While they were practicing, and B succeeded each time in drawing the card, J, a confederate of S, came up, appearing to be a stranger, and inquired what they were doing, and S told him he would show him, and gave him the same explanation as to the mode of selling tea, but did not tell him about the marked cards. S, after some talk, said that B could draw the fifty-pound card. J, offered to bet $100 that he could not, and held out to S what seemed to be a roll of bills. S said he had not the money, but had a $300 check. J' said he did not want the check; he wanted money. S asked B if he had it. B said he had not $100, but had $80. B, at S's request, handed him the $80, and S whispered to him to draw the marked card. He drew it, and it was a blank, and S at once handed the money to J. This was held to be larceny. [In the opinion of the court by Campbell, J., it is said: "In Robson's Case, Russ. & R. 413, the circumstances were nearly like those in the present case, and where they differed, it was not in a way to negative criminality here. In that case, the person whose money was alleged to have been stolen, was induced to take part in a bet, and put his money in the hands of a stakeholder, who paid it over to the winner. The bet, as here, was got up by confederates, who played into each others' hands, and one of whom persuaded the victim that the bet was certain. They were convicted of lar ceny, and the trial judge, who allowed the conviction, reserved the point for the opinion of the judges, ten of whom met and agreed in sustaining the conviction, because, at the time of taking, the owner only parted with the possession of the money. As the opinions are not reported, it can only be inferred that the judges thought there was no bona fide wager which made the stakeholder anything more than the temporary bailee, and therefore the transfer and acceptance by the apparent winner were unauthorized, and operated as a felonious taking. The case is substantially like this, except that Brown made no bet, but handed his money to Shaw on the belief that there was a real bet between him and Jones. Brown himself deserves no special favor for undertaking to facilitate Shaw's knavery. But this does not help respondents, whose methods consisted in tempting weak fools into confiding in their superior cunning. Their offense is the same as if Brown had been altogether virtuous. They used just so much trickery as was necessary to get his money on a sham bet, and that was enough, as we think, to bring them within the law."] Peopletv. Shaw, S. C. Mich., June 17, 1885; 24 N. W. Repr.

12. CRIMINAL LAW-Statutory Offense of Sending Threatening Letters, etc.,Different from that of Libel.-In a prosecution under act Mo. 64 of 1884, of the Legislature of Louisiana, deferring and punishing the offense of maliciously sending threatening letters, etc., proof of the truth of the charges threatened to be made is not per se a 'justification under the statute, though such proof in connection with other evidence tending to rebut the malicious intent might, under some circumstances, be admissible; the offense is entirely different from libel, and neither the letter nor the reason of the constitutional provision permitting the truth of the libel to be given in evidence has any application to a case under this statute. State v. Goodwin, S. C. of La., Opelousa, July, 1885. 13. DAMAGES. [Measure of-Prospective ProfitsTelegraph Co.]-Telegraph Co. not Liable for Loss on Prospective Contract.-Plaintiff's agent

telegraphed him an offer to buy apples at two dollars per barrel, but by the negligence of the agents of the telegraph company the telegram was not properly copied, and plaintiff took no notice of it, and afterwards the price of apples advanced, and in purchasing he was obliged to pay the advance price. Held, in an action against the telegraph company for his loss, that he could only recover the amount paid for the telegram. [In the opinion of the court by Adams, J., it is said: "In Hibbard v. W. U. Tel. Co., 33 Wis. 567, the court said: "Profits on a contract never made, are quite too remote and uncertain to be taken into consideration. In the case at bar the plaintiff merely lost an offer, and if we were to apply the rule above mentioned, it would be clear that the plaintiff could not recover more than the cost of the telegram. But we need not go so far as to hold the above rule applicable. In no event could the plaintiff recover more than the value of the offer, and that could not be greater than the value of the contract would have been, in case the offer had been received and accepted.. Now, the value of a contract for the purchase of property, where nothing is paid, is the difference between the amount agreed to be paid and such greater amount, if any, as the property may be worth in the market; and where damages are allowed for a breach of the contract, they are to be estimated as of the time of the breach. See Sedg. Dam. 313, and cases cited."] Pennington v. Western Union Tel. Co., S. C. Iowa, June 13, 1885.

