Trial of appeal.] Usually the respondent begins: he it is who makes the charge, against which the appellant appeals, and he must prove it; it is not for the appellant to prove his innocence, until the charge against him has first been substantiated by the other party. In appeals against convictions this is universally true; but in some of the other appeals it is not always the case. In appeals against poor-rates, for instance, where the defendant objects to his being rated at all, the respondent begins; R. v. Newbury, 4 T. R. 475; where he objects to the sum at which he is rated only, as that he is overrated, or that other persons on the rate are underrated, the appellant begins; Id. R. v. JJ. of Suffolk, 6 M. & S. 57; and where he appeals upon both grounds, the respondents begin. R. v. Topham, 12 East, 546. So, in appeals against orders of removal, as it is now decided that if the appellants, in their grounds of appeal, do not deny the settlement set up by the respondents in the pauper's examination, they thereby admit it, and the respondents are not bound to prove it, R. v. Hockworthy, 7 Ad. & El. 492, in most courts of quarter sessions the appellants, in such a case, now begin, and prove any new settlement they may have set up in their grounds of appeal: but if the appellants have denied the settlement set up by the respondents in the examination, whether they set up any new settlement or not, the respondents begin. There must also necessarily be many other exceptions to the above general rule, arising out of the particular circumstances of each case, which must in a great measure be left to the good sense and discretion of the justices at session to regulate. : But whether the respondent or appellant begins, the respondent in most cases may, if he wish, call upon the appellant to prove his service of notice of appeal, before the case is at all gone into in some cases the statute giving the appeal expressly requires this proof before the court proceed to hear and determine the appeal; and in most other cases the statute makes the notice of appeal a condition precedent to the party's appealing, and the appellant in such cases must, if required, prove his notice of appeal, to show that he is in a situation to appeal, within the meaning of the statute. Upon notice of appeal being proved, or proof of it not being required, the counsel for the respondent, supposing him to have a right to begin, states his case to the court, and adduces evidence and witnesses to prove it; which witnesses may be cross-examined by the appellant's counsel, and afterwards reexamined by the counsel for the respondent. The counsel for the appellant next addresses the court, and either confines his observations to the case and proofs of the respondent, in which case the respondent has no right to reply; or, after observing upon the respondent's case and proofs, he may open a case for the appellant, and adduce evidence and witnesses in support of it, which witnesses may be cross-examined and afterwards re-examined, as above-mentioned. In the latter case the counsel for the respondent has a right to the general reply ; or before he replies he may call witnesses to disprove the case set up by the appellant, in which case the appellant's counsel has a right again to address the court (confining his observations, however, to the testimony of the witnesses so called by the respondents), and then the respondent's counsel is entitled to a general reply upon the whole case. See R. v. JJ. of Carnarvon, 4 B. & A. 86. The proceedings are the same, mutatis mutandis, where the appellant has the right of beginning. As soon as the case has thus been closed on both sides, the court, by their chairman, or in boroughs the recorder, deliver the judgment, and either confirm the order, &c. or quash it. Any justices present who have a personal interest in the matter of appeal should refrain from voting, or taking any part directly or indirectly in it. See Anon. 1 Salk. 396. R. v. Foxham Tithing, 2 Salk. 607. R. v. Great Chart, Burr. S. C. 194, 2 Str. 1173. R. v. Yarpole, 4 T. R. 71. R. v. Gudridge, 5 B. & C. 459. R. v. JJ. of Hertfordshire, 14 Law J. 73, m. By stat. 16 G. 2, c. 18, s. 1, indeed, justices are empowered to act in all matters relating to the laws for the relief, maintenance, and settlement of the poor, for passing and punishing vagrants, for the repair of highways, and concerning parochial taxes, levies, or rates, notwithstanding they are rated to or chargeable with the taxes, levies, or