necessarily pass upon every question at law raised by this petition, its decisions therein are conclusive in the present case. This question was fully considered by this court in Hanna v. Read, 102 Ill. 596, and again in Tilley v. Bridges, 105 Id. 336. In the first named case there had been a decree of the circuit court of Vigo County, Indiana, between the same parties in interest-although the nominal parties were different-declaring that Ezra B. Read, at the time he executed certain deeds, was insane, and that the deeds were therefore invalid. The bill in that case was filed in the circuit court of Cook county, to set aside one of those deeds on the ground of Read's insanity, and it was held the adjudication of that question by the Vigo, Indiana, circuit court, was binding and conclusive upon the Cook circuit court. The property in litigation in the two different courts was not the same, but the deeds to the property in Indiana and in this State were executed in the same transaction, and as nearly at the same time as was possible. Among other things, we then said: 'Where some specific fact or question has been adjudicated and determined in a former suit, and the same fact or question is again put in issue in a subsequent suit between the same parties, its determination in the former suit, if properly presented and relied on, will be held conclusive upon the parties in the latter suit, without regard to whether the cause of action is the same in both suits or not. Whether the adjudication relied on as an estoppel goes to a single question or all the questions involved in a cause, the fundamental principle upon which it is allowed, in either case, is, that justice and public policy alike demand that a matter, whether consisting of one or many questions, which has been solemnly adjudicated by a court of competent jurisdiction, shall be deemed finally and conclusively settled in any subsequent litigation between the same parties, where the same question or questions arise, except where the litigation is a direct proceeding for the purpose of setting aside such adjudication.' This doctrine is limited to matters necessarily involved in the litigation, but it is equally applicable whether the point was, itself, the ultimate vital point, or only incidental, but still necessary to the decision of that point. Bigelow on Estoppel (1st ed.), 95; Id. (2d ed.) 36; Freeman on Judgments, §§ 254, 255, 260; Demarest v. Darg, 32 N. Y. 281."] Attorney-General v. Chicago & Evanston R. Co., 112 Ill. 520, 537 (adv. sheets).

7. RES JUDICATA.-[Judgment by Default]— When a Bar in an Action to Prevent Diversion of Water. -A judgment by default in favor of a plaintiff, in an action to prevent the defendant from diverting and using the waters conducted from a certain stream by the plaintiff's ditch, and to protect the plaintiff in the use of such water, thus diverted, for the purpose of irrigation, is a bar to a subsequent action by such defendant against such plaintiff, to restrain him from diverting the waters of such stream by means of the said ditch, for the uses of irrigation, and to protect the former in the use of such water as the riparian proprietor. [In the opinion of the court, after pointing out that the gist of the action in each case, was the right to the water in Bear Creek, Lord, J., speaking for the court, says: "The rule is well settled that "a party cannot litigate matters which he might have interposed, but failed to do in a prior action between the same parties or their privies, in reference to the same subject matter;" Wells on Res Adjudica

