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"dead? No, but in great danger." How are you concerned in thofe rumours? Suppofe he should meet fome fatal ftroke: you would foon raife up another Philip, if your interests are thus regarded. For it is not to his own frength that he fo much owes his elevation, as to our fupinenefs. And fhould fome accident affect him; fhould fortune, who hath ever been more careful of the state than we ourfelves, now repeat her favours (and may the thus crown them!) be affured of this, that by being on the spot, ready to take advantage of the confufion, you will every where be abfolute mafters; but in your prefent difpofition, even if a favourable juncture should present you with Amphipolis, you could not take poffeffion of it, while this fufpence prevails in your designs and in your coun

cils.

And now, as to the neceffity of a general vigour and alacrity; of this you must be fully perfuaded: this point therefore I fhall urge no further. But the nature of the armament, which, I think, will extricate you from the prefent difficulties, the numbers to be railed, the subsidies required for their fupport, and all the other neceffaries; how they may (in my opinion) be best and most expeditiously provided; these things I fhall endeavour to explain. But here I make this requeft, Athenians! that you would not be precipitate, but fufpend your judgment till you have heard me fully. And if, at first, I feem to propofe a new kind of armament, let it not be thought that I am delaying your affairs. For it is not they who cry out " Inftantly! "This moment!" whofe counfels fuit the prefent juncture (as it is not poffible to repel violences already committed by any Occafional detachment) but he who will shew you of what kind that armament must be, how great, and how fupported, which may fubft until we yield to peace, or till our enemies fink beneath our arms; for thus only can we be fecured from future dangers. These things, I think, I can point out not that I would prevent any other perfon from declaring his opinion; thus far am I engaged. How I can acquit myself, will immediately appear to your judgments I appeal.

First then, Athenians! I fay that you fhould fit out fifty fhips of war; and then refolye, that on the first emergency you will embark yourfelves. To thefe I infift that you must add tranfport, and other neceflary veffels fufficient for half our horfe,

Thus far we fhould be provided against thofe fudden excurfions from his own kingdom to Thermopyla, to the Cherfonefus, to Olynthus, to whatever places he thinks proper. For of this he fhould neceffarily be perfuaded, that poffibly you may break out from this immoderate indolence, and fly to fome scene of action: as you did to Eubea, and formerly, as we are told, to Haliartus, and but now, to Thermopyla. But although we should not act with all this vigour, (which yet I must regard as our indifpenfable duty) ftill the measures I propofe will have their use as his fears may keep him quiet, when he knows we are prepared (and this he will know, for there are too too many among ourselves who inform him of every thing): or, if he fhould defpife our armament, his fecurity may prove fatal to him; as it will be ab folutely in our power, at the first favourable juncture, to make a defcent upon his own coafts.

These then are the refolutions I propofe; thefe the provifions it will become you to make. And I pronounce it ftill farther neceffary to raise fome other forces which may harrafs him with perpetual incurfions. Talk not of your ten thousands, or twenty thousands of foreigners; of those armies which appear fo magnificent on paper; but let them be the natural forces of the state and if you chufe a single perfon, if a number, if this particular man, or whomever you appoint as general, let them be entirely under his guidance and authority. I alfo move you that subsistence be provided for them. But as to the quality, the numbers, the maintenance of this body: how are these points to be fettled? I now proceed to speak of each of them diftinctly.

The body of infantry therefore-But here give me leave to warn you of an error which hath often proved injurious to you. Think not that you preparations never can be too magnificent: great and terrible in your decrees; in execution weak and contemptible. Let your preparations, let your fupplies at first be moderate, and add to thefe if you find them not fufficient. I fay then that the whole body of infantry fhould be two thoufand; of thefe, that five hundred should be Athenians, of such an age as you fhall think proper; and with a ftated time for fervice, not long, but fuch as that others may have their turn of duty. Let the rest be formed of foreigners. To thefe you are to add two hundred horse, fifty of them at least Athenians, to serve

in the fame manner as the foot. For thefe you are to provide tranfports. And now, what farther preparations? Ten light gallies. For as he hath a naval power, we must be provided with light veffels, that our troops may have a fecure convoy.

