herein provided; provided that in no case it shall be lawful to collect, attach or receive on any single debt, or claim a greater portion than ten per cent of the debtor's personal weekly earnings or income, of which ninety per cent thereof shall be exempt from levy of such attachment or execution, and in proceedings supplementary to or in aid of such execution.

§ 3. Party claimant to furnish statement of such debtor's account may be due him, when said triplicate copies have been sworn to, the constable is to serve one copy to debtor, one to employer, and the third to be retained by the justice of the peace. Said employer or his agent to declare to said constable, whether or not the person named as debtor is in his or their employ, and if so, what compensation he or she is paid for his services, and whether daily, weekly or monthly, and the date at which next payment is made, and that ten per cent be retained, of his average weekly earnings, until said claim is paid and satisfied with cost thereof. In case more than one claim is presented, they may be paid in order of service.

$ 4. It is herein provided in case any debtor, not being employed, but having other source of income, they shall be obliged to appear before a magistrate when requested, and make a sworn statement of his average weekly income, the defendant to have the right to appeal as in any other case, as the law provides.

§ 5. The term necessary of life within the meaning of this act shall include manual labor, food, medicines, shelter, clothing and all other things not known luxuries.

§ 6. All acts and parts of acts inconsistent with this act are hereby repealed.

§ 7. This act shall take effect and be in force from and after its passage.

To local associations: The Executive Board of the (). R. M. A. recommends the above bill for your consideration. Submit it to some lawyer in your city, and furnish us with any suggestions you may see fit as soon as practicable.

AKRON, June 5, 1889.

P. P. CHERRY, Secretary.

NEW BOOKS AND NEW EDITIONS.

ABBOTT'S LIMITED PARTNERSHIP.

The statutes of New York, with the decisions thereon relating to limited partnerships, together with the statutes relating to compromises by partners and joint debtors, and to partnership names and signs, and the requisite forms. with all amendments to date. Austin Abbott. Baker, Voorhis & Co., New York.

This collection of the partnership laws of New York is reprinted from Abbott's New York Digest and Abbott's Legal Remembrancer, with the necessary additions to make it complete to July, 1889. Although containing but forty-four pages, there is a very full index.

SNYDER'S LAW OF CLUBS, ETC. Laws authorizing the incorporation of clubs, societies and associations for literary, library, social, recreative and

sporting purposes, and political clubs. Also the general provisions of law applicable to voluntary unincorporated associations, clubs and societies as to the mode in which they may sue and be sued, embracing the provisions as to the rights and liabilities of individual members. By Wm. L. Snyder. Pp. 50. Baker, Voorhis & Co., New York. This is a handy and useful compilation of the statute law (fourteen acts) upon the subject-matter, which is fully indicated in the title. In an explanatory note, the author contrasts the two principal statutes relating to the incorporation of societies and clubs for 80cial purposes, and advises that "it would be well to consult counsel should uncertainty arise as to which law, under certain circumstances, is prefer

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EFERRING to the appearance before Lord Justice Lopes of a queen's counsel without a junior, Truth is amazed at any question being possible as to the etiquette of a single counsel appearing unaided when only one is wanted. The etiquette, whatever it is, is of course absurd, and the day has arrived when absurd etiquette will not be allowed to stand in the way of economy in litigation. Lawyers should pray for cheap procedure and rapid dispatch of business.

A good story is told of the late S. L. M. Barlow's experience several years ago with some Democratic friends who had gone to his summer home at Glen Cove, on Long Island, to spend a holiday with him. The party was made up of the late Gov. Tilden, Charles A. Dana, then, as now, editor of the Sun; Manton Marble, editor of the World; Smith M. Weed, since become prominent in politics, and one or two other men of position. After dinner his guests made their way to the billiard-room and began to play. Before long Mr. Tilden confessed sleepiness, and proposed to go to bed. Mr. Barlow accompanied him, with the purpose of returning later to his pleasure-seeking friends, but when he got up stairs he reached the conclusion, that as his guests knew where to sleep, he would follow Mr. Tilden's example. He did so, and slept soundly until after daylight the following morning. On awaking he heard the rattle of the billiard balls, and concluded that as his guests were such early risers, it was quite desirable that their host should get out as soon as possible. He did so, and went to the billiard-room, where the game had proceeded without interruption through the whole night. He found at the door, the only exit, his faithful but fierce bulldog standing guard. The guests had made during the night one attempt after another to get away and go to bed; but the bulldog had done his duty so successfully as to prevent their departure, and there was nothing else to do through all the long watches of the night but to return to their cues and billiard tables.

