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trial, will entitle the accused to a continuance of his cause. State v. Egan, S. C. of La., April 13, 1885.

9. DEED.-Words of Purchase.-In a conveyance of land to the grantor's daughter and her present heirs in consideration of natural love and affection which he bears to them, the words "present heirs" mean heirs apparent, and the daughter and her present heirs take as tenants in common. [Citing Vannorsdall v. Van Deventer, 51 Barb. 137; Burchett v. Durdant, 2 Vent. 311; Simms v. Garrot, 1 Dev. & B. Eq. 393; Preston Estates, 273; 2 Fearne Remainders, 238.] Fountain County Coal Co. v. Beckleheimer, S. C. of Ind., May 25, 1885.

10. GRANT OF FRANCHISE-Repeal of Grant by Legislature in Presence of a Reservation of Right to Repeal.-Where the legislature grants a franchise, and in the same act imposes on the grantee certain duties, and reserves the power to repeal the act in case the grantee fail to perform those duties, it may, in case he does so fail, repeal the act without a previous judicial determination that he had so failed. Whether he had failed, so that the appeal is effectual is a question for courts. [In giving the opinion of the court, Gilfillan, C. J., said: "The insertion in legislative grants, like the one in question, of express provisions for forfeiture in case of non-user or misuser, is not uncommon, and it can hardly be questioned that it is competent for the legislature, which is the law-making power, as well as one of the contracting parties, to provide in the grant a mode of enforcing the forfeiture, either by repeal of the act making the grant or otherwise; and there can be as little doubt that the forfeiture will be effectually enforced by resort to the stipulated mode, provided the event on which it is to be resorted to has arisen. Where the right reserved to recall the grant depends on the happening of a contingent event, the existence of the fact at the time of the recall must, of course, be a matter for judicial investigation. Whether the re-entry by a private grantor perfects a forfeiture, must depend on the fact of condition broken, and that must be ascertained by the judiciary; but in no case where the forfeiture may be enforced by act of the grantor, need he secure, before he enforces it, a judicial determination that the fact upon which the right to forfeit depends, exists. The courts will decide upon the effect of his act subsequently; but neither does the legislature when it exercises a reserved right to repeal, nor the private grantor when he exercises a reserved right of re-entry, perform any judicial function. The act of neither assumes to determine finally the rights of the parties, as effected by the act, to enforce the forfeiture. That is necessarily and inherently a judicial question, which only the judiciary can decide. The foregoing propositions are sustained by the following cases, and we find no decision to the contrary. Erie & N. E. R. Co. v. Casey, 26 Pa. St. 287; Crease v. Babcock, 23 Pick. 334; McLaren v. Pennington, 1 Paige, 101; Ferguson v. Bank, 35 Tenn. 609; Read v. Bank, 23 Me. 318; Bank v. U. S., 1 Greene, (Iowa,) 553. In this case, the event (as determined by the court) upon which the right to repeal was reserved having arisen, the repeal was effectual to terminate the grant.] Myrick v. La Moure, S. C. Minn., May 25, 1885; 23 N. W. Rep. 449.

11. INJUNCTION-To Prevent County Board from Employing Attorney.-An injunction is not the

appropriate remedy to prevent a police jury [which in Louisiana corresponds to supervisors of a county] from employing an attorney in its suits, even where the law provides that the district attorney shall represent it in such suits-the less so where the latter claims for himself exclusively the salary allowed to the employed attorney who is not made a party to the action. Leche v. Police Jury, S. C. La., March 16, 1885.

12. JUDGMENT-Lien of-Not Continued by Subrogation. The lien of a judgment cannot be continued by subrogation when the judgment has been satisfied, nor against a party who acquired rights before the action in which the judgment of subrogation was rendered was begun, nor can such subrogation impair the rights of persons not parties to the action. Lowdermilk v. Chorpenning, S. C. N. C., Spring Term, 1885.

