Р people ex rel. v. Ryalls, S. C. Colo., 71. ERRY V. HOUSE OF REFUGE, C. of App. Md., 124. latt v. Pennsylvania R. Co., S. C. O., 98, ouder v. Ritzinger, S C. Ind., 296. Pullman Palace Car Co. v. State, S. C. Tex., 320. Railroad Co. v. Rush, S. C. Tenn., 369. RAIL OAD CO. V. SCHULTZ, S. C. O., 162. Ralston v. Turpin, U. S. C. C. S. D. Ga., 417. Ramsey v. Arrott, S. C. Tex, 158. Ramsey v. Hardy, S. C. O., 15. Read v. Anderson, Eng. C. of App., 173. Republican Valley R. Co. v. Fink, S, C. Nebr., 346. Richardson v. Day, U. S.C. C., N. Dist. Ill., 56. Roberts, In re, U. S. Dist. C. S. D. Ga., 118. Rogers v. Hand, P. C. N. J., 360. Rogers v. Rogers, S. C. Mass., 27; 294. Ross v. Scott, S. C. Tenn., 416. Rubelman Hardware Co. v. Greve, C. of App., St. L., 108 SCHLUETER V.BELLINGHEIMER,C. P. O., 305. Schoolin v. Com., S. C. Pa., 55. Schrother v. City of Prescott. S. C. Wis., 438. Schufeldt v. Jenkins, S. C. C. App. Va., 96. Second Nat. Bank v. Gaylord, S. C. Ia.. 115. Security Co. v. Ball, S. C. Ind.. 319. Seemuller v. Fuchs, C. of Ap. Md., 440. State v. Nevin, S. C. Nev., 309. State v. Plant, S. C. W. Va., 216, 276. State v. Sanchez, S. C. La., 13, 38. State ex rel. v. Chosen Freeholders, S. C. N. J., 337. State ex rel v. Englemann, S. C. Mo., 317. State er rel v. Hawes, S. C. O., 295. TAYLOR V. BARTON, S. C. N. . Wales, 43. Taylor v. Chicago, etc. R. Co., S. C. Wis., 334. Taylor v. Gilman, U. S. C. C. S. D. N. Y., 365. Taylor v. Wendling, S. C. Ia., 218. TEBO V. ROBINSO C. of App. N. Y., 400. Thomas v. New York Life Ins. Co., N. Y. C. of App., 174. Thompson v. Lowry, S. C. La., 218. Thompson v. Reno Savings Bank,. S. C. Nev., 466. Thompson v. State, C. of App. Tex., 435. Tirrell v. Freeman, S. C. Mass., 345. Torrence v. Shedd, S. C. III., 37, 38, 194. Torres v. Falgoust, S. C. I a., 74. Town of State Center v. Barenstien, S. C. Ia., 273. Truman v. London, etc. R. Co., 277. Turner v. Turner, S. C. App Va., 536. Turner v. Vicksburg etc. R. Co., S. C. La., 219. 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Robertson, C. of App. Va., 364, 491. York's Appeal, S. C. Pa., 438. Young v. County of Blackhawk, S. C. Ia. 196. Accidents are not Crimes. John D. Lawson, 264. Appropriation of Payments. H. Campbell Black, 473. At Assizes. A. B. M., 106, 330. Deeds-Inuring of after Acquired Title. Joseph A. Excluding Pupils from Public School. E. S. Whitte- Executions against Separate Estate of Married Women. Fresh Injury Arising from Original Tort. Irish Law Grand Jurors as Witnesses-Statutory Provisions. M. Guaranty and Suretyship Actions against Makers Inter-State Garnishments-Exemptions. R. T. Hollo- Law for Ladies. R. N. R. in Canada Law Journal. Libel-Newspaper Privilege. Gideon D. Bantz, 86. Libel-Privileged Publications Legislative and Judi- cial. W. L. Murfree, Sr., 450. Limitations in Insurance Policies as to Time of Bring- Limitations of Actions for Conversions. A. J. Donner, National Corporations. Russell H. Curtis, 428. Of the Purchaser's Right to a Good Title and how it Power of Bank Presidents. L. K. Mihills, 146. Priority of Claims for Labor and Materials over Lien of Railroad Mortgage. Charles Chauncey Savage, Proceedings in Rem as Affected by Death of Party. J. Rights of a Person Suffering an Injury when Violating Suicide-Effect upon a Life Insurance Policy. Charles Sole Traders. A. J. Donner, 47. Some Points on the Subject of Compulsory References, The Animus Manendi in relation to Domicil. Solici- The Great Red Pepper Case. A. B. M., 384. The Law of Ancillary Administration. H. Campbell "The Law of the Land." D. H. Pingrey, 147. The Neighbor to Whom Duty is Due, 382. Trial of Adverse Claims of Title in Suit to Foreclose a The Central Law Journal. not write grammatical English. A large pro ST. LOUIS, JULY 3, 1885. CURRENT EVENTS. of THE DAKOTA PLAN.-W. H. Lyon, Esq., Sioux Falls, Dak., has issued a proposition for a scheme of goverment for the proposed State of Dakota, which he calls "The Dakota plan." The substance of it is to have no legislature, but to have a council of, say, five members, who, together with the governor, shall propose annually to the people such legislation as is deemed suitable, the same to be adopted or rejected at an election by the popular vote. Although this proposed scheme is called "the Dakota plan," there is nothing new in it; in fact it is as old as the democracy of Athens, and as matter-of-fact as the govern ment of the little land of Appenzell (Appenzeller Ländli) in Switzerland. It is an attempt to get a State government nearer to the idea of a simple democracy than at present. It contains both good and bad ideas. Its good idea is, that there should be in every State a legislative body always in session which should have the power, at least, of proposing laws and drafting them in suitable form for passage. Its bad idea number one is, that it takes away from the immediate representatives of the people at large the initiative in proposing laws. This might be in some measure obviated by increasing the number of the council from five, say to fifteen, each one to be elected from a separate district of the State. Its bad idea number two is, that the masses of the people are so ignorant and careless that they are utterly unfit for the task of directly enacting laws. Ninty-nine out of a hundred do not know much more about the laws which they want, than a mule does. This is shown by the experience which is had in many States in the adoption of constitutions and constitutional amendments. The difficulty with our present governments is that there is too much democracy in them. The tendency of the people is to elect to their legislatures men like themselves-jolly good fellows, who know little about the real needs of the State in respect of new legislation, and who not only cannot draft a legislative bill, but who canVol. 