sum, desidero; assequi enim non possum quod volo." Quid mihi et tibi, bone vir, quid velis aut possis? De DEO loquimur, qui quod vult facit, et quod velle potest, facere vel effectum dare potest. Quod vult facit, quatenus et quousque facere vult. Quid autem si non semper velit, quousque tu eum velle facere opinaris ? Noli Deum auTEE8σov et. Omnipotentem tuo modulo metiri. Et tu tamen, nunquamne experiris voluntatem tuam potentiæ tuæ non imperare ut ad extremum virium ubique et semper agat?

Si a te causâ solitariâ res in arbitrio tuo penitus sita agenda fuerit, effectum dabis: Secus opinor, eveniet, si cum causis sociis, aut instrumentalibus (quæ ab officio cessare, vel te destituere possint, præsertim si hoc ex tuo ipsius instituto sit ut possint) imperatum sit perducendum in actum. Sed quid tibi vult "effectum impero?" Ambigua locutio, et Anglicismum sapiens, si etiam intelligatur ut significet (uti hic videtur) "finem seu effectum intentum assequor." Præterea, "si volo," inquis, "quod non possum, desidero:" Rursus ambigua dictio. "Desidero," si careo significet, recte: si cupio, male: Quippe doles, desperas, irasceris; sic homines solent, quando quod non possunt volunt. At "indignum est Deo," et "proinde:" Quare proinde ? An quia, quod tu vis et non potes, "desideras?" At Deus quodcunque vult, quatenus vult, potest, et facit. At "indig

TRANSLATION.

for I cannot obtain that which I have willed." Good man! what have you and I to do with what you will to be done or what you are capable of doing? We are speaking about GOD, who does whatever he wills; and who is able to do, and to give effect to, whatever he is capable of willing. He does whatever he wills, so far and so long as it is his pleasure to do it. What harm is there, if HE does not always will to act so far or so long, as you think it is his pleasure to do? Allow not yourself to measure God, the Independent and Omnipotent Being, by your own small and slender proportions.-Aud yet, on rerection, do you never experience, that your own will does not command your power to act in every case and on all occasions according to the extreme stretch of its capabilities?

If a thing, placed entirely in your own will and power, is to be performed by yourself as a solitary cause, you will produce the effect: But this will not be the case, I think, if it be commanded to be brought into performance by associated or instrumental causes, that can cease from fulfilling their duty or can abandon you,-especially if their being capable of cessation or abandonment be in accordance with your design. But what do you intend by the words, "I command the effect?" It is an ambiguous expression that savours of an Anglicism,-even if it be understood to signify, what it seems to do in this place, "I obtain the end or effect intended."-You next say: "If I will that which I am not able [to gain], I desire it." This is another ambiguous expression. If desidero signify to want" or "to be without any thing," your phrase is correct. But if it be intended to convey the meaning of "I long for it," or "I covet it," the phrase is improper; because, in such circumstances, you indulge in grief, despair, and anger, as men usually do when they will what they are not able to obtain].-You then say: "It is therefore unworthy of God." But why is this word therefore" used? Is it because you desire that which you will, and which you are not able [to obtain]? But God is able to do and actually performs whatever he wills, aud as far as he wills. But, I ask, "Why is it unworthy of

num est Deo:" Quare?, inquam. "Quia Omnipotenti potentiæ," inquis, "defectum adfingit." Minime, inquam, nec OMNIPOTENTIS potentiæ cujuscunque modi, nedum omnipotenti potentiæ cui resisti nequit. Si quem defectum adfingeret, hic esset voluntati adfingendus non imperanti, minime autem polentia, voluntatis (ut ita dicam) imperata semper facienti, sed secundum voluntatis intentionem et imperium, et eorundem mensuram. At "adfingit etiam," inquis, "assequcndi voti incertam spem FELICISSIMO." Noli timere, bone vir, salva res est. Falli aut incertus esse nequit Deus: Hoc certo certiùs scio, etiamsi nec tu, qui metaphysicâ totâ imbutus es, modum explicare potis fueris. "Nescire velle quæ Magister Optimus docere non vult, erudita est inscitia." Quod de Fœlicitate et Omnipotentia philosopharis, prætereo, ne actum agam.

"Denique," inquis, "objecti ratione est impossibile." Quid est hoc impossibile? Quid objecti ratione? Scilicet, opinor, vis, "velleitatem (more humano loquor) quandam esse in Deo, impossibile esse." Quare?, inquam. Primam," inquis, "potentiam transfert in hominem, qui creatura est et uxikos." Quis "transfert primam," &c.? Deus? Quid primam &c. transfert? Hic de velleitate error, opinor. Minime autem inquam ego: sed "HOMINEM," non negabit, "quoad sensum gratiæ pulsantis et prævenientis esse omnino PASSIVUM, quamvis in consensu" (dicam et assensu interdum ?) esse plerumque, a gratia actum,

TRANSLATION.

