8. 6. The stat. 9 G. 4, c. 31, s. 13, upon this subject, is repealed: and the distinction there made between women quick with child, and those pregnant but not quick with child, is now abolished. See Arch. Cr. St. 18, 37, and note. It is immaterial, whether this be done with the consent of the woman or not; or whether in fact she be pregnant at all at the time, or not, see Arch. Cr. St. 38, 39, although this was formerly otherwise. R. v. Scudder, Ry. & M. 216. Formerly, where the woman was not quick with child, it was immaterial what was administered, provided it was administered with intent to procure miscarriage; R. v. Coe, 6 Car. & P. 403; but now the article administered must be proved to be either poison or "other noxious thing." To be administered, also, it seems that the poison or other thing must be actually taken into the stomach of the woman; see R. v. Cadman, Ry. & M. 114. R. v. Harley, 4 Car. & P. 369, per Park, J.; but an attempt to administer it, would probably be deemed a misde

meanor.

at

did

Commitment for administering drugs: on unlawfully and feloniously administer to one C. D. and did then and there cause to be taken by her, one ounce weight of a certain poison [or noxious thing] called -, with intent in so doing then and there to procure the miscarriage of the said C. D.: against the form of the statute in such case made and provided. And you the said keeper, &c.

Commitment for using instruments, &c.: on- at

did [use a certain instrument called a, stating how, or if other means have been used, state them,] with intent, &c. as above.

ABUSING A GIRL.

See "Carnally knowing a girl."

ACCESSORY AND PRINCIPAL.

Principal.] He who actually commits the offence, is said to be principal in the first degree; he who is present, aiding and abetting him in doing it, is said to be principal in the second degree. See R. v. Boyce, 4 Burr. 2073. Both how

ever are equally guilty. And so immaterial is the distinction considered, in practice, that if a man be indicted as principal in the first degree, proof that he was present aiding and abetting another in committing the offence, although his was not the hand that actually did it, will support the indictment; see R. v. Crisham, Car. & M. 187; and on the other hand, if he be indicted as principal in the second degree, proof that he was not only present, but committed the offence with his own hand, will support the indictment. And persons present at the commission of an offence, are said to be aiding and abetting the party actually committing it, if they be confederated or engaged with him in a common design, of which the offence is a part, R. v. Tattersall, 1 Russ. 22. R. v. Standley, R. & Ry. 305. R. v. Bowen, Car. & M. 149, and see R. v. Hornby et al. 1 Car. & K. 305, cor. Coltman J., or if by their presence they encourage him in the commission of it. R. v. Murphy, 6 Car. & P. 103. So, a person is said to be present aiding and abetting, who, being engaged in the same design with the person who actually commits the offence, although not actually present at the commission of it, is yet at such a convenient distance as to be able to come to the immediate assistance of his associate, if required, or to watch to prevent surprise, or the like. See Fost. 350-355. R. v. Goggerly and Whitford, R. & Ry. 343. And where a person was waiting outside of a house, to receive goods which his confederate was stealing within, he was holden to be a principal in the theft. R. v. Owen, Ry. & M. 96. So, persons present, aiding and abetting in a part of the offence, may, if the offence be completed by their confederate, be indicted as principals and therefore, where two persons with their umbrella, screened a third whilst he was breaking into a dwelling-house in the day time, and then went away, and were not seen near the place whilst the third party was committing a larceny within the house, Gaselee, J. and Gurney, B., held that they were principals as to the whole offence, namely, the breaking and entering the dwelling-house, and stealing therein. R. v. Jordan et al., 7 Car. & P. 432.

But if a man be at such a distance from the place where the offence is committed, that he could not assist in it if required, he cannot be deemed a principal; and therefore it was holden, that going towards the place where a larceny was to be committed, for the purpose of assisting in carrying off the property and assisting accordingly, did not make the party a principal in the larceny, where it appeared that he was at such a distance at the time of the felonious taking, that he could not have assisted in it. R. v. Kelly, R. & Ry. 421. So, where persons, having stolen goods from a warehouse, carried them along the street for about thirty yards, and then fetched the prisoner, who was apprised of the robbery, but not at all acting in it, and he assisted in carrying away the property;

it was holden that he was not principal but accessory merely. R. v. King, R. & Ry. 332. So, where several persons were out for the purpose of committing a felony, but, upon an alarm, ran different ways, and one of them, to avoid being taken, wounded a man who was pursuing him: it was holden that the others could not be deemed principals in this offence. R. v. White, R. & Ry. 99. So, where two persons were riding their horses violently along the road, seemingly racing, and the first of them passed a man on horseback without injuring him, but the last rode against him, threw him, and he was killed: Patteson, J. held that the first of the two could not be deemed a principal in the homicide. R. v. Martin et al., 6 Car. & P. 396.

The commitment of a principal in the second degree, may either be in the ordinary form, as a principal in the first degree; or if the principal in the first degree be committed with him, then after describing the offence of the principal in the first degree, the offence of the abettor may be described in the same warrant, thus: And that the said C. D. feloniously was then and there present, feloniously aiding, abetting and assisting the said A. B. to do and commit the said felony. And you the said keeper, &c.

