1827.

The

Palmyra.

ly before the

foundation. The libel was filed by the District Attorney, as well in behalf of the United States, as of the captors, and prayed, as usual, a condemnation of the vessel, and distribution of the proceeds. This fact is noticed for the purpose of answering the observation made at the bar, as to the parties to the libel. It has been supposed, that the United States, and The entire the captors, are to be deemed severally libellants, having cause regulardistinct rights, both of prosecution and appeal. But this Court. proceeds upon a mistake. In every case of a proceeding for condemnation, upon captures made by the public ships of war of the United States, whether the same be cases of prize, strictly jure belli, or upon public acts in the nature of captures jure belli, the proceedings are in the name and authority of the United States, who prosecute for themselves as well as for the captors. The captors cannot, without the authority of the government, proceed to enforce condemnation. The suit is, in form and substance, a proceeding by and in the name of the United States, for the benefit of all concerned. And whether the question respect the point of condemnation, or of damages, the United States have a right of appeal coextensive with the whole matter in litigation, and may interpose their protection to guard their agents and officers against injury and damages. These agents and officers are, indeed, in a certain sense, parties to the suit, as the seizing officer is in cases of mere municipal seizures; and when the claimant makes himself, by a demand of damages, an actor in the suit, no doubt exists that the Court may proceed to decree damages against them, and thus entitle them to a separate right of appeal, if the government should feel that it had no further interest to pursue the suit. But still the right to damages must always be dependant upon the question of condemnation or acquittal, for it can never be successfully contended, that if a condemnation is finally adjudged, a decree for damages can be maintained. And, on the other hand, in a case of acquittal, the whole circumstances of the case must be taken into consideration, in order to ascertain that the case is one which justifies an award of damages.

1827.

The Palmyra.

of the libel.

In the present case, there was an appeal entered by the Dis-
trict Attorney for the United States, and also for the cap-
tors, from the decree of the Circuit Court. If this decree
was final, such an appeal brought up the whole cause as to
all he parties; and would, in point of law, have produced
the same effect, if in form the appeal had only been in the
name of the United States. If the decree was not final,
(as upon
the original record it appeared to this Court not to
be,) then it was void as to all parties. Either way, then,
there never was any separation of the parties libellants, so
as to give rise to the point of separate independent causes.
We are, then, of opinion, that the whole cause is now right-
fully before us.

Objections to
It is contended on behalf of the appellees, that the pre-
the sufficiency sent suit cannot be maintained, because the libel itself is
fatally defective in its averments. It is said to be too loose,
inartificial and general in its structure, to give a just foun-
dation for any judgment of condemnation. If this were
admitted to be true, the only effect would be, supposing the
merits on the evidence appeared to be in favour of the
libellants, that the Court would, according to its known.
course of practice, remand the cause to the Circuit Court,
with directions to allow an amendment of the libel, and ul-
terior proceedings consequent thereon. But there is assert-
ed to be another fatal defect in the averments of the libel,
which is incapable of being cured, because it cannot be es-
tablished in point of fact; and that is, that the offenders are
not alleged to have been convicted upon any prosecution in
personam, of the offence charged in the libel. The argu-
ment is, that there must be a due conviction upon a prose-
cution and indictment for the offence in personam, averred
and proved, in order to maintain the libel in rem.

How far the

In respect to the first objection, it must be admitted, that strict rules of the libel is drawn in an inartificial, inaccurate, and loose

the common

law, as to manner. The strict rules of the common law as to crimipleading in criminal cases, nal prosecutions, have never been supposed by this Court are applicable informa- to be required in informations of seizure in the Admiralty tions in rem. for forfeitures, which are deemed to be civil proceedings in

to

1827.

The

Palmyra.

as to libels in

rem.