14.

[Trespass]-For Cutting Logs on Land of Another by Mistake.-Where logs are, by mistake, cut on the land of another and hauled and deposited in a creek several miles away, the measure of damages is the value of the logs on the plaintiff's land before they were cut, and not their value in the creek. [In the opinion of the court Sherwood, J., said: "We discover nothing in the case indicating any wilful or negligent trespass on the part of the defendant or the company's employees. The general rule of damages is the value of the property lost under such circumstances at the time and place of conversion. The declaration avers plaintiff's possession of the land, and the ownership of the property taken, and that upon the land the property was taken, and there came to the possession of the defendant by finding, and on the same day and place the defendant converted the same. The record shows this declaration supported by the proofs. Complete indemnity for the actual loss sustained in this case by the plaintiff is what he was entitled to recover. In civil actions the amount of recovery does not depend upon the form of the action, in a case like the present; but whether it be upon contract or in tort, the proper measure of damages, except in cases where punitory damages are allowed, is just indemnity to the party injured for the loss, which is the natural, reasonable, and proximate cause or result of the wrongful act complained of. Baker v. Drake, 53 N. Y. 211; Page v. Fowler, 39 Cal. 412; Forsyth v. Wells, 41 Pa. St. 291; Single v. Schneider, 30 Wis. 570; Hungerford v. Redford, 29 Wis. 345; Allison v. Chandler, 11 Mich. 542; Warren v. Cole, 15 Mich. 265; Daily Post Co. v. McArthur, 16 Mich. 447; Northrup v. McGill, 27 Mich. 238; Winchester v. Craig, 33 Mich. 205; Allen v. Kinyon, 41 Mich 281; s. c. 1 N. W. Rep. 863; Weymouth v. Railway Co., 17 Wis. 550; Tilden v. Johnson, 52 Vt. 628; Cushing v. Longfellow, 26 Me. 306; Ensley v. Nashville, 2 Baxt. 144; Thompson v. Moiles, 46 Mich.

42; s. c. 8 N. W. Rep. 577. Each case, however, must necessarily to a very great extent depend upon its own peculiar circumstances and equities. Erwin v. Clark, 13 Mich. 10; Ripley v. Davis, 15 Mich. 80; Allen v. Kinyon, 41 Mich. 281; s. c. 1 N. W. Rep, 863."] Ayres v. Hubbard, S. C. Mich., June 10, 1885; 23 N. W. Repr. 829.

15. DEED [Condition Subsequent Restraint of Trade.]-A condition in a deed that in the event of the property conveyed being used for the sale of liquor, it should revert to the grantor, is valid. [In the opinion of the court by Cooley, C. J., it is said: "The defendants also rely upon the legal proposition that conditions in restraint of trade are void. This, in its application to a parallel case, was considered in Beal v. Chase, 31 Mich. 490, where the authorities are collated and examined. It was there held that a covenant in restraint of trade, so far as the covenantee had in his own business an interest in enforcing it, might be valid. This case comes within the decision in that case. See, also, Doty y. Martin, 32 Mich. 462; Caswell v. Gibbs, 33 Mich. 332. There is nothing in the position taken by the defense that the condition tends to the establishment of a monopoly in the business of selling intoxicating drinks, and is thus opposed to public policy. It is not the policy of this State that every one should sell intoxicating drinks who pleases. On the contrary, heavy taxes are levied, and onerous conditions imposed by the State for the express purpose of limiting the number of those who shall sell; and the condition in question is directly in the line of that policy, instead of being opposed to it."] Watrous v. Allen, S.C.Mich., June 17, 1885; 24 N. W. Repr. 104.