God?" You reply, "Because it imputes a defect to that Power which is Omnipotent." It ascribes no such deficiency to any species of Omnipotent Power, much less to an Omnipotent Power that cannot be resisted. If it betokened any defect at all, that defect would be imputable to a Will which did not issue its commands; and on no account to a Power which always performs (if I may so term it,) the commands promulgated by the will, but which executes them according to the intention and mandate of the will, and according to the measure of the commands themselves.-You also declare, that it attributes, to ONE who is MOST HAPPY, an uncertain hope of obtaining his wishes." Good man! never fear; that matter is in perfect safety: For God can neither be deceived nor be uncertain. Of this truth I am persuaded with the assurance of complete certainty, although you, who are entirely imbued with Metaphysical lore, may not be capable of explaining the manner. "An unwillingness to become acquainted with those matters which the Best Master is unwilling to teach, is [a good trait in] learned and skilful ignorance." That I may not appear to discuss those points upon which I have already treated, I pass by all that you are pleased to philosophize about Felicity and Omnipotence.

us,

You tell " Lastly, It is impossible with respect to its object." What is intended by "impossible," and what by "relation to its object?" I think you wish to state, that it is impossible for such a thing as Velleity to be in God,"-speaking after the manner of men. Again I put the question, "Why?" You reply, "For it [or He] transfers the first [or primary] power to man, who is a creature and seusual." Is it God that is the transferrer? And what is this primary power which he transfers? I think this must be erroneous-to talk of primary power when treating about Velleity. But I say, this transferring to man is not true, and he will not deny, that man is altogether passive with regard to his sense or perception of propelling and preventing grace; although, when acted upon by

ACTIVUM."

Sed primam potentiam omnes, certe Christiani, in Deum transferunt, eique acceptam ferunt. Facessant, qui

aliter sentiunt.

THESIS XI.

MEDIE.

2. Proinde nec observatur determinatio illa SCIENTIÆ Hinc enim idea rei prius in creatura esset, quam in Deo: cognitionis etiam Divina principium a re finitâ procederet: ipsumque adeo Summum Bonum, Omnipotens, Infinitum, Purus Actus, dependenter a voluntatis create consilio et providentia moveret. Quinetiam impossibile idem: Quippe scibile est ante scientiam, sicut to ov ante to tefi. Præest autem, dum præcedit ipsius eivai, vola, uñaρžis. At nihil est nec existit, quod a Dei voluntate non est nec existit. Si præscit igitur priusquam velit, præscit nihil. At si aliquid esset in homine, quod sine præeunte voluntate præsciret, quale est in fieri, præsciretur a causa dependens. Causa vero si non prædeterminetur a Deo, mere contingens est. Hinc incerta vicissim esset Divina cognitio. Quare præscientia non esset, quæ effecti est non contingentis sed necessarii judicium.

grace, he is generally active in giving his consent-shall I also call it his assent sometimes? But all true Christians transfer the primary power to God, and declare that it is received by him. Let those persons be dismissed who entertain different sentiments.

THESIS XI.

"Secondly. That determination therefore of MIDDLE KNOWLEDGE is not observed. For, from hence the idea of a thing would be in the creature before it was in God; the commencement of the Divine Knowledge would also proceed from a thing that is finite; and thus the Chief Good itself, which is an Omnipotent, Infinite, and Pure Act, would move in dependence upon the counsel and foresight of a created will. Besides, it is impossible; because that which is capable of being known must be in existence before the knowledge of it, as entity itself must have precedence of its circumstances. But its being, essence, or existence, while it has the precedence, enjoys also the pre-eminence. But nothing is or exists, which has not its being or existence from the will of God. If therefore he foreknows before he wills, he foreknows nothing. But if there was any thing in man, which he [God] could foreknow without the aid of his will preceding, (such as any thing that is in a course of being made,) it would be foreknown as dependent on a cause. But if the cause be not predetermined by God, it is merely contingent: Hence, of course, the Divine Knowledge would be uncertain. Wherefore, it would not be foreknowledge, which is the judgment of an effect is NOT CONTINGENT but NECESSARY.'

ANNOTATIONES.

Quamvis mihi nulla necessitas incumbat SCIENTIAM MEDIAM astruendi, quædam tamen non obscura hujusmodi scientiæ rerum, ex suppositione circumstantiæ hujus aut illius eventurarum vel secus, vestigia in sacris literis apparent. Ut exemplar mittam de Davide in Keilah notissimum, (Sam. xxiii, 12,) de Chorazin etiam et Bethsaida; (Matt. xi, 21; Luke x, 13;) consule, inter alia ejusdem numeri, dicta Salvatoris nostri ad sacerdotes et scribas sciscitantes, Num tu es ille Christus? Dic nobis : dicentis, "Si vobis dixero, nequaquam credetis." Et versu sequente, Quod si etiam interrogavero, nequaquam respondebitis mihi, neque absolvetis." (Luke xxii, 67, 68.) En tibi tres eventus non eventuros ex suppositione etiam ipsius Christi Domini nostri! Cætera mitto. Frustra ergo a te quæritur, vel potius supponitur, quid prius sit aut posterius; frustra etiam, (quod non capis) "impossibile" affirmas. Nec rationes a te productæ aliud quid probant, quam quod plurimis sacræ scripturæ affirmationibus sole clarioribus oculos obnubis, ut refrageris. Nec minus ideo præscientia Dei, eaque certa de effectis naturâ

TRANSLATION.

