to seven, in 1807. The appointment to the additional place was made by Jefferson, who had also appointed Johnson and Livingston as successors to Moore and Paterson. During Madison's first term, Chase and Cushing died, and Duval and Story were appointed to succeed them. A majority of the court were thenceforth appointees of Jefferson, or his followers in office and doctrine. There remained of the original associates of Marshall only Bushrod Washington, who died in 1829. When Cushing died it was hailed as a godsend because of the opportunity it gave to defederalize the court. But, none the less, Marshall retained his ascendency almost to the last. And the very man appointed to succeed Cushing proved to be the ablest and most loyal coadjutor of Marshall on the bench. This was Joseph Story.

During Marshall's time, eleven hundred and six opinions were filed by the court, of which five hundred and nineteen were by him. He also filed eight dissenting opinions. The range of subjects covered is a very wide one, for the jurisdiction of the Federal courts over controversies between citizens of different States brought before them the entire realm of Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence. But it is in the field of constitutional law that Marshall stands pre-eminent. While he was on the bench the court rendered sixty-one constitutional decisions. In thirty-five of the cases the opinion of the court was by Marshall. In only one case, that of Ogden v. Saunders, was he in the minority.

One of the first cases was Marbury v. Madison, which has a twofold interest. It was the first clash between Jefferson and Marshall.

It is obvious that the opinions in the Bank and Cohens cases completely overthrew the Virginia and Kentucky

resolutions, and firmly established the national character of our government. At this day the principles declared are accepted as fundamental, but at the time they were reprehended as revolutionary. The court was likened to a "subtle corps of sappers and miners, constantly working underground to undermine the foundations of our confederated fabric." To appreciate the value of Marshall's work we must bear in mind the conditions under which he wrought. The field of constitutional law was

a new one.

In many of the cases not a single precedent is cited. Marshall was absolutely a pioneer, blazing out the way, with nothing but his reason to guide him. Something more than a lawyer was required. It was essential that the position of Chief Justice should be occupied by a statesman of large experience in practical affairs and possessed of great breadth of view. Beyond a doubt, it was of value to the Nation that Marshall had been a soldier in the war of the Revolution. His observation and experience of the insufficiency of the Articles of Confederation, the selfishness of the States, the force of local prejudice, had made a marked impression upon his mind. Even the great exigencies of the Revolution were scarcely sufficient to hold the States to the most meager performance of the duties which they owed each other, and it was manifest that, unless constrained by stronger bonds in times of peace, each would pursue its own immediate interests without regard to the requirements of the general welfare, and even without regard to what its own ultimate good demanded.

It was assumed always by the advocates of State sovereignty that theirs was the cause of individual rights and individual liberty, and that these priceless boons

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were threatened by the establishment of a strong National Government. To them the States were the especial guardians of civil liberty and the representative institutions of popular government. And yet, as Marshall saw, their especial dogma was founded in distrust of the people, that is, of all the people except those of their own particular locality. Experience had not shown to them, as it has to us, that free institutions may be strengthened by their extension, and that the final security of individual rights is to be found in the sense of justice of the many rather than of the few, and is better guaranteed by the Constitution of the United States than by that of an individual State.

Gibbons v. Ogden, decided in 1824, was the first of a long line of decisions, continued to our own day, of the greatest practical consequence, and undoubtedly carried the power of the General Government to an extent not apprehended by many of the framers. This was, however, not because of any perversion of the principles declared in the Constitution, but because of their application to conditions not dreamed of when the Constitution was framed. As a reward for the invention of the steamboat, the State of New York had given to Fulton and his associates a monopoly of the navigation of the Hudson river, and this monopoly had been sustained by the highest courts of the State, Chancellor Kent concurring in the decision. It was assailed as a violation of the authority of Congress to regulate commerce among the several States, and by the Supreme Court of the United States was held to be illegal. The power of Congress under the Constitution, Marshall held, was comprehensive and complete, and extended not only to traffic between the States, but to all the means and instrumentalities by

which that traffic was carried on. The result of it was that not only the steamboats upon the rivers, but the railroads spanning the continent, the telegraph, the telephone — all the improved modes of transportation and communication devised by the inventive ingenuity of the century were established as national in their character and subject to the control of the General Government. The steam-engine, in its application to manufactures and to transportation, more than any other agency, has contributed to the consolidation of the government and to making this union of States essentially a Nation; and it was well for the country that, until it had come into play as one of the forces of social and industrial life, there was a man like Marshall upon the Bench, who had prescience of its future needs, and who, not wanting faith in the people,-possessing that in as large degree as any of his opponents,- saw that the greater the number of the people, the greater the warrant for confidence reposed in them.

In 1829 Marshall was again called upon to serve his State, having been elected a member of the convention to frame a new Constitution, and his service here closed his distinctly political career. His influence in the convention was marked, and was exerted to secure a compromise of the radically conflicting views which at first prevailed.

During Jackson's administration there occurred another instance of the tendency of the party in power to apply Marshall's principles in practice, however much rejecting them in theory. In the case of the missionary, Worcester, in which the status of the Cherokee nation was involved, the Governor of Georgia refused to obey the mandate of the court, and the President, who was

opposed to the views of the court, is reported to have said: "John Marshall has made the decision, now let him execute it." It was not to be long ere the President's authority was challenged, and then he became the ener getic supporter of John Marshall's views. When he met the nullification ordinance of South Carolina with an unmistakable determination to enforce the laws of Congress in every State of the Union, he was simply giving effect to the views of government which Marshall had long and consistently declared. Justice Story attended a dinner given by the President at the time of the debate on the Force bill, and thought it worthy of remark that the President should specially invite him to drink a glass of wine with him. "But what is more remarkable," he says, "since his last proclamation and message the Chief Justice and myself have become his warmest supporters, and shall continue so just as long as he maintains the principles contained in them."

But the career of the Chief Justice was drawing to a close. He passed peacefully away, on the 6th day of July, 1835, retaining full possession of his intellectual faculties to the last and meeting the end with perfect composure.

In a manner his death was timely. The recent appointments to the Bench wrought a change in the views of the court, which, however, did not find expression until after his death, and he was spared the pain of finding himself in a minority in that august tribunal whose counsels he had guided so long, so wisely, and so well.

His work was done, and it was well done, and, whatever attempts might be made against it, would stand for all time. The exigencies of slavery were to bring his views for final determination to the arbitrament of