ta, § 251, citing Hackworth v. Zollers, 30 Iowa, 433; Hites v. Irving, 13 Ohio St. 283; Le Guen v. Guvenuer, 1 Johns. Cases, 435; Gray v. Dougherty, 25 Cal. 266. In some of the cases the rule has been carried to the extent of declaring that 'if a party fails to plead a fact he might have plead, or fails to prove a fact he might have proved, the law can afford him no relief:' Wells on Res Adjudicata, § 251; Bell v. McCulloch, 31 Ohio St. 399; Ewing v. McNary, 20 Ohio St. 322; Embury v. Conner, 3 Comst. 511; Covington etc. v. Sergeant, 27 Ohio St. 227; LeGuen v. Guveneur, supra. In other cases it is said that the test is, to determine whether the matter, which is claimed to be barred, might have been litigated under the pleadings: Columbus and S. R. R. Co. v. Watson, 26 Ind. 52; Duncan v. Holcomb, Id. 378; Sheets v. Selden, 7 Wall. 416; Belost v. Morgan, 7 Wall. 619; Henderson v. Henderson, 3 Hare, Ch. 115. The finality of judgments rests upon the maxim, 'interest reipublicæ ut sit finis litum.' 'It is for the public good,' says Mr. Brown, 'that there be an end of litigation, and if there be any one principle of law settled beyond all question, it is this, that whensoever a cause of action, in the language of the law, transit in rem judicatum, and the judgment remains therein in full force and unreversed, the original cause of action is merged and gone forever:' Broom's Legal Maxim. 'It is not only final," says Radcliffe, J., 'as to the matter actually determined, but as to every other matter which the parties might have litigated in the cause, and which they might have had decided. The reasons in favor of this extent of the rule, appear to me satisfactory; they are found in the expediency and propriety of silencing the contention of the parties, and of accomplishing the ends of justice by a single and speedy decision of all their right. It is evidently proper to prescribe some period to controversies of this sort, and what period can be more fit and proper than that which affords a full and fair opportunity to examine and decide all their claims. This extent of the rule can impose no hardship. It requires no more than a reasonable degree of vigilance and attention; a different course might be dangerous and oppressive; it might tend to unsettle the determinations of law and open a door for infinite vexation.' Nor is the principle of the rule affected that the judgment was obtained by default. "The rule,' says Mr. Freeman, 'that a judgment is conclusive of every fact necessary to uphold it, admits of no exception; and is equally applicable whether the final adjudication resulted from the most tedious and stubborn litigation, or from a suit in which no obstacle was possible to delay or defeat plaintiff's recovery. A judgment by default is attended with the same legal consequences as if there had been a verdict for the plaintiff. There exists no solid distinction between a title confessed and one tried and determined:" Freeman on Judgments, and note. 'So the neglect of a defendant to answer, and a decree pro confesso, are equivalent to an admission of the allegations of the bill as to all parties against whom such a decree passes:" 6 Wait's Actions and Defenses, 771; Brumagim v. Ambrose, 48 Cal. 368. "The judgment is final and conclusive between the parties, not only as to the matter actually determined, but as to every other matter which the parties might have litigated and have decided as incident to, or essentially connected with the subject matter of the litigation, within the purview of the original action, either as a matter of claim or defense:'

Miller, J., in Jordan v. Van Epps, 85 N. Y. 43; see also, Barrett v. Failing, 8 Ore. 152; Bloomer v. Sturgis, 58 N. Y. 168; Embrey v. Conner, 3 N. Y. 512. Nor is it any objection that 'the former suit embraced more subjects of controversy, or more matter than the present; if the entire subject of the present controversy was embraced in it, is res judicata. No man is to be twice vexed with the same controversy. Biglow v. Windsor, 1 Gray, 302; Trago R. R. v. Blossburg R. R., 20 Wall. 137.]" Neil v. Folman, S. C. Ore., May 19, 1885; 6 West Coast Repr. 679.

8. SET-OFF. [Action against State]-Claim for Same against State in Suit against Tax Collector Denied.-A tax collector is not entitled to deduct, from amount due by him for taxes collected for the State, the cost of deeds on purchase of lands sold for taxes and bought by the State, in the absence of a statute permitting such deduction; such set-off being reconventional in its character, and not pleadable against the States. State v. Bradley, S. C. La., Monroe, June, 1885.

9. SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE-Not Granted to Compel the Assignment of a Lease, where the Consent of the Lessor is a Prerequisite to the Right.-A court of equity will not decree the specific performance of a contract to assign a lease for a term of years, where the lease requires the lessor to erect a building on the premises of not less value than a given sum, and prohibits its assignment except by the written consent of the lessor, where the lessor has failed to give such assent, and has put it out of his power to do so by accepting a surrender of the lease and the execution of a new one to other parties. [In the opinion of the court by Mr. Justice Dickey, the following language occurs: "In Fry on Specific Performance, § 536, it is said: "The court will not compel specific performance of a contract unless it can execute the whole contract.' In 3 Parsons on Contracts, (7th ed.) 362, the author says: 'If one promising to sell land has no title to it, and the buyer knows this, and the seller is unable afterwards to acquire title, a decree (for specific performance) will not be granted,'-citing Love v. Cobb, 63 N. C. 324. Again, on page 361, he says: 'A vendor will not be ordered to make a sale of a thing, or give a deed of land, when he has no legal title,'-citing Malden v. Fyson, 9 Beav. 347. In 3 Pomeroy's Eq. Jur., § 1405, the author says "The contract must be such that its specific enforcement would not be nugatory. * * * Although the contract, by itself, can be specifically enforced, the defendant must also have the capacity and ability to perform it, by obeying the decree of the court. * * Finally, the contract

must be such that the court is able to make an efficient decree for its specific performance, and is able to enforce its own decree when made."] Hurlbut v. Kantzler, 112 Ill. 482 (Adv. Sheets). 10. STATUTES [Interpretation]-When the Word "May" is to Read "Shall.”—The word "may" in a statute, means "shall" whenever the rights of the public or third persons depend upon the exercise of the power, or the performance of the duty to which it refers. The word has such meaning in the proviso of § 90 of the Practice act, which reads as follows: "Any party to such cause shall be permitted to remove the same to the Supreme Court by appeal or writ of error, in the same manner as provided in §§ 67, and 70, of this act for appeals to said Appellate Court: Provided, that such appeal may be prayed for at any time within twenty days

after the rendition of such judgment, order or decree, whether such Appellate Court be in session or not; and if such appeal be prayed for in vacation, any one or more judges of such Appellate Court may make and sign all orders necessary for the perfecting of such appeal." The court cite: Kane v. Footh, 70 Ill. 587; Fowler v. Pirkins, 77 Id. 271] James v. Dexter, 112 Ill. 489 (Adv. Sheets.)

11. When the Word "or" is Read so as to Mean "and."-The word “or” in a statute will be construed to mean "and" when the sense of the statute requires it. [Citing State v. Brandt, 41 Iowa, 615; Boyles v. McMurphy, 55 Ill. 236; Weston v. Loyhed, 30 Minn. 226; s. C., 14 N. W. Rep. 892.] Kanne v. Minneapolis, etc. R. Co., S. C. Minn., June 5, 1885; 23 N. W. Repr. 854. 12. TAX TITLES. [Adverse Possession]-Effect of Quit claim Deed of Tax Title Claimant to Original Owner. The execution of a quitclaim deed by a tax-title claimant to the original owner of land sold for taxes, that had not been occupied by any one for three years after the date of the recording of the tax deed, within three years of the recording thereof, held to operate as an abandonment and surrender to said original owner of the constructive adverse possession which arose in his favor by virtue of his taking such tax deed and recording it, which constructive adverse possession set the statute of limitations running in his favor, and that after such constructive adverse possession ceased, the statute of limitations ceased to run in favor of his title, and thereafter it ran in favor of the original owner, and barred any right of action in favor of those claiming under the tax deed after the expiration of the three years from the recording thereof. [In the opinion of the court by Taylor, J., it is said: “This court has repeatedly decided: 1. That if the tax-title claimant has been in the actual adverse possession of the lands described in the tax deed for three years next after the recording of the tax deed, the right of the original owner to show any irregularities in the tax proceeding is absolutely barred, even though the tax deed may be void upon its face. 2. That if such actual possession has been interrupted by any one claiming under the former owner during said three years, then the statute does not bar such owner's right, but, on the contrary, the statute runs in favor of the original owner; and unless the person claiming under the tax deed brings his action within the three years he is barred from maintaining any action to assert his rights under said deed. Lewis v. Disher, 32 Wis. 504; Gunnison v. Hoehne, 18 Wis. 268; Lawrence v. Kenney, 32 Wis. 281-293; Jones v. Collins, 16 Wis. 594: Dean v. Earley, 15 Wis. 100; Lain v. Shepardson, 18 Wis. 59; Cutler v. Hurlbut, 29 Wis. 152; Wilson v. Henry, 35 Wis. 241; Haseltine v. Mosher, 51 Wis. 443; S. C., 8 N. W. Rep. 273. 3. That when the tax deed is in due form and recorded in the proper office, and the lands described therein remain vacant and unoccupied for three years or more after the recording thereof, the tax-title claimant is deemed to be in the constructive adverse possession, and the statute runs in his favor, and the original owner is barred from attacking its validity. Austin v. Holt, 32 Wis. 478; Lawrence v. Kenney, Id. 281. 4. The bar of the statute is held to run in favor of the tax claimant in the case last stated, upon the presumption of fact that the recorded tax deed creates a constructive adverse possession in favor of the tax claimant, which, if continued for the three years, is as effectual to bar the orig

