may be, being respectively under the seal of the inferior court, and the signature of the proper officer thereof, to order and direct the judgment, or as the case may be, the rule or order of such inferior court, to be removed into the said superior court, or into the Court of Common Pleas at Lancaster, as the case may be, and immediately thereupon such judgment, rule or order shall be of the same force, charge and effect as a judgment recovered in or a rule or order made by such superior court, and all proceedings shall and may be immediately had and taken thereupon or by reason or in consequence thereof, as if such judgment so recovered or rule or order so made had been originally recovered in or made by the said superior court, or into the Court of Common Pleas at Lancaster, as the case may be; and all the reasonable costs and charges attendant upon such application and removal shall be recovered in like manner as if the same were part of such judgment or rule or order: provided always, that no such judgment or rule or order, when so removed as aforesaid, shall affect any lands, tenements or hereditaments, as to purchasers, mortgagees or creditors, any further than the same would have done if the same had remained a judgment, rule or order of such inferior court, unless and until a writ of execution thereon shall be actually put into the hands of the sheriff or other officer appointed to execute the same (x). (a) The proviso at the end of this section is repealed by 18 & 19 Vict. c. 15, s. 7, post. 1 & 2 Vict. c. 110, s. 22. Where a judgment is removed from an inferior court for execution Removal of under this act, the court will only enforce the judgment, and will not inquire judgments. into the regularity of previous proceedings below. (Simons v. Count de Wintz, 8 Dowl. P. C. 646.) A final order or decree of the vice-warden of the Stannary Courts, on the equity side, may be removed into the Court of Queen's Bench, the defendant having gone out of the jurisdiction, in order to issue execution pursuant to this section. (Harvey v. Gilbard, 7 Dowl. P. C. 616; 3 Jur. 316.) Under this statute such an order or decree may be made a rule of the Court of Queen's Bench by a rule absolute in the first instance. (lb., see 7 Dowl. P. C. 525.) See, further, 1 Chitty's Archbold, 1332 et seq., 12th ed. The judgment of a county court constituted under the 9 & 10 Vict. c. 95, Judgments of is not removable into a superior court for the purpose of execution, either county courts. under the 19 Geo. 3, c. 70, s. 4, or this section. (Moreton v. Holt, 10 Exch. 707; 1 Jur., N. S. 215; 24 L. J., Ex. 169; see Re Turner, 12 W. R. 337.) The Court of Chancery will aid a judgment of a county court, which cannot be enforced at law against the equitable chattel estate of the defendant. (Bennett v. Powell, 3 Drew. 326.) Where a court of competent jurisdiction has adjudicated a certain sum to be due from one person to another, a legal obligation arises to pay that sum, on which an action of debt to enforce the judgment may be maintained. It is in this way that the judgments of foreign and colonial courts are supported and enforced; and the same rule applies to inferior courts in this country, and applies equally whether they be courts of record or not. (Parke, B., Williams v. Jones, 14 Mees. & W. 633.) As to actions brought upon foreign judgments, see Doe v. Oliver, 2 Smith, L. C. 726 et seq., 6th ed. And as to making judgments obtained in England, Scotland, Ireland, effectual in other parts of the United Kingdom, see 31 & 32 Vict. c. 54. In order to acknowledge satisfaction of a judgment, it shall be required only to produce a satisfaction piece in form as hereinafter mentioned, and Entry of satisfaction on roll. 1 & 2 Vict. c. 110, s. 22. Entry of satisfaction on judgments. such satisfaction piece shall be signed by the party or parties acknowledging the same, or their personal representatives, and such signature or signatures shall be witnessed by a practising attorney of one of the courts at Westminster, expressly named by him or them and attending at his or their request, to inform him or them of the nature and effect of such satisfaction piece, before the same is signed, and which attorney shall declare himself in the attestation thereto to be the attorney for the person or persons so signing the same, and state he is witness as such attorney [provided that a judge at chambers may make an order dispensing with such signature under special circumstances, if he thinks fit], and in cases where the satisfaction piece is signed by the personal representative of a deceased, his representative character shall be proved in such manner as the master may direct. A.D. 187-. plaintiff, and do hereby expressly nominate and appoint -, attorney-at-law, to witness and attest of day of (1 Ell. & Bl. App. p. xvi, Rule 80.) in the The above-named Upon a satisfaction piece, duly signed and attested in accordance with R. 80 of Reg. Gen. H. T. 1853, being presented to the clerk of the judgments of the masters in the court in which the judgment has been signed, he shall file the same, and enter satisfaction in the judgment book against the entry of the said judgment, and no roll shall be required to be carried in for the purpose of entering satisfaction on a judgment. (Reg. Gen. E. T. 23rd April, 1857; 3 Jur., N. S., Part II., p. 176; 2 C. B., N. S. 92.) The court or a judge will compel a plaintiff, who has received satisfaction of his judgment, to execute the proper satisfaction, in order to have the entries on the registers duly vacated. (Fish v. Tindal, 10 W. R. 801, Exch.) See, further, 1 Chitty's Archbold, 721, 12th ed. 2&3 Vict. c. 11, s. 1. 