disbelief can tell the truth now. If it can be shown that we as a people accept as true the statements of such disbelievers, certainly other men are not necessarily false witnesses because of such disbelief. All of us know that the ancients had no faith in a reward or punishment after death, or, if so, the faith was too vague to restrain or encourage; and yet, throughout Christendom, throughout civilization, we call Herodotus, Tacitus, Cæsar, Xenophon, Sallust, and hosts of others, to tell us the facts about which they speak. We weigh their evidence, when given, just as we do the testimony of Froissart, Guizot, Robertstone, and others. Nay, we go further, and call Gibbon and Hume to give testimony. Is it not manifest, therefore, that the little two by six rule which says an unbeliever cannot speak the truth is itself false? The individual who fills the bench may be convinced by the words and writings of a disbeliever, but he must judicially declare that such a person is unworthy of belief. Thus the law holds back while mankind moves forward to the broad plain of toleration.

The question first came before our Supreme Court in 1807, in the case of State v. Cooper. The opinion was delivered by Justice Overton; and, with that brevity which it is to be regretted has disappeared, the court affirms the proposition that a witness who does not believe in a future state of reward and punishment is incompetent. There is no discussion of the religious belief underlying the legal conclusion. The court contents itself with merely announcing that our State will follow the settled English precedent. State v. Cooper, 2 Overton, 96.

The matter is again before the court in 1 Swan, 412, Judge McKinney delivering the opinion. The substance of this opinion is that a witness who has expressed a disbelief in a future state of reward and punishment, who will also say that he believes in God and the Bible, is competent. The language of the witness was that he "did not believe in a state of future rewards and punishments after death, and that the only punishment inflicted for wrongs in this life was the pangs of conscience. But he believed in the existence of a God. He also believed the Bible." Judge McKinney says, as to this language: "The statement of the witness as respects a future state of rewards and punishments is neither very intelligible.

nor consistent. As we understand it, however, he means not to disavow, but, on the contrary, distinctly to affirm his belief in such a future state, but entertains an opinion different from many persons as to the nature of the punishment-an opinion in which he is by no means singular." I may be pardoned, perhaps, when I say, in passing, that, if there is an inconsistency here, it is in the language of the opinion. Clearly, the learned judge was seeking to evade the rule, because nothing could be more distinct than the witness' statement that punishment ceased with death.

The next time that the matter is adjudicated is in 1 Head, 125. In this case Judge McKinney again delivers the opinion of the court. There is nothing noticeable in the opinion other than the holding-which has since been followed-that the witness himself may be interrogated as to his belief, and his competency thus determined.

The opinion by Chief Justice Nicholson in 2 Heiskell, 656, merely affirms this 1 Head case, and repeats the holding that the witness himself is to be the judge of his own competency; or, rather, he may state what he believes, and from his statement the court may conclude as to his competency.

The last decision which I have been able to find in our State is by Judge Freeman, in 5 Heiskell, 88. There the court holds that it is error to ask the witness himself the question as to what is his religious belief, but states that such belief may be proven by declarations made by the witness when he is not on the stand. We travel, it seems, therefore, in the circle that, while it is error to let the witness say in court what he believes, it is not error to prove in court what the witness said out of it.

Judge Freeman also takes occasion to very severely reflect upon that class of beings who are wanting in Christian faith. His opinion has much vigor in its denunciation of these creatures; and his own conviction seems to be firm that a want of faith is synonymous with a want of morality.

It is not intended in this paper to offer excuses for skepticism, or to enter upon any religious discussion. I wish to confine myself to the point that, for the ends of justice, it is well that all persons not convicted of certain crimes should be permitted to testify, leaving to the jury who hears them, or to the court empowered to pass upon the facts, what weight to attach