over

Notwithstanding the well-known fact that the legiti mate fees for legal business of this city have fallen off more than one-half during the last five years, and without any prospect of improvement, we are steadily multiplying lawyers, and a large number of them must either steal or starve. Our professions are crowded by young men, because many of them seem to think it more genteel to steal or starve than to earn a good living by non-professional labor. Even successful mechanics disparage their honest and respected in. dustry with their own sons by encouraging them to climb or crawl into professions, and they do it in the face of the known fact that many of them must steal or starve. There are over 500 lawyers in this city who do not earn in legitimate fees as much as the average mechanic who works an average of eight hours per day, and most of these pitiable dependants have no reasonable prospect of ever earning an honest living by their profession. There is no want for them; there is no business for them to get, and the false dream of gentility in a profession ends in the sober reality that compels them to steal or starve.- Philadelphia Times.

Men who work in Rondout brickyards should be taught their duty. Hastily summoned by a woman who had found a would-be suicide hanging, and yet alive, they declined to cut him down, fearing they had no right to do so until the coroner arrived. As most people understand such cases, the coroner's duty begins after death. Of course in this instance the coroner had a case-by the time he got there.-Albany Journal.

THE

ALBANY, AUGUST 24, 1889.

CURRENT TOPICS.

HE twelfth annual meeting of the American Bar Association will be held at Chicago, Illinois, on Wednesday, Thursday and Friday, August 28, 29 and 30, 1889. The sessions will be held on Wednesday morning and afternoon; on Thursday morning and evening; and on Friday morning, in the auditorium in the Methodist Church Block, at the corner of Washington and Clark streets. Wednesday morning, 10 o'clock: The president's address, by David Dudley Field of New York; nomination and election of members; election of the general council; reports of the secretary and treasurer; report of the executive committee; miscellaneous business. Wednesday afternoon, 2 o'clock: A paper by Henry B. Brown of Michigan, on "Judicial Independence; " discussion upon the subject of the paper read; a paper by Walter B. Hill of Georgia, on "The Federal Judicial System;" discussion upon the subject of the paper read; miscellaneous business. Wednesday evening, 8 o'clock: Reception at the Union League. Thursday morning, 10 o'clock: The annual address, by Simon E. Baldwin of Connecticut, on "The Centenary of Modern Government; " reports of committees; miscellaneous business. Thursday afternoon, 2 o'clock: Excursion to Pullman. Thursday evening, 8 o'clock: Report and debate on commercial law reform; reports of committees; unfinished and miscellaneous business. Friday morning, 10 o'clock: Nomination of officers; unfinished business; miscellaneous business; election of officers. Friday evening: Banquet at the Grand Pacific Hotel. The Illinois State Bar Association and the Chicago Bar Association will give a reception to the association at the Union League at 8 o'clock on Wednesday evening, August 28. Mr. B. F. Ayer, of the Chicago bar, has arranged an excursion to Pullman by special train. The train will leave the Illinois Central Depot, at the foot of Randolph street, at 2 o'clock, P. M., on Thursday, August 29. The excursion will occupy not over four hours. The Chicago Bar Association will give the association a banquet at the Grand Pacific Hotel on Friday evening, August 30. It is expected that a reduced rate of a fare and a third for the round trip will be obtained from all the leading railroads, as to which information may be had of the secretary. Arrangements have been made with the Grand Pacific Hotel, on Clark, Jackson and La Salle streets, for reduced rates for members of the association. This is an enticing programme, both as to the feast of reason and the flow of soul. Our Chicago brethren never do things by halves, and those who are their quasi guests will be so well cared for that they will probably prefer VOL. 40-No. 8.

