DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE.

partment records

1347. Copies of any books, records, papers, or documents Copies of De. In any of the Executive Departments, authenticated under and papers.

Sept. 15, 1789, c. 14, s. 5, v. 1, p. When such an accused person elects 69; Feb 22, 1849, U.S.v. Brown, 40 c. 61, s. 3, v. 9, p.

guilt. U. S. r. Pendergrast, 32 Fed. Rep., 198.
to testify in his own behalf, his testimony may be impeached
Fed. Rep., 437.

An accused person can not testify in his own behalf if incompetent to testify as a witness for any cause. U. S. r. Hollis, 43 Fed. Rep.. 248

Pardon restores competency to testify. Logan U.S, 144 U. S., 263; Boyd v. U. S., 142 U. S., 450.

If he waives his privilege as to one act, he does so fully in relation to that act. But he does not thereby waive us privilege of refusing to reveal other acts, wholly unconnected with the act of which he has spoken, even though they be material to the issue. Low r. Mitchell, 18 Me., 372: Tillson Bowley 8 Greenl., 163.

Where a witness has voluntarily answered as to material criminating facts, it is held with uniformity that he can not then stop short and refuse further explanation, but must disclose fully what he has attempted to relate. This view is adopted by the text writers, and is very well explained in several of the authorities, where the 1 Starkie Evid (9th Am. ed.); Roscoes Crim. principle is laid down and enforced.

Ev., 174; 1 Greenl., sec. 451, 2 Phill. Ev., 935, 2 Russ. Cr. 931, Coburn v. Odell, 10
Foster, 540; State v. K, 4 N. H., 562; State Foster, 3 Foster, 348; Foster v. Pierce,
11 Cush., 437, Brown e. Brown, 5 Mass 320; Amherst v Hollis, 9 N. H., 107; Low
Willson, 12 Vt, 491; People v Lohmann, 2
r. Mitchell, 18 Me., 372, Chamberlain e
Barb, S C. 216; Norfolk v. Gaylord. 28 Conn, 309,

The testimony of an accused party is competent only when presented as authorized by the act of March 16, 1878, chapter 37, viz, when the party himself requests to be admitted to testify. But such testimony is not excepted from the ordinary rules governing the admissibility of evidence, nor from the application of the usual tests of cross-examination rebuttal, etc. (Dig. Opin. J. A. Gen., p. 398 par. 14.) See, also, MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, p. 40, par. 2.

It was heretofore an established rule that accused parties could not legally testify as witnesses before military courts. (a) But now, by the act of March 16, 1878 chapter 37. it is expressly provided that at trials, not only before the courts of the United States, but before courts martial and courts of inquiry, the person charged shall, at It is added: "And his own request, but not otherwise be a competent witness.

his failure to make such request shall not create any presumption against him."
But parties testifying under this act have no exceptional status or privileges; they
must take the stand and be subject to cross-examination like other witnesses. The
submission by the accused of a sworn written statement is not a legitimate exercise
of the authority to testify conferred by the statute, and such a statement should not
(Ibid., 749, par. 2.)
be admitted in evidence by the court. (b)

COMPETENCY OF WITNESSES.

A wife is not a competent witness for or against a person accused of crime, on his trial. Comment on her absence by the district attorney held to be reversible error. Graves v. U. S. 150 U. S., 118: U. S. v. Jones, 32 Fed. Rep., 569.

It has been uniformly held that the wife of a person on trial before a court-martial could not properly be admitted as a witness for or against him; (c) and the statute The wife, however, authorizing accused parties to testify does not affect this rule.

of an officer or soldier may be admitted to testify in his case before a court of inquiry, the proceeding before such a body not being a trial, but an investigation merely. Where a court-martial refused to admit in evidence (as being incompetent) the testimony of the wife of the prosecuting witness, held that its action was entirely erroneous, no legal objection existing to the competency of such a person. (Dig. Opin. J. A. Gen., 750, par. 3.) See, also, MANUAL FOR COURTS MARTIAL, p. 40. par. 3. An insane person is no more competent as a witness before a court-martial than at common law. Testimony admitted of a person shown to be insane should be stricken out on motion made. (Dig. Opin. J. A. Gen., 399, par. 23.)

An objection, A person who is insane at the time is incompetent as a witness. however, to a witness on account of alleged insanity will not properly be allowed, unless sustained by clear proof, a man being always presumed to be sane till proven to be otherwise. (Ibid., 751, par. 8.)