13. JURISDICTION-Of United States Courts in Actions on County Warrants.-County warrants, signed by the chairman of the county commissioners and county clerk, directing the county treasurer to pay to bearer a certain sum, for certain services stated therein, are negotiable and pass from hand to hand and not by assignment, and therefore do not come within the restriction of jurisdiction in the first section of the Act of Congress of March 3, 1875. The holder of such warrants, being a citizen of another State, may sue thereon in this court, although the original payee is a citizen of this State, but subject to all defenses which existed against them in the hands of the first holder. Adams v. County Commissioners, Cir. Ct. Dist. Kansas, March 3, 1885; 23 Fed. Rep. 211.

14. MORTGAGE-On Land in Actual Possession of Third Party-Notice to Mortgagee.-A loaned to B a sum of money, receiving B's promissory note and a mortgage on real estate to secure the same; but when A accepted the note and mortgage, C was in actual possession of the premises, and resided thereon with his family: Held, that A was chargeable with notice of C's rights and interest in the premises; and A having assigned the note and mortgage, his assignee occupied the same situation; nor will the fact that A and his assignee did not know that C was in possession, make any difference. [Okey, J., in delivering the opinion of the court said: As David Ranney, when he loaned the money to Hardy, and accepted from a mortgage on lot 17, knew that McKinnon was residing on the lot with his family, he was charged with knowledge of the terms and conditions upon which such possession was held. Cunningham v. Buckingham, 1 Ohio, 264; House v. Beatty, 7 Ohio, 2 pt. 84; Kelley v. Stanbery, 13 Ohio, 408; Williams v. Spriggs, 6 Ohio St. 585; McKinzie v. Perrill, 15 Ohio St. 162; Bank v. Sawyer, 38 Ohio St., 339, 343. And the other case (Beller v. Bading), presenting the question whether knowledge by the mortgagee, at the time he accepted the mortgage, that the purchaser was in possession, was material, we answer the question in the negative. True, in some of the cases above cited, expressions may be found which seem to support the claim that such knowledge is important; but in neither of them was the fact material to the decision, and where, as in the cases now before us, the premises are occupied by a man with his family as a homestead, no well considered case can be found, aside from those controlled by statutory provision, in which it was held that such

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possession was not notice to subsequent purchasers and mortgagees of the rights and interests of such occupant, although such purchaser or mortgagee did not know the premises were occupied. Le Neve v. Le Neve, Amb. 436, s. c. Led. Cas. in Eq. 35*, 63*, 4th Am. ed. 180; Wade on Notice, §§ 273-306; Holmes v. Powell, 8 DeG. M. & G. 572; Hottenstein v. Lerch, 104 Pa. St. 454; Noyes v. Hall, 97 U. S. 94; Coari v. Oslen, 91 Ill. 273; Brunson v. Brooks, 68 Ala. 248; Pique v. Arendale, 71 Ala. 91. If the possession is not exclusive, or is not of a character to fairly give information that the occupant is asserting dominion over the property under some claim of right or authority, it will not operate as notice. Williams v. Sprigg, supra; Pope v. Allen, 90 N. Y. 298; Lincoln v. Thompson, 75 Mo. 613: Jeffersonville, etc. R. Co. v. Oyler, 82 Ind. 394; White v. White, 105 Ill. 313. But neither of the cases before is within cases of that class.] Ranney v. Hardy; Zeller v. Bading, S. C. Ohio, April 21, 1885; 13 Weekly Law Bulletin, 599.

Illustration.-B. sold to C. real estate, placed him in possession, and agreed in writing to execute to him a deed on payment of the purchase money in monthly installments. Subsequently B. executed to A. a mortgage on the premises, which was recorded: Held, that such mortgage was valid, but subordinate to the rights of C.; that C. might, validly, make payments of purchase money to B., until A. or his assignee, by suit or in some other unequivocal form, asserts the right to receive from C. the unpaid installments of purchase money; and that the assignee of C. has the same right. The assignee of A. asserted, by action, his right against B., C, and the assignee of C., to such unpaid purchase money; Held, that a deed from B. to the assignee of C., reciting the payment of the purchase money, is not, as against the assignee of A., evidence of such payment. Ranney v. Hardy; Zeller v. Bading, S. C. Ohio, April 21, 1885: 13 Weekly Law Bul. 599.