ANNOTATIONS.

Although no necessity is imposed upon me of establishing Middle Know. ledge, yet in the sacred scriptures certain not obscure vestiges are apparent of this kind of Knowledge,-of things that will happen thus or otherwise, on the supposition of the occurrence of this or that circumstance. Omitting the the well-known example of David in Keilah, (1 Sam. xxiii, 12,) † and of Chorazin and Bethsaida, (Matt. xi, 21; Luke x, 13,) consult, among other sayings of the same description, the answer of our Saviour to the Chief Priests and Scribes who had asked, "Art thou the Christ? Tell us." And he said unto them, "If I tell you, ye will not believe." In the subsequent verse he adds, "If 1 also ask you, ye will not auswer me, nor let me go.' (Luke xxii, 67, 68.) You have here three events specified, which yet will not occur even on the supposition of Christ our Lord himself. The rest of your remarks I pass by. In vain therefore is the question, or rather the supposition, which you raise about what is prior or what is posterior; and useless your affirmation respecting the impossibility [of middle knowledge]", which you do not comprehend. Neither do the reasons produced by you tend to prove any thing more than this,-that you shut your eyes against several of the affirmations in the Holy Scriptures, which are clearer than the sun, for the purpose of contradicting them. The foreknowledge of God would be no less CERTAIN respecting effects which are in their own nature contingent, although it may appear uncertain to you who measure

+ This case is very remarkable: David had ordered Abiathar the priest to bring the ephod, and enquired of the Lord, "Will the men of Keilah deliver me up into the hands of Saul? Will Saul come down, as thy servant hath heard? O Lord God of Israel, I beseech thee, tell thy servant." And the Lord said, "He will come down."-Then said David, “Will the men of Keilah deliver me and my men into the hand of Saul?" And the Lord said, "They will deliver thee up."-Then David and his men, which were about six hundred, arose and departed out of Keilah, and went whithersoever they could go. And it was told Saul, that David was escaped from Keilah; and he forbore to go forth.

Respecting Chorazin and Bethsaida, it is said: If the mighty works which were done in you had been done in Tyre and Sidon, they would have repented long ago in sackcloth and shes-EDITOR.

suâ contingentibus esset, quamvis tibi SCIENTIAM DIVINAM ex tua finita et fallaci omnium mortalium metienti ita videatur. Quid nos scire ex suppositione possimus, vix ipsi cognoscimus: quid autem scire possit Deus, vix, ac ne vix; nisi quod OxNISCIUM EUM ESSE, infallibiliter scire possumus, ac debemus.

THESIS XII.

Denique. Corruit simul ex conditione prævisa concursus intentio, quippe quæ tum independenti naturæ Dei repugnat, tum vocationis decretum non est, ut postea declarabimus.

ANNOTATIONES.

Quia te postea declaraturum, ais, paucula ista, quæ de errore tertio dicenda habuisti, hîc istorum examine supersedebimus, te illic præstolaturi.

66

At at talia cogitanti mihi jam subolet, dum sequentia perfunctorie lustro, quamobrem hæ Theses totæ, scilicet gemmeœ, et hoc solo nomine redarguendæ," (si præfatori credimus,) Latine etiamnum prostent, necdum vernaculum calleant: Nemo, opinor, apte et ad mortalium captum, Anglico redderet, aut redditas intelligeret. Lectorem haud facile invenissent, quæ jam a nonnemine, nescio quo, eruditionis laudem captante, immane quantum!, allaudantur. Quid ais, Clarissime Præfator, "Istæne

TRANSLATION.

the DIVINE KNOWLEDGE by your own, which is finite, or by that of mortals, which is fallacious. We ourselves scarcely understand what it is possible for US to know on supposition. But to measure the extent of the possibility of God's knowledge, is beyond our power: The only thing concerning it which we may and ought infallibly to know, is, that HE IS OMNISCIENT!

THESIS XII.

"Lastly. The intention of a concurrence from a foreseen condition is at the same time destroyed, both because it is repugnant to the independent nature of God, and because it is not the decree of vocation, as we shall hereafter declare."

ANNOTATIONS.

Because you say, that you will hereafter declare the few things which you had to say about this third error," we will now cease from our examination of them, being willing to wait till you have them ready.

But while I slightly cast my eyes over those which follow, and was reflecting upon such topics, I begun to suspect the reason why these Theses are still sold in Latin, and why they have not yet been published in our native language; although, if we may credit the editor," the only fault with which they can be charged, is, that they are entirely studded with gems!" The reason of their yet remaining untranslated, is this,-uo man could, in my opinion, render them into English so as to be grasped by the comprehension of mortals, or could himself understand them when translated. A single reader would with difficulty be found engaged in the perusal of a production,that has been thus immoderately extolled by some one whom nobody knows, and who plumes himself greatly on the praise to which he considers himself entitled for the extent of his erudition. What, most famous Prefacer, do you say, "These Theses have been frequently pub