But whence are thefe forces to be fubfifted? This I shall explain, when I have firft given my reafons why I think fuch numbers fufficient, and why I have advised that we should serve in perfon. As to the numbers, Athenians! my reafon is this it is not at prefent in our power to provide a force able to meet him in the open field; but we must harrafs him by depredations: thus the war must be carried on at first. We therefore cannot think of raifing a prodigious army (for fuch we have neither pay nor provifions), nor muft our forces be abfolutely mean. And I have propofed, that citizens fhould join in the fervice, and help to man our feet; because I am informed, that fome time fince, the state maintained a body of auxiliaries at Corinth, which Polyftratus commanded, and Iphicrates, and Chabrias, and fome others; that you yourfelves ferved with them; and that the united efforts of these auxiliary and domeftic forces gained a confiderable victory over the Lacedemonians. But, ever fince our armies have been formed of foreigners alone, their victories have been over our allies and confederates, while our enemies have arifen to an extravagance of power. And these armies, with scarcely the flighteft attention to the fervice of the ftate, fail off to fight for Artabazus, or any other perfon; and their general follows them: nor fhould we wonder at it; for he cannot command, who cannot pay his foldiers. What then do I recommend? That you should take away all pretences both from generals and from foldiers, by a regular payment of the army, and by incorporating domeftic forces with the auxiliaries, to be as it were inspectors into the conduct of the commanders. For at prefent our manner of acting is even ridiculous. If a man should ask, " Are "you at peace, Athenians ?" the answer would immediately be, "By no means! "we are at war with Philip. Have not "we chofen the ufual generals and officers "both of horse and foot?" And of what ufe are all thefe, except the Tingle perfon whom you fend to the field? The rest attend your priests in their proceffions. So that, as if you formed fo many men of clay, you make your officers for fhew, and

not for fervice. My countrymen! should not all thefe generals have been chofen from your own body; all these feveral officers from your own body, that our force might be really Athenian? And yet, for an expedition in favour of Lemnos, the general must be a citizen, while troops, engaged in defence of our own territories, are commanded by Menelaus. I fay not this to detract from his merit; but to whom foever this command hath been intrufted, furely he should have derived it from your voices.

Perhaps you are fully fenfible of thefe truths; but would rather hear me upon another point; that of the fupplies; what we are to raife, and from what funds. To this I now proceed.-The fum therefore neceffary for the maintenance of these forces, that the foldiers may be fupplied with grain, is fomewhat above ninety talents. To the ten gallies, forty talents, that each veffel may have a monthly allowance of twenty minæ. To the two thoufand foot the fame fum, that each foldier may receive ten drachmæ a month for corn. To the two hundred horfe, for a monthly allowance of thirty drachmæ each, twelve talents. And let it not be thought a fmall convenience, that the foldiers are fupplied with grain: for I am clearly fatisfied, that if fuch a provifion be made, the war itself will fupply them with every thing elfe, fo as to complete their appointment, and this without an injury to the Greeks or allies; and I myself am ready to fail with them, and to aniwer for the confequence with my life, should it prove otherwise. From what funds the fum which I propofe may be fupplied, shall now be explained.

[Here the fecretary of the affembly reads a scheme for raifing the fupplies, and propofes it to the people in form, in the name of the orator.] Thefe are the fupplies, Athenians! in our power to raife. And, when you come to give your voices, determine upon fome effectual provifion, that you may oppose Philip, not by decrees and letters only, but by actions. And, in my opinion, your plan of operation, and every thing relat ing to your armament, will be much more happily adjusted, if the fituation of the country, which is to be the icene of action, be taken into the account; and if you reflect, that the winds and feafons have greatly contributed to the rapidity of Philip's conquefts; that he watches the blow