2 & 3 VICTORIA, C. 11. An Act for the better Protection of Purchasers against Judg- DOCKETS TO BE CLOSED. No judgment to be hereafter docketed under WHEREAS it is desirable that further protection should be afforded to purchasers against judgments, crown debts and lis the provisions of pendens; be it therefore enacted, that no judgment shall here 2 & 3 Vict. c. 11, s. 1. after be docketed under the provisions of an act passed in the fourth and fifth years of the reign of their late Majesties King William and Queen Mary, intituled "An Act for the better 4 & 5 Will. & Discovery of Judgments in the Courts of King's Bench, Com- M. c. 20. mon Pleas and Exchequer, at Westminster," but that all such dockets shall be finally closed immediately after the passing of this act, without prejudice to the operation of any judgment already docketed and entered under the said recited act, except so far as any such judgment may be affected by the provisions hereinafter contained (b). (a) This act is repealed so far as relates to the protection of purchasers against secret acts of bankruptcy and fiats in bankruptcy. (12 & 13 Vict. c. 106, s. 1.) (b) By stat. 4 & 5 Will. & Mary, c. 20, made perpetual by 7 & 8 Will. 3, c. 36, s. 3, judgments were directed to be docketed in alphabetical order; and it was declared that no judgments should affect lands or tenements as to bona fide purchasers, unless docketed and entered according to the act. Docketing the issue is not a sufficient docketing of a judgment within the provisions of the above act. (Braithwaite v. Watts, 2 Cr. & J. 318; 2 Tyr. 293. See Brandling v. Plummer, 3 Jur., N. S. 401; 26 L. J., Ch. 326.) DOCKETED JUDGMENTS TO BE ENTERED PURSUANT TO 2. No judgment already docketed and entered under the said As to judgments recited act of their late Majesties King William and Queen already docketed. Mary shall, after the first day of August, one thousand eight hundred and forty-one, affect any lands, tenements or hereditaments, as to purchasers, mortgagees or creditors, unless and until such memorandum or minute thereof as is prescribed in an act passed in the first and second years of her present Majesty Queen Victoria, intituled "An Act for abolishing Arrest on 1 & 2 Vict. c. 110. Mesne Process and Civil Actions, except in certain cases; for extending the Remedies of Creditors against the Property of Debtors; and for amending the Laws for the Relief of Insolvent Debtors in England," shall be left with the senior master of the Court of Common Pleas at Westminster, who shall forthwith enter the same in manner thereby directed in regard to judgments; and such officer shall be entitled for any such entry to the sum of five shillings (c). (c) See ante, s. 19, p. 593. An outstanding docketed judgment not registered pursuant to 1 & 2 Vict. c. 110, s. 19, and this act, is not a valid objection to the title of the vendor on the sale of realty. (Bedford v. Forbes, 1 Carr. & K. 33.) DATE OF MINUTE. the memorandum 3. In addition to the entry by the said last-mentioned act or The date when by this act required to be made in a book by the senior master of judgment is of the particulars to be contained in every memorandum or left to be entered minute left with him of any judgment, decree or order, rule or in a book. 2 & 3 Vict. c. 11, s. 3. order, he shall insert in such book the year and the day of the month when every such memorandum or minute is so left with him (d). (d) The 3rd, 4th, 5th and 7th sections of this act are extended to the courts of counties palatine. (18 & 19 Vict. c. 15, s. 3.) Judgments, after five years from unless a fresh memorandum is left. JUDGMENTS TO BE REGISTERED PERIODICALLY. 4. All judgments of any of the superior courts, decrees or entry, to be void, orders in any court of equity, rules of a court of common law, and orders in bankruptcy or lunacy, which since the passing of the said recited act of the first and second years of the reign of her present Majesty have been registered under the provisions therein contained, or which shall hereafter be so registered, shall, after the expiration of five years from the date of the entry thereof, be null and void against lands, tenements and other hereditaments, as to purchasers, mortgagees or creditors, unless a like memorandum or minute as was required in the first instance is again left with the senior master of the said Court of Common Pleas within five years before the execution of the conveyance, settlement, mortgage, lease or other deed or instrument vesting or transferring the legal or equitable right, title, estate or interest in or to any such purchaser or mortgagee for valuable consideration, or as to creditors, within five years, before the right of such creditors accrued, and so, toties quoties, at the expiration of every succeeding five years; and the senior master shall forthwith re-enter the same in like manner as the same was originally entered; and such officer shall be entitled for any such re-entry to the sum of one shilling (e). Creditors within this section. General effect of this section as to registration. (e) As to judgments entered up between the 23rd July, 1860, and the 29th July, 1864, see 23 & 24 Vict. c. 38 (post). And as to judgments entered up after the 29th July, 1864, see 27 & 28 Vict. c. 112 (post). The provision in 2 & 3 Vict. c. 11, s. 4, that the judgment is to be void as against creditors, refers only to creditors who have some right or interest in such lands, tenements or hereditaments, as, for example, by virtue of a creditor's decree directing a sale of such property. Creditors of a deceased debtor have not on his death a right against his leasehold