16. [Equity.]-What Relief Equity will Grant to the Grant or in Such a Deed.-While equity will not declare the estate of a grantee forfeited for a breach of a condition in the deed against the use of premises conveyed in the sale of liquor, it will enforce such condition as an agreement, and enjoin him from its violation, and such remedy may be had by and against the assigns of the respective parties. [In the opinion of the court by Cooley, C. J., it is said: "This disposes of all the grounds of defense which are brought to our notice by the brief in this court. The complainants are not entitled to enforce a forfeiture of the estate in equity, for equity does not aid in enforcing forfeitures. Crane v. Dwyer, 9 Mich. 350; White v. Port Huron, etc. R. Co., 13 Mich. 356; Wing v. Railey, 14 Mich. 83; Horsburg v. Baker, 1 Pet. 232; Livingston v. Tompkins, 4 Johns. Ch. 415; Smith v. Jewett, 40 N. H. 530; Warner v. Bennett, 31 Conn. 468. But on the hearing in this court they do not claim a forfeiture, and only ask the enforcement of the condition as an agreement. This is a remedy much more favorable to the defendants than the remedy at law, for the equitable remedy only compels the party to abide by the agreement, while the remedy at law takes from him the property he has paid for, and operates as a punishment. Injunction then, to restrain a breach of a condition, if the condition is legal, is perfectly reasonable. It was so declared in Clark v. Martin, 49 Pa. St. 289, where, as in this case, the remedy was sought by a grantee of the party in whose favor the condition had been reserved. He had become purchaser of a lot adjoining that which the defendant had bought subject to the condition, and was held entitled to a perpetual injunction, upon the ground that the condition was imposed for the benefit of such adjoining lot. 'Common sense,' say

the court, 'cannot doubt its purpose; and thus it becomes plain that the duty created by the condition and restriction is a duty to the owner of the adjoining lot, whoever he might be.' A like case is Whitney v. Union R. Co., 11 Gray, 359. Bigelow, J., delivering the opinion of the court, after speaking of the restrictions which appeared in the deed then in question, said: "The purpose of inserting them in the deed is manifest. It was to prevent such a use of the premises by the grantee, and those claiming under him, as might diminish the value of the residue of the land belonging to the grantor, or impair its eligibility as sites for private residences. That such a purpose, is a legitimate one, and may be carried out consistently with the rules of law by reasonable and proper covenants, conditions or restrictions, cannot be doubted. Every owner of real property has the right so to deal with it as to restrain its use by his grantees within such limits as to prevent its appropriation to purposes which will impair the value or diminish the pleasure of the enjoyment of the land which he retains. The only restriction on this right is that it shall be exercised reasonably, with a due regard to public policy, and without creating any unlawful restraint of trade. Nor can there be any doubt that in whatever form such a restraint is placed on real estate by the terms of a grant, whether it is in the technical form of a condition or covenant, or of a reservation or exception in the deed, or by words which give to the acceptance of the deed by the grantee the force and effect of a parol agreement, it is binding as between the grantor and immediate grantee, and can be enforced against him by suitable process, both in law and in equity.' And he proceeds to show that it may also be enforced as against those who shall derive interests through or under the grantee. Those cases in which it is held that the fact that a penalty or forfeiture is imposed for doing a prohibited act is no obstacle to the interposition of equity by injunction, rest on the same principle. French v. Macale, 2 Drury & War. 269; Coles v. Sims, Kay, 56; 5 De Gex, M. & G. 1; Barret v. Blagrave, 5 Ves. 555; Brady v. Martin, 1 Cox, 26. So do cases in which specific performance is decreed, notwithstanding the contract provides for stipulated damages. Fox v. Scard, 33 Beav. 327; Howard v. Woodward, 10 Jur. (N. S.) 1123. This is perfectly reasonable and equitable; for the penalty, forfeiture, or fixed damages are only agreed upon to render it more improbable that the act against which they are directed will be committed. The cases above referred to sufficiently show that the remedy may be had by and against the assigns of the respective parties, but the following cases may be cited to the same: Tulk v. Moxhay, 2 Phil. 774; Mann v. Stephens, 15 Sim. 377; Hills v. Miller, 3 Paige, 254; Barrow v. Richard, 8 Paige, 354; Brouwer v. Jones, 23 Barb. 153; Linzee v. Mixer, 101 Mass. 512; Gibert v. Peteler, 38 N. Y. 165: Atlantic Dock Co. v. Leavitt, 54 N. Y. 35. Even a parol agreement, if once executed, may be subsequently enforced in behalf of parties for whose benefit it was intended. Tallmadge v. East River Bank, 2 Duer, 614. That a condition like that in this case is valid in law was decided in Smith v. Barrie, 22 N. W. Rep, 816, at the last term of this court, and is not now in question. A perpetual injunction should be decreed, and complainant should recover his costs. Sherwood and Champlin, JJ., concurred. Campbell, J., said: 'I think the case is not one for equity.'"] Watrous v. Allen, S. C. Mich., June 17, 1885; 24 N. W. Repr. 104.

