been made, not merely the objects of conquest, but the instruments of ambition, to effect more conquests

It was in like manner the policy of Rome, to make use of her feeble enemies to destroy such as were strong. The Etolians in Greece were first engaged to assist in destroying Philip of Macedon. They, finding themselves duped and enslaved by the Romans, called in Antiochus, king of Syria, to assist them in their defence. The cities of Greece were gained, and dexterously played off to destroy the liberties of Greece. While Rome and Carthage were contending, the great powers, still unconquered, took no part in the contest. Thus Rome not only attacked them one after another, but was always sure to have the assistance of an old enemy, whom she had just conquered into an alliance, to overpower a new one. Hannibal, after his defeat, fled to Antiochus: it was then too late, for Carthage had received the law of the conqueror. Antiochus interfered in the affairs of Greece, after Philip of Macedon was humbled, and forced to be the ally of Rome against him. Mithridates, king of Pontus, had no ally till his power was much enfeebled; -then Tigranes joined him in time to be defeated. Greece would have been strong if it had been united; but its numerous governments were jealous of one another, often at war, and ready to call in the Romans to enslave them all. It seems astonishing, that neither Macedon, nor Greece, nor Syria, nor Egypt, made treaties of mutual defence, or took any sensible measure to employ all their joint forces in self-preservation. The world would have been saved from slavery.

There is scarcely a single article of Roman policy,

in which we do not perceive the servile imitation of the French; and if Great Britain was a republic, as Carthage was, there would be a faction in its bosom, devoted to France, strong enough to ensure her slavery. The fall of Great Britain would quench every hope of the recovery of the independence of Europe: a new Roman servitude would spread over the civilized world. The United States would be exposed to new toils, conflicts and dangers: faction would raise her snaky head with new audacity, confiding in the support that France would give to her efforts. We might be alarmed in time to see the approach of a foreign tyrant; but we should have to fight for our independence, or to resign it.

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CHAPTER IX.

THE RESOURCES OF A FREE AND STABLE GOVERNMENT, CONTRASTED WITH THOSE OF A

REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT.

IN France, we behold the effects of trying by the test of experience the most plausible metaphysical principles, in appearance the most pure, yet the most surprisingly in contrast with the corruption of the national manners. Theories, fit for angels, have been adopted for the use of a multitude, who have been found, when left to what is called their self-government, unfit to be called men. By stamping the rights of man on pocket handkerchiefs, it was supposed they were understood by those who understand nothing; and by voting them through the convention, it would cost a man his life and estate to say, that they were not established.

On grounds so solid Condorcet could proclaim to the enlightened, the fish-women, and the mob of the suburbs of St. Antoine, all disciples of "the new school of philosophy," that France had improved on all known plans of government, and that her liberty was immortal.

Experience has shown, and it ought to be of all teaching the most profitable, that any government by mere popular impulses, any plan that excites, instead of restraining, the passions of the multitude, is a despotism: it is not, even in its beginning, much less in its progress, nor in its issue and effects, liberty. As

RESOURCES OF A FREE GOVERNMENT.

173

well might we suppose, that the assassin's dagger conveys a restorative balsam to the heart, when it stabs it; or that the rottenness and dry bones of the grave will spring up again, in this life, endued with imperishable vigour, and the perfection of angels. To cure expectations, at once so foolish and so sanguine, what can be more rational than to inspect sometimes the sepulchre of French liberty? The body is not deposited there, for indeed it never existed; but much instruction is to be gained by carefully considering the lying vanity of its epitaph.

The great contest between England and France, also, shows the stability aud the resources of free governments, and the precariousness and wide-spreading ruin of the resort to revolutionary means.

contest.

Great Britain and France are the primary nations; it is evident, that all the rest play a subordinate and secondary part. The French adopt this opinion, and call France, Rome, and Great Britain, Carthage. If this similitude were exact, Britain would sink in the But the British Government is more stable than that of Carthage; and, therefore, faction is a little less virulent, and a great deal less powerful. Besides, the British superiority on the seas is more clearly, as well as more durably established, and more effectively displayed, than that of Carthage. The naval art was rude and imperfect in ancient times; and those, who then understood it best, were little the better for that advantage. Duillius, the Roman consul, gained a naval victory with mere landsmen. The reason was, that the ships of war were rowed alongside their antagonists, and being grappled firmly together, the combat was maintained, as in fights on land, by

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RESOURCES OF A FREE GOVERNMENT.

a body of soldiers on each side. This being the ordinary event of a sea-fight, no wonder the Roman soldiers, whose valour was the steadiest and the best trained in the world, prevailed over the mercenaries of Carthage. Every thing is different between England and France. So superior are the English seamen to the French, so little now depends on the number of men, and so much upon naval art, that the crowd of Frenchmen on board their vessels are rather an incumbrance than an effective force. There is seldom a sea-fight, in which the French escape, although their crews are far more numerous than those of their conquerors. Great Britain, too, enjoys a durable superiority. There must be commerce, before there will be seamen; there must be a stable government, before there will be a general spirit of enterprise and industry to create commerce. The hands of labour will be weak, while its earnings are exposed to rapine, as in France. It will be an age or two, before that nation will get rid of her military tyrants and her revolutionary spirit; and, till she does, her prosperity will be precarious, and her naval power will be displayed, like that of Turkey, by forcing awkward landmen on board ships. Despotism will waste men and wealth, and in vain, to imitate the spontaneous energies of industry and commerce, fostered by a free and stable government. It may be added, that a naval power is exerted with infinitely more effect now, than it was in ancient times: every nation almost is now vulnerable in its commerce and in its colonies; the ruin of these produces a decay of the revenues and resources for war.

If, then, France affects to be Rome, she will not find