21-No. 1. portion of our legislatures is composed of that sort of men; and the crude, bungling, slipshod, and even corrupt legislation which they turn out is an illustration of the vices of the system. An improvement on Mr. Lyon's plan would be to have a permanent legislative council such as he suggests always in session; to have the laws proposed by them published, say, three months prior to each election for members of the legislature; to have the business of the legislature limited to the ratification or rejection of the measures proposed by them, with the exception of appropriation bills and other matters which experience might dictate. A QUICK WAY TO COLLECT NOTES. At the last meeting of the Georgia Bar Association, Judge Bleckley, as Chairman of the Commit tee on Law Reform, filed an interesting re- ̄ port, in which he took the position that the Among law was falling behind the age. other things, he recommended the following quick method of collecting promissory notes: "An action on the instrument, and a judgment shall be dispensed with, and the original writing shall be registered, filed and remain in the clerk's office, and that an execution founded upon it be issued by the clerk, and enforced by the sheriff. What would warrant a judgment on mere inspection is injudgment as with it. Relatively to the exetrinsically as worthy of confidence without a cution, it at last, is the real producer, and the judgment a superfluous middle-man." Albany Law Journal thinks this plan impolitic, and with this view we concur. No man ought to suffer the seizure of his property under compulsory process unless he has had his day in court. Such a method of collecting debts would not be "due process of law," nor the "law of the land," within the meaning of the guaranties which exist, it is supposed, under the Constitutions of all the American States, and which have come down to us from Magna Charta. It would prevent the defendant from making a defense to a forged note under a plea of non est factum, from pleading fraud or want of consideration, or from getting the benefit of any counterclaim which he might have against the holder of the note. It is quite practicable to model judicial proceedings in suits upon promissory notes and other unconditional contracts to pay money, so as to give the obligee a speedy judgment and to punish dilatory pleas, appeals for delay, and the like. Our Missouri statute has, it is believed, been found sufficient for the purpose, though it is doubtful whether it would be in a period of general financial stringency. It contains provisions giving damages for the non-acceptance,1 and also for the non-payment 2 of bills of exchange, and it extends these provisions to promissory notes by making the latter inland bills of exchange. 8 DELAYS IN THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE. -At the last annual meeting of the American Bar Association, a committee was appointed, consisting of David Dudley Field, of New York, Edward J. Phelps, of, Vermont, (since appointed minister to England,) James O. Broadhead, of Missouri (since appointed law agent for the United States in the matter of the French Spoliation Claims), John F. Dillon, of New York, and Herrick, of Washington, D. C., with instructions to report at the next meeting, whether the present delay and uncertainty in judicial administration can be lessened, and if so, by what means. Mr. Field, the chairman of the committee, has sent a circular to certain mem bers of the Association in different States, containing a series of questions, and requesting that answers to the same be sent to him as early as the 15th of July. These questions are as follows: I. How many judges of courts of record are there in your State? II. How many lawyers are there? III. What is the average length of a defended law-suit from its beginning in the court of first instance to its end in the court of last resort? IV. What is the average expense in costs and counsel fees of such a law-suit, to each party? V. How many appeals are allowed in the same suit? VI. How many volumes of reported cases are annually published, and how many decisions are reported in the last volume of each court? VII. What is the number of affirmances and reversals reported in this last volume? 11 Mo. Rev. Stat. § 539. 2 Id. § 540. 3 Id. § 547. VIII. Is there delay or uncertainty in the judicial administration of your State, and if so, what in your opinion is the cause and what is the remedy? The report of the above-named committee and the debate which will follow, promise to lend great interest to the next meeting of the American Bar Association, which takes place at Saratoga on the 18th of August. The question of the codification of the common law, which has been agitated in New York for many years, will, it is conjectured, be transferred by that report to the larger forum of the American bar; and those who attend the meeting will hear many things on the subject which will be worth listening to. RECEIVERS APPOINTED AT THE INSTANCE OF THE DEBTOR.