17. DOMICIL-When Domicil of Origin Prevails in Case of Unsettled Residence.-A Scotchman obtained a commission in the English army in the year 1810, and at once proceeded with his regiment on foreign service and served abroad until the year 1860, when he sold his commission and retired from the army. From 1860 until his death he resided in lodgings, hotels, and boarding-houses in various places in England, and died in 1882 in a private hotel in London, a bachelor and intestate. He never visited Scotland after 1810, and during the last twenty years of his life never left the territorial limits of England. Held, that he had not lost his domicile of origin. [The following cases were examined: Arnott v. Groom, Court of Sessions Cases, 1846, 9 D. 142, cited in Dicey; on Domicil, 57; Udney v. Udney, L. R. 1 Sc. App. 441; Doucet v. Geohegan, 9 Ch. Div. 441; Hodgson v. De Beauchesne, 12 Moore P. C. 285; s. C., 33 Law Times Rep. (O. S.) 36; Haldane v. Eckford, L. R. 8 Eq. 631; s. c., 21,Law Times Rep. (N. S.) 87; Bell v. Kennedy, 1 H. L. Sc. 307; Brown v. Smith, 15 Beav. 444; Munro v. Munro, 7 Cl. & Fin. 842; Attorney-General v. Dunn, 6 Mees. & W. 511; Stanley v. Barnes, 3 Hagg. Ecc. 373.] Re Patience, English Chancery Division, March 24, 1885; 52 Law Times Rep. (N. S.) 687.

18. ESCROW. [Agency.]-Depositary of Escrow is a Special Agent.-"The depositary of an escrow is a special and not a general agent, and the person dealing with him is bound to know the extent of his powers. Smith v. South Royalton Bank, 32 Vt. 350. It is the settled doctrine that the delivery of an escrow by the depositary to the grantee named therein, without a compliance with the conditions, is not a delivery with the assent of the grantor, and conveys no title, and that the authority of the depositary of an escrow is limited strictly to the conditions of the deposit, a compliance with which alone justifies the delivery. Stanley v. Valentine, 79 Ill. 544; Evarts v. Agnes, 4 Wis. 343; Ogden v. Ogden, 4 Ohio St. 182; Smith v. South Royalton Bank, supra." Chicago etc. Land Co. v. Peck, 112 Ill. 408, 447, opinion by Sheldon, J.

CORRESPONDENCE.

STATUTORY BONDS WITH SUPERADDED CONDITIONS.

To the Editor of the Central Law Journal:

Your correspondent Mr. Rivers is somewhat hasty in his criticism of your note to the opinion in Rubelmann Hardware Co. v. Greve, 21 Cent. L. J. 108. You remarked that the cases cited were "the only American cases which bear on the precise point involved." The "point involved" was, whether an action could be maintained on the "superadded condition," not prescribed by the statute, but interpolated in a statutory bond? The cases supplied by Mr. Rivers are of suits on the statutory conditions, and therefore do not "bear on the precise point involved" in the Rubelmann

QUERIES AND ANSWERS.

