The act cannot be held to be local, nor is it special in its enactment; nor can we see in what sense it does not operate uni-, formly.

614 It is said that "even though it is assumed that the law is capable of enforcement, no one can be held liable for the nonperformance therewith until the inspector of factories has served the notice required by the act." With this contention we cannot agree. It is true the first and second sections do not say who shall provide the required fire-escape, but we think the fair and reasonable intendment is that the owner or owners shall perform that duty, and we so held in construing the fire-escape act of 1885, the provisions of which in this regard are the same as the act under consideration, in the recent case of Landgraf v. Kuh, 188 Ill. 484, 59 N. E. 501. The language of section 6, "who shall be required to place one or more fire-escapes upon any building or buildings, under the provisions of this act," does not mean who shall be required by the inspector of factories, but who shall be required by the act. The duty to provide fire-escapes upon buildings described in section 1 does not depend upon the performance of any duty by the inspector of factories.

In McRickard v. Flint, 114 N. Y. 222, 21 N. E. 153, the language of the act under which the suit was brought was, “in any store or building in the city of New York in which there shall exist or be placed any hoisting elevator or well-hole, the openings thereof through and upon each floor of such buildings shall be provided with, and protected by, a substantial railing, and such good and sufficient trap-doors with which to inclose the same, as may be directed and approved by the superintendent of buildings," and it was held "the exercise of the duty imposed upon the defendants by this statute was not dependent upon any action of the superintendent of buildings. They could not properly delay for him to direct, but it was for them to call on him for directions and approval in that respect."

In Willy v. Mulledy, 78 N. Y. 310, 34 Am. Rep. 536, where the act provided "that every building in the city of Brooklyn should have a scuttle or place of egress in the roof thereof," etc., and also that certain houses "shall be provided with such 015 fire-escapes and doors as shall be directed and approved by the commissioner" (of the department of fire and buildings), and also that "any person, after being notified by such commissioner, who shall neglect to place upon any such building the fire-es

capes herein provided for, shall forfeit the sum of five hundred dollars, and shall be guilty of a misdemeanor," it was held: "The owner of the building in question was bound to provide it with a fire-escape. He was not permitted to wait until he should be directed to provide one by the commissioners. He was bound to do it in such way as they should direct and approve, and it was for him to procure their direction and approval." And the court further says: "Here was, then, an absolute duty imposed upon a defendant by statute to provide a fire-escape, and the duty was imposed for the sole benefit of the tenants of the house, so that they would have a mode of escape in case of a fire. For the breach of this duty, causing damage, it cannot be doubted that the tenants have a remedy." To the same effect is Rose v. King, 49 Ohio St. 213, 30 N. E. 267.

When the act went into effect it was the duty of every owner, trustee, or lessee or occupant, in the actual control of any building within the description mentioned in the first section, in obedience to section 6, to file in the office of the inspector of factories a written application for a permit to erect or construct fire-escapes, and if these defendants failed to do so, as alleged in the several counts of the declaration, and injury resulted from their failure to place the required fire-escapes in the building described, they incurred a liability to the person injured, and cannot escape that liability merely because they may not have been designated by the inspector of factories as the persons upon whom the duty was imposed to comply with the law. In other words, the law imposed upon them the performance of the duty, and the action of the inspector of factories, the grand jury, the sheriff, and the circuit and criminal courts is only made necessary in case they failed to do that duty. It has 616 been held that the term "owner," in similar statutes, does not mean the owner of the fee, but may mean the lessee in actual possession and control of the building; but we are not aware that any court has held such laws invalid because of their failure to definitely designate who should be liable. We think it clear that under this statute the owner is primarily liable for a failure to perform the duty.

Several of the counts in the declaration aver that the defendants, upon and for a long time prior to March 16, 1898, were owners of a certain seven-story brick building, etc.; that said building was used for manufacturing purposes; that by reason of the statute approved May 27, 1897, in force July 1, 1897, it be

came their duty to provide such building with such fire-escapes, the number, location, material, and construction of such escapes to be subject to the approval of the inspector of factories, but that the defendants have never filed in the office of said inspector of factories a written application for a permit to erect or construct such fire-escapes; that by reason of the statute it became their duty to apply for such permit, and that they failed and neglected to comply with the requirements of the statute in providing fire-escapes. The demurrer, of course, admits these allegations to be true, and we are of the opinion that such counts, under the provisions of the statute, sufficiently fix the liability upon defendants.

