his person, property, or relative rights, through the act or default of another. The sum claimed as such indemnity by a plaintiff in his complaint. The injury or loss for which compensation is sought.

Actual damages are those awarded for a loss or injury actually sustained; in contra-distinction from damages implied by law, and from those awarded by way of punishment. Compensatory damages are those allowed as a recompense for the injury actually received. Consequential damages are those which, though directly, are not immediately consequent upon the act or default complained of. Exemplary damages are damages allowed as a punishment for torts committed with fraud, actual malice, or deliberate violence, or oppression. General damages are those which necessarily, and by implication of law, result from the act or default complained of. Liquidated damages are

a-11 Johns. 130; 2 Texas, 460; 11 Pick. 527; 15 Ohio, 726; 3 Sumn. C. C. 192; 4 Mass. C. C. 115. b2 Greenl. Ev. 256; Sedgwick Dam. c. 3. C-17 Pick. 78; 3 Texas, 324: 13 Ala. (N. S.) 490: 28 Me. 361; 2 Wis. 427: 1 Sneed, 515; 4 Blackf. 277: 6 Q. B. 928. d-4 Jones, 163; 1 Smith L Cas. 302-304. e-i C. & P.

damages whose amount has been determined by anticipatory agreement between the parties. Measure of damages is a rule or method by which the damage sustained is to be estimated or measured. Nominal damages are a trifling sum awarded where a breach of duty, or an infraction of the plaintiff's right is shown, but no serious loss is proved to have been sustained. Punitive damages are exemplary damages. Special damages are such as arise directly, but not necessarily, or by implication of law, from the act or default complained of. For further definition see subsequent sections of this subject. Unliquidated damages are damages whose amount has not been determined.

To constitute a right to recover damages, the party claiming damages must have sustained a loss; the party against whom they are claimed must be chargeable with a wrong; the loss must be the natural and proximate consequence of the wrong. There is no right to damages, properly so called, where there is no loss. Damages are based on the idea of a loss to be compensated, a damage to be made good. This loss, however, need not always be distinct and definite, capable of exact description, or of measurements in dollars and cents. A sufficient loss to sustain an action may appear from the mere nature of the case itself.

conse

The loss must be the natural and proximate consequence of the wrong. Or, the "direct and necessary," or, "legal and natural" consequence. It must not be "remote" or quential." The loss must be the natural consequence. Every man is expected-and may justly be-to foresee the usual and natural consequences of his acts, and for these he may justly be held accountable; but not for consequences that could not have been foreseen. It must also be the proximate consequence. W Vague and indefinite results, remote and consequential, and, thus, uncertain, are not embraced in the compensation given by damages. It cannot be certainly known that they are attributable to the wrong, or whether they are not rather connected with other causes.d

In an action for damages for an injury caused by negligence, the plaintiff must himself appear to have been free from fault; for, if his own negligence in any way contributed directly to produce the injury, he can recover nothing. The law will not attempt to apportion the loss according to the different degrees of negligence of the two parties. Judicial officers are not liable in damages for erroneous decisions.

When a servant is injured through the negli gence of a fellow-servant employed in the same enterprise or avocation, the common employer is not liable for damages. The servant in cngaging, takes the risk of injury from the neg ligence of his fellow-servants. But this rule 181; 11 East. 60; 7 Me. 51; 1 Iowa, 407; 17 Pick. 284; 2