rem. Even on indictments at the common law, it is often sufficient to state the offence in the very terms of the prohi bitory statute; and the cases cited by the Attorney General are directly in point. In informations in the Exchequer for seizures, general allegations bringing the case within the words of the statute, have been often held sufficient. And in this Court it has been repeatedly held, that in libels in rem, less certainty than what belongs to proceedings at the common law, will sustain a decree of condemnation, if the words of the statute are pursued, and the allegations point out the facts, so as to give reasonable notice to the party to enable him to shape his defence. There is, indeed, in Admiralty proceedings, little ground to insist upon much strictness of averment, because, in however general terms the offence may be articulated, it is always in the power of the Court to prevent surprise, by compelling more particular charges as to the matters intended to be brought forward by the proofs. In general, it may be said, that it is sufficient in General rule libels in rem, for forfeitures, to allege the offence in the terms of the statute creating the forfeitures. There may be exceptions to this rule, where the terms of the statute are so general as naturally to call for more distinct specifications. Without pretending to enumerate such exceptions, let us look at the allegations in the amended libel in the present case. It charges, "that the said brig, called the Palmyra, &c. was, and is, a vessel from which a piratical aggression, search, depredation, restraint, and seizure, has been first attempted and made, to wit, upon the high seas, in and upon the schooner Coquette, a vessel of the United States, and of the citizens thereof, and in and upon the master, officers, and crew of the said schooner Coquette, citizens of the United States; and also in and upon the Jeune Eugenie, a vessel of the United States, and of the citizens thereof, and in and upon Edward L. Coffin, the master, and the officers and crew of the said vessel, being citizens of the United States, and also in and upon other vessels of the United States, their officers and crews, citizens of the United States, and in and upon other vessels of various nations, states and

1827.

The Palmyra.

How far a pre

sary to found

ing in rem.

kingdoms, their officers and crews, citizens and subjects of said states and kingdoms." Now, whatever may be said as to the looseness and generality, and consequent insufficiency of the latter clauses of this allegation, the former specifying the Coquette and Jeune Eugenie, (upon which alone the proofs mainly rely for condemnation,) have, in our opinion, reasonable and sufficient certainty. It was not necessary to state in detail the particular acts constituting the piratical aggression, search, depredation, restraint, or seizure. The general words of the statute are sufficiently descriptive of the nature of the offence; and the particular acts are matters proper in the proofs. We may, then, dismiss this part of the objection.

The other point of objection is of a far more important vious prosecu- and difficult nature. It is well known, that at the common tion in personam is neces- law, in many cases of felonies, the party forfeited his goods the proceed- and chattels to the crown. The forfeiture did not, strictly speaking, attach in rem; but it was a part, or at least a consequence, of the judgment of conviction. It is plain from this statement, that no right to the goods and chattels of the felon could be acquired by the crown by the mere commission of the offence; but the right attached only by the conviction of the offender. The necessary result was, that in every case where the crown sought to recover such goods and chattels, it was indispensable to establish its right by producing the record of the judgment of conviction. In the contemplation of the common law, the offender's right was not devested until the conviction. But this doctrine never was applied to seizures and forfeitures, created by statute, in rem, cognizable on the revenue side of the Exchequer. The thing is here primarily considered as the offender, or rather the offence is attached primarily to the thing; and this, whether the offence be malum prohibitum, or malum in The same principle applies to proceedings in rem, on seizures in the Admiralty. Many cases exist, where the forfeiture for acts done attaches solely in rem, and there is no accompanying penalty in personam. Many cases exist, where there is both a forfeiture in rem and a personal pe

se.

nam.

nalty. But in neither class of cases has it ever been decided that the prosecutions were dependent upon each other. But the practice has been, and so this Court understand the law to be, that the proceeding in rem stands independent of, and wholly unaffected by any criminal proceeding in persoThis doctrine is deduced from a fair interpretation of the legislative intention apparent upon its enactments. Both in England and America, the jurisdiction over proceedings in rem, is usually vested in different Courts from those exercising criminal jurisdiction. If the argument at the bar were well founded, there could never be a judgment of condemnation pronounced against any vessel coming within the prohibitions of the acts on which the present libel is founded; for there is no act of Congress which provides for the personal punishment of offenders, who commit "any piratical aggression, search, restraint, depredation or seizure," within the meaning of those acts. Such a construction of the enactments, which goes wholly to defeat their operation, and violates their plain import, is utterly inadmissible. In the judgment of this Court, no personal conviction of the offender is necessary to enforce a forfeiture in rem in cases of this nature.

Having disposed of these questions, which are preliminary in their nature, we may now advance to the consideration of those which turn upon the merits of the cause. These questions are, 1. Whether the present be, upon the facts, a case for condemnation; and, if not, 2. Whether it be a case for remunerative damages, for vindictive damages are. and must be disclaimed.

Upon the first point, it is unnecessary to go into any examination at large of the various facts preceding and accompanying the capture, because the Judges are divided in opinion; and consequently, according to the known practice of the Court, the decree of the Circuit Court, so far as it pronounced a decree of acquittal, must be affirmed.

1827.

The

Palmyra.

damages.

In respect to the second point, we are all of opinion that Question of the case is clearly not a case for damages. The whole circumstances present such well founded grounds for suspicion