d of the Government of Panama, will be taken within the framework of a great onal consensus.

Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, I urge adoption of the amendment d I reserve the remainder of my time. I thank the Chair. Mr. SARBANES. Mr. President, I rise in opposition to the amendent. This matter was among many other discussed with the Dertment of Defense in the course of the consideration of the treaty ovisions in the hearings that were held by the Senate Committee Foreign Relations. The Defense Department was of the concluon, which I share with them, that the treaty and the agreement implementation of article IV of the treaty and the annex thereto lly and adequately protect the rights.

In fact, it can be argued, I think cogently, that an effort to evelop this right, as it were, within these documents really raises e concern or the danger of movement and access by U.S. forces of derogation of rather broadly stated U.S. rights of use of defense tes and of movement with respect to such sites. That is an impornt sort of legal concept, but I think one that is a valid one. awyers may differ on its application, but I think the concept is a alid one. When you have broad statements and then you seek to ake specific statements, you run the danger of derogation from he broad grant of authority that may be provided for.

The distinguished Senator from North Carolina quoted the lanuage with respect to the rights of movement, concerning moveent when in the performance of official duties with respect to essels or aircraft, or without any other impediment, and also that ealt with air and water movements, and also vehicle and equipnent movements, again in the performance of official duties.

There is no assertion of movement rights unrelated to official {uties. It seems to me that is an obvious and appropriate limitaion. So there is no assertion in that regard.

But in respect to the performance of the official duties, the right o undertake movement without the obligation, there is a specific provision with respect to the taxing and licensing and an additional provision that goes on to say, "without any other impediment." Now, we are given the unconditional right to use the defense sites and, of course, appropriate use of this would require, when in pursuance of the performance of official duties, that we have the right of access to the defense sites.

The basic problem or difficulty I have with the Senator's amendment runs to this question of trying to specify certain rights which I think are fully and adequately covered in the agreement, raising a question that it constitutes a limitation with respect to the extended scope of the rights that we are given in the statement of implementation to implement the provisions of the treaty.

It might well be construed as supporting a more narrow interpretation of the U.S. rights in other portions of the agreement than would otherwise be the case.

Of course, most of what I have said has been developed in an exchange with the Department of Defense which, of course, has a very keen and vital interest in these treaties, both the Panama Canal Treaty which we are now considering and the Neutrality Treaty which we approved on March 16, by a vote of 68 to 32.

I think, as many people realize, the Department of Defense was very much involved in the negotiation process with respect to thes treaties. In fact, a general officer representing the Department d Defense participated in full on the negotiating team, and Genera Dolvin was a very integral part of the American team of negot tors with respect to arriving at the provisions that we have bee reviewing over these many weeks here in the Senate concerning the Panama Canal treaties.

Since there will be a continuing American military presence Panama until the end of the century and then, of course, beyon that there will not be such a continuing military presence, a though the United States and Panama joining together in the period after the end of the century have reached agreement tha each of them shall be able to take action to maintain the regime d neutrality and to maintain the neutrality of the canal and the right of safe passage for ships through the canal. So, of course, the Department of Defense may have a continuing interest after the year 2000. They will not have a continuing presence in Panama after the year 2000.

Between now and the year 2000, their rights, of course, are spelled out in the Panama Canal Treaty and in the agreemen which implement that treaty which of course, have been reached between the two parties and have been submitted to the Senate a documents associated with the Panama Canal treaties.

I have been quoting, to some extent, from those documents and also putting forth the position which the Department of Defense has reached concerning these provisions, concerning their rights under these provisions, and concerning the amendment which the distinguished Senator from North Carolina has presented to the Senate.

Implementation, of course, has been very carefully worked out as a matter of negotiations between the parties.

The question that was raised about noncontiguous military areas. bases and training areas, has been fully dealt with by the provision in terms of the operational elements that are necessary and, obviously, this is a matter to which the Department of Defense gave great and careful attention.

The question of operational element has been met by the provision that we are entitled to movement between such facilities when in the performance of official duties.

That applies, of course, both to vehicles and equipment; that is, land movement and also air and water movement, where it can take place without impediment in the furtherance of the perform ance of official duties.

Accordingly, I anticipate and, very frankly, Mr. President, see no problem in this area.

I think the matter which is raised by the distinguished Senator from North Carolina was given very careful and thorough atten tion by our negotiators, and particularly by those members of the negotiating team who represented the Department of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and that the treaty and the associated documents with the treaty fully and satisfactorily deal with this matter.

Therefore, I oppose the amendment of the Senator from North arolina.

Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, I thank the Senator from Maryland or his comments on the amendment.

Inasmuch as the leadership has made clear that it will not ermit any amendment to this treaty, I am not optimistic as to the ending amendment. I am, however, heartened by the statement of he Senator from Maryland, if I understood him, that he agrees with the thrust of the amendment, and that its intent is essential. The Senator further contends, if I understand him, that this matter is taken care of in the implementation agreement and in he treaty itself. I find no language that clearly does that, but I am heartened by the legislative history that the distinguished Senator nade.

All that notwithstanding, this is such an important, fundamental right, that I wonder what the objection is to spelling it out? The Senator from North Carolina can think of no objection to doing that. In fact, it is essential.

This is the point the Senator from North Carolina would make to his friend from Maryland: We have noncontiguous installations and military bases; and insofar as I have been able to find, the only reference in the treaty text to this right comes under the section relating to whether we will have to put license plates on our tanks and trucks. Obviously, the treaty and the implementation agreement are not adequate in this regard.

I hope the Senate will approve the amendment, although I must say that I do not have a great deal of optimism on that score. However, in this instance, as in others, I feel that it is essential that the Senate confront this defect-and I perceive it to be a defect-in the treaty.