16. NATIONAL BANKS

Individual Liability of Stockholders for Voluntary Assessments Rendered Necessary by Increase of Capital Stock.The Pacific National Bank of Boston was organized in October, 1877, with a capital of $250,000. with the right to increase it to $1,000,000. In November, 1879, the capital was raised to $500,000; September 13, 1881, the directors voted to increase the capital to $1,000,000. On November 18, 1881, the bank suspended. On December 13, 1881, the directors voted that as $38,700 of the increase of capital stock had not been paid in, the capital be fixed at $961,300, and the comptroller of currency was notified to that effect, and he notified the bank, under Rev. St. § 5205, to pay a deficiency on its capital stock by an assessment of 100 per cent. At the annual meeting the assessment was voted, and on March 18, 1881, with consent of the comptroller and the approval of the directors and the examiner, the bank resumed business, and continued until May 20, 1881, when it again suspended and was put in the hands of a receiver. Prior to May 20, 1882, $742,800 of the voluntary assessment had been paid in. Complainant was the owner of 25 shares of stock on Septembr 13, 1881, and after the vote to increase the stock, took 25 shares, for which he paid $2,500, on October 1, 1881, and received a certificate. He voted for the assessment at the annual meeting, and in February, 1882, paid the assessment on the old and new stock, and subsequently sought to enjoin the suit at law against him by the receiver, to enforce his individual lia

bility as a stockholder, under Rev. St. § 5151, on the ground that the increase of capital was illegal and void, and that the voluntary assessment under Rev. St. § 5205, relieved the stockholders of individual liability. Held, that he was not entitled to relief, and the bill should be dismissed. Morrison v. Price, Cir. Ct. Dist. Mass., March 14, 1885, 23 Fed. Rep. 217.

17. NOTICE-Facts Sufficient to put Party on Inquiry is.-Anything which apprises a purchaser or incumbrancer that a particular person claims the property or an interest in it, makes it his duty to pursue that notice to its source and make inquiry of such person, and failing to do so, he will be chargeable with all he would have learned had he pursued and investigated the matter to the full extent to which it led. It is not required that he must have full, complete and accurate information of the nature, extent and all of the particulars of an incumbrance. Crawford v. C. B. & Q. R. Co., S. C. Ill. (Ottawa,) Sept. 27, 1884.

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. Record of Agreement to Seli Subject to `an Incumbrance, Notice of it.-The owner of lots after having given trust deeds thereon to secure the sum of $125,000, being the purchase money, executed his written agreement for the sale of the same to another, which recited that the sale was subject to an incumbrance of $130,000 due in four years from "October next, with interest at seven per cent. payable semi-annually," which was duly recorded. The incumbrance recited described that created by the trust deed in all things except the name of the person for whom it was given was not named, and the sum was for a larger sum. Held, that the record of this agreement was notice to a subsequent purchaser of the prior incumbrance created by the trust deeds which were not recorded, it being sufficient to put him on inquiry, Ibid.

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By Possession Through Tenant.-The possession of a lot by a tenant of a party whose debt is secured by deed of trust on the same is notice to all subsequent purchasers or incumbrancers of the rights of the prior incumbrancer. Ibid. 20. PRACTICE IN UNITED STATES COURTS- When Court will Retain Affidavit of "Illegality" Against an Execution in Conformity with the Georgia Statute.-An execution was issued upon a decree. The defendant filed an affidavit of illegality, (a remedy permitted by the State law,) suggesting various grounds upon which the the execution was alleged to have been illegally issued, levied, and advertised. Upon motion made by the plaintiff to the execution to dismiss the affidavit of illegallity, held, that the same might be regarded as a statutory remedy adopted by the rule of the court, or as a motion or petition supported by the affidavit, and the same would be retained for a hearing. [Settle, J., in delivering the opinion of the court, said: "It is said that the only remedy in case like this is the bill of review. I do not think so. The Supreme Court have virtually held that in matters of this character the form of the proceeding is less important than the substance of the right; and that in some instances mere motions, supported by affidavit, are the most appropriate modes of relief. Krippendorf v. Hyde, 110 U. S. 276; s. c. 4 Sup. Ct. Rep. 27. If there were no remedy in a case of this kind, nor alleged to exist, it would be the right and duty of the court to frame one."] McGriff v. Baldwin, Cir. Ct. S. D. Ga. Jan. 23, 1885; 23 Fed. Rep. 222.