[Correspondents are requested to draw up their answers in the form in which we print them, and not in the form of letters to the editor. They are also admonished to make their answers as brief as may be.-Ed.]

QUERIES ANSWERED.

Query No. 6.-[21 Cent. L. J. 120.] I am trying to find out, from the derivation of the two names, whether Miller can be regarded as idem sonans with Millen. I have a case depending upon the question.

case.

JOHANNES FACTOTUM. Answer:-Probably not. For a full collection of cases on idem sonans see 24 Alb. L. J. 445; also note in 35 N. J. Eq. 398. B. K. MILLER, J. Milwaukee. Another Answer:-Johannes Factotum will probably be able to show to the court that Miller can be properly regarded as idem sonans with Millen. A good deal will depend on the special facts of the particular Lord Mansfield applied the test whether or not "the omission or addition of a letter would change the word so as to make it another." In Ward v. State, 28 Alabama, 53, it was said: "If the names may be sounded alike without doing violence to the power of the letters found in the variant orthography, then the variance is immaterial." McInnis and McGinnis were held to be covered by the doctrine in Barnes v. People, 18 Ill. 52. Conly and Connolly in Fletcher v. Conly, 2 Greene, (Iowa) 88; usury and usuary in Gresham v. Walker, 10 Ala. 370. If the inquirer will secure a copy of Browne's Humorous Phases of the Law, he will find a pretty full collection of the Adjudicated Examples, on page 439 to 443 inclusive, and will have a good law book left over after the investigation.

H. M. WILTSE.

RECENT PUBLICATIONS.

LAWSON ON PRESUMPTIVE EVIDENCE. The Law of Presumptive Evidence, Including Presumptions both of Law and of Fact, and the Burden of Proof both in Civil and Criminal Cases. Reduced to Rules. By John D. Lawson. Author of a similar work on "The Law of Expert and Opinion Evidence." San Francisco: A. L. Bancroft & Co. 1885.

Mr. Lawson's work is the best presentation of the modern case law on the subject of presumptive evidence, but we doubt whether he has discriminated with sufficient clearness between evidence which is merely relevant because having a tendency in connection with other evidence to support an issue, and evidence which reaches that degree of probative force which entitles it to be called presumptive, that is, which is either conclusive of a certain fact by reason of some rule of law founded in public policy or otherwise which is sufficient to take the question to the jury, and to uphold the verdict of the jury if it be in conformity with the tendency of the evidence. The work is in the form of rules, illustrations and notes, like the previous work of the same author on the subject of Expert and Opinion Evidence. It is well presented by the publishers and cannot fail to prove a very valuable work for a lawyer's library.

MANUAL OF WILLS.-A Manual Relating to the Preparation of Wills; with an Appendix of Forms. A Book of Massachusetts Law. By George F. Tucker, Counsellor at Law. Boston: Published by George B. Reed. 1884.

While this book purports to be "a book of Massachusetts law," it cites many authorities outside of

Massachusetts, English and American. It is a small octavo of 250 pages, well printed and bound in cloth. No doubt it will prove a useful hand book to the student and practitioner.

STEWART ON HUSBAND AND WIFE.-The Law of Husband and Wife, as Established in England and the United States. By David Stewart, Esq., of the Baltimore Bar, author of "Marriage and Divorce." San Francisco: Sumner Whitney & Co. 1885.