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ing

ing of the Etefians, and the feverity of the
winter, and forms his fieges when it is im-
poffible for us to bring up our forces. It
is your part then to confider this, and not
to carry on the war by occafional detach-
ments, (they will ever arrive too late) but
by a regular army constantly kept up. And
for winter-quarters you may command
Lemnos, and Thaffus, and Sciathus, and
the adjacent islands; in which there are
ports and provifions, and all things necef-
fary for the foldiery in abundance. As to
the feafon of the year, in which we may
land our forces with the greatest eafe, and
be in no danger from the winds, either up-
on the coaft to which we are bound, or at
the entrance of thofe harbours where we
may put in for provifions-this will be ea-
fily discovered. In what manner, and at
what time our forces are to act, their gene-
ral will determine, according to the junc-
tures of affairs. What you are to perform,
on your part, is contained in the decree I
have now propofed. And if you will be
perfuaded, Athenians! firft, to raife thefe
fupplics which I have recommended, then,
to proceed to your other preparations, your
infantry, navy, and cavalry; and lastly to
confine your forces, by a law, to that fer-
vice which is appointed to them; referving
the care and distribution of their money to
yourselves, and strictly examining into the
conduct of the general; then, your time
will be no longer waited in continual de-
bates upon the fame fubject, and scarcely
to any purpofe; then, you will deprive
him of the moft confiderable of his 'reve-
nues. For his arms are now fupported,
by feizing and making prizes of thofe who
pafs the feas. But is this all?-No.-You
hall alfo be fecure from his attempts: not
as when some time fince he fell on Lem-
nos and Imbrus, and carried away your
citizens in chains: not as when he fur-
prized your veffels at Geraftus, and fpoiled
them of an unspeakable quantity of riches:
not as when lately he made a defcent on
the coast of Marathon, and carried off our
facred galley: while you could neither op-
pofe thefe infults, nor detach your forces
at fuch junctures as were thought conve-

nient.

And now, Athenians! what is the reafon (think ye) that the public feftivals in hoHour of Minerva and of Bacchus are always celebrated at the appointed time, whether the direction of them falls to the lot of men of eminence, or of perfons lefs diLinguished: (feftivals which coft more trea

fure than is ufually expended upon a whole navy; and more numbers and greater preparations, than any one perhaps ever coft) while your expeditions have been all too late, as that to Methonè, that to Pegafæ, that to Potidea. The reason is this: every thing relating to the former is afcertained by law; and every one of you knows long before, who is to conduct the feveral entertainments in each tribe; what he is to receive, when, and from whom, and what to perform. Not one of these things is left uncertain, not one undetermined. But in affairs of war, and warlike preparations, there is no order, no certainty, no regulation. So that, when any accident alarms us, first, we appoint our trierarchs; then we allow them the exchange; then the fupplies are confidered. Thefe points once fettled, we refolve to man our fleet with ftrangers and foreigners; then find it neceffary to fupply their place ourselves. In the midst of thefe delays, what are we failing to defend, the enemy is already master of: for the time of action we spend in preparing : and the junctures of affairs will not wait our flow and irrefolute measures. These forces too, which we think may be depended on, until the new levies are raifed, when put to the proof plainly discover their infufficiency. By these means hath he arrived to fuch a pitch of infolence, as to fend a letter to the Euboeans, conceived in fuch terms as thefe:

*The LITTER is read.

What hath now been read, is for the moft part true, Athenians! too true! but perhaps not very agreeable in the recital. But if, by fuppreffing things ungrateful to the ear, the things themselves could be prevented, then the fole concern of a public fpeaker fhould be to pleafe. If, on the contrary, thefe unfeasonably pleafing speeches be really injurious, it is fhameful, Athenians, to deceive yourfelves, and, by deferring the confideration of every thing difagreeable, never once to move until it be too late; and not to apprehend that they who conduct a war with prudence, are not to follow, but to direct events; to direct them with the fame abfolute authority, with which a general leads on his forces: that the courfe of affairs may be determined by them, and not determine their meafures. But you, Athenians, although poffeffed of the greatest power of all kinds, fhips, infantry, cavalry, and