21. PRACTICE-Voluntary Appearance to Object to Jurisdiction not Equivalent to Service of Summons.-The appearance of defendant in court for the sole purpose of objecting, by motion, to the jurisdiction of the court over this person, is not an appearance in the action, but where such motion also asks to have the cause dismissed on the ground that the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action, which motion is not well founded, it is a voluntary appearance, which is equivalent to service of summons. Handy v. Ins. Co., 37 O. St., 366, approved. Elliot v. Lawhead, S. C. Ohio, April 28, 1885; 13 Weekly Law Bul. 601.

22. SALE OF LAND-Description in Power of Attorney, When Cured by Description in Deed.-Where a power of attorney empowers an agent to sell a lot at the corner of two named streets, and the deed of the agent specifies which corner by mentioning the boundaries of the square in which the lot is, the undefiniteness of the description of the lot in the power of attorney is cured by the full description of its locus in the deed, and a purchaser of the lot by public auction is not justified in refusing to comply with his bid because of the indefiniteness of description in the power of attorney. Such refusal is the less justifiable when the original vendor, who is the author of the power of attorney, did not own a lot at any other corner of the named streets, and he and they who hold under him have possessed the lot thirty years. entine v. Hawley, S. C. La., April 13, 1885.

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23. SLANDER-Words, not Actual per se-Plaintiff must show Facts making them Actionable.-In an action of slander, where the words spoken are not slanderous per se, but are made so by reason of the existence of some extraneous facts, it is incumbent upon the plaintiff to prove such latter facts, and the defendant, under the general issue, has the right to disprove them. [In giving the opinion of the court, McKee, J., said: "The action was founded not only upon the publication of the words, but upon the extrinsic facts in connection with their publication, which, it was alleged, gave them their slanderous meaning; and as the defendant took issue with the averments of the complaint, the plaintiff, to make out his case, was bound to prove all the material averments; and the defendant, on the general issue, had the right to disprove them. The law of that subject is thus clearly expressed by Shaw, C. J., in Carter v. Andrews, 16 Pick. 6: 'Where words are used in a particular sense it is in consequence of some usage or agreement, or of some report in circulation, or of the time, place and manner in which the conversation was held; in short of some fact, capable of being averred in a traversable form, so that it may be put in issue and proved or disproved. If the words have the slanderous meaning alleged, not by their own intrinsic force, but by reason of the existence of some extraneous fact, the plaintiff must undertake to prove that fact and the defendant must be at liberty to disprove it.'"] Nidever v. Hall, S. C. Cal., May 28, 1885; 6 W. C. Rep. 556.

24. -. Evidence as to Meaning of Words used. -In such action it is necessary for the plaintiff to aver and prove that the words were actually used in their actionable sense, and were applied to the plaintiff, and that the hearers so understood them. upon this point the testimony of the hearers, as to how they understood them, is admissible.