This is one of a series of small books issued by Messrs. Sumner Whitney & Co., known as the "Practitioner's Series." Our readers are so familiar with the general style of these books that it is unnecessary to explain it to them. They are, for the most part, brief statements of doctrine and digests of points, greatly crowded together, and affording a very numerous citation of adjudged cases. Their highest value consists in the fact that they are the best indexes extant of the case law upon the particular topics to which they relate. Mr. Stewart is the author of another work, in the same series, on the law of "Marriage and Divorce," and these two works are intended by him to cover the whole subject of marriage and marital rights. It would be hard to over-estimate the value of such a work as this to the busy judge or practitioner. Nearly half the space of this volume is taken up with citations of cases printed in the finest type. Some of the sections, not much more than page in length, have several hundred cases cited in support of the propositions which they lay down. The enormous industry which has collected all these materials and arrayed them under their proper heads, and cited every case with the particular point or proposition which it supports, cannot fail to excite the admiration of the reader.

JETSAM AND FLOTSAM.

THE LAW OF LIBEL IN WALL STREET. A short time ago three corporations, the Western Union Telegraph, the Missouri Pacific Railway and the Manhattan Elevated Railway, commenced criminal prosecutions against the Wall Street Daily News. These proceedings are based on the provisions of the New York Penal Code, by which, "knowingly making false statements calculated to affect the market price of corporate securities," is declared a criminal offense. The three corporations are nominally one complainant, and officers of each company swear to the affidavits charging the defendant with the offense. It would seem, however, that Mr. Jay Gould is the real prosecutor, and that the actions are his answer to a series of attacks upon his corporate methods by the journal in question. The preliminary hearing in one case, that of the Manhattan Elevated, is now proceeding before a police justice. The alleged libel in this instance was a statement that the six per cent. dividends which the company pays upon its $26,000,000 of stock are not earned, but are pieced out by bond sales. The treasurer of the company, as nominal complainant, deposed that this statement was false. On the witness stand, however, he is confronted with the company's sworn reports to the State railroad commissioners. They show that on December 31, 1884, when the Manhattan Company had existed six months, and had declared two quarterly dividends, there was, after paying arrears of taxes, a deficiency in income of $800,000. The facts, as brought out, seem to be that when the elevated roads of New York City were finally consolidated in the Manhattan Elevated, the latter had a floating debt of about $2,000,000, most of which, together with unpaid taxes amounting to some $1,000,000, were chargeable to in

come. If paid out of earnings this debt would of course preclude payment of dividends for some time. There were, however, some bonds of the Metropolitan Company, one of the roads consolidated, which had been turned over to the Manhattan. These bonds were sold and the debt apparently paid with the proceeds, so that the earnings could be used for dividends. The developments so far are not calculated to encourage Mr. Gould's efforts. His success would make intelligent criticism upon corporate manipulators of this kind dangerous. In the past there has been too little real scrutiny of the statements, or publicity given to their methods. In the present instance the complaint, made by the architect of such a man as Wabash, can only be characterized as impudence.-Bradstreet's.

LAW JOURNAL (LONDON) LAW AND GOSPEL."Sam" Jones, the Kentucky evangelist, was originally a lawyer, and on his conversion joined the Methodist Church.

MIGHT HAVE BEEN A GREAT LAWYER.-There were whole rooms full of busts and statutes, in Mr. Story's great studio-busts of Robert and Mrs. Browning, of Keats and Shelley, of Shakespeare, Beethoven and many another, statues of Medea, of Horace's witchlike Canidia, of Ruth as she gleaned "amid the alien corn," and of Esther, who is even now growing under the sculptor's fingers-but it was the Cleopatra to whom I returned after I had seen all the others. Standing beside her and smiling benignly at our praises, Mr. Story told a droll tale of an old friend of his father's who, when the son had been some twenty years a sculptor, visited him in Rome. The visitor, himself a man of the law, had the profoundest respect for his own profession; and after he had gone through the studio he stood and regarded Story sorrowfully. "Ah, William," he said, "to think you might have followed in your father's footsteps! You might have been a great lawyer-you had it in you-and you chose to stay on here in Rome and pinch mud!”—Rome Cor. N. Y. Tribune.

