where the party involved is given a fair opportunity to be heard and to present his evidence. But if an opportunity to be heard should be denied, there can be no doubt as to the right of the aggrieved party to come into the courts for the protection of his rights. And we do not believe that the District Judge meant to say that a decision must be regarded as final under such circumstances.

The law courts have a general superintending control by certiorari over all inferior tribunals acting in a judicial or quasi judicial character. And jurisdiction is not entirely taken away by the words of a statute which declares that the judgment of the inferior tribunal shall be final.

In Rex v. Moreley, 2 Burr. 1014 (1760), the statute provided "that no other court whatsoever shall intermeddle with any cause of appeal upon this act; but they shall be finally determined in the quartersessions only." An application was made to the King's Bench, Lord Mansfield presiding, for a writ of certiorari to remove several orders made by a justice of the peace, and it was claimed that the writ could not issue because of the language of the statute. But the court was unanimously of the opinion that a certiorari ought to issue, and it was said that "a certiorari does not go to try the merits of the question, but to see whether the limited jurisdictions have exceeded. their bounds." "The jurisdiction of this court," it was said, "is not taken away, unless there be express words to take it away; this is a point settled." Citing 11 Co. 64b; 4 Mod. 145; Salk. 45; 2 Hawk. P. C. 211. And see Lawton v. Commissioners, 2 Caines (N. Y.) 179 (1804); Rex v. The Justices, 3 D. & R. 35 (1823); State v. Falkinburge, 15 N. J. Law, 320, 322 (1836).

And if an individual is restrained of his liberty by a decision of an executive officer or board declared final by statute, he may nevertheless be entitled to a writ of habeas corpus upon a proper showing. Thus in Chin Yow v. United States, 208 U. S. 8, 28 Sup. Ct. 201, 52 L. Ed. 369 (1908), the Supreme Court reversed the court below, and directed a writ of habeas corpus to issue upon an application made by a Chinese person who alleged that he was a citizen of the United States and detained unlawfully under a decision or order made by the commissioner of immigration at the port of San Francisco after a hearing, which decision had been affirmed by the Department of Commerce and Labor. But in that case the petitioner alleged that he had been prevented by the officials of the commissioner from obtaining testimony, and that if he had been given a proper opportunity he could have produced overwhelming evidence that he had been born in the United States and had departed to China on a temporary visit.

* * *

There can be no doubt, therefore, that under the Conscription Act, where a board has denied a full and fair hearing to an individual claiming exemption from military service, he might, if restrained of his liberty, sue out a writ of habeas corpus and obtain his liberty.

4. But whatever remedy the complainant may have or not have, there can be no doubt that he is not entitled to the relief he asks in his bill of complaint. It has heretofore been laid down by the textwriters and the courts as beyond the scope of the powers of a court of equity to enforce mere personal rights as distinguished from prop

erty rights. This, it need not be said, has not been due to the fact that equity regarded rights of property as more sacred than rights of the person. But the reason for it lies in the fact that equity affords no remedy where there is a full and adequate remedy at law, and that the ordinary process of the law courts are fully adequate for the redress of wrongs to the person. * * *

In Green v. Mills, 69 Fed. 852, 16 C. C. A. 516, 30 L. R. A. 90 (1895), a case in the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, Chief Justice Fuller, sitting as a Circuit Judge and writing the opinion, it was held that a court of equity had no jurisdiction of a bill seeking to enjoin a county supervisor of registration from performing the duties prescribed by the state registration laws, on the ground that such laws were unconstitutional and operated to deprive the plaintiff and others of their right to vote. In the course of his opinion the Chief Justice said:

"It is well settled that a court of chancery is conversant only with matters of property and the maintenance of civil rights. The court has no jurisdiction in matters of a political nature, nor to interfere with the duties of any department of government, unless under special circumstances, and when necessary to the protection of rights of property, nor in matters merely criminal, or merely immoral which do not affect any right of property." * * *

And the rule is that courts of equity do not interfere by injunction for the purpose of controlling the action of public officers constituting inferior quasi judicial tribunals, on matters properly pertaining to their jurisdictions, and that they do not review and correct errors in the proceedings of such officers, the proper remedy, if any, being at law by writ of certiorari. See High on Injunctions (4th Ed.) vol. 2, § 1311. * * *

While disagreeing, therefore, with the opinion expressed by the District Judge, that the courts cannot interfere with the action of the boards and holding as we do, that the civil courts can afford relief from orders made by such boards in any case where it is shown that their proceedings have been without or in excess of their jurisdiction, or have been so manifestly unfair as to prevent a fair investigation, or that there has been a manifest abuse of the discretion with which they are invested under the act, we nevertheless approve the conclusion he reached that the bill should be dismissed.