inal owner as an actual adverse possession for the same length of time. It is held by this court that this constructive adverse possession is based upon the presumed claim made by the grantee in the tax deed to the premises described therein, evidenced by his taking such deed and placing the same upon record, as against the original owner, not having any actual possession; and it is also held that such constructive adverse possession is at once interrupted and destroyed by an actual possession taken within the three years by the original owner, or by any one claiming under him; and it seems equally clear that any act on the part of the tax-title claimant which is inconsistent with his supposed adverse constructive possession, would also interrupt and destroy the same. If he releases his claim during the three years to the original owner, such release interrupts his constructive adverse possession, and from the date of such release the statute ceases to run in his favor. Having, in fact, abandoned his constructive adverse possession within the three years by such release, he can no more transfer to his grantee the right to set up such constructive adverse possession as a bar to the right of the original owner, than he could if he had released and surrendered an actual adverse possession to such owner during said three years. The nature of this constructive adverse possession of the tax claimant when the lands are vacant, which causes the statute of limitations to run in favor of such claimant, was considered in the case of Lewis v. Disher, 32 Wis. 504-507. In that case Chief Justice Dixon says: "The constructive possession of unoccupied land, which follows the tax deed and vests in the grantee, is, for all the purposes of the statute of limitations, and of becoming conclusive evidence of title under it, of the same nature, and operates in the same way and with the same force, as an actual adverse possession for the same period of time, where a possession of the latter kind is taken, and relied upon as a bar under the statute. The constructive possession is in this respect of the same nature, and the force and effect of it is the same, as the twenty-years, adverse possession without color of title, or the ten-years with, under the other statutes limiting the time within which actions for the recovery of real estate must be brought. The constructive possession is an adverse possession, and the nature of such a possession, or what it must be when it is actual, is well understood and defined in the law. It is well settled that an actual adverse possession, to be available as against the true owner, and to operate to bar his rights, and to transfer the title to the adverse claimant, must have been continuous and uninterrupted during the period of limitation prescribed, and that any cessation of such possession, or pause or intermission in it, or any re-entry and actual and peaceable occupation and holding by the true owner, before the period of limitation has expired, will restore such owner to his original right, and defeat the prescription of the adverse claimant, or postpone it so that he can thenceforth only assert or hold, by virtue of it, from the time his adverse possession is renewed, and shall be thereafter continuously maintained and held. This doctrine was examined and fully recognized by this court in Sydnor v. Palmer, 29 Wis. 226. See, also, Haag v. Delorme, 30 Wis. 591. And so strict is the rule that it has been held if the adverse possession be broken but for a day, its effect is entirely destroyed, and, so far as that possession is concerned, it is at an end. And in some cases the

