provided such a course is not repugnant to the general law or policy of the state.18 1 Glass v. Ashbury, 49 Cal. 571; Hopple v. Brown, 13 Ohio St. 311; Sherlock v. Winnetka, 68 Ill. 530; Carron v. Martin, 2 Dutch. 594. 2 Glass r. Ashbury, 49 Cal. 571; and see Clay v. Wright, 44 Vt. 538; Moser v. White, 29 Mich. 59; Geary v. City of Kansas, 61 Mo. 378. 3 Cheeney v. Town of Brookfield, 60 Mo. 53; Davies v. Mayor, 13 Jones & S. 373; McDonald v. Mayor etc. 68 N. Y. 23; 23 Am. R. 144. Compare Cook v. Deerfield, 64 Pa. St. 445; Doering v. State, 49 Ind. 56; Kobs v. Minneapolis, 22 Miun. 159; Bladen v. Philadelphia, 60 Pa. St. 464; Westerfield v. Radde, 7 Daly, 326. 4 Richardson v. Heydenfeldt, 46 Cal. 68; Stockton v. Creanor, 45 Cal. 643; and see Board of Excise v. Sackrider, 35 N. Y. 154. 5 Richardson v. Heydenfeldt, 46 Cal. 68; State v. Paterson, 34 N. J. L. 163. See also, City of Troy v. Winters, 2 Hun. 63; St. Louis v. Clemens, 43 Mo. 395; East St. Louis v. Wehrung, 50 11. 28; Hydes v. Joyes, 4 Bush, 464; Thompson v. Schermerhorn, 6 N. Y. 92. 6 Judevine v. Hardwick, 49 Vt. 180; San Diego v. San Diego etc. R. R. Co. 44 Cal. 106; Manley v. Atchison, 9 Kan. 358; Richards v. Columbia, 55 N. H. 96. 7 See Muscatine v. Steck, 7 Iowa. 505; Gulick v. New, 14 Ind. 93; Nichols v. Boston, 98 Mass. 39; Achley's Case, 4 Abb. Pr. 35; Ela v. Smith, 5 Gray, 121. 8 Smith v. Deweese, 41 Tex. 594. See Prell v. McDonald, 7 Kan. 426; 12 Am. R. 423; Howard v. Shoemaker, 35 Ind. 111. 9 Shafer r. Mumma, 17 Md. 331; Smith v. Hutchinson, 8 Rich. 260; Pedrick v. Bailey, 12 Gray, 161. 10 Warwick v. Mayo, 15 Gratt. 528. See Green v. Talbot, 36 Iowa, 499. 11 Fletcher v. Lowell, 15 Gray, 103; City of Bryan v. Page, 51 Tex. 532; 32 Am. R. 637. 12 Prell v. McDonald, 7 Kan. 426; 12 Am. R. 423; Taylor v. Strong, 3 Wend. 384; Butolph v. Blust, 5 Lans. 4; 41 How. Pr. 481; Thomas v. Ashland, 12 Ohio St. 124; City Council v. Payne, 2 Nott & McC. 475. See Harft v. McDonald, 1 City Court R. (N. Y.) 181. 13 State v. Lafferty, 5 Har. (Del.) 491; Low v. Evans, 16 Ind. 486; White v. Kent, 11 Ohio St. 550; Pesterfield v. Vickers, 3 Cold. 205. § 311. Liabilities of officers.-Officers of a munici pal corporation are not liable, either civilly or criminally, for acts done in a judicial or quasi judicial capacity,1 and within the scope of their authority,2 in the absence of fraud, or malice, or a statute imposing the liability.8 But where the law requires absolutely a ministerial act to be done by a public officer, and he neglects or refuses to do such act, he may be compelled to respond in damages to the extent of the injury arising from his conduct. Thus, county supervisors are personally liable to pay a judg ment against the municipality for failing to levy a tax which they had power to levy, to pay such judgment." And a public officer may likewise be held personally liable for injuries resulting from the improper execution of official duties, not judicial in their nature.7 And the fact, that the law makes a civil corporation liable "for the illegal doings and defaults" of its officers, does not deprive the party injured of his right to proceed personally against the officer who committed the injury.8 As it respects money that comes into the hands of a municipal officer, by virtue of his office, he is liable to account for it and pay it over, whether stolen without his fault, or whatever may have become of it," unless relieved from this responsibility by statute.10 But, public officers cannot be held liable for the misconduct and malfeasance of persons they are obliged to employ; 11 having no freedom of choice in the selection of agents, the maxim respondeat superior cannot be applied. 12 Nor are municipal officers personally liable on contracts made within the scope of their authority, unless the intent to bind themselves personally is very apparent; 13 nor are they personally liable, merely because they transcended their authority, in cases where the other contracting party knew at the time that the contract was in excess of such authority.14 1 See Wilkes v. Diuman, 7 How. 89; Bartlett v. Crozier, 17 Johns. 439; Township v. Carey, 3 Dutch. 