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giving the opinion of the court, McKee, J., said: "It has been held that persons who heard the words charged to be slanderous, could not be permitted to state what meaning they understood the defendant to convey by the words. In Snell v. Snow, 13 Met. 278, which was a case of slander, Shaw, C. J., passing on this point, says: "The judge very properly decided that the witness might testify as to any existing facts or circumstances to which the defendant alluded and referred, if any; but having given the whole conversation, it was for the jury to determine what was meant by the language used, and that it was not competent for the witness to testify to his understanding of the defendant's meaning in, the language used. If the words in their ordinary sense, according to the rules of language, imputed a charge of unchasteness and crime, or if taken in connection with other facts or words, they would bear that meaning, we are to presume that the jury would so find.' To the same effect will be found the cases of Van Vechten v. Hopkins, 5 Johns. 211; Gibson v. Williams, 4 Wend. 320, 325; Beardsley v. Maynard, Id. 359; Goodrich v. Davis, 11 Met. 484; and White v. Sayward, 33 Maine, 322. But, in such cases as the one under consideration, the true rule deducible from the modern authorities, including those of our own State, makes the averment and proof of the extrinsic facts in which words are published, and of their meaning in connection with those circumstances, essential to a recovery in the action. The rule is thus stated in Maynard v. Fireman's Fund Insurance Company, 34 Cal. 48: 'Where in an action for libel the words complained of are not per se libelous, what the defendant intended and understood them to mean, and what they were understood to mean by those to whom they were published, constitute a proper subject of averment in pleading and of proof on the trial, and if what was so intended and understood by the defendant, and understood by those to whom the words were published, was libelous, the words are actionable.' The law thus enunciatied was afterwards approved in Chamberlain v. Vance, 51 Cal. 75, which was an action of slander, like the one under consideration; and, under the law, it was incumbent on the plaintiff in this case, in order to recover, to aver and prove: 1. That the words were actually used in their actionable sense, and were applied to the plaintiff. 2. That the hearers so understood them; and, upon this point, the testimony of the hearers, as to how they understood them, is admissible: Smart v. Blanchard, 42 N. H. 140; Russell v. Kelly, 44 Cal. 641; Mix y. Woodward, 12 Conn. 262; Nelson v. Borchenius, 52 Ill. 236; Briggs v. Byrd, 11 Ired. 353; Tompkins v. Wisener, 1 Sneed, 458; Leonard v. Allen, 11 Cush. 271."] Ibid.

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27. SUMMONS-Manner of Serving, on Party Who Refuses to Accept Copy.-Where a defendant refuses to accept a copy of a summons, which is offered to him in a civil and proper manner, after being informed what the paper is, service may be made by depositing the process in some appropriate place in the presence of the party, or where it will be most likely to come into his possession. [Cole, C. J., in giving the opinion of the court, said: "It is of course impossible, without the use of violence, to compel a party to receive and retain papers offered him with a view of making a service. Any act of violence to accomplish that end is not to be tolerated. And when a party refused to accept a copy of a summons which is offered him in a civil and proper manner, after being informed what the paper is, there is do other way to make service but deposit the process in some appropriate place, in the presence of the party, if possible, or where it will be most likely to come to his possession. If, then, the party to be served does not get the copy of the summons it will be entirely owing to his own fault. He certainly, when everything has been done to make service upon him, should not be allowed to come into court and object that because a copy of the summons was not delivered to nor left with him, therefore the service was insufficient. 'If a defendant declines to receive from the proper officer a paper presented by him for service, he may deposit it in any convenient place in the presence of the party.' Mr. Justice Field, in Norton v. Meader, 4 Sawy. 619: 'If a party refuse to accept papers when decorously offered him, after being distinctly informed what they are, he should be held to the consequences of his own perverseness; and if they should be laid down for him and before him, such offer, information, refusal to accept, and leaving of the papers for him and in his presence, should be deemed legal service.' Davison v. Baker, 24 How. Pr. 41; see also Smith, Sher. & Cor. 196; Slaght v. Robbias, 13 N. J. Law 340."] Borden v. Borden, S. C. Wis., June 1, 1885; 23 N. W. Rep. 573.

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think it sufficiently unique to publish in "Jetsam and Flotsam," if not, no offense will be taken. It reads as follows, omitting names: "To my son-for his arrogant demeanor, his desertion of his father in his old age, and his contentious disregard of parental authority and interest, I bequeath fifty dollars ($50), to be paid to him at the convenience of my administrator." The above seems to us to be one of the most curious reasons for a bequest that we ever remember of seeing. Milan, Mo. W. F. CALFEE.