interruptions of simple trespassers, when quite decided and indicative of claim, have been declared to be sufficient to break the continuity and defeat the adverse possession. Tyler, Ej. & Adv. Enj., c. 51, pp. 907, 910, 911, and authorities cited. There is no reason why the rules thus established, with respect to an actual adverse possession and enjoyment, should not always apply to and govern an adverse possession which is constructive. We think they do apply and govern, and that the constructive possession of unoccupied land, to be effective as conclusive evidence of title in favor of the grantee in the tax deed, and to bind and conclude the former owner, must be continuous from the date of the recording of the tax deed, to the full end and expiration of the three years prescribed by the statute." I have made this extended quotation from the opinion of the learned chief justice, for the reason that I consider it conclusive upon the point raised in the case at bar. It is clear from the opinion above cited, that if the taxtitle claimant had taken actual adverse possession under his deed, and during the running of the three years, and while in such actual possession he had acknowledged the right of the original owner, and consented to hold the possession in the future subordinate to the title of such original owner, the statute would cease to run in favor of the tax deed; and if, after so acknowledging the right of the original owner, and holding subordinate to his title, he conveyed his title to a third person who had no knowledge of such arrangement, such grantee would not be in any better position in regard to his title, so far as adverse possession and the statute of limitations is concerned, than his grantor; and, according to the reasoning in the case above cited, the constructive adverse possession which sets the statute running and keeps it running in favor of the tax deed, being of the same nature as an actual adverse possession, it can be interrupted in the same way by an abandonment thereof by the grantee in the deed, or by surrendering such constructive adverse possession to the original owner. And the fact that such surrender or abandonment is not made known to his grantee does not in any way affect the running or not running of the statute in his favor. See Knox v. Cleveland, 13 Wis. 245-252. For the purposes of . this case it may be admitted that the release of the tax claimant to the original owner, not having been recorded, would not affect the title of the grantee of the tax claimant who purchased without notice; but the only title he would get in such case would be the title actually conveyed by the tax deed. If his grantor's title has been barred by the statute of limitations having run against it, and in favor of the original owner, his right under the deed would also be barred; and if the statute of limitations has run in favor of the tax deed he would take the title perfected by such limitation. The registry act has nothing to do with the question of title which is acquired or lost by adverse possession. A title so acquired or lost depends wholly upon the acts of the parties not appearing upon the records, and not protected or affected thereby; and a grantee, who claims that his grantor's title has been perfected by such adverse possession, must establish such adverse possession by the same proofs that would be required of his grantor, and his claim would be defeated by the same proofs that would defeat his grantor. Upon this question the registry acts neither make for or against his claim of title." Warren v. Putnam, S. C. Wis., June 1 1885; 24 N. W. Repr. 58.

13. TRADEMARK. [Injunction.]-Use of Name of a Place by a Subsequent Owner of the Place not Enjoined.-A person used the words "Tower Palace" to designate the place or store where he did business, and not the kind of business he did. It is held that the words did not constitute a trademark, and he having moved could not enjoin the owner of the building or a subsequent tenant from continuing to designate the house as "Tower Palace." [Compare Howard v. Henriques, 3 Sandf. Ch. 725; Booth v. Jarrett, 52 How. Pr. 149; Pepper v. Labrot, 8 Fed. Repr. 29; s. c., 3 Ky. Law Repr. 126; Woodward v. Lazar, 21 Cal. 448.] Armstrong v. Kleinhaus, Ky. Ct. of App., Oct. 28, 1884; 6 Ky. Law Repr. 561.

14. TRESPASS UPON LAND. [Title.]—Plaintiff must Show Title where Injury is to Freehold.-In an action on the case for negligence on the part of a boom company, causing, as alleged, the absolute destruction, by washing away, of a rod or more of plaintiff's land, he must prove title to the land, and a quitclaim deed from a party not shown to have been in possession at the time of its execution will not be sufficient. [In the opinion of the court, Champlin, J., said: "This was an injury to the freehold, and no one but the owner of the inheritance could recover for its destruction. George v. Fisk, 32 N. H. 32; Van Deusen v. Young, 29 N. Y. 9; Davis v. Nash, 32 Me. 411; Curtiss v. Hoyt, 19 Conn. 159; Hosking v. Phillips, 3 Exch. 168; Moyer v. Scott, 30 Mich. 345."] Anderson v. Thunder Bay Boom Co., S. C. Mich., June 10, 1885; 23 N. W. Repr. 776.