A wife is not a competent witness to prove a charge of failing to support her, for which her husband is on trial. (Ibid., 329. par. 21.)

It is no objection to the competency of a witness that he is the officer upon whom will devolve the duty of reviewing authority when the proceedings are terminated. (Ibid. 751. par. 6.)

It is no objection to the competency of a witness that his name is not on the list of The prosecution is not obliged to witnesses appended to the charges when served. furnish any list of witnesses, nor, where one is furnished, to confine itself to the

a See G. C. M. O. 3, H. Q. A., 1870, in which is incorporated an opinion of the JudgeAdvocate-General on the subject.

bSee the general orders cited in the note to "Evidence"-a co-conspirator is a competent witness upon the trial of an indictment for conspiracy. U.S. v. Sacia, 2 Fed. Rep., 754. The evidence of an accomplice, though uncorroborated, is to be considered for what it is worth. U. S. r. Hemming, 18 ibid., 907.

Nor will the testimony of the wife of an accused be admissible in favor of or against a party jointly charged with him, where her testimony will be material to the merits of the question of the guilt or innocence of her husband. See Territory v. Paul, 2 Montana, 314.

347; May 31, 1854, c. 60, s. 2, v. 10, p.

297.

Sec. 882, R. S.

witnesses thus specified. The fact that material testimony is given by an unexpected witness may indeed constitute ground for an application by the accused (under article 93) for further time for the preparation of his defense (Ibid. par 73 The fact that a party is a publie enemy of the United States, or has engaged in gry ing aid to the enemy, does not affect the competency of his testimony as a witness before a court-martial. Where testifying, however, in time of war, either in favor of a person in the enemy's service or an ally of or sympathizer with the enemy, or against a Federal officer or soldier, his statements (like those of an accomplice) are ordinarily to be received with caution unless corroborated. The fact that a party is under a political disability is not one which goes to his competency if offered as a witness. So the fact that a witness has been convicted of desertion may impair his credibility, but can not affect his competency. (Ibid., 397, par.12.)

Desertion is not a felony and does not render a witness incompetent at common law or before a court-martial. Nor does the loss of citizenship upon conviction of desertion, under sections 1996 and 1998, Revised Statutes, have such effect, the competency of a witness not depending upon his citizenship. A pardon of a person thus convicted would not therefore add to his competency. But where it was proposed to introduce such a person as a material witness for the prosecution in an important case, advised that it would be desirable to remit the unexecuted portion of his sentence, if any. (Ibid., 399. par. 24.)

Where a conviction (of rape) rested mainly on the testimony of the victim, a child of 8 years of age, held that the competency of the witness was doubtful, and that the trial should have been suspended and the child instructed. (a) Where a courtmartial received the testimony of a female child of 34 years without swearing her, held, that it had wholly exceeded its authority, unsworn testimony being entirely incompetent in any case. (Ibid., 399, par. 22.)

The president or any member of a court-martial, as also the judge-advocate, may legally give testimony before the court. That the court, at the time of a member's testifying, is composed of but five members will not affect the validity of the proceedings, since in so testifying he does not cease to be a member. It is in general, however, most undesirable that the judge-advocate, and still more that a member, should appear in the capacity of a witness, except perhaps where the evidence to be given relates simply to the good character or record of the accused. (Ibid., p. 750, par. 5.)

THE RULES OF EVIDENCE-MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS.

Courts-martial, in the absence of any specific statutory rules, are in general gov erned by the rules of evidence of the common law. (Dig. Opin. J. A. Gen., 398. par. 16.) Courts martial should in general follow, so far as apposite to military cases the rules of evidence observed by the civil courts, and especially the courts of the United States, in criminal cases. (b) They are not bound, however, by any statute in this particular, and it is thus open to them, in the interests of justice, to apply these rules with more indulgence than the civil courts to allow, for example, more latitude in the introduction of testimony and in the examination and cross-examination of witnesses than is commonly permitted by the latter tribunals. In such particulars, as persons on trial by corts-martial are ordinarily not versed in legal science or practice, a liberal course should in general be pursued, and an over technicality be avoided. (c) (Ibid. 393, par. 1.)