property in the hands of his executor or administrator within the meaning of this act. It was questioned if they have even after a creditor's decree any such right in the specific chattels of the deceased debtor, unless the decree directs them to be sold for the benefit of the creditors. (Simpson v. Morley, 2 Kay & J. 71.) It was held under this section that the circumstance that a re-registration is not within five years from the previous registration does not make it ineffectual as against subsequent purchasers, mortgagees and creditors. (Beavan v. Earl of Oxford, 6 De G., M. & G. 492.) And see 18 & 19 Vict. c. 15, s. 6 (post). The effect of the provisions of this section is to deprive the judgment creditor who omits to register within five years of protection against subsequent purchasers, mortgagees and creditors; but not to alter his position as to previous purchasers, mortgagees and creditors. A., B. and C. were judgment creditors of D.; A. and B. having priority to C. A. and B. subsequently omitted to register their judgments within five years from their previous registration; C. duly registered within the five years: it was held, that A. and B. did not thereby lose their priority to C. (Beavan v. Earl of Oxford, 6 De G., M. & G. 492.) Under this act, if A. has a judgment registered under the 1 & 2 Vict. c. 110, s. 18 (ante, p. 589), such registration will protect him against all who become mortgagees or purchasers during the currency of the five years, and such protection will continue as to them under a re-registration, even though he should have omitted to re-register within five years; but as to persons becoming mortgagees or purchasers between the period when his first registration ceased and when his re-registration began, he will not be protected, but they will have priority over him. (Shaw v. Neale, 6 H. L. Cas. 581; 4 Jur., N. S. 695; 27 L. J., Ch. 444.) In 1836, before the passing of this act, T. had recovered a judgment against Lord O., which was duly docketed. After that judgment was so docketed and before the passing of this act, Lord O. executed a voluntary settlement in favour of his wife, under which she was tenant for life. After the passing of this act other creditors recovered judgments against Lord O., which were duly registered in pursuance of the statute 2 & 3 Vict. c. 11, and the question was whether they, in respect of these judgments, had a claim on Lady O.'s interest under the voluntary settlement. T. omitted to register his judgment till 1849, and thereby lost his priority as against the subsequent judgment creditors: it was held, that this did not entitle the latter to stand in his place as against the voluntary settlement. (Beavan v. Lord Oxford, 25 L. J., Ch. 299.) The provisions as to re-registration in this section were held to be operative for the benefit of all persons deriving title mediately or immediately from the judgment debtor, and not merely for that of immediate purchasers, mortgagees and creditors of the debtor himself. A purchaser from a mortgagee of the judgment debtor, taking with notice of a judgment which had not been registered or re-registered in the Common Pleas within five years, and having the legal estate, was held not to be affected by such judgment. Wood, V.-C., said that the intention of this act was to make a five years' search sufficient. (Benham v. Keane, 1 J. & H. 685.) In 1846, the plaintiff, a mortgagee with power of sale under a deed of mortgage dated in January, 1844, contracted to sell the mortgaged premises to the defendant. At the date of the contract the premises in question were subject to two judgments registered against the mortgagor in 1843, but it appeared that on taking his mortgage the plaintiff also took an assignment to a trustee for himself of the residue of a term of 1,000 years in the premises created in 1818, and it was denied by the plaintiff that at the date of the mortgage he had notice of the judgment. The defendant, who had been let into possession, having refused to complete the contract by payment of the purchase-money, the suit was instituted for specific performance of the contract. Shortly afterwards, the five years from the date of the registration of the judgments terminated without a re-registration of such judgments having been made pursuant to this section, and afterwards, pending the suit, one only of such judgments was re-registered: it was held, upon appeal from the decree of Sir J. Stuart, V.-C., for specific performance, that the purchaser could not be forced to take a conveyance of the premises in question, except upon the terms either of the concurrence therein of the judgment creditor who had re-registered, and of the other in case he should re-register, or of a release or exoneration of the premises from the judgments. (Freer v. Hesse, 17 Jur. 703; 22 L. J., Ch. 597.) 2 & 3 Vict. c. 11, s. 4. The search for judgments on a purchase or mortgage was rarely carried Search for judgback beyond twenty years, because the lapse of that period raised, as has ments. been already stated, the presumption of satisfaction (ante, p. 238); and now, by stat. 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 27, s. 40, no action or suit or other proceeding shall be brought to recover any sum of money secured by any judgment but within twenty years next after a present right to receive the same shall have accrued to some person capable of giving a discharge for or release of the same, unless the charge be kept alive by part payment, or by some written acknowledgment. (See ante, p. 236.) The search for judgments need not be extended beyond five years, because the second section of this act (ante, |