occasions, so I will not take the time to quote it now. That statement, however, is helpful in that it clears up some concern about the current Panamanian view on this question. Of course, Dr. Barletta's comment remains only a statement of opinion. It is reassuring, it is welcome, but it is nontheless, not binding. Similarly, the April 4 letter from the Comptroller General to Senator Stone, to which Senator Hollings referred and which was also put into the Record on April 7, provides reassurance. Again, it is welcome reassurance, but it does not necessarily bind the Panamanians. I believe it is important to lay this matter to rest once and for all, and to do that we need language which will have to be formally accepted by both the United States and Panama when the instruments of ratification are exchanged. The reservation which we offer achieves that objective. The reservation defines and limits our obligation with respect to the payment described in article XIII, paragraph 4(c), and it limits our obligation in terms of both amount of money and duration. The reservation leaves no question that although unpaid balances may "roll over" or accumulate from year to year, at the time the treaty is terminated, that is to say December 31, 1999, any payment due may not exceed the amount of any surplus in the final year of canal operation under this treaty. Further, no payment may be made in any event after December 31, 1999. So what this language does is to clarify and make a part of the resolution document two essential points. First, that the United States owes nothing after the treaty terminates; second, that we cannot be expected or required to pay an excessive amount, conceivably as much as $220 million, in the final days before the treaty terminates. Mr. President, this reservation clearly limits the financial obligation of the United States and in doing so it limits the financial obligations of the taxpayers of the United States. This is, I believe, the way the negotiators on both sides intended to write the treaty. Unfortunately, in my judgment, that is not the way they did write the treaty. I think that the adoption of this reservation, therefore, is a necessary and responsible addition to the Panama Canal Treaty. I am hopeful-indeed I am confident-that it will be acceptable to both proponents and opponents of the treaties, and I urge its adoption. Mr. President, I reserve the remainder of my time. I yield to the Senator from Illinois. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Illinois. Mr. PERCY. Mr. President, I thank my distinguished colleague. The Senator from Illinois wishes to make some comments that might run as long as 15 minutes or so. Is that perfectly all right? Mr. HEINZ. Yes. 1 Mr. PERCY. Mr. President, when I returned from a visit to the Canal Zone in January The PRESIDING OFFICER. If the Senator will suspend, the Senator from Pennsylvania only has 4 minutes remaining. Mr. PERCY. Mr. President, will the Senator yield? Mr. HEINZ. How is the time divided and among whom? Who controls the remainder of the time? The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time is divided between the Senator from Pennsylvania and the Senator from South Carolina on one hand and the floor manager of the treaty on the other. Mr. HEINZ. Mr. President, I am not sure of the position of the floor manager of the treaty. Perhaps he will be willing to yield some time to Senator Percy. Mr. Matsunaga addressed the Chair. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Hawaii. Mr. MATSUNAGA. How much time does the manager have? The PRESIDING OFFICER. Forty-one minutes. Mr. MATSUNAGA. I thank the Chair. Mr. President, the committee is not opposed to this reservation and is willing to accept the reservation, and in the interests of time I am willing to yield back all of our time. Mr. HOLLINGS. Mr. President, have we had the yeas and nays ordered yet? The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator may yield it to another Senator. The vote on this does not come until 5 o'clock by previous agreement. Mr. MATSUNAGA. That is correct. But I was about to ask unanimous consent. The PRESIDING OFFICER. This comes after another vote that occurs first at 5 o'clock. This comes after that other vote. Mr. MATSUNAGA. I understand that, Mr. President. But I was about to ask unanimous consent that inasmuch as there were no other Senators who wished to speak on this amendment- Mr. STONE. Mr. President, I wish to ask unanimous consent if the Senator will yield for that purpose. Mr. MATSUNAGA. I am happy to yield for a unanimous-consent request. Mr. STONE. I thank the Senator. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that my name be added as a cosponsor to the Long amendment, which is scheduled for vote this afternoon, and the Heinz amendment which is also scheduled for a vote this afternoon. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. Mr. MATSUNAGA. Mr. President, if there be no other requests and if the cosponsors of the amendment are willing to yield back their time, I ask unanimous consent that the Senator from North Carolina (Mr. Morgan) may proceed under a previous order of the Senate for a period not to exceed an hour but in no case beyond 5 o'clock, when the vote will be taken back to back on the amendments pending. Mr. HEINZ. Mr. President, as I understant the request of the Senator from Hawaii, we will yield back the remainder of our time on the reservation, that is the Hollings-Heinz-Bellmon amendment, and the Senator from Hawaii will also yield back the remainder of his time. I know at this point of no request for time to speak further on reservation 14. Does the Senator know of anyone? Mr. HOLLINGS. No, I do not know of any. I would be prepared to yield back the time. Mr. HEINZ. I would be more than prepared, with that understanding. Mr. MATSUNAGA. Then, Mr. President, I make this unanimousconsent request. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Does the Chair understand the Senator from Illinois was not speaking on 14; is that correct? Mr. PERCY. The Senator from Illinois would like to speak on an unrelated subject of about 15 minutes' duration before 5 o'clock if it is at all possible, if there is no other pending business. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection to the request of the Senator from Hawaii? If not, it is so ordered. The Senator from North Carolina is recognized. Mr. MORGAN. Mr. President, we have been on this issue now for approximately 2 months, and I suspect that about every thing has been said on behalf of these treaties that can be said, as well as all that can be said against the treaties, and I doubt that anything I could say this afternoon would change the minds of any of those who are prepared to vote. But I would like to take a few moments of the Senate's time and state for the Record some of my thoughts about these treaties, some of the things I have studied, and some of my beliefs about them, and why I intend, barring any unforeseen developments between now and tomorrow afternoon at 6 o'clock, to cast my vote in favor of ratification of the treaty before the Senate, as I did for the Treaty of Neutrality which was ratified by the Senate some 2 or 3 weeks ago. I would say in the beginning, Mr. President, that there are a lot of things in these two treaties with which I disagree, but I doubt that anyone can draft any treaties or that any treaties could be drafted with which I would agree completely and in totality. As a matter of fact, I doubt if treaties could be drafted that would be satisfactory to any Member of the Senate as well as the Government of Panama. But, taken as a whole, I believe the treaties are in the best interests of the United States, the national security of this country and, therefore, I think they should be ratified. I want to address my remarks primarily to three topics this afternoon in the debate, if time permits. I want to talk a little about the history, which has led me to the conclusion that the time for a new treaty arrangement with Panama is now. And then I want to address the tough questions which we all have to answer about the second treaty dealing with the Panama Canal. And, finally, I want to speak of my personal convictions about the canal issue and about my hopes for our country. No issue to my recolleciton has aroused so much debate and montroversy, and certainly no issue during my 4-year tenure in the J.S. Senate has generated so much mail from the American eople. While at times the communications we have received have een less than pleasant, I am refreshed and I am reassured by the ublic debate on this issue. I have just returned from a long weekend of travels back and orth across the State of North Carolina where I have talked to iterally hundreds of people, and I am impressed with the knowledge of the people concerning the issues before us, and I am imDressed with the willingness of what I believe to be the majority of he people of North Carolina to place their trust and their confidence in the majority of the Members of this Senate. We have a great country, Mr. President, and I believe that the greatness of this country requires us to make some decisions that a lesser country could not afford to make. It is this time of decision which prompts me to speak about the Panama Canal treaties. Let me say, Mr. President, that my concern about these treaties did not begin in August of last year when the President of the United States announced that an agreement had been reached between the Governments of Panama and of this country. My concern and my interest began during the first year that I arrived in the Senate. Like so many of my colleagues and like so many of my constituents in North Carolina when I was first approached about the idea of a new treaty on the Panama Canal which might eventually turn over control of the canal the Panamanian Government, I was repelled by the idea. Like more than a majority of the Members of this Senate, when asked in 1975 to join in a resolution expressing our displeasure and opposition to any kind of a new treaty with Panama, I joined in that resolution. But like so many of my colleagues and my constituents I joined in sponsoring that resolution without first taking the time to ascertain whereof I was speaking. Later on, in the latter part of 1976, on behalf of and at the behest of another committee on which I serve, the Select Committee on Intelligence, and at the request of my distinguished chairman, the senior Senator from Hawaii (Mr. Inouye), I undertook a trip, along with my assistant, Mr. Ricks of that committee, to visit the Canal Zone, not for the purpose of talking about the Panama Canal Treaty but looking at the Southern Command of the U.S. military forces, looking at the defense intelligence agencies of that command. It was while I was there and talking with the people in the defense intelligence agencies of our country, and talking with the American Ambassador, in going through the Canal Zone and meeting with the Citizens Association of the Canal Zone, and with the rank and file of the Panamanians, that I came home in January of 1977 and said to the people of my State that I felt that some adjustments and some rearrangements ought to be made with the people of Panama; that we had come a long way from the days of gunboat diplomacy, a diplomacy that was accepted by most all of the world when we acquired the right to build that canal, and that, if we expected to develop a relationship which would help us devel |