MEDICAL BOOKS AS EVIDENCE.-Medical books, though shown to be standard authority, are not admissible in evidence in actions for damages for personal injuries, to prove the nature and extent of such injuries and their effect. Where a medical expert refers to medical books to sustain his opinion, such books may be admitted to contradict him: Gallagher v. Market St. R. Co., Supreme Court of California, May 6, 1885.

THE MIDSHIP MITE. The kids of the Columbia Jurist have not only tendered us good advice on several occasions, but they have taken the name of our Albany brother in vain. The aforesaid brother says: "The 'Mid-ship mite' pats 'the ruler of the queen's navee' on the back-The Columbia Jurist calls us its 'esteemed contemporary.' This is too, too much." This reminds us of a little joke that happened at the time of the great Chicago fire A commission merchant in Cairo wrote to a dealer at a little railway station: "What a terrible calamity has befallen our sister city!"

LAWYERS IN OHIO.-The last edition of the Ohio State Directory, compiled last summer, under the head of "Attorneys-at-Law," contains the names of the lawyers of Ohio. The total number of individual names (not firms) is 3,687, which, though much less than generally supposed, is probably very nearly correct. The Bar of Cincinnati number 700, of Cleveland 349, Columbus 180, Dayton 78, Akron 49, Canton 43, Mansfield 47, Sandusky 31, Springfield 52, Steubenville 32, Tiffin 24, Toledo 79, Youngstown 58, Zanesville 48, Hamilton 42, Lima 26, Warren 36, Portsmouth 25.-Cincinnati Law Bulletin.

The Central Law Journal.

ST. LOUIS, SEPTEMBER 11, 1885.

CHARLES DENBY.

Above we present to our readers a portrait of an old and esteemed subscriber and occasional contributor to this journal, who has lately been honored by being appointed our minister to China. He was born in Botetourt county, Va., and is now about fifty-five years of age. His education included three years at Georgetown College, in the District of Columbia. wards he entered the Virginia Military Institute, where he graduated with high honors. He was a professor in the Masonic University at Salem, Ala., until 1853, when he located at Evansville, Indiana, and edited the Daily Enquirer, the first Democratic daily published in Evansville. While editing this paper for his support, he began the study of the law in the office of the late Gov. Baker, of Indiana, who was then a practicing attorney in Evans

ville.

In 1856 he was elected a member of the Indiana legislature. When Sumter fell, in Vol. 21-No. 11.

1861, he recruited the 42nd Indiana volunteer regiment, and was appointed Lieutenant Colonel. After the battle of Perryville, in which action his regiment took an active part, he was promoted to colonelcy of the 80th Indiana regiment. In 1863 he resigned from the army on account of physicial disabilities and returned to Evansville, where he resumed the practice of the law. He has ever since devoted himself exclusively to his profession. In 1876 and 1884 he was delegate at large to the Democratic conventions held in those years. He has been several times requested to accept the nomination for Congress, but refused, preferring to continue the practice of the law to engaging in active politics. For sixteen years last past, Col. Denby has been the senior member of the law firm of Denby & Kumler, composed of himself and Daniel B. Kumler.

He is distinctively a lawyer and has few superiors in his profession at the Indiana bar. His practice has been very large and general, and his knowledge of the law is not confined to any one branch, but extends through all. He is a close student and a hard worker, and is particularly qualified for his new duties as minister to China. His appointment has been received with great favor, and has been pronounced by all acquainted with him to be an exceptionally good one.

CURRENT EVENTS.

MEETINGS OF JUDGES.-The circuit judges of Missouri meet annually for consultation as a voluntary association, and make recommendations to the legislature touching incongruities in the laws, which the individual judges are required by law to make. These recommendations receive, as a general rule, about the same attention from the legislature which the written instructions of judges receive from juries: they go into the legislative waste basket. In Ohio the circuit judges are required by law to meet annually, and the date of their annual meeting is fixed at the third Tuesday of August, as we learn from the Weekly Law Bulletin. The Bulletin does not, however, state the purposes for which the law of that State requires the judges to meet..