It seems that Judge Bookstaver has incurred the displeasure of the New York World for alleged misconduct in the Flack divorce case. Its grounds are three: “(1) The confirmation of the referee's report, after a hearing in which Mrs. Flack did not testify; (2) the appointment of a referee who was a searcher in the county clerk's office, and (3) the appointment of a referee at the suggestion of the counsel who appeared for both parties to the action." Mr. Roger Foster, in a communication to the Commercial Advertiser, defends the judge. He says that "so much of rule 73 as requires the testimony of the plaintiff in a divorce suit as to the want of collusion and other facts, has been nullified by section 831 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as amended in 1881; and the testimony of a plaintiff as to these facts is now not only no longer required, but is absolutely prohibited." Citing Farace v. Farace, 61 How. Pr. 61. This seems conclusive. He continues: "(2) A searcher in the office of the county clerk renders him no assistance in the discharge of his duties as clerk of the Supreme Court. He merely aids him in the discharge of his separate duties as guardian of the public records. A searcher is no more the assistant of a clerk of the court within the meaning of the Code than is an employee of the county clerk in his private business. Moreover, the Code provides that a clerk of a court or his assistant may be appointed referee on the consent of the parties to the action." To this we should say "not guilty, but we advise not to do it again." There is such a thing as keeping such investigations too much in the bosom of the family. Mr. Foster concludes: "(3) If Judge Bookstaver is correctly reported, he undoubtedly disregarded rule number 73 in appointing a referee in a divorce suit at the suggestion of the counsel in the case. But it has been repeatedly held that rules, unlike statutes, inasmuch as they are made by the judges, are not binding upon them, but may be disregarded in their discretion. And it is well known that this rule, like that forbidding the appointment of a referee in a foreclosure suit at the nomination of a party, is constantly disregarded by the majority of the judges in this county when so requested by counsel in whom they have confidence, and there is no opposition. As the object of rule number 73 is to prevent collusion, it is considered that it may be disregarded when the character of the counsel is such as to preclude the suspicion of an attempt to defraud the court. Whether this practice is advisable may be questioned, but it is customary. * ** I am a political opponent of Judge Bookstaver, and firmly believe that the power of the Tammany machine is injurious to the welfare of this city. I know that fearless and independent criticism of public officials by the press has been of great good in the past and will be in the future. But I fear that attacks made upon insufficient grounds against

a magistrate whose character and ability had won for him the respect and confidence of the profession even before he was elevated to the bench, will not only diminish the influence of newspapers in the future, but also hinder the administration of justice by teaching the people to hold it in disrespect." Mr. Foster seems illogical in the last sentence, for if the influence of the press is thus diminished it will so much the less teach the people to disregard the administration of justice. But on the merits, we regard the rule as a wholesome one, and the custom to disregard it as one more honored in the breach than in the observance. It certainly is not the custom out of the city of New York. A disregard of the rule has brought the judge into trouble. We cannot believe that he intended any thing more than discreetly to keep quiet an unpleasant scandal, but his action was unwise and injudicious. The only safe way for a judge is to hew close up to the line of the law, and let parties and consequences take care of themselves. As might have been expected, the World refused to publish Mr. Foster's defense. That is the "way of the World."

