ANNOTATIONES. 1. Nota ut hic sermonem in re prorsus eâdem licenter variet. In Thesi quartâ legimus "Deum reconciliari voluisse quibusdam;" hîc "homines reconciliandi et reconciliari" dicuntur, idque "propter Christi merita." Quid ergo? An Christus non meruit ut Deus hominibus reconciliaretur? Non dixeris, opinor. At tantundem hic dicitur. Certe Christus Deo, non hominibus satisfecit. Verissimum quidem est, nos recte dici Deo " esse reconciliandos," ut applicetur reconciliatio merito Christi impetrata: utinam autem apertius et liquidius nos docuisset, quo pacto "merita Christi prius applicanda" fuerint. 2. Ex meritorum Christi, ad hominem, qua intellectu et voluntate præditum, applicatione, fœdus Dei cum Electis emergens, hoc esse dicitur, "se recipientibus Christum reconciliatum iri," quod oracularem ambiguitatem, ex vocum sono, referre videtur. Sed præstat sic intelligere, ac si clare affirmetur, "Deum reconciliatum iri recipientibus Christum :" Quid autem sit hoc, "Christum recipere," utinam explicasset. Sed quid si noluit, ne quid infirmum subter latens exponeretur: aut non potuit, Thesibus, dicam, an hypothesibus salvis? 3. Non moror sequentium amphibolias dictionum, nec minus exactas loquendi formas vellico. CONDITIONES audio; placet. At "reconciliationem" ad Deum non esse rem aliam ab "ejus TRANSLATION. ANNOTATIONS. 1. Observe with what licentiousness he varies his expressions, in this place, on a matter that is entirely alike. In the Fourth Thesis, we read, "It was the will of God to be reconciled" to certain individuals: while in this, men are said to be reconciled," and "the subjects of reconciliation," " on account of the merits of Christ." What is the inference? Has not Christ merited, that God may be reconciled to men? I think, you would not venture to speak thus: Yet in this passage is expressed the same sentiment. Christ has undoubtedly rendered satisfaction to God, and not to men. It is a grand truth, that we are rightly said "to be reconciled to God, in order that the reconciliation obtained by the merits of Christ may be applied." But I wish our author had taught us in a clearer and more luminous manner, by what means the merits are first to be applied." 2. "From the application of the merits of Christ to man, considered as endowed with an understanding and will, arises God's covenant with the Elect." This is said to be "a betaking themselves to Christ to be reconciled;" which seems, from the sound of the words, to be the rehearsal of an oracular ambiguity. But it is better to understand it as though it was openly affirmed, that God is ready to be reconciled to those who receive Christ." I wish, however, that he had explained what he means by "receiving Christ." But if he be unwilling to give this explanation, it is lest some concealed weakness should be exposed: Or, perhaps, he was not able to do this with safety to his-"Theses" shall I call them, or "Hypotheses?" 3. I will neither detain myself with the equivocations of the subsequent expressions, nor criticize those forms of speaking which are not the most accurate. I am delighted at hearing the word "conditions." But I confess, cannot sufficiently comprehend how "reconciliation to God is not a different dem fruitione," sed idem hominis finis, nisi quod "relatione interruptionis præviæ distinguatur,"-fateor me non satis capere; non quod minus intelligam, quam quod minus sanum esse judicem. Sed transeat. 4. "Conditionem a parte nostra," scilicet " Christi receptionem, ab homine non propriis naturæ viribus præstari, sed a Dei præsertim gratia," damus: modo "hominis esse actum, a nobis, mediante Dei evangelio, per Spiritus Sancti gratiam productum," non negetur. 5. Meminerit lector, "conditionem hanc," ab authore concedi, "esse in homine quid ad reconciliationem prærequisitum. THESIS VI. Applicatio utriusque conditionis fit primo per deductionem earum ad actum, ut sint: deinde per conservationem in actu, ut porro sint. Deductio autem ad actum est receptioni Christi prius, cum ex ea tanquam medio prærequisito reconciliatio ineatur. Hæc vero vocatio dici solet, quæ motus est a Deo, quo Christi receptionem electis ingenerat. ANNOTATIONES. 1. Advertat etiam, quod ex ea, tanquam medio prærequisito, reconciliatio ineatur," eodem hic fatente. An vero hæc VOCATIO dici soleat," in sacris literis, ambigo. TRANSLATION. matter from the enjoyment of God," or how "it is the same end of man, differing from it in relation to the previous interruption :" Not so much because I cannot understand some part of his meaning, as because I consider it to be unsound. But, let that pass. 4. We grant, that the condition on our part, ("the reception of Christ,") is not performed by man through the strength of his own nature, but that it is specially performed by the grace of God. Provided that it be not denied to be the act of man, produced by us through the medium of the gospel of God, and by the grace of the Holy Spirit. 