A considerable portion of the argument is devoted to the discussion of the question whether or not the statute should receive a strict construction. We think it is well settled that at common law there was no liability imposed upon the owner of a building to provide the same with fire-escapes or other means of exit in case of fire, as a general rule, and that for this reason, as well as because of the penal character of the act, it must be strictly construed-that is, that it cannot be extended to persons or to requirements not fairly within the provisions of the act. The rule in such case is, that courts cannot properly 617 give force to statutes beyond what is expressed by its words or is necessarily implied from what is expressed. Our construction of this act in no way violates that rule.

The judgment of the superior court will be reversed, and the cause will be remanded to that eourt for further proceedings not inconsistent with the views here expressed.

Every Statute is Presumed Constitutional: Alabama etc. R. R. Co. v. Reed, 124 Ala. 253, 82 Am. St. Rep. 166, 27 South. 19; Austin v. State, 101 Tenn. 563, 70 Am. St. Rep. 703, 48 S. W. 305. Legislative acts are to be upheld in all cases of doubt: Overshiner v. State, 156 Ind. 187, 83 Am. St. Rep. 187, 59 N. E. 468. They should not be declared unconstitutional unless the violation of the constitution is so manifest as to leave no room for reasonable doubt: State v. Layton, 160 Mo. 474, 83 Am. St. Rep. 487, 61 S. W. 171; Hanna v. Young, 84 Md. 179, 57 Am. St. Rep. 396, 35 Atl. 674.

The Title of a Statute is sufficient within the requirements of the constitution when it discloses the general object of the legislation: See the monographic note to Crookston v. County Commissioners, 79 Am. St. Rep. 460.

Special and Class Legislation is considered in the monographic note to State v. Ellet, 21 Am. St. Rep. 780-789. The fourteenth amendment contemplates classes of persons, and protection is deemed equal if all persons in the same class are treated alike under like circumstances and conditions: State v. Broadbelt, 89 Md.

565, 73 Am. St. Rep. 201, 43 Atl. 771. The legislature has power to form classes for the purpose of police regulation: Lasher v. People, 183 Ill. 226, 75 Am. St. Rep. 103, 55 N. E. 663. But the legislation must extend to, and embrace equally, all persons who are or may be in like situation or circumstances, and the classification must be natural and reasonable, not arbitrary and capricious: State v. Garbroski, 111 Iowa, 496, 82 Am. St. Rep. 524, 82 N. W. 959.

Fire-escapes.-The constitutionality of statutes requiring the owners of tenement houses and factories to provide fire-escapes seems to have passed unquestioned in Willy v. Mulledy, 78 N. Y. 310, 34 Am. Rep. 536; Schott v. Harvey, 105 Pa. St. 222, 51 Am. Rep. 201.

CASES

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF JUDICATURE

ОР

MAINE.

HENRY V. DENNIS.

[95 Me. 24, 49 Atl. 58.]

ONE MAKING A MISREPRESENTATION IS RESPONSIBLE to such persons only as it is intended for. (p. 366.)

MISREPRESENTATION TO THIRD PERSON.-A misrepresentation to one with the intention that it shall reach and be acted upon by another, and which does reach and is acted upon by him, gives him the same right to relief or redress as if made to him directly. (p. 366.)

MISREPRESENTATION.-ONE IS LIABLE TO A PARTNERSHIP for misrepresentation to one of its members, though not made to him as such, if he, relying thereon, induces his firm to act to its injury. (p. 367.)

Two actions for false representations, one brought by W. S. Henry, Jr., and the other by him and his copartner.

L. C. Cornish, for the plaintiff.

A. M. Spear, for the defendant.

WISWELL, C. J. For some time prior to May 1, 1896, Henry, the plaintiff in one of these suits, had been engaged in the wool business alone, under the name of W. S. Henry, Jr., & Co. On that day he formed a copartnership in the same business with one Charles C. Parsons, and the business was subsequently carried on in the firm name of Henry & Parsons. But after the formation of the firm, Mr. Henry continued his individual business, in the name of W. S. Henry, Jr., & Co., to the extent of selling, from time to time, a quantity of wool which he had on hand at the time of the formation of the copartnership.