377; Baker. State, 27 Ind. 485; Ramsey v. Riley, 13 Ohio, 157; Borough of Freeport v. Marks, 59 Pa. St. 253. 2 State v. Duunington, 12 Md. 340; Craig r. Burnett, 32 Ala. 728; Waldron v. Berry, 51 N. H. 137. When officers of a municipal corpora tion are vested with legislative powers, they are exempt from personal liability for the mistaken use of such powers, if within their authority, and if they exceed their powers, their acts are void, and consequently do not impose personal liability: Jones v. Loving, 55 Miss. 109; 30 Am. R. 508. Compare Newman v. Sylvester, 42 Ind. 106; Green v. Talbot, 36 Iowa, 499. 3 Waldron v. Berry, 51 N. H. 136; Walker v. Hallock, 32 Ind. 239; Johnson v. Stanley, 1 Root, 245; Stewart v. Southard, 17 Ohio, 402. 4 Amy . Supervisors, 11 Wall. 136; Clark v. Miller, 54 N. Y. 528; Nowell v. Wright, 3 Allen, 166. 5 Amy v. Supervisors, 11 Wall. 136; Porter v. Thomson, 22 Iowa, 391; Oswald . Thedinga, 17 id. 13. Compare People v. East Saginaw, 33 Mich. 164. 6 Nowell v. Wright, 3 Allen, 166; Weaver v. Devendorf, 3 Denio, 117. 7 Hover v. Barkhoof, 44 N. Y. 113; Griffith v. Follett, 20 Barb. 620, 8 Rounds v. Mansfield, 38 Me. 586. 9 Rock v. Stinger, 36 Ind. 346; Township of Union v. Smith, 39 Iowa, 9; 18 Am. R. 39; Lowry v. Polk Co. 51 Iowa, 50; 33 Am. R. 114; State v. Powell, 67 Mo. 935; 29 Am. R. 512. Compare State v. Parker, 33 id. 285; Inhabitants etc. v. Pearson, 61 Me. 552. But see Cumberland v. Pennell, 69 Me. 357; 31 Am. R. 284. 10 Halbert r. State, 22 Ind. 125; State v. Harper, 6 Ohio St. 607. 11 Pritchard Keefer, 53 Ill. 117; Mayor etc. v. Furze, 3 Hill, 612; Humphreys v. Mears, 1 Man. & R. 187. 12 Bailey v. Mayor etc. 3 Hill, 531; 2 Denio, 433; Bolton v. Crowther, 2 Dowl. & R. 195. 13 Hodgson v. Dexter, 1 Cranch C. C. 345; Nickerson v. Dyer, 105 Mass. 320; Olney v. Wickes, 18 Johns. 122; Brown v. Rundlett, 15 N. H. 360; Ogden v. Raymond, 22 Conn. 379. 14 Leet v. Shedd, 42 Vt. 277. Compare Stone v. Higgins, 28 Vt. 617; Dameron v. Irwin, 8 Ired. 421; Boardman v. Hayne, 29 Iowa, 339; Hall v. Cockrell, 28 Ala. 507. § 312. Compensation of officers and agents.— An officer of a municipal corporation cannot maintain an action for official services for which no compensation has been provided, either by law, or by express contract or vote of the corporation;1 nor is the corporation liable for services rendered by an officer under an unconstitutional statute.2 But it may become liable to pay for services rendered in its behalf by an agent, without either a sealed contract or a resolution in writing employing an agent.3 And where a municipal corporation has the power to employ an officer or agent, and fix his compensation, and it does employ him, but neglects to fix his compensation, he may recover on a quantum meruit. It is competent for the municipal authorities to change the compensation of officers, from time to time, during the continuance of their term of office,5 unless the services to be performed are professional and private, rather than public or official; 6 in which case, the employment will be deemed a contract, which the corporation has no right to impair.8 But an increase of an officer's duties, made by the city council, does not imply any obligation to increase his salary; nor will the promise of a committee or individual members of the corporation to pay extra compensation be binding on the corporation.10 But for services rendered by request, relative to matters which the officer 9 was under no obligation to attend to, he is entitled to a reasonable extra compensation." And it is no defense to an action by an employee of a municipal corporation for his salary, that absences from his post were numerous, provided they did not interfere with the faithful discharge of his duties.12 But an officer cannot recover the compensation attached to an office during the period of his suspension therefrom, by competent authority, upon well-founded charges of misconduct.18 But if charges made by order of a city government against its agents prove to be groundless, the city may reimburse to them their expenses in defending the charges; 14 and it may indemnify an executive officer for the