The law by which the admissibility of testimony in criminal cases in the courts of the United States must be determined is the law of the State, as it was when these courts were established by the judiciary act of 1789. They have uniformly acted upon this construction of the judiciary act of 1789 and the crimes act of 1790, and it has thus been sanctioned by a practice of sixty years. U.S. r. Reid, 12 How., 361, 363, 366; Logan. U. S., 144 U. S.. 263, 300.

How applied. The rules of evidence should be applied by military courts irrespective of the rank of the person to be affected. Thus a witness for the prosecution, whatever be his rank or office, may always be asked, on cross-examination, whether he has not expressed animosity toward the accused as well as whether he has not on a previous occasion made a statement contradictory to or materially different from that embraced in his testimony. Such questions are admissible by the established law of evidence, and imply no disrespect to the witness, nor can the witness properly decline to answer them on the ground that it is disrespectful to him thus to attempt to discredit him. (d) (Ibid., par. 2.)

Character.-Evidence of the good character, record, and services of the accused as an officer or soldier is admissible in all military cases without distinction-in cases where the sentence is mandatory as well as those where it is discretionary, upon conviction. For, where such evidence can not avail to affect the measure of punishment, it may yet form the basis of a recommendation by the members of the court, or induce favorable action by the reviewing officer whose approval is necessary to the execution of the sentence. Where such evidence is introduced, the prosecution may offer counter testimony, but it is an established rule of evidence that the prosecution can not attack the character of the accused till the latter has introduced evidence to sustain it, and has thus put it in issue. (Ibid., 394, par. 4.)

It is in general competent, on trials by court-martial, for the accused to put in evidence any facts going to extenuate the offense and reduce the punishment, as the fact that he has been held in arrest or confinement an unusual period before trial, the fact that he has already been subjected to punishment or special discipline

a1 Greenleaf on Evidence, section 367.

b See 3 Greenl. Ev, sec. 476; Lebanon r. Heath, 47 N. Hamp., 359; People v. Van Allen, 55 N. York, 39: 2 Opin. Att. Gen., 343; Grant e. Gould, 2 H. Black., 87; 1 McArthur, 47: Harcourt, 76: De Hart, 334; O'Brien, 169; G. O. 51, Middle Department, 1865; G. C. M. O. 69, Department of Texas, 1879; G. C. M. O. 3, 52, Department of the East, 1880.

c Compare the views expressed in G. C. M. O. 32, War Department, 1872; G. C. M. O. 23, Department of Texas, 1873; G. C. M. O. 60, Department of California, 1873. d See opinion of the Judge Advocate-General, as adopted by the President, in G. C. M. O. 66, Headquarters of Army, 1879; and compare remarks of reviewing officers, in G. O. 11, Department of California, 1865; G. C. M. O. 31, Department of Dakota, 1869; G. C. M. O. 8, Fourth Military District, 1867.

on account of his offense, the fact that his act was in a measure sanctioned by the act or practice of superior authority, etc. (Ibid., 398, par. 15.)

Weight of evidence. The weight of evidence does not depend upon the number of the witnesses A single witness whose statements, manner, and appearance on the stand are such as to commend him to credit and confidence, will sometimes properly outweigh several less acceptable and satisfactory witnesses. (a) But a court-martial can not properly exclude from consideration the testimony of a witness because it is diffuse and inconclusive (peculiarities which may result from embarrassment or infelicity of expression). provided it be pertinent to the issue. (Ibid., 394 par 3.) Leading questions.-In commencing the examination of a witness. it is a leading of the witness, and objectionable, to read to him the charge and specification or specifications, since he is thus instructed as to the particulars in regard to which he is to testify and which he is expected to substantiate. (b) So to read or state to him in substance the charge and ask him what he knows about it, or in terms to that effect, is loose and objectionable as encouraging irrelevant and hearsay testimony. The witness should simply be asked to state what was said and done on the occasion, etc. A witness should properly also be examined on specific interrogatories and not be called upon to make a general statement in answer to a single general question. (e) (Ibid., 394, par 5)

Opinion-Upon a trial where the offense is drunkenness or drunken conduct, charged under article 62 or drunkenness on duty, charged under article 38 it is not essential to confine the testimony to a description of the conduct and demeanor of the accused, but it is admissible to ask a witness directly if the accused "was drunk,' or for a witness to state that the accused was drunk, on the occasion or under the circumstances charged. Such a statement is not viewed by the authorities as of the class of expressions of opinion which are properly ruled out on objection unless given by experts, but as a mere statement of a matter of observation palpable to persons in general, and so proper to be given by any witness as a fact in his knowledge. (d) (Ibid., 395, par. 6.)