Order affirmed.

WARD, Circuit Judge. I concur in the opinion of the court without expressing any opinion as to the precise jurisdiction of courts of equity over purely personal rights, or any opinion as to whether an unlawful compulsion of a man's labor or services does not concern property as well as personal rights.

11. STATE ex rel. CONSTANTI v. DARWIN.

(Supreme Court of Washington, 1918. 173 Pac. 29.)

MOUNT, J. This is an application for a writ of mandate to require the fish commissioner of this State to issue to the relator a purse-seine fishing license for the Puget Sound district for the current year.

The facts are conceded as follows: The relator is a native of Austria-Hungary. He came to the United States in May, 1913, and since June of that year has been an actual resident of this State. On the 29th day of December, 1913, he regularly and in the manner required by law declared his intention to become a citizen of the United States. Since the year 1914, and during the years 1915, 1916, and 1917, his regular occupation has been that of a salt-water fisherman, working on fishing appliances in the Puget Sound district under fishing licenses. issued by the respondent. He owns property in the city of Tacoma, is a married man, 45 years of age, having four children, two of whom were born in Austria-Hungary and the two youngest were born in this State.

On April 15, 1918, upon application therefor to the United States Food Administration, a fisherman's license was issued to the relator by that administration, authorizing the relator to engage in the business of catching and distributing salt-water fish..

On the 29th day of April, 1918, the relator applied to the respondent, who is the duly qualified and acting fish commissioner of this State, for a purse-seine fishing license for the district of Puget Sound, and tendered the amount required by law to be paid therefor. The application was denied for the reason that the applicant was not a naturalized citizen of the United States, but a citizen of Austria-Hungary, with which country the United States are at war.

This application is resisted by the attorney general, upon behalf of the respondent, upon the grounds that the relator is an alien enemy and therefor is not entitled to maintain this proceeding, and under the law is not entitled to the license from this State. The statute of this State (Rem. Code, secs. 5150-43) provides that

"No license for taking or catching salmon or other food or shellfish required by this act shall be issued to any person who is not a citizen of the United States of the age of 18 years or over, unless such person has declared his intention to become a citizen and is and has been an actual resident of the State for one year immediately preceding the application for such license. * * * "

It is plain under this provision of the statute that the relator, being an actual resident of the State for more than one year prior to the application, and having declared his intention to become a citizen of the United States, is entitled to the license he seeks unless the fact that this country is at war with Austria-Hungary impels the suspension of the statute in so far as applicants are not citizens of the United States. On December 7, 1917, the Congress of the United States passed a resolution that a state of war is declared to exist between the United States of America and the imperial royal Austro-Hungarian Govern

ment. Thereafter, on December 11, 1917, the President, in pursuance of that resolution, and in pursuance of sections 4067, 4068, 4069, and 4070 of the Revised Statutes of the United States (Comp. St. 1916, §§ 7615-7618), relative to natives, citizens, denizens, or subjects of a hostile nation or government, issued a proclamation as follows:

"Now, therefore, I, Woodrow Wilson, President of the United States of America, do hereby proclaim to all whom it may concern that a state of war exists between the United States and the imperial and roya! Austro-Hungarian Government; * * *

"And, acting under and by virtue of the authority vested in me by the Constitution of the United States and the aforesaid sections of the Revised Statutes, I do hereby further proclaim and direct that the conduct to be observed on the part of the United States towards all natives, citizens, denizens, or subjects of Austria-Hungary, being males of the age of 14 years and upwards, who shall be within the United States and not actually naturalized, shall be as follows:

"All natives, citizens, denizens, or subjects of Austria-Hungary, being males of 14 years and upwards, who shall be within the United States and not actually naturalized, are enjoined to preserve the peace towards the United States and to refrain from crime against the public safety, and from violating the laws of the United States and of the States and Territories thereof, and to refrain from actual hostility or giving information, aid, or comfort to the enemies of the United States, and to comply strictly with the regulations which are hereby or which may be from time to time promulgated by the President; and so long as they shall conduct themselves in accordance with law, they shall be undisturbed in the peaceful pursuit of their lives and occupations and be accorded the consideration due to all peaceful and law-abiding persons, except so far as restrictions may be necessary for their own protection and for the safety of the United States; and towards such of said persons as conduct themselves in accordance with law, all citizens of the United States are enjoined to preserve the peace and to treat them with all such friendliness as may be compatible with loyalty and allegiance to the United States.

"And all natives, citizens, denizens, or subjects of Austria-Hungary, being males of the age of 14 years and upwards, who shall be within the United States and not actually naturalized, who fail to conduct themselves as so enjoined, in addition to all other penalties prescribed by law, shall be liable to restraint, or to give security, or to remove and depart from the United States in the manner prescribed by sections 4069 and 4070 of the Revised Statutes, and as prescribed in regulations duly promulgated by the President;

"And pursuant to the authority vested in me, I hereby declare and establish the following regulations, which I find necessary in the premises and for the public safety:

"(1) No native, citizen, denizen, or subject of Austria-Hungary, being a male of the age of 14 years and upwards and not actually naturalized, shall depart from the United States until he shall have received such permit as the President shall prescribe, or except under order of a court, judge, or justice, under sections 4069 and 4070 of the Revised Statutes.

"(2) No such person shall land in or enter the United States except under such restrictions and at such places as the President may prescribe.

"(3) Every such person of whom there may be reasonable cause to believe that he is aiding or about to aid the enemy, or who may be at large to the danger of the public peace or safety, or who violates or attempts to violate, or of whom there is reasonable ground to believe that he is about to violate any regulation duly promulgated by the President, or any criminal law of the United States, or of the States or Territories thereof, will be subject to summary arrest by the United States Marshal, or his deputy, or such other officer as the President shall designate, and to confinement in such penitentiary, prison, jail, military camp, or other place of detention as may be directed by the President.

"This proclamation and the regulations herein contained shall extend and apply to all land and water, continental or insular, in any way within the jurisdiction of the United States."

On the next day after this proclamation was issued the Attorney General of the United States, referring to it, said:

"This proclamation differs from the preceding proclamation relating to the subjects of the German Empire in that, while it authorizes the arrest and internment of any subjects of the dual Empire whose conduct may be a menace to the safety of the country, the only restrictions which it contains are prohibitions against either entering or leaving the United States without first obtaining permission.

"Many subjects of Austria-Hungary have already demonstrated their strong loyalty to this country by their faithfulness in industrial work, their organization of recruiting committees, and in service with our armies. For the present, therefore, no restrictions will be placed upon the movements of subjects of Austria-Hungary. They are not subject to the restrictions of the previous proclamations relating to German enemy aliens; they will be permitted to reside and labor in prohibited areas and to travel freely without molestation. Only those who are dangerous or disloyal are subject to arrest."

It seems plain, under this proclamation, that, though the relator may be an alien enemy because he has not been naturalized, yet there is nothing in this proclamation which treats a native of Austria-Hungary as an alien dangerous to the peace and safety of the country. The proclamation declares with reference to such persons that "so long as they shall conduct themselves in accordance with law, they shall be undisturbed in the peaceful pursuit of their lives and occupations and be accorded the consideration due to all peaceful and law-abiding per* * *" and that "all citizens of the United States are enjoined to preserve the peace and to treat them with all such friendliness as may be compatible with loyalty and allegiance to the United States.

sons,

So it is apparent that this proclamation recognizes such persons as friendly aliens and not as alien enemies. That the legislature may prohibit any but citizens of this State and of the United States from receiving a fishing license within the State, admits of no doubt. It has not done so. That the Federal Government may establish the status