rates, within any parish, township or place affected by such act. But the statute contains a proviso (s. 3), "that it shall not extend to authorize or empower any justice of peace for any county or riding at large, to act in the determination of any appeal to the quarter sessions for any such county or riding, from any order, matter or thing relating to any such parish, township or place where such justice of the peace is so taxed or chargeable as aforesaid." Amendment.] By stat. 5 G. 2, c. 19, s. 1, reciting that great expenses had been occasioned by reason that the judgments and orders of justices had been quashed or set aside at the sessions, upon exceptions or objections to the form or forms of the proceedings," without examining the truth and merits of the matter in question between the parties, it is enacted, that upon all appeals to be made to the justices of the peace at their respective general or quarter sessions to be holden for any county, riding, city, liberty or precinct within that part of Great Britain called England, against judgments or orders given or made by any justices of the peace as aforesaid, such justices so assembled at any general or quarter sessions shall, and they are hereby required from time to time, within their respective jurisdictions, upon all and every such appeals so made to them, to cause any defect or defects of form that shall be found in any such original judgments or orders, to be rectified and amended, without any costs or charges to the parties concerned; and after such amendment made, shall proceed to hear, examine, and consider the truths and merits of all matters concerning such original judgments or orders, and likewise to examine all witnesses upon oath, and hear all other proofs relating thereto, and to make such determinations thereupon, as by law they should or ought to have done, in case there had not been such defect or want of form in the original proceeding." Where an order of removal described the place of settlement as a parish, instead of a vill, R. v. Amluch, 4 B. & C. 753, or a township instead of a parish, R. v. Bingley, 4 B. & Ad. 567, n, or ordered the removal from A. to B. instead of from B. to A.: R. v. Harrow-on-the-Hill, 2 Bott, 706: the court held that the justices at sessions might amend it, within the meaning of this statute. But where such an order described the justices as of a wrong county; R. v. Chilverscoton, 8 T. R. 178. R. v. Moor Critchell, 2 East, 66; and where the order omitted the adjudication of chargeability: R. v. Great Bedwin, Burr. S. C. 163,2 Str. 1150: the court held that such misdescription and omission could not be remedied by amendment. Costs.] Costs if granted, form part of the judgment of the court. It depends, however, upon the statute giving the appeal, whether the sessions can award costs or not: even in cases where they have such authority, they do not in all cases exercise it. APPRENTICE. 1. Apprenticeship in ordinary cases, p. 80. 5. Complaints by masters of their apprentices, p. 114. 1. Apprenticeship in ordinary cases. Who may be bound, and to whom.] Any person, capable of executing a deed, may bind himself as an apprentice; and although he be under age at the time, he is bound by the indenture to serve his master during the time therein specified, stat. 5 Eliz. c. 4, s. 43. R. v. Saltern, 1 Bott, 617. Arundel, 5 M. & S. 257, at least, unless he become of age be R. v. fore the expiration of it, at which time it appears that he may avoid the contract if he will. Ex p. Davis, 5 T. R. 715. See Ex p. Gill, 7 East, 376. So any person, capable of executing a deed, may take an apprentice; even a person under age may do so. R. v. St. Petrox in Dartmouth, 4 T. R. 196. But a married woman cannot take an apprentice, because her deed is altogether void, and not merely voidable. R. v. Guildford, 2 Chit. 284. It is not necessary, however, to the validity of an indenture of apprenticeship, that the master should exercise any trade, art, or mystery; where a girl was bound apprentice to a common day-labourer, to learn "the art and mystery of a housewife." the court held that the indenture was not invalid on that ground. R. v. St. Margaret's, Lincoln, Burr. S. C. 728. Any apprenticeship, however, effected in contravention of an Act of Parliament, or by any contrivance in fraud of, or for the purposes of avoiding its express provisions, will be void altogether, and not merely voidable. And therefore where it was prohibited by statute to bind a child under eight years of age to