The July-August number of the American Law Review is very interesting. The opening paper is Mr. Hoadly's address on codification. We are rather amused by the Review's reason for publishing it a year after its delivery at Saratoga the desire to give it "wider circulation." We gave it that a year ago. Then there is Chauncey M. Depew's sensible discourse at the Yale Law School, on "The Dignity of the Law." One sentence must be quoted: "I sometimes think that there is no limit to what a man may do if the idle hours usually given to waiting for somebody or something, to worthless gossip, to the social glass at the club in the afternoon, which unfits him for work in the evening, and to the fascinating luxury of empty-headedness, were hailed as special gifts of Providence, to be treasured and used for study." We hesitate at "work in the evening." If a man does not loaf or dawdle in the day-time he need not work in the evening, as a rule. There are excellent technical papers by Stewart Rapalje, John W. Beaumont and Epaphroditus Peck, and one of especial interest on "Libel of the Dead," by H. Campbell Black. Sixty pages of the ever welcome "Notes" set forth a goodly treat. We are here informed that Mr. Ignatius Donnelly, in a rigmarole entitled "Ragnarök," elaborates the theory that drift was spread over the earth by the tail of a comet. It is an old theory that the flood was thus caused. There is nothing new about Donnelly's cranks; it is only the extreme silliness of his advocacy that is original. Commenting on the constitution of the Illinois Supreme Court, the Review says: It is "badly constituted in two respects: 1. Its judges are elected from districts, instead of being elected from the State at large- on the old democratic, local self-government principle of passing the offices around and giving each deestrik a whack at them.' |

2. The court is on wheels- meets at three places; in consequence of which the judges have no official home, and are, we are informed, in the habit of taking records home with them after the adjournment of court to write opinions - the result of which vicious practice has frequently been that the court reverses itself, one judge reversing a case in which the opinion has been written by another judge, which decision he has forgotten. If this system still exists in Illinois, as it has been described to us, it is a wonder that the decisions of the court stand as well as they do." Add to this, the practice which prevails in several western States, and we believe in Illinois, of the judges in taking turns at playing chief justice, is certainly ludicrous if not injurious. By the way, we did not criticise the opinions of the Illinois courts, but the character of the litigation as "lacking in interest." But we do not hesitate to say that some of those judges write abominable English. We fear our brethren of the Review will find themselves in hot water for the following, which is rather too sweeping, although there is much truth in it: "Of all professions that of a newspaper editor disqualifies one for diplomatic work more than any other. American journalism is carried on in such a manner that it dishonors those who follow it, and the idea of an editor keeping a secret, unless by so doing he can make what is called 'a scoop,' is perfectly preposterous. Many of our American newspaper editors are mere man-hunters - their trade deprives them of the character of gentlemen."

A New York lawyer- at least we understand that he is a lawyer- has been sued for $152 for laces, lingerie and embroideries sold to his wife, a woman in good society. He denies that they were "necessaries," and his answer has been held not frivolous. Certainly it is not. Every thing depends on the fortune, income and station of the husband. In old times jewelry was held superfluous for the wife of a special pleader, while silver fringes to a petticoat and side-saddle, value £94, were held reasonable for the wife of a sergeant at law. But the defendant must look out for that decision in the Federal Supreme Court about the Russian countess' ten thousand dollars' worth of laces as travelling luggage.

NOTES OF CASES.

'N State v. Murphy, Rhode Island Supreme Court,

made by one fatally wounded, immediately after receiving his injuries, to a person whom he called to his assistance, that he was robbed and assaulted about half a minute previously by men whom he described, is part of the res gesta, and admissible against the alleged murderer; and that similar statements made ten minutes later to a personal friend, for whom deceased sent immediately after

is intended. The law is founded on reason and common sense, and the statute was enacted to prevent the mails from being used to disseminate the vile literature and indecent pictures with which the country was flooded; those things calculated and intended to create and cater to a morbid appetite for obscenity and lewdness, and to corrupt the morals of the people, and especially the young, who are more susceptible to such influences. United States v. Bebout, 28 Fed. Rep. 522; United States v. Chesman, 19 id. 497. No one in this day can deny the right to the widest latitude of discussion of all subjects of interest to the people. Any thought which may contain the germ of an idea calculated to benefit any human being, when couched in decent language, ought to be disseminated among the people. The question of obscenity in any particular article must depend largely on the place, manner and object of its publication. It would not be proper to discuss certain matters in a family newspaper which might be discussed with propriety in a medical journal. Again, if the writer was in good faith attacking some great, flagrant wrong, the use of plain language, although offensive to ears polite, might be permitted."