A statement to the effect that a person was intoxicated is not inadmissible in evidence as being an expression of an opinion. Whether a person is drunk or sober is "a fact patent to the observation of all requiring no scientific knowledge.' (e) Ibid.,) 400, par. 25.)

An officer of the Quartermaster Department was admitted by a court martial to testify as an "expert" in regard to the proper performance of his duties by a chief quartermaster of a military department. Held that such testimony was inadmis sible and should have been ruled out, the subject being one regulated by law and orders, and the witness being in no proper sense an expert (Ibid. par 26.)

Refreshing memory - Where a witness for the prosecution was permitted by a court-martial to temporarily suspend his testimony and leave the court room for the purpose of refreshing his memory as to certam dates, held that such action was irregular and the further testimony of the witness as to such dates inadmissible. By the course pursued the court and accused were prevented from knowing by what means the memory of the witness had been refreshed-whether, for instance, it may not have been refreshed by oral statements of some person or persons. (Ibid., 399, par. 19.)

Confessions. – A confession is competent evidence when free and voluntary; otherwise where made through the influence of hope and fear (f) So where an officer admitted to a superior, in writing, the commission of a military offense and promised not to repeat the same, under the well-founded hope and belief that a charge which had been preferred against him therefor would be withdrawn, held that, in case he were actually brought to trial upon such charge, the admission thus made would not properly be received in evidence against his objection. Confessions made by private soldiers to officers or noncommissioned officers, though not shown to have been made under the influence of promise or threat, should yet, in view of the military relations of the parties, be received with caution. (g) Mere silence on the part of an accused, when questioned as to his supposed offense, is not to be treated as a confession. (h) (Ibid., 397, par. 13.)

A confession that he had deserted, made by an alleged deserter to a police officer, who, on arresting him. assured him that if he told the truth he (the officer) would give ⚫ him an opportunity to escape before being delivered up to the military authorities, held clearly not admissible in evidence, as having been induced by promise of favor on the part of a person in authority. (Ibid., 399, par. 20.)

PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS.

Official communications between the beads of the Departments of the Govern ment and their subordinate officers are privileged. Were it otherwise it would be impossible for such superiors to administer effectually the public affairs with which they are intrusted. (Ibid., 398, par. 18.)

PRESUMPTION AS TO PERFORMANCE OF DUTY

The law presumes that public officers duly perform their official functions, and this presumption continues till the contrary is shown. (Ibid., 398, par. 17 )

a Compare Rudolph r. Lane, 57 Ind., 115; McCrum r. Corby, 15 Kans., 117.

b Compare G. O. 12. Department of the Missouri, 1862; G. O. 36, ibid., 1863; G. O. 29. Department of California, 1865; G. O. 67, Department of the South, 1874.

See G. C. M. O. 14, 24, Department of Dakota 1877.

d People v. Eastwood, 14 N. York, 562. Stacy r. Portland Pub. Co., 68 Mame 279; Sydleman v. Beckwith, 43 Conn., 12. State r. Huxford, 47 Iowa, 16; G. O. 42, Department of the Platte, 1871.

Lawson on Exp. and Opin. Ev., p. 473, et seq.

ƒUnited States v. Pumphreys, 1 Cranch C. C., 74: U. S. r. Hunter, ibid., 317. U S. r. Charles, 2 ibid., 76; U. S. r. Pocklington, ibid., 293; U. S. v. Nott, 1 McLean, 499; U. S. r. Cooper, 3 Qu. L. J, 42. ; Sparf and Hansen v. U. S., 156 U. S., 51.

g See G. C. M. O. 3, War Department. 1876, G. O. 54. Department of Dakota, 1867. And compare Cady v. State, 44 Miss., 332.

A See Campbell v. State, 55 Ala., 80.

Copies of records, etc., in

the seals of such Departments, respectively, shall be admitted in evidence equally with the originals thereof.1 1348. Copies of any documents, records, books, or papers office of Solicitor in the office of the Solicitor of the Treasury, certified by Feb. 22, 1849, him under the seal of his office, or, when his office is vacant, by the officer acting as Solicitor for the time, shall be evidence equally with the originals.

of the Treasury.

c. 61, s. 2, v. 9, p. 347.