15. TRUSTS. [Parol Evidence.]-Express Trusts in Lands Provable by Parol.-In Ohio, it is competent to prove an express trust in respect of lands by parol. [In the opinion of the court so holding, Dickman, J., said: "Previous to the enactment of the statute of frauds of this State, a trust might be created in real estate by parol and established by parol evidence, and there is nothing in our statute which prevents the establishment of an express trust in lands by evidence of the same kind. By the 7th section of the English statute of frauds,it is required that all declarations or creations of trusts of lands shall be manifested and proved by some writing, signed by the party who is by law enabled to declare the trust. But this section and the 8th and 9th sections of that statute, in relation to trusts, are omitted from our statute, and express trusts are allowed to be proved by parol evidence, as well as resulting trusts which arise by operation of law, and are unaffected by the statute. Fleming v. Donahoe, 5 Ohio, 225; Broadup v. Woodman, 27 Ohio St. 553; Matthews v. Leaman, 24 Ohio St. 615. While the evidence should be clear, certain and conclusive in proof, not only of the existence of the express trust at the time of the conveyance, but also of its terms and conditions, the trust may be engrafted by parol evidence upon a conveyance of real estate absolute on its face. Miller v. Stokely, 5 Ohio St. 194; Stall v. Cincinnati, 16 Ohio St. 169. Nor is this rule contravened by the 4th section of our statute, which refers to the assigning or granting of legal interests; nor by the 5th section, which prevents the bringing of any action to charge any person upon any contract or sale of lands, tenements, or hereditaments, or any interest in or concerning them. And as said by the court in Fleming v. Donahoe, supra, the creation of the trust in lands by parol, is not to be considered as varying the terms of the deed, but only as setting up an independent contract consistent with it."]

Harvey v. Gardner, Ohio Sup. Ct. Com., Jan. 13, 1885; 13 Weekly Law Bull. 309. 16.. [Declaration.]

17.

May be Proved by Contemporaneous Declarations of Trustor. H, "for one dollar and other valuable consideration," by an instrument not under seal and absolute on its face, transferred to his three sons all his "right and title in" certain mineral lands, of which the legal title was in another. An iron company was thereafter organized under the laws of this State, a large part of the capital stock of which was subscribed by those holding interests in the lands, and the lands were all conveyed to the company and accepted by it in full payment of the stock subscriptions. The certificates of the stock subscribed by two of the sons in their own names, were issued, at their instance and request, to their respective wives, and the two sons-partners in business -subsequently assigned their partnership and individual property in trust for the benefit of their creditors. In an action by the assignees to declare such certificates of stock fraudulent and void, as against the creditors, it was held, that declarations of H at the time he transferred to his sons his right and title in the mineral lands, were admissible in evidence, for the purpose of proving that such transfer was made to his sons in trust, for the use and benefit of their respective wives. Ibid.

[Acceptance-Presumption.]—Acceptance of Trust, when Presumed.-The acceptance of an express parol trust engrafted upon an absolute grant of an interest in land, may be presumed from acts of the grantee at, or subsequent to the time of the grant. Ibid.

JETSAM AND FLOTSAM.