to the evidence given. In taking the position that this should be our law, I am in harmony with the progress we have made in the last fifty years in this direction. It has been only a brief period of time since parties in civil actions were made competent witnesses. Parties in criminal suits have only become competent in the last five years. The tendency is, therefore, to enlarge the class of those who may testify. We have now, as a condition of our law, that the professional gambler, engaged in daily law-breaking, engaged in immoral pursuits, is a competent witness; that the prostitute, who leads a life of shame, immorality, and law-breaking, is a competent witness; that the murderer, convicted upon judicial investigation, is a competent witness; that the wife-beater, who strikes down the partner of his joys and sorrows in a brutal, drunken fit, is a competent witness; that he who commits treason against his country is a competent witness; and that many others of immoral nature or convicted of crimes, are competent witnesses. And yet, he who has the honesty to take upon himself the opprobrium of saying that he does not believe in the religion of those about him, and thinks-bear it in mind, merely conjectures that there is not a state of future reward and punishment, though his life may be blameless, his conduct upright, is an incompetent witness in our courts of justice. His may have been the only human eye that saw a wrong; his the only human lips to tell of that wrong, and thus permit society to right itself; and yet, because our ancestors burned women for witches, put men in the stocks for skepticism, and-to the shame of that time be it said-burned at the stake those who differed with them about theological dogmas, we of this day chain the car of progress to the temple of their superstitious precedent, and hold it fast bound.

This rule of exclusion is not founded on the religion taught by our Saviour. Not in his life; not in his triumphant and beautiful death; not in the teachings which came from the lips that were mortal while they spoke but were divine in what they said, do we find the bigoted doctrine that the courts now uphold. Neither is the rule founded in that justice which man owes to his fellow-man; nor should it longer receive the sanction of that which has been called "the perfection of human reason."

ANNUAL ADDRESS: IS THE TRUST DANGEROUS?

HORACE H. LURTON.

If that feature of utilitarian advantage most characterizing a people or an age be fitly regarded as designating and distinguishing an era, then this should be denominated the "corporate age." This invention of the wit of man has been most clearly and accurately defined by that greatest of all jurists, Chief Justice Marshall, in these words: "A corporation is an artificial being, invisible, intangible, and existing only in contemplation of law. Being the mere creature of law, it possesses only those properties which the charter of its creation confers upon it, either expressly or incidental to its very existence." Subsequently he added that "the great object of an incorporation is to bestow the character and properties of individuality on a collective and changing body of men."

The invention of private corporations has been attributed by Sir Wm. Blackstone to Numa Pompilius. But it is clear from historical investigation that the idea was borrowed by the Romans from the Greeks, as was the case with much of Roman literature, philosophy, and art, as well as jurisprudence. The powers conferred by English and American law upon these artificial creations bear very strong resemblances to those under the civil law. In the department of corporation law the common law has been immensely enriched by what it has borrowed from the earlier code. The corporation, under the civil law, rested under one very marked disability, differentiating it from the modern institution in this: in case of insolvency the corporators were personally liable for debts; and in that respect it more nearly resembled the association known as a co-partnership.

The technical term in the Roman law describing this legal entity was collegium or universitas, from whence came our words college and university. A collegium or corpus, under that law,

must have consisted of at least three persons, termed corporati. Several classes. of collegia are to be distinguished under the Roman law, corresponding to similar divisions under modern law: (1) Municipal or public governing bodies. (2) Religious societies. (3) Trading associations with corporate powers and privileges.

Down to a very late date, historically speaking, the corporations known to English law were chiefly municipal, educational, and eleemosynary. Prior to the beginning of this century, the instances of strictly private business incorporations, as distinguished from those having some public function, were exceedingly rare; and until a period within the memory of most of us, some solemn, distinct act of legislative power was necessary to the creation of any kind of corporation. The manifest convenience of the power of acting as a unit, the quality of immortality, and the non-liability of the corporators beyond a fixed proportion of the capital, has led to the most wonderful facilities for the speedy and cheap organization of such bodies, and a corresponding increase in the number of these institutions. It may be interesting to notice, in this connection, a few facts pertaining to the history of corporations for private profit in this State.

The first corporations for profit ever created by this State were authorized by the Legislature of 1801. The first charter granted was to the "Nollichucky River Company," a corporation created for clearing out obstructions and improving the navigation of the Nollichucky River. The capital was fixed at $12,000, in shares of $10 each; and it was allowed to establish three "custom-houses" at different points for the purpose of collecting tolls. Subsequent legislation indicates that this company was never organized, the tolls from the "customhouses" not proving sufficient inducement.

Four days later a charter was granted to the "Cumberland Turnpike Company," for the purpose of improving the road over the Cumberland Mountains. This act, curiously enough, empowered the Governor to "erect and incorporate, under his hand and seal, any number of persons not exceeding five, who shall be known by the title and style of the Cumberland Turnpike Company," etc. The doctrine that a charter was a con