treafure;

treafure; yet, to this day, have never employed any of them feasonably, but are ever laft in the field. Juft as barbarians engage at boxing, fo you make war with Philip: for, when one of thefe receives a blow, that blow engages him: if ftruck in another part, to that part his hands are fhifted: but to ward off the blow, or to watch his antagonist for this, he hath neither kill nor fpirit. Even fo, if you hear that Philip is in the Cherfonefus, you refolve to fend forces thither; if in Thermopyla, thither; if in any other place, you hurry up and down, you follow his ftandard. But no useful scheme for carrying on the war, no wife provisions are ever thought of, until you hear of fome enterprife in execution, or already crowned with fuccefs. This might have formerly been pardonable, but now is the very critical moment, when it can by no means be admitted.

It feems to me, Athenians, that fome divinity, who, from a regard to Athens, looks down upon our conduct with indignation, hath infpired Philip with this reftlefs ambition. For were he to fit down in the quiet enjoyment of his conquefts and acquifitions, without proceeding to any new attempts, there are men among you, who, I think, would be unmoved at thofe tranfactions, which have branded our ftate with the odious marks of infamy, cowardice, and all that is bafe. But as he ftill purfues his conquefts, as he is ftill extending his ambitious views, poffibly, he may at last call you forth, unless you have renounced the name of Athenians. To me

it is aftonifhing, that none of you looks back to the beginning of this war, and confiders that we engaged in it to chastise the infolence of Philip; but that now it is become a defenfive war, to fecure us from his attempts. And that he will ever be repeating thefe attempts is manifest, unlefs fome power rifes to oppofe him. But, if we wait in expectation of this, if we fend out armaments compofed of empty gallies, and thofe hopes with which fome fpeaker may have flattered you; can you then think your interests well fecured? fhall we not embark? fhall we not fail, with at leaft a part of our domeftic force, now, fince we have not hitherto ?-But where fhall we make our defcent ?-Let us but engage in the enterprife, and the war itfelf, Athenians, will fhew us where he is weakeft. But if we fit at home, listening to the mutual invectives and accufations of our ora

tors; we cannot expect, no, not the least fuccefs, in any one particular. Wherever a part of our city is detached, although the whole be not prefent, the favour of the gods and the kindness of fortune attend to fight upon our fide; but when we send out a general, and an infignificant decree, and the hopes of our fpeakers, misfortune and difappointment muft enfue. Such expeditions are to our enemies a fport, but trike our allies with deadly apprehenfions. For it is not, it is not poffible for any one man to perform every thing you defire. He may promife, and harangue, and accuse this or that perfon: but to fuch proceedings we owe the ruin of our affairs. For, when a general who commanded a wretched collection of unpaid foreigners, hath been defeated; when there are perfons here, who, in arraigning his conduct, dare to advance falfehoods, and when you lightly engage in any determination, juft from their fuggeftions; what must be the confequence? How then fhall thefe abuses be removed?

By offering yourselves, Athenians, to execute the commands of your general, to be witneffes of his conduct in the field, and his judges at your return: fo as not only to hear how your affairs are tranfacted, but to infpect them. But now, fo fhamefully are we degenerated, that each of our commanders is twice or thrice called before you to answer for his life, though not one of them dared to hazard that life, by once engaging his enemy. No; they chufe the death of robbers and pilferers, rather than to fall as becomes them. Such malefactors fhould die by the fentence of the law. Generals fhould meet their fate bravely in the field.