MIXED MARRIAGES.-There is a probability that the distressed heroine whose woes arise out of the fact that, being an Englishwoman, she marries a Frenchman, without any knowledge of the French marriage laws, will soon become out of date. Lord Granville recently replied to a letter on the subject from the Bishop of Manchester, to the effect that the Foreign Offices of London and Paris had agreed upon a form of certificate which should be issued by the French Consuls, throughout the United Kingdom, before the celebration of marriages between French and English subjects. There can be no question about the value of such a document, setting forth that the requirements of the French code have been complied with to the satisfaction of the Consul issuing it. But it would be still better if it were known that such a certificate would be received in any French Court of Law as in itself constituting indisputable proof that an English marriage had been performed in strict accordance with French Law. Having addressed an inquiry to the French Consulate on this point, we are politely informed by M. Cochelet, the Vice-Consul, that "the instructions received from the Foreign Office in Paris are silent on the subject." It should be added, indeed, that in a letter from M. Napoleon Argles, the Solicitor to the Consulate, which was published a few weeks ago, that gentleman declares that when the Consular certificate has been obtained, the marriage "can be proceeded with, without risk of being annulled." This, of course, would be the natural assumption, from the formal nature of the document; but it would be more satisfactory if the inference of M. Argles were corroborated by an express declaration from the French Foreign Office.-Pump Court.

The Central Law Journai.

ST. LOUIS, SEPTEMBER 25, 1885.

CURRENT EVENTS.

COME WEST.-We offer to the American Bar Association Mr. Greeley's advice to the young man, Go west. It is a prosperous body, with a large and influential membership and a plethoric treasury; but as it has always held its sessions in the east, it has been chiefly attended by eastern members, and the result is that it is an eastern rather than a representative body. All other bodies of this character habitually migrate from place to place. We ask the executive committee to try Chicago or St. Paul for the place of meeting next year. If Chicago is chosen, the proceedings and reports and papers will be printed in the great dailies in full and the proceedings of the meeting will in that way reach a portion of the lay public, which public they never reach now.

The

THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION. meeting of this body was carried out according to the programme announced in a previous issue of this JOURNAL. It was more numerously attended than any former meeting, and was in all respects successful. The principal feature, as we indicated, was a report of the special committee upon Delay and Uncertainty in Judicial Administration. The report was signed by but two members of the committee, David Dudley Field, and John F. Dillon.

Of the other members, Mr. Merrick, of Washington, had died; Mr. Phelps, of Vermont, was absent as our minister at the Court of St. James; and Mr. Broadhead, of Missouri, was absent in France on legal business for the government. The recommendations of the report were adopted, except that that favors the codification of the common law. This, after a long debate, was postponed for further consideration at the next meeting, and was finally recommended to the committee with instructions to report again at the next meeting. The committee, as reorganized, consists of the following gentlemen: David Dudley Field, of New York, Chairman; John Vol. 21-No. 13.

F. Dillon, of New York; George G. Wright, of Iowa; Cortlandt Parker, of New Jersey, and Seymour D. Thompson, of Missouri.

THE NEXT MEETING OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION. The next meeting of this body will be presided over by William Allen Butler, an accomplished lawyer of New York. The important features of the meeting, as they now foreshadow themselves, are a second report of the committee on "Delay and Uncertainty in Judicial Administration," and also a debate upon the report of the committee on "Jurisprudence and Law Reform," concerning the surveillance of professional criminals, which was laid over for consideration. The former report will undoubtedly have the effect of renewing the debate on the subject of codification of the common law, and the question will be pressed by the advocates of codification to a decisive vote. The latter report was one of exceptional ability, for which the Association is greatly indebted to Simeon E. Baldwin, of Connecticut. It explains the system of surveillance to which professional criminals are subjected in England and upon the continent, and recommends the adoption of a similar system in this country. The adoption of this report will be powerfully opposed by that splendid and popular class of the profession known as advocates, who, from the habitual defense of persons accused of crime, have come insensibly to sympathize with the criminal classes. They will protest against the adoption of the report as inhuman, barbarous, contrary to the spirit of liberty which animates our institutions, and they will have much to say about the Divine Master, just as they do when they talk to a jury in the defense of a red-handed murderer, But the fact remains that houses are habitually burglarized in all the great cities of the country; that life is unsafe in by far the greater portion of our great territory; and that irregular executions of offenders at the hands of mobs outnumber the executions which take place under legal process. These facts have created a profound impression upon the public mind, and the American Bar Association will not face public opinion and refuse to sanction the measures advocated by this report.