I say to the Senator from Maryland that it is now 12:31, and we have a 1-hour limitation. I would be glad to yield back the remainder of my time, if he is willing to do so, and we can have a note on the amendment.

Mr. SARBANES. Mr. President, I am quite happy to do that, but I think an order was entered that there would not be a vote until 2 o'clock. Is that correct?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator is correct.

Mr. SARBANES. I assume, in view of that order, that some Members of the Senate have made commitments elsewhere.

Perhaps we could set this amendment aside and go on to the next amendment, if the Senator wants to do that.

Mr. HELMS. In that case, I ask unanimous consent, first, that it be in order for me to ask for the yeas and nays on the amendment. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator has the right.

Mr. HELMS. I ask for the yeas and nays.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second? There is not a sufficient second.

Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum, during which time I will see if we can round up some Senators to get the yeas and nays.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The second assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

23-400 (pt. 3) O 79 65

Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, is the Senator from North Carolina correct in his understanding that the pending amendment is now being laid aside, in order that I can call up a second amendment, or is unanimous consent in that regard necessary?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. A unanimous-consent order was entered yesterday to that effect, so the Senator's amendment could be set aside and other amendments taken up.

UP AMENDMENT NO. 20

Mr. HELMS. I thank the Chair. I send an unprinted amendment to the desk and ask that it be stated.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The amendment will be stated.

The legislative clerk read as follows:

The Senator from North Carolina (Mr. Helms) proposes an unprinted amendment numbered 20.

Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, I have unanimous consent that reading of the amendment be dispensed with.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
The amendment is as follows:

At the end of paragraph 3 of article IV, add the following undesignated paragraph:

"Nothing in this paragraph prevents the military forces of the Republic of Panama or of the United States of America from conducting such separate military planning, exercises, or operations as each Party deems necessary to protect and defend the Canal."

Mr. HELMS. I yield myself such time as I may require.

Mr. President, the central defense concept in the Panama Canal Treaty is the concept of "combined defense." Indeed, were it not for the concept of "combined defense" it is probable that the Department of Defense would never have agreed to the treaty.

It is a matter of historical record that the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Department of Defense had continuously maintained that all the land in the Canal Zone was necessary to the defense of the canal; and that it would, indeed, be impossible to defend the canal under any new treaty unless the entire zone would be, in effect, a military reservation once the United States surrendered its sovereign rights.

This was the official DOD position until the fall of 1975. It is not difficult to understand why DOD maintained that position. It is only commonsense. One does not have to be a great military strategist or tactician to see that the most effective way to secure an installation is to secure all the components of the installation, as well as a reasonable buffer zone around each component. This was, in fact, the basic reasoning behind the creation of the Canal Zone in the first place. I doubt that any special studies or analyses were conducted to come to that conclusion; it was simply a deeply ingrained concept in defense that everyone took for granted. Once the decision had been made that a U.Š. canal had to be fortified to protect its neutrality, the concept of a zone around it came naturally.

Until 1975, no one ever questioned the concept that if the United States were to defend the canal our military forces must have a reasonable area in which to exercise unilateral defense judgments. It was the Department of State, however, that objected to the unitary zone defense concept. The State Department negotiators found that the treaty negotiations had virtually collapsed. The Panamanians, for reasons of excessive nationalistic pride, insisted on the elimination of the Canal Zone for domestic political reasons. Rather than press the Panamanians on a point that was critical to the United States. the negotiators developed the idea of "combined defense," wherein the Canal Zone would be eliminated and a fiction created that United States and Panamanian military forces would defend the canal together, with the zone itself under Panamanian control. So the State Department negotiators then began to negotiate with the Defense Department, rather than with the Panamanians.

In mid-1975, a position paper embodying a conceptual "combined defense" was prepared and presented to the Panamanians. As was inevitable, that paper was leaked in Panama. Later, the Senator from North Carolina made a lengthy analysis of its fallacies and reprinted the paper in the Congressional Record. For those who may be interested in that 1975 analysis, my statement was reprinted in the hearings of the Separation of Powers Subcommittee, page 197, which I believe is on every Senator's desk. I do not know for certain who was the author of the conceptual paper, but some who are close to the State Department have said that it was Mr. Morey Bell, who at that time was prominent on the U.S. negotiating team. At any rate, Ambassador Bunker later admitted to the press that the conceptual paper was authentic.

The fallacies of the combined defense concept are so obvious that it is hardly necessary to mention them; yet perhaps they should be laid on the record. First, there is absolutely no comparison between the force structure and training level of the United States and Panamanian military forces. Panama does not even have a navy or an air force. Of the 8,000 members of the National Guard, about 6,000 do not have professional military training. They serve as policemen, and not very well trained policemen at that.

Secondly, the Panamanian forces do not have sophisticated equipment, the training to use sophisticated equipment, or the budgetary resources to support sophisticated equipment. Any combined defense arrangements on that level would be ridiculous.

Thirdly, the only level where there could be true participation would be in the Combined Defense Board. But participation in the Board by Panamanians would turn the Board into a forum for antiU.S. propaganda, into a device to put pressure on U.S. defense decisions, and into a medium for learning the details of secret U.S. defense plans. Although Panamanian military forces would be too weak to oppose United States military plans, it would be very easy to bring propaganda to bear, to mobilize civilians in demonstrations, or to take the most adverse case-to call upon nations antagonistic to the United States to assist them in sabotage, military operations, or concerted international pressure.

Finally, the physical elimination of a zone defense around the canal would make it far more vulnerable to sabotage, terrorism,