ROBBED THE GALLOWS.

To the Editor of the Central Law Journal:

In your last number, No. 22, Vol. 20, Query 29, T. W. A., Houston, Texas, the question is asked whether, in the event of a conviction and sentence of death being passed upon a criminal, the law is satisfied where the man sentenced to be hanged is resuscitated. The ollowing is the only instance of record to my knowl

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1. A applied to B for a loan of money, B being a broker who made loans and re-discounted them at C bank in New York City, and when short of funds made loans direct to C bank, and bank paid face of loan, and three per cent. commission to B. B made out negotiable note to C bank, and A signed same, but before delivery A learned that he did not need the money and looked for note, but it was, as he supposed, mislaid, but in fact was stolen by B. B sent note to C bank, and obtained face value of same, and three per cent. commission. Subsequently C bank sold note, before due, to D, for full value. Neither C bank or D had any notice of facts until note became due. Query: 1. Can A get out of note when sued by D by proof of above facts? 2. If A pleads above facts does the plea amount to a denial of the execution of note, so as to put the burden of proof of execution and delivery on D, the plea being sworn to? 3. Can D rest his case on proof of his bona fides, and purchase for value before due? The querist has examined Parsons Notes & Bills, Daniel Nego. Instruments, Edward's on Bills, Chalmer's Digest, and Michigan, Illinois, Wisconsin and New York cases, but want some additional corroborating authority on both sides of question, as he wants to get at the law and collect this note. D'S ATTORNEY.

2. In 1870, a father made a division of his estate among his children, and placed each one in possession of his allotment-had deeds drawn up calling for metes and bounds, but did not sign and deliver then Two years thereafter, on his death-bed, he sent for a neighbor who had aided him in making the division. The deceased remarked to his neighbor when he came: "The deeds I have had prepared are not finished up, and they are over at W's" (one of his sons). He was at the time very feeble, but possessed of all his faculties, and his neighbor says conscious of the near approach of dissolution. He was asked by one of the witnesses to the instrument if they were drawn as he intended them. He replied: "Yes, Mr. B I think drew them as I directed him." He then signed the papers, and they were witnessed as required in this State under the statute of wills. After signing he was asked by his neighbor what he (the latter) was to do with them. He replied: "Hand them to their owners." One of the grantees remarked: "Not now; let Mr. M (the neighbor) hold them, and if you never call for them he will then deliver them to us;" or, "Let Mr. M hold them for us,

and if you never call for them," etc., to which the grantor replied: "Well, well." The grantor died in a day or two, and the papers were delivered to their owners. Was there a sufficient delivery as a deed? If not, will the instrument, if probated, take effect as a testamentary disposition? S. Marion, N. C.

RECENT PUBLICATIONS.

NINTH SAWYER. Reports of Cases Decided in the Circuit and District Courts of the United States for the Ninth Circuit. Reported by L. S. B. Sawyer, Counselor at Law. Volume IX. San Francisco: A. L. Bancroft & Co. 1885.

As all the decisions of the Circuit and District Courts of the United States are published in the Federal Reporter, the question is whether there is any utility in keeping up an expensive series of reports of this kind. The question is of course to be determined with sole reference to the question whether the books will sell. If, in addition to having the Federal Reporter, which publishes the decisions of all the nisi prius courts of the United States, there are enough members of the profession who will subscribe for and take a separate series, which embraces the decisions of a single circuit, why, then, "willy nilly, he goes."

This volume embraces many cases of very great importance upon constitutional law, mining law, the law of taxation, the recent statutes relating to Chinese immigration, police regulations unfriendly to the Chinese, admiralty law, and the other questions usually litigated in the Federal courts. In many cases the interests involved are very great, and counsel of the very highest ability and reputation are employed.