Accessory before the fact.] An accessory before the fact to a felony, is one who counsels, incites, moves, procures, hires or commands another to commit it, but is not himself present aiding or abetting in the commission of it. R. v. Gordon, 1 Leach, 515, East, Pl. C. 352; and see R. v. Tuckwell et al., 1 Car. & M. 215. There cannot consequently be an accessory before the fact to manslaughter; for that offence, in its nature, cannot be premeditated. 1 Hale, 616. The doctrine as to accessories, also, is confined entirely to felonies; for in treason and misdemeanors, those who, by counsel or incitement, &c. would be accessory before the fact in felony, are deemed principals, and prosecuted and punished accordingly. See R. v. Clayton et al., 1 Car. & K. 128. It is not necessary in order to constitute the offence of accessory, that there should be any direct communication between him and the principal; the procurement may be through the intervention of an agent. R. v. Cooper, 5 Car. & P. 534. And if managed through an agent, it is not necessary that the principal should be named by the accessory; if the latter desire the agent to procure some person to commit the offence, without naming any, and the agent accordingly procure a person, wholly unknown to the accessory, to commit it, it will be sufficient to constitute the offence of accessory before the fact. Id. If the principal felon be unknown, the warrant of commitment of the accessory should be accordingly; and if it afterwards turn out that he is known,

or even was so at the time, this will not affect the validity of the warrant. But if an indictment against an accessory before the fact, state the principal to be unknown, and it turn out in evidence that he is known, this will be a fatal variance, and the defendant must be acquitted. R. v. Walker, 3 Camp. 264. See R. v. Bush, R. & Ry. 372.

The accessory before the fact may be tried either with the principal or after his conviction, or he may be tried as for a substantive felony, whether the principal have been convicted or be amenable to justice or not. 7 G. 4, c. 64, s. 9. He is usually punishable in the same manner as a principal; but this of course depends upon the statute creating or punishing the offence. He is so punishable in all offences within stat. 7 & 8 G. 4, c. 29, (the Larceny Act,) by sect. 61; in all offences within stat. 7 & 8 G. 4, c. 30, (Malicious Injuries,) by sect. 26; in all offences against stat. 11 G. 4 & 1 W. 4, c. 66, (the Forgery Act,) by sect. 25; and in all offences against stat. 2 W. 4, c. 34, (Coin,) by sect. 18. In some cases, however, a less punishment is assigned to him.

It may be necessary to add, that a man cannot be committed or indicted as accessory before the fact to a felony, unless it be proved that the felony has been actually committed. But soliciting or inciting a person to commit a felony, although the felony be not afterwards in fact committed, is a misdemeanor at common law, R. v. Higgins, 2 East, 5, punishable with fine or imprisonment, or both, and the party may be committed and indicted for it.

Commitment with principal:-After describing the offence of the principal, state that of the accessory thus: "And that the said C. D., before the said felony was so committed as aforesaid, did feloniously [and maliciously] incite, move, procure, counsel, and command the said A. B. to do and commit the said felony. And you the said keeper," &c.

Commitment without the principal:-" For that one [or some person unknown] on at —, did feloniously," &c., describing the offence as in a commitment of the principal, "and that the said C. D., before the said felony was so committed, did feloniously and maliciously incite, move, procure, counsel and command the said [A. B. or person unknown] to do and commit the said felony. And you the said keeper," &c.

Accessory after the fact.] After a felony has been committed, if any person receive, harbour, or assist the principal felon, knowing him to have committed the felony, he is deemed an accessory after the fact. And this extends as well to the offence of manslaughter, as to other felonies. R. v. Greenacre, 8 Car. But it must be considered as having reference to

& P. 35.

felony only; the same receipt, &c., which in felony will make a man accessory after the fact, will, in treason, make the party a principal traitor, 1 Hale, 238, but in misdemeanors is not punishable at all. 1 Hale, 613.

An accessory after the fact to felony, may be tried either in the county where he has been accessory, or in that in which the original felony was committed. 7 G. 4, c. 64, s. 10. He may be tried either with the principal, or after the principal has been convicted; it is not necessary however that the principal should be attainted, to enable the prosecutor to proceed against the accessory after the fact. Id. s. 11. The offence is a felony; but is punishable with much less severity than that of the principal or the accessory before the fact. In felonies within stat. 7 & 8 G. 4, c. 29, (the Larceny Act,) accessories after the fact are punishable with imprisonment, with or without hard labour, for any term not exceeding two years, by sect. 61; and the same in felonies, within stat. 7 & 8 G. 4, c. 30, (Malicious injuries,) by sect. 26; in felonies within stat. 9 G. 4, c. 31, (Offences against the Person,) by sect. 31; in felonies within stat. 11 G. 4 & 1 W. 4, c. 66, (Forgery,) by sect. 25; and in felonies within stat. 2 W. 4, c. 32, (Coin,) by sect. 18.

Commitment with the principal:-After describing the offence of the principal, state that of the accessory thus:"And that the said C. D. well knowing the said A. B. to have committed the felony aforesaid, did afterwards on ———, at feloniously receive, harbour, and maintain the said A. B. And you the said keeper," &c.

Commitment without the principal:-" For that one A. B. [or some person unknown] on ———, at, did feloniously," &c., describing the offence, as in a commitment of the principal; "And that the said C. D., well knowing the said A. B. to have committed the felony aforesaid, did afterwards on ——, at , feloniously receive, harbour, and maintain the said A. B. And you the said keeper," &c.

ACCUSING OF CRIME.

Threatening to accuse, &c., with intent to extort.] If any person shall accuse, or threaten to accuse, or shall knowingly send or deliver any letter or writing accusing or threatening to accuse any person of any crime punishable by law with death, transportation, or pillory, or of any assault with intent to com