Sec. 883, R. S.

Transcripts from books, etc.,

in suits against

Mar. 3, 1797, c.

512; Mar. 3,1817,

1349. When suit is brought in any case of delinquency of of the Treasury, a revenue officer, or other person accountable for public delinquents. money, a transcript from the books and proceedings of the 20, s. 1. v. 1, p. Treasury Department, certified by the Secretary or an c. 45, s. 11, v. 3. Assistant Secretary of the Treasury and authenticated 1894, s. 17, v. 28, p. under the seal of the Department, or, when the suit involves Sec. 886, R. S. the accounts of the War or Navy Departments, certified by the Auditors respectively charged with the examination of those accounts, and authenticated under the seal of the Treasury Department, shall be admitted as evidence, and

p. 367; July 31,

210.

The muster rolls on file in the War Department are official records, and copies of the same, duly certified, are primary evidence of the facts originally entered therein and not compiled from other sources, (a) subject, of course, to be rebutted by evidence that they are mistaken or incorrect. So though such rolls are evidence that the soldier was duly enlisted or mustered into the service, and is therefore duly held as a soldier they may be rebutted in this respect by proof of fraud or illegality in the enlistment or muster (on the part of the representative of the United States or otherwise), properly invalidating the proceeding and entitling the soldier to a discharge. (But that the entries in such rolls are not proof of the commission of an offense, as desertion for example, see Desertion.) (Dig. Opin. J. A. Gen., 395. par. 9.) A descriptive list is but secondary evidenco and not admissible to prove the facts recited therein. It is not a record of original entries, made by an officer under a duty imposed upon him by law or the custom of the service, but is simply a compilation of facts taken from other records. (Ibid., 401, par. 33.)

General orders issued from the War Department or headquarters of the Army may ordinarily be proved by printed official copies in the usual form. The court will, in general, properly take judicial notice of the printed order as genuine and correct. A court martial, however should not, in general, accept in evidence, if objected to, a printed or written special order (which has not been made public to the Army) without some proof of its genuineness and official character. (b) (Ibid., 396, par. 10.)

A court-martial (by subpoena duces tecum, through the judge-advocate) may summon a telegraph operator to appear before it bringing with him a certain telegraphic dispatch. But it is beyond the power of such court to require such witness, against his will, to surrender the dispatch, or a copy, to be used in evidence. (Ibid., 401, par. 35.)

In view of the embarrassment which must generally attend the proof, before a court-martial, of the sending or receipt of telegraphic messages by means of a resort, by subpoena duces tecum, to the originals in possession of the telegraph company, (e) advised that the written or printed copy, furnished by the company and received by the person to whom it is addressed should in general be admitted in evidence by a court-martial in the absence of circumstances casting a reasonable doubt upon its genuineness or correctness. But where it is necessary to prove that a telegram which was not received, or the receipt of which is demed and not proven, was actually duly sent, the operator or proper official of the company or other person cognizant of the fact of sending, should be summoned as a witness. (Ibid., p. 396, par. 11.) The enlistment paper, "the "physical examination paper, and the "outline

a But note in this connection the ruling of the supreme court of Massachusetts in the case of Hanson S. Scituate, 115 Mass., 336, that an official certificate from the Adjutant-General's Office to the effect that certain facts appeared of record in that office, but which did not purport to be a transcript from the record itself, and was therefore simply a personal statement, was not competent evidence of such facts. It has been held by the United States Supreme Court in a recent case, Evanston r. Gunn, 9 Otto, 660, that the record made by a member of the United States Signal Corps of the state of the weather and the direction and velocity of the wind on a certam day was competent evidence of the facts reported, as being in the nature of an official record kept by a public officer in the discharge of a public duty. b See a similar ruling in G. O. 121, Second Military District, 1867.