Mr. District Judge Deady appends a note to his decision in the case of Doowoon, in which he combats the position taken by the American Law Review, that the surrender by one State of a fugitive from the justice of another State is not necessarily a proceeding under the Constitution and laws of the United States. Mr.District Judge Deady does not state correctly the propositions there contended for, which was that the obligation of mutual surrender between the members of the British Empire, and consequently between the members of the American Union, existed at common law; that the Constitution merely enforces the obligation, and that the Federal Statute merely regulates the mode of its performance. The Constitution enforces it, but it does not prohibit it. The statute says how it may be done, but it does not say that it shall not be done otherwise. It therefore may be, and generally is, done in conformity with the Act of Congress; but it is not necessary that it should be done in this way; and if the governor of the demanding and that of the surrendering State chose to do it otherwise, what ground, we ask, is afforded by the Constitution or Act of Congress for the interference of a Federal judge?

The ground on which the right thus to interfere is predicated by the learned Judge on the following provision of the Constitution: "No State shall, without the consent of Congress * * enter into any agreement or compact with another State or foreign power." And he reasons that if the Governor of one State choses to surrender a fugitive to the justice of another State without the demand having been made in the precise manner and upon the precise evidence prescribed by the Act of Congress, this is entering into an agreement or compact with such other State!

118 Am. L. Rev. 136.

If two States were to enter into an agreement with each other through their legislatures to dispense with the requirements of the Act of Congress in surrendering fugitives from justice, that would probably be within the inhibition of the Constitution. But suppose a State prescribes by one of its own laws the evidence upon which its governor shall surrender a fugitive from the justice of another State, and suppose its governor in the execution of this law, makes such a surrender to such other State, upon what principle can this be called a compact with such other State? It is difficult to conceive of a position more weak and untenable. It might as well be argued that when one State, upon a principle of interstate comity, permits an administrator or receiver appointed in another State to sue in its courts, or otherwise gives effect in its own courts to rights arising under the laws of another State, this is a compact between the particular State and such other State. It is upon such flimsy ground as this that some of the Federal courts have been attempting to erect a superintending jurisdiction over the governments of the States. The people are tired of it; they propose to be governed by their duly constituted representatives, and not by a judicial body appointed by the President of the United States, and responsible for their antics and extravagances to no one.

SHARSWOOD AND BUDD ON REAL PROPERTY. Leading Cases in the Law of Real Property, Decided in the American Courts. With Notes by George Sharswood, LL.D., and Henry Budd, of the Philadelphia Bar. Vol. II. Notes by Henry Budd. Philadelphia: M. Murphy, No. 715 Sansome Street. 1885.

Since the first volume of this work was issued Judge Sharswood died, and the publisher was therefore deprived of the benefit of his supervision of the notes written by the junior editor, which was all that Judge Sharswood contracted to do. Whether the work will suffer any by the want of his supervision, we do not know. The notes in the present volume are very extensive, and cover a large variety of subjects relating to the law of real property. The index is very full indeed. The work is well printed in good open type, pleasant to the eye. This form of presenting to the profession the case law upon given titles is a very popular one. Nothing really can take the place of discussions of legal questions by judges learned in the law, sitting in solemn judgment upon the rights of parties, after argument had lefore them by learned and competent counsel. A text-writer, sitting in his library, does not see both sides of any question to the same extent to which the judge sees it. He is apt to take imperfect and partial views of things, and especially he is apt to rely too much upon the supreme thought of the hour. We bespeak the attention of the profession to this series.

THE FEDERAL REPORTER. VOLS. 21 and 22.-The Federal Reporter. Cases Argued and Determined in the Circuit and District Courts of the United States. Robert Desty, Editor. St. Paul: West Publishing Company. 1884 and 1885.

It seems almost superfluous to review a work which we suppose is in the library of every prosperous practitioner in the United States. The publishers of this work undertake to report all the decisions of the Circuit and District Courts of the United States, in weekly parts, so as to give the decisions very soon after their rendition. The bound volumes make a very important series of reports. The greatest variety of questions are covered, with the possible exception of criminal cases, of which there are few. The edit or Mr. Desty, is the author of a work on Federal Proce

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