As to the attempt to shoot, and as to stabbing, cutting, and wounding, see ante, p. 146. A wound inflicted by biting, has been holden not to be within the statute, that being intended to apply only to a wounding by some instrument, and not to a wounding by the teeth or hands or the like. R. v. Harris, 7 Car. & P. 446. But where a man struck another with an air-gun on the hat, with great force, so that the hat inflicted a contused wound upon the head, the judges held this to be a wounding within the meaning of the statute. R. v. Sheard, 7 Car. & Payne, 846. It is generally understood, that to constitute a wounding, the skin must be broken; and in one case, three of the judges held that, supposing it to be so, a breaking of the cuticle, or outer skin, would not be sufficient; the inner as well as the outer skin must be broken. R. v. M'Loughlin, 8 Car. & P. 635. But where it appeared that the prisoner hit the prosecutor a blow with a hammer in the face, which had the effect of breaking the jaw in two places, and the skin was broken internally, but not externally: Lord Denman, C. J., and Park, J. held this to be a wounding within the meaning of the Act. R. v. Leonard Smith, 8 Car. & P. 173. As to the intent, it may be inferred from the conduct or expressions of the party, before or at the time of his committing the act, or afterwards from the nature of the wound itself; but the latter is not in all cases to be depended upon as a test of the intent, for the wound may be slight, and yet the intent of the party inflicting it evidently such as is mentioned in the statute. R. v. Hunt, Russ. 93. Cutting a female child's private parts, for the purpose of enlarging them, has been holden to be a grievous bodily harm within the meaning of the statute, and to have been done with that intent, although the hymen was not injured, and the wound not deep or dangerous. R. v. Cox, R. & Ry. 362. Where the prisoner wounded the prosecutor, in an attempt to rob him, and was indicted on this Act, Coleridge, J. told the jury that if they thought that the wound was inflicted with intent to do the prosecutor some grievous bodily harm, in order to effectuate the purpose of robbing him, they should find him guilty; and he was found guilty accordingly. R. v. Bowen, 1 Car. & M. 149. As to what apprehension is lawful, that subject has been already treated of, under the title "arrest," ante, p. 127, and see R. v. Hems, 7 Car. & P. 312. R. v. Dyson, 1 Stark. 246. R. v. Ricketts, 3 Camp. 68. R. v. Taylor, 7 Car. & P. 266. R. v. Whalley, Id. 245. Malice is also made an ingredient in this offence, by the words of the statute. But this must not be understood to mean a preconceived malice against the individual, which, if death had ensued, would have rendered the offence murder, but that kind of malice which may be inferred from the party's purposely committing the offence, with any one of the intents stated in the statute, and not in the necessary defence of his person or property. R. v. Griffiths, 8 Car. & P. 248. See Arch. Cr. St. 30, 31. Also, if a man shoot at or cut A., imagining that he is doing so to B., and out of malice to B., he may be stated to have done so with intent to maim or disable A., and the facts will be considered as proving that statement. R. v. Hunt, Ry. & M. 93. Commitment same as that for stabbing, shooting, &c., ante, p. 146, but stating the intent thus: with intent thereby then and there [to maim the said A. B. or to disfigure, or disable, or to do some grievous bodily harm to the said A. B., or to resist and prevent the lawful apprehensim and detainer of him the said C. D., or of one E. F., as the case may be;] against the form of the statute in such case made and provided. And you the said keeper, &c. As to shooting at vessels or boats belonging to the navy or revenue, see post, tit. " Smuggling." Doing bodily injury, by explosive substances or corrosive liquids.] "Whosoever shall unlawfully and maliciously send or deliver to, or cause to be taken or received by any person, any explosive substance, or any other dangerous or noxious thing, or shall cast or throw upon or otherwise apply to any person any corrosive fluid or other destructive matter, with intent, in any of the cases aforesaid, to burn, maim, disfigure, or disable any person, or to do some grievous bodily harm to any person, and whereby, in any of the cases aforesaid, any person shall be burnt, maimed, disfigured or disabled, or receive some other grievous bodily harm,"-shall be guilty of felony, and be transported for life, or not less than 15 years, or imprisoned, with or without hard labour, for not more than three years. 1 Vict. c. 85, s. 5. This offence of sending explosive substances to persons, for the purpose of doing them some bodily injury by the explosion, was holden not to be an attempt to discharge loaded arms, within the repealed clause of stat. 9 G. 4, c. 31, on that subject; R. v. Mountford, 7 Car. & P. 242; nor is it within the above clause of this statute, unless the party be actually burnt or otherwise injured by it; but it would evidently be indictable as a misdemeanor at common law, as an attempt to commit a felony. If sent to A. and it come into the hands of B., and injure him, it will be an offence within the Act; and it may be stated to have been sent to B., with intent to injure him. See R. v. Hunt, supra. As to throwing corrosive fluids, &c.: the doing so, with intent to spoil or burn the clothes of any person, was formerly made felony by stat. 6 G. 1, c. 23, s. 11, (now repealed by stat. 7 G. 4, c. 64, s. 32;) and on that statute it was holden, that if the act were done for the purpose of injuring the person and not the clothes of the party, it was not a case within the meaning of it. R. v. Williams, 1 Leach, 529. And as under this Act, the offence must be committed with intent to injure the person, not the clothes of the party, if a man, intending to spoil the clothes only, also in doing so injure the person of the party, it is probable that it would not be deemed an offence within this Act, unless it appear clearly that the necessary or very probable consequence of attempting thus to injure the clothes, would be attended with an injury to the person also. If, on the other hand, it appear clearly that the offender intended to injure the person, but succeeded only to the extent of injuring the clothes, it is probable that he might be indicted for it, as for an attempt to