Then, as to your own conduct--fome wander about, crying, Philip hath joined with the Lacedemonians, and they are concerting the deftruction of Thebes, and the diffolution of fome free states. Others affure us he hath fent an embaffy to the king; others, that he is fortifying places in Illyria. Thus we all go about framing our several tales. I do believe indeed, Athenians! he is intoxicated with his greatness, and does entertain his imagination with many fuch vifionary profpects, as he fees no power rifing to oppofe him, and is elated with his fuccefs. But I cannot be perfuaded that he hath fo taken his measures, that the weakest among us know what he is next to do: (for it is the weakest among us who spread thefe rumours)-Let us difregard them: let us be perfuadea of L14

this,

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this, that he is our enemy, that he hath fpoiled us of our dominions, that we have long been fubject to his infolence, that whatever we expected to be done for us by others, hath proved against us, that all the refource left is in ourfelves, that, if we are not inclined to carry our arms abroad, we may be forced to engage here-let usbe perfuaded of this, and then we shall come to a proper determination, then shall we be freed from thofe idle tales. For we are not to be folicitous to know what particular events will happen; we need but be convinced nothing good can happen, unless you grant the due attention to affairs, and be ready to act as becomes Athenians.

I, on my part, have never upon any occafion chofen to court your favour, by speaking any thing but what I was convinced would ferve you. And, on this occafion, I have freely declared my fentiments, without art, and without referve. It would have pleafed me indeed, that, as it is for your advantage to have your true intereft laid before you, fo I might be affured that he who layeth it before you, would fhare the advantage: for then I had spoken with greater alacrity. However, uncertain as is the confequence with respect to me, I yet determined to fpeak, because I was convinced that these measures, if pursued, must have their use. And, of all thofe opinions which are offered to your acceptance, may that be chofen, which will beft advance the general weal! Leland.

2. The firft Olynthiac Oration: pronounced four Years after the first Philippic, in the Archonship of Callimachus, the fourth Year of the Hundred and Seventh Olympiad, and the twelfth of Philip's Reign.

INTRODUCTION.

The former Oration doth not appear to have had any confiderable effect. Philip had his creatures in the Athe. nian affembly, who probably recommended lefs vigorous measures, and were but too favourably heard. In the mean time, this prince pursued his ambitious defigns. When he found himself shut out of Greece, he turned his arms to fuch remote parts, as he might reduce without alarming the ftates of Greece. And, at the fame time, he revenged himself upon the Athenians, by making himself master of fome places which they laid claim to. At length his fuccefs emboldened him to declare those inten

4

tions which he had long entertained fecretly against the Olynthians. Olynthus (a city of Thrace poffeffed by Greeks originally from Chalcis,-a town of Euboea and colony of Athens) commanded a large tract called the Chalcidian region, in which there were thirty-two cities. It had arifen by degrees to fuch a pitch of grandeur, as to have frequent and remarkable contefts both with Athens and Lacedemon. Nor did the Olynthians fhew great regard to the friendship of Philip when he firft came to the throne, and was taking all measures to fecure the poffeffion of it. For they did not fcruple to receive two of his brothers by another marriage, who had fled to avoid the effects of his jealoufy; and endeavoured to conclude an alliance with Athens, against him, which he, by fecret practices, found means to defeat. But as he was yet fcarcely fecure upon his throne, instead of expreffing his refentment, he courted, or rather purchased, the alliance of the Olynthians, by the ceffion of Anthemus, a city which the kings of Macedon had long difputed with them, and afterwards, by that of Pydna and Potidea; which their joint forces had befieged and taken from the Athenians. But the Olynthians could not be influenced by gratitude towards fuch a benefactor. The rapid progrefs of his arms, and his glaring acts of perfidy alarmed them exceedingly. He had already made fome inroads on their territories, and now began to act against them with less reserve. They therefore difpatched ambaffadors to Athens to propose an alliance, and requeft affiftance against a power which they were equally concerned to oppose. Philip affected the higheft refentment at this ftep; alledged their mutual engagements to adhere to each other in war and peace; inveighed against their harbouring his brothers, whom he called the confpirators; and, under pretence of punishing their infractions, pursued his hoftilities with double vigour, made himself master of fome of their cities, and threatened the capital with a fiege.

In the mean time, the Olynthians preffed the Athenians for immediate fuc

cours.

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