In Timpson v. Manhattan Railway Co., 53 Hun, 489, an action for personal injuries, the plaintiff in leaving the train of the defendant stepped upon the platform of the station, slipped and fell. There had been a considerable fall of snow the day before the accident, which there had been an attempt to remove from the platform, and it was snowing and sleeting, and the wind was blowing hard, and the No platform was slippery either from snow or ice. sand or ashes had been put upon the platform. Held, that a proper case was presented for the consideration of the jury. Van Brunt, P. J., said: "This action was brought to recover damages for personal injuries received by the plaintiff by slipping upon ice upon the platform of the defendant's station, and in falling striking against an iron pillar, and thus injuring himself. This case was tried once before and came up to this court upon appeal, and we see no reason now to change the opinion then expressed, that there was enough of competent proof to sustain the verdict, although we were compelled to reverse the judgment because of an error in the reception of evidence. It is true that there has been called to our attention, upon this appeal, a decision of the Court of Appeals which had not been rendered upon the argument of the previous appeals; and although it may be difficult to reconcile entirely the reasoning of the court in the last case cited (Palmer v. Penn. Ry. Co., 111 N. Y. 488) with some previous decisions, yet it seems to us that in construing the particular facts of that case it should not be held to overrule the authority of previous cases, which seem to be entirely applicable to the facts disclosed by the evidence in the case at bar. In the case of Weston v. New York Elevated Ry. Co., 73 N. Y. 595, it was held that the defendant was bound to be alert during cold

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weather and see whether there was ice upon the platform, and to remove it or make it safe by sanding it, or by putting ashes upon it, or in some other manner. Consequently upon the fact being shown that this platform was in this slippery condition, and that no means had been used by either sanding or putting ashes upon the platform to make it safe for passengers who were compelled to land upon it, a prima facie case was made out against the defendant. It is true that in the opinion in the case of Palmer v. Penn. Ry. Co., above mentioned, the learned judge who delivered the same makes use of language which seems to be inconsistent with the rule above laid down. But we think that until it is distinctly held by the Court of Appeals that no such diligence is to be used upon the part of railroad companies in respect to the maintenance of that part of the platform upon which the passenger is bound to alight, as to which he has no choice, we cannot concur."

ASSIGNMENTS VOID BECAUSE OF PREFER

10

ENCES.

So long as he clings to the wreck with hope the mas

ter may throw freight and ballast to the clamoring waters. But when he pushes off from the foundered ship in despair, and abandons her to the besieging elements, he may no longer direct or say whither she shall go. So is it with the insolvent debtor to-day; though it was not thus formerly. Once his right to prefer any creditor knew no limit, no matter what were the circumstances under which the preference was made. Now this hitherto unrestricted power has been hemmed in by statute on one side. In all other directions it is as before, as "broad and general as the easing air." What is the scope of this statutory cur. tailment of power? The inquiry must be answered by an analysis of numerous cases seemingly in conflict. But there runs through them all a broad principletheir virility, so to speak-which signally accords with the philosophy of the statutory changes made. That principle is illustrated by the case of the mariner who deserts the sinking vessel. The statutes referred to generally prohibit preferences in general assignments; and the doctrine to be educed from the decisions is that the debtor's loss of hope, followed by the determination to yield to creditors the dominion of his entire property, makes the boundary at which the power to prefer must stop, whatever be the form or order or number of the instruments by which this design is sought to be effectuated. A general assignment in form is not necessary to bring the preferences within the inhibition of the statute.

The enactments which have wrought this change either declare void the preference or annul the assignment itself, and convert the assigned property into a trust fund, to be administered by a court of equity for all creditors alike; or in some instances destroy the assignment, and stop there. They have all one mission to perform, namely, to strike at and kill the preference wherever an insolvent debtor parts with control of all of his property. The question has come up under various circumstances in the Federal court in the Missouri district. In Martin v. Hausman, 14 Fed. Rep. 160, a transfer as security was made, embracing the assignor's property. The instrument was not in form a general assignment for benefit of creditors; but it was held to be within the Missouri statute, which provided that "all assignments must be