commit a felony, which is a misdemeanor at common law. Commitment for sending explosive substances, &c. :-On at - -, unlawfully, maliciously and feloniously did send to one A. B. [two drachms weight of a certain explosive substance called here describe the thing sent,] with intent thereby then and there to burn [or as the case may be] him the said A. B., and whereby the said A. B. was then and there grievously burnt; against the form of the statute in such case made and provided. And you the said keeper, &c. Commitment for throwing corrosive fluids:-On at unlawfully, maliciously and feloniously did cast and throw upon one A. B., half a pint of a certain corrosive fluid and destructive matter called oil of vitriol, with intent thereby then and there to burn [or as the case may be] him the said A. B., and whereby he the said A. B. was then and there grievously burnt; against the form of the statute in such case made and provided. And you the said keeper, &c. ATTEMPTS TO COMMIT OTHER OFFENCES. All attempts to commit a felony, not specially provided for and made punishable by some particular statute, are punishable as misdemeanors at common law, whether committed with force or otherwise; see R. v. Higgins, 2 East, 5; and in like manner, every attempt to commit a misdemeanor, either at common law or created by statute, is itself a misdemeanor at common law. R. v. - R. & Ry. 107, per Le Blanc, J. R. v. Butler, 6 Car. & P. 368, per Patteson, J. R. v. Wm. Roderick, 7 Car. & P. 795, cor. Parke, B. R. v. Ball, 1 Car. & M. 249. The punishment is by fine or imprisonment, or both; except as to assaults, with intent to commit a felony, which are punishable as stated, ante, p. 142. Commitment:-On —, at -, did unlawfully attempt and endeavour to [&c. stating the felony or misdemeanor attempted,] by then and there [&c. stating the act done.] And you the said keeper, &c. ATTORNEY. In what cases permitted to act. At sessions.] Attornies may in all cases act as such at sessions. But it is provided by stat. 6 & 7 Vict. c. 73, s. 2, that no person shall act as an attorney at the general or quarter sessions, or before any justice or justices, unless he be admitted in one of the courts at Westminster, and, by stat. 37 G. 3, c. 90, s. 30, unless he have obtained his annual certificate, in the same manner as is necessary to enable him to act as attorney in the courts at Westminster. See 1 Arch. Pr. 41, n. Arch. Pr. Q. Sess. 19. Before justices out of sessions.] In all cases of summary conviction " persons accused shall be admitted to make their full answer and defence, and to have all witnesses examined and cross-examined, by counsel or attorney." 6 & 7 W. 4, c. 114, 8. 2. But in all other cases before justices out of sessions, attornies are allowed to take part in the proceedings, as a matter of courtesy only; they cannot insist upon it as a right. Where a person is charged before magistrates with a felony or misdemeanor, and they inquire into the case for the purpose of committing him for trial or discharging him, the room in which they sit upon such an occasion is not in law an open court; and neither an attorney, nor any other of the public, has a right to be present, without the consent of the magistrates; Cox v. Coleridge, 1 B. & C. 37; or, if any attorney be permitted to be present, he has no right to take any part in the proceedings, if the magistrates object to it. Id. And the same, in cases of applications for warrants against persons not in custody. R. v. Borron, 3 B. & Ald. 43. But although this is the strict rule of law upon the subject, yet, in practice, magistrates not only allow attornies to be present, and to act for their clients, prosecutors, or defendants, but are in general happy to have the attendance of respectable professional gentlemen in cases before them, who, from their business habits, and their knowledge of the law of evidence, may be able to simplify a case and render it intelligible, which in the hands of the parties themselves would appear complex and difficult. Their Duties. As to commitments.] When an attorney is engaged by a prosecutor, to procure the commitment for trial of a person charged with a felony or misdemeanor, the case requires as much management and attention as if he were actually preparing it for trial. As the depositions which may be taken before the magistrate will be laid before the judge, or chairman of the quarter sessions, before whom the offender will be tried, in precisely the manner in which they are taken, and whether they make for or against the prosecution, if they be incomplete, or raise any doubt in the case, it is often difficult entirely to erase from the judge's mind the impression the depositions may have made, although the case be made more complete by additional evidence at the trial. In cases of any importance, therefore, the attorney should first collect all the evidence he can procure upon the subject; he should then examine the witnesses himself, and take minutes of their evidence, letting each tell his own story, but occasionally putting such questions as may be necessary to explain any part of the evidence, or, generally, of eliciting the truth. He should then arrange his evidence, in the order in which it will be best to lay it before the magistrates; and in this some tact, and often a good deal of nicety, are requisite. If there be direct evidence of the defendant's having committed the offence, that fact should be first proved, and then the facts or circumstances, from which intent or guilty knowledge (if either form an ingredient in the offence) may be inferred, may follow. But if the fact of the defendant's guilt is to be made out by circumstantial evidence, the fact of the offence having been committed by some person should first be proved, and then the circumstances from which it is to be inferred that it was committed by the defendant; and in laying these latter circumstances before the magistrate or a jury, often much will depend even on the order in which they are detailed. In attending before magistrates on behalf of a prisoner, the principal duty of an attorney is to watch and take notes of the evidence against his client, and to prevent him from saying any thing which may prejudice his case. If he be furnished with evidence, either that the offence charged was not in fact committed, or not committed by the defendant, or that the defendant was legally justified in what he did, it may then |