a chimney-sweep, and a child of five years was notwithstanding bound, the court held the indentures void altogether, and not merely voidable. R. v. Hipswell, 8 B. & C. 466. So, where by stat. 10 G. 2, c. 31, s. 5, it was enacted that no waterman or waterman's widow should take an apprentice, unless they were housekeepers; and by sect. 4, that they should not take or have more than two apprentices; and a boy being in the service of one Twiss, a waterman, and it being desirable that he should be apprenticed, Twiss, who had already two apprentices, and therefore could not take him, had him bound to one Elizabeth Pearce, a waterman's widow, but who did not carry on the trade, nor was she a housekeeper; the boy, in fact, served Twiss alone under the indenture, Twiss paying Mrs. Pearce a sum quarterly for his services: the court held that the binding was clearly an evasion of the Act of Parliament, and was therefore void. R. v. Gravesend, 3 B. & Ad. 240. So, where during the time that it was prohibited by the stat. 5 Eliz. c. 4, that any person should exercise a trade unless he had served an apprenticeship for seven years to it, a boy was apprenticed to a tailor, nominally for seven years, but the indenture was ante-dated two years, for the purpose of enabling him to exercise his trade after a service of only five years, in fraud of the statute: the court held that as this was a plain evasion of the provisions of the statute, and done for the very purpose, the indenture was void, and no settlement was acquired by a service or inhabitancy under it. R. v. Barmston, MS. H. 1838. 3 Nev. & P. 167. For what time.] The binding is usually for seven years. Formerly it was required to be so, by stat. 5 Eliz. c. 4, s. 26, which however has since been repealed. But even whilst that statute was in force, a binding for less than seven years was holden to be voidable only, not void. R. v. St. Nicholas in Ipswich, 2 Str. 1066. R. v. Evered, Cald. 26. Gray v. Cookson, 16 East, 13. R. v. Rainham, 1 East, 531. So, where by a local act, the guardians of the poor at Canterbury were empowered to bind poor children apprentices for any number of years they should think fit, provided they should not be bound for a longer term than they should attain the age of 22 if boys, or 20 if girls; and a boy was apprenticed for a term which would not expire until after he should have attained the age of 22: the court held that the indenture was voidable only, not void, on that account. R. v. St. Gregory, 2 Ad. & El. 99. On the other hand, if, in ordinary cases, an infant is apprenticed for a time which will expire after he becomes of age, he may, it seems, put an end to the contract as soon as he becomes of age. Ex. p. Davis, 5 T. R. 715. See Ex p. Gill, 7 East, 376. But if a man of full age becomes an apprentice, he is thereby bound to serve the full time mentioned in the indenture. How bound.] The binding must be by deed, that is to say, it must be under seal, and be signed and delivered by the parties, in the same manner as other deeds generally; otherwise no contract of apprenticeship will be created by it. R. v. Ditchingham, 4 T. R. 796. R. v. Kingsweare, Burr. S. C. 839, R. v. All Saints, Hereford, Burr. S. C. 656. R. v. Highnam, 1 Bott, 553. But whether the deed be indented or not is immaterial. It must be executed by the apprentice, although he be an infant no execution by his father or other person, who covenants for his faithfully serving, even although the apprentice assent, will be deemed equivalent to his own execution. R. v. Cromford, 8 East, 25. R. v. Ripon, 9 East, 295. R. v. Arnesby, 3 B. & A. 584. It is also usually executed by the father or some other friend of the apprentice, who covenants for the due service of the apprentice; but this is only for the security of the master, and is not essential to the validity of the indenture. Also, it or a counterpart is usually executed by the master but this also has been holden not to be necessary to render the indenture valid; R. v. St. Peter's-on-the-Hill, 2 Bott, 393, 377; and see R. v. Fleet, Cald. 31; execution by the master is necessary only to give the apprentice or his father or friend a remedy against him, for any breach of the usual covenants on his part to teach and keep the apprentice. Where money was given by will to trustees, for the purpose of putting out poor boys apprentices, and the trustees having put a boy out, and given a premium of 20l. with him, the indenture stated them, as well as the boy and master, to be par |