5. The reader must recollect, it is the author's own concession, that "this condition is in man as a certain pre-requisite to reconciliation." THESIS VI. "The application of both these conditions is made, First, by the deduction of them to action, that they may be; and, Secondly, by [their] preservation in action, that they may be [proceed] further. But deduction to action is prior to the reception of Christ, since from it, as from a mean pre-required, reconciliation is commenced. But it is usual to call it VoCATION, that is, a motion from God, by which he produces the reception of Christ in the Elect." ANNOTATIONS. 1. Observe, that "from this deduction, as from a mean pre-required, reconcliation is commenced," is the author's own confession in this passage. But I have my doubts whether, in the sacred scriptures, "it is usual to call it VOCATION." 2. Reconciliatio hic dicitur vocatio, quæ "motus est a Deo, quo Christi receptionem electis ingenerat." Quid audio? "Reconciliatio generat receptionem, quæ receptio est reconciliatione prior, seu quid ei prærequisitum ?" Annon hæc sunt valde operosum nihil? Capiat qui potest. Fallor? An hæc sibi contradicunt? Certe Robertus Parkerus pater tuus fuit, non idem tuus filius. THESIS VII. Motio hominis est: ideo movens requiritur, et mobile quod movetur, et motus moventis actus, et res motu facta: De quibus ordine. ANNOTATIONES. An "Motio hominis est," inquis. Cave dixeris. Quid? hominem affirmas actus hujus dispensatorem, quod modo Thesi Quintâ negasti? Rursus hæreo, nisi "motio" pure pute passive intelligatur. Pergo. THESIS VIII. Movens est, qui intendit finem: principium et finis Deus. Movens autem est, ut consilio agens; proinde decreto, quod pariter secundum proportionem decreti circa TRANSLATION. 2. Reconciliation is here said to be "vocation, that is a motion from God, by which he produces the reception of Christ in the Elect." What do Í hear? Does reconciliation produce reception, which reception is prior to reconciliation and is "something that is a pre-requisite to it?" "Are not these very operose nullities? Let him comprehend them who is capable. Am I deceived? Is each of these expressions contradictory to the other? Undoubtedly ROBERT PARKER was your father, but your production is not of the same lineage. THESIS VII. "Moving is the duty of man: A Mover therefore is required, as well as something movable that may be moved, a motion as the act of moving, and a thing produced by motion: Of each of which [we will treat] in its order." ANNOTATIONS. "Motion," you say, "is the part of man." Beware of what you assert. What! do you affirm "man to be the dispenser of this act," which, in the Fifth Thesis, you just now denied?-I hesitate again, unless "moving" be understood purely in a passive sense. But I proceed. THESIS VIII. "The Mover is he who intends the end, God is both the beginning and the end. But a Mover is one who acts by counsel, and therefore by a decree, which is absolute at the same time according to the proportion of the jinem, absolutum est. Nec enim finis absolute ab ipso intenti, ex fullibili conditione suspendi eventus potest. ANNOTATIONES. De "fine," qui ipse Deus dicitur et est, litem non moveo. Sed an "eodem modo Deus intendat SE ut finem suum, et hominis finem, seu mercedem magnam, consilio, proinde decreto," merito ambigo. Intendit quippe SE finem suum, opinor, naturâ ; SE autem hominis finem, consilio. Nec satis assequar, nisi statuendum sit" Dei decreta esse ipsum Deum," et " posse SEIPSUM non velle sicut DECRETA potuisset facere non voluisse; et Deum seipsum, sicut decreta, secundum voluntatis suæ consilium facere," arbitremur. Non tamen negaverim hominis finem DEUM (si media ad eum assequendum connotet,) a Deo homini absolute intendi. Neque hinc metuendum est, si Dei intentio finis humani sic explicetur, ne ex fallibili (Deus nam falli nequit,) conditione (non dico necessitata) eventus suspendatur, quam conditionem supra, Thesi Quintâ, statuisti esse "Christi receptionem." Hanc nam secundum Evangelii vocem, dicentis Qui credit salvabitur, in decreto hoc circa hominem includi affirmo. Adeo ut certo certius et infallibiliter, finis hujusmodi eventus "ex fallibili conditione NON suspendatur." THESIS IX. Et sicut in comparatione