expenses of a judg ment against him for acts committed in good faith in the discharge of his official duty.15 Where a municipal corporation has once paid the compensation attached to an office to an officer de facto, whose right to the office has not been determined against him, it is protected from a second payment; 16 but after such determination against him by a competent tribunal, any amount of compensation for services rendered, not paid to the intruder, is due and payable to one adjudged to be the officer de jure, and may be recovered by the latter of the municipality.17 1 Garnier v. St. Louis, 37 Mo. 554; Sikes v. Hatfield, 13 Gray, 347; Farnsworth v. Inhabitants etc. 122 Mass. 268; Locke v. City of Central, 4 Colo. 65; 34 Am. R. 66; and see McClung v. St. Paul, 14 Minn. 420; Bladen v. Philadelphia, 60 Pa. St. 464; State v. Brewer, 59 Ala. 130. 2 Meagher v. County of Story, 5 Nev. 244. 3 New Athens v. Thomas, 82 Ill. 259; Selma v. Mullen, 46 Ala. 411. 4 Tucker v. Mayor etc. 4 Nev. 20; and see Kinnie v. Waverly, 42 Iowa, 486; Preble v. Bangor, 64 Me. 115. 5 Commonw. v. Bacon, 6 Serg. & R. 322; Iowa City v. Foster, 10 Iowa, 189; Alexander v. McKenzie, 2 So. Car. 81. Compare People v. Auditors etc. 13 Mich. 233. 6 See Chase v. Lowell, 7 Gray, 33; Kimball v. Salem, 111 Mass. 87. 7 Chase v. Lowell, 7 Gray, 33. 8 See Caverley v. Lowell, 1 Allen, 289; Cox v. Burlington, 43 Iowa, 612. 9 Wendell v. Brooklyn, 29 Barb. 204; 376; Covington v. Mayberry, 9 Bush, 304; 632; Oakley v. Mayor etc. 4 id. 72. Detroit v. Redfield, 19 Mich. 10 Evans v. Trenton, 4 Zab. 764; and see Debolt v. Cincinnat!, 7 Ohio St. 237; Hatch v. Mann, 15 Wend. 44; Gilmore v. Lewis, 12 Ohio, 281; Heslep v. Sacramento, 2 Cal. 580; Preston v. Bacon, 4 Conn. 471; Mayor of Niles v. Muzzy, 33 Mich. 61; 20 Am. R. 670. 11 Calais v. Whidden, 64 Me. 249; Converse v. United States, 21 How. 463; Evans v. Trenton, 4 Zab. 764. 12 Whitney v. Mayor etc. 7 Jones & S. 106. 13 Wesberg v. Kansas, 64 Mo. 493. Compare Shaw v. Mayor etc. 19 Ga. 468; Stadler v. Detroit, 13 Mich. 346. 14 Lawrence v. McAlvin, 109 Mass. 311. See Hoboken v. Gear, 3 Dutch. 265; Mayor etc. v. Shaw, 25 Ga. 590. 15 Sherman v. Carr, 8 R. I. 43: Gregory v. Bridgeport, 41 Conn. 76; 19 Am. R. 485; Hasdell v. Hancock, 3 Gray, 526; Pike v. Middleton, 12 N. H. 278; Fuller v. Groton, 11 Gray, 340. Compare Halstead v. Mayor etc. 3 N. Y. 430; State v. Council, 9 Vroom, 430; 20 Am. R. 404. 16 McVeany v. Mayor etc. 80 N. Y. 185; and see Smith v. New York, 37 id. 518; Benvit v. Wayne County, 20 Mich. 176. That the salary is incident to the title to the office, and not to its occupancy and exer cise: see Carroll v. Siebenthaler, 37 Cal. 193; Dorsey v. Smyth, 28 id. 21; Meagher v. County, 5 Nev. 244. 17 McVeany ". Mayor etc. 80 N. Y. 185. Pa. St. 136; People v. Miller, 24 Mich. 458; 21; United States v. Addison, 6 Wall. 291; Ad. & E. 682; Ex parte Ramshay, 83 Eng. Supervisors etc. 53 Miss. 715; 24 Am. R. 715. Compare City v. Given, 60 § 313. Remedies by and against.-Municipal corporations may sue and be sued in all courts, in like cases as private corporations or natural persons.1 They are liable to actions upon contract and in tort; 2 and as a general rule, when a good cause of action exists against a municipal corporation, it may be prosecuted by an action in whatever form would be appropriate against an individual. In practice, courts of law are deemed to be the proper tribunals to review the irregularities or errors in the acts or proceedings of such corporations; 4 but in special cases, equity will entertain jurisidiction for like purposes. A municipal corporation is liable to proceedings by dispossession for non-payment of rent; but is not liable to process of garnishment; 7 and moneys in the hands of an officer of a municipal corporation, held by him in virtue of his office, are not subject to garnishment.8 Nor can the taxes and public revenues of such corporations be seized under execution against them; 9 though it is otherwise as it respects property owned by them as an investment of funds merely.10 Where a city charter pro vides that no action shall be maintained against the city, |