-In the case of the Wabash, St. Louis & Pacific R. Co. v. The Central Trust Co., Mr. Circuit Judge Brewer explained how it was that the court had appointed a receiver of a debtor's property on a bill filed by the debtor against its creditor. He said: "It has been said that that original action was an anomaly. A mortgagor, before default, comes into a court of equity and says he is going to default, and wants the court to take possession of his property, the mortgagee saying nothing. It may be it is not a common action, and yet I believe it is not solitary nor the first. That application presented this state of facts to the court: that here was a vast property, running through several States, burdened with a variety of local incumbrances and obligations, whose value consisted largely in its being preserved in its entirety and with all its connections. Split up into a hundred fragments, the aggregate value of the varied fragments, it was contended, would be as nothing compared with the value of the single, intact property; and the question was put before the court whether, two days before a default, when various rights of attack would arise in different parts of this territory, the court might anticipate and take possession of the property, and preserve it intact, in order to permit the general mortgagee, when default actually occurred, to file its bill for foreclos 423 Fed. Rep., 513. ure, and have the property, as an entirety, sold? While, of course, there were matters, in respect to this, of doubt that required consideration, and we did consider it carefully, -yet both of us then thought, and both agree now, that it was wise that it was so done, and that the court properly appointed the receivers." We are glad that this explanation has been made. The proceeding was regarded by the profession as a most extraordinary one. The English bond-holders looked upon it as a mere trick, devised by the owners of this railway property to keep it together in spite of their insolvency until they could force their creditors to a compromise upon their terms. What equity has a man who cannot pay his debts to have a court of justice take charge of his property and manage it for the mere purpose of holding his creditors at arm's length? We are surprised at the above statement that this is not the first case in which this has been done. If any of our learned readers know of any other case of this kind, we should be glad to have them cite it to us. NOTES OF RECENT DECISIONS. POWER OF THE FEDERAL COURTS TO JUDGE OF THE REASONABLENESS OF STATE STATUTES. In a former number of this JOURNAL,5 we used this expression: "This calls up the pertinent question which the American people must face and solve, whether the Federal courts are judges of the reasonableness of the acts of the State legislatures. Some of them are of the opinion that they are." In our last issue we stated the same thing in the following language: "The steady encroachments of that body upon the powers of the States, are matters of every day observation and every day concern; and we might as well now call a halt, and face the question whether the Federal courts are to exercise a general superintending jurisdiction over the State governments. That they have exercised such a jurisdiction again and again within the last twenty years, is a matter of history and of common knowledge. They have exercised it 520 C. L. J, 427. until such a confusion of legal principles has grown up in the minds of some of the judges of those courts that they have come to look upon the laws of the States very much as judges of the common law were wont to look upon the by-laws of corporations,-to be enAs forced only when deemed reasonable. we shall point out hereafter, the legislation of the States has been overturned by the Federal Circuit and District judges in the most important matters, and their loose discretion substituted in place of the same." Some of our readers have challenged these expressions. We can prove that they were true. In Ex parte Koehler, Mr. District Judge Deady, sitting in the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Oregon, in giving directions to a receiver of a railway appointed by his court, asserted the power to enforce a statute of Oregon, limiting the rates of charges by railway companies, only so far as he should deem the same to be reasonable. The company in question was organized under the Constitution and laws of the State of Oregon. The Constitution of Oregon, provides as follows: "Corporations may be formed under general laws. All laws passed pursuant to this section may be altered, amended or repealed, but not so as to impair or destroy any vested corporate right." The Oregon and California Railway Company was formed under the General Corporation Act, passed by the legislature of Oregon in pursuance of this constitutional provision in the year 1862. Section 36 of this statute reads as follows: "Every corporation formed under this act for the construction of a railway, as to such road, shall be deemed a common carrier, and shall have power to collect and receive such tolls or freights for transportation of persons or property thereon as it may prescribe.' 8 This same court had previously held that this section, when construed in connection with the above constitutional provision, only authorized a railway corporation organized under the act, to charge a reasonable compensation for the transportation of persons and property; that to this extent and no further, it had a vested corporate right which the legis 6 23 Fed. Rep. 529. 7 Art. 2, § 9. 8 Laws Ore., 522. |