ad finem, sic qua id quod de TRANSLATION. decree concerning the end. For the event of the end which has been abso~ lutely intended by him, cannot be suspended on a fallible condition." ANNOTATIONS. I enter into no controversy respecting the end, which is stated to be God himself, and is so in reality. But I entertain some just doubts, whether in one and the same manuer God, by his counsel and therefore by his decree, intends himself as his own end, and as the end of man, or [his] "exceeding great reward." Because, I think, he intends himself as his own end, by [his] NATURE; but as the end of man, by COUNSEL. Nor can I properly comprehend [his assertion], unless it be stated, that the decrees of God are Himself, and that it is possible for him not to will Himself, as it might be possible not to will to make decrees; and unless we suppose that God makes Himself, as he does his decrees," according to the counsel of his own will." Yet I have not denied, that God absolutely intends himself to man as man's end, if he points out the means to obtain it. Nor is there any cause to fear, when the intention of man's end is thus explained, lest "the event should be suspended on a condition that is fallible," (for God is not fallible,)—I do not say on one that is necessitated,-which condition you have stated in the Fifth Thesis to be the reception of Christ. For I affirm, that this condition ["the reception of Christ"] is included in this decree concerning man, according to the expression of the Gospel which says, He that believeth shall be saved. It is therefore most certain and infallible, that "the end of an event of this description is NOT suspended on a fallible condition. "And a THESIS IX. in comparison to the end, so in reference to what is decreed cernitur est effectus entis primi; a quo sicut omnium entium dependent essentia, virtutes, actiones, (Rom. xi, 36,) sic præcipue supernaturalis boni. (Jac. i, 17.) Hinc vocationem independente consilio producens, tum per sapientiam de forma deliberat, tum per voluntatem intendit secundum illam formam ex suppositione potentiæ. Forma illa exemplar est et mensura veritatis in re, ut prout ipsa fuerit, sic rem fore necesse sit dependenter ab ea. Hinc ex conditione in re non vult conversionem Deus, sed secundum deliberationem sapientiæ suæ, voluntas intendit, et potentia exequitur immutabilis. Et quia secundum sapientiam et bonitatem vult et potest, proinde futuram prævidet virtualiter a voluntate pendentem. ANNOTATIONES. Sicut decretum circa finem, seu "decretum secundum proportionem decreti circa finem," (stylo et phrasi horridis, hactenus inauditis, et mortalium captum pene superantibus,) statim dixerat, "sic" (quod hoc "sic" sibi vult ?) " id quod decernitur" (quid tibi est "id" istud? An neque motio, nec movens, nec mobile, nec motus, nec res motu-facta? Quanta hic confusio, quantus tumultus !,) "sic id quod decernitur," inquis, "est effectus Entis Primi; a quo dependere omnium essentias, TRANSLATION. being the effect of the First Being, on whom (Rom. xi, 36,) the essences, virtues, and actions of all beings depend, and principally those of supernatural good. (Jamesi, 17.) Hence producing vocation by [his] independent counsel, he deliberates concerning the form by his wisdom, and he intends [purposes] by his will according to that form on the supposition of power: That form is the exemplar and measure of truth in the thing; that as it [the form] was, so the thing itself must of necessity be, dependently on it. Hence from the condition in the thing God wills not conversion; but according to the deliberation of his own wisdom his will intends, and his immutable power executes [it] And, because according to his wisdom and goodness he employs his will and his power, therefore he foresees that it [conversion] will afterwards occur, being virtually dependent on [his] will. ANNOTATIONS. After having said, that "as the decree concerning the end," or "the decree according to the proportion of the decree concerning the end," he immediately adds, (in a style and phraseology that are most barbarous, that have never before been heard, and that nearly transcend the comprehension of mortals,) "so in reference to that which is decreed being the effect of the First Being," &c. What meaning has this particle "so?" And what do you do with the phrase, "that which is decreed?" Is it neither something moving, a Mover, something that is movable, motion, nor the thing produced by motion? [See page 182.] What confusion and tumult are here! You state, that "what is decreed is an effect of the First Being ;" and I do |