The subject of the extent of the authority of the courts to compel telegraph companies to produce original private telegrams for use in evidence is most fully treated in an essay by Henry Ritchcock, esq., on the Inviolability of Telegrams," published in the Southern Law Review for October, 1879.

the court trying the cause shall be authorized to grant judgment and award execution accordingly. And all copies of bonds, contracts, or other papers relating to, or connected with, the settlement of any account between the United States and an individual, when certified by such Auditor to be true copies of the originals on file, and authenticated under the seal of the Department, may be annexed to such transcripts, and shall have equal validity, and be entitled to the same degree of credit which would be due to the original papers if produced and authenticated in court: Provided, That where suit is brought upon a bond or other sealed instrument, and the defendant pleads "non est factum," or makes his motion to the court, verifying such plea or motion by his oath, the court may take the same into consideration, and, if it appears to be necessary for the attainment of justice, may require the production of the original bond, contract, or other paper specified in such affidavit.1

card are original writings made by officers in the performance of duty and compe tent evidence of the facts recited therein. Copies, authenticated under the seal of the War Departement, according to section 882, Revised Statutes, are equally admissible with the originals. (Ibid., 401, par. 31.)

The morning report book is an original writing. To properly admit extracts in evidence, the book should be first identified by the proper custodian, and the extracts then not merely read to the court by the witness, but copied, and the copies, properly ver.ted, attached as exhibits to the record of the court. (Ibid., par. 32.)

Copies of pay accounts (charged to have been duplicated) are admissible in evidence where the accused has by his own act placed the originals beyond the reach of process and fails to produce them in court on proper notice. So where the originals are in the hands of a person who has left the United States, so that they can not be reached, on notice to the accused to produce them, or otherwise. (Ibid., par. 34.)

To the admission in evidence of a letter written and signed by the accused (of which the introduction is contested) proof of his handwriting is necessary. Evidence of handwriting by comparison is not admissible at common law except where the standard of comparison is an acknowledged or proved genuine writing already in evidence in the case. A writing not in evidence and simply offered to be used as a standard is not admissible. (Ibid., par. 36)

At the trial, in 1894, of an officer charged with a disorder and breach of discipline which involved the killing by him of another officer, there was offered in evidence, on the part of the accused, to exhibit the character and disposition of the officer killed, a copy of a general court-martial order of 1872, setting forth certain charges alleging dishonest and unbecoming conduct, upon which the latter officer was then tried and convicted, and the findings of the court thereon. Held, that such evidence was wholly inadmissible for the purpose designed. (Ibid., 402, par. 37.)

Strictly speaking, a press copy is secondary to the original document from which it is taken. Such a copy is receivable in evidence on proof of the loss of the original. At the best, however, it continues secondary; hence it has been held that a copy can be produced from a press copy of a lost writing without producing the principal copy. Photographs and other reproductions are secondary. (1 Wharton Ev., sec. 93.)

Except by the consent of the opposite party, the testimony contained in the record of a previous trial of the same or a similar case can not properly be received in evidence on a trial by court-martial; nor can the record of a board of investigation ordered in the same case be--otherwise-so admitted. In all cases (other than that provided for by the one hundred and twenty-first article of war) testimony given upon a previous hearing, if desired to be introduced in evidence upon a trial, must (unless it be otherwise specially stipulated between the parties) be offered de novo and as original matter. (Dig. Opin. J. A. Gen., 395, par. 7.)

Affidavits taken ex parte, and not as depositions under article 91, are in no case admissible as evidence on a trial by court-martial, if objected to. (a) (Ibid., par. 8.) Waltonr. U.S., 9 Wh., 651; U.S. v. Buford, 3 Pet., 12; Smith e. U.S., 5 Pet., 292; Cox v. U. S., 6 Pet., 172; U. S. v. Jones, 8 Pet., 375: Gratiot v. U. S., 15 Pet., 336; U. S. v. Irving, 1 How, 250; Hoyt v. U. S., 10 How., 109: Bruce v. U. S., 17 How., 437; U. S. r. Edwards, 1 McLean, 467; U. S. v. Hilliard et al., 3 McLean, 324; U. S. v. Lent, 1 Paine. 417; U. S. v. Martin, 2 Paine, 68; U. S. v. Van Zandt, 2 Cr. C. C., 328; U. S. v. Griffith, 2 Cr. C. C., 336; U. S. r. Lee, 2 Cr. C. C., 462; U. S. v. Harrill, 1 McAll., 243; U. S. v. Mattison, Gilp., 44; U. S. e. Corwin, 1 Bond, 149; U. S. v. Gaussen, 19 Wall., 198.

a See G. C. M. O. 10, Headquarters Army, 1879; G. O. 21. Department of the Missouri, 1863; G. O. 17, Department of Arkansas, 1866; G. O. 19, Third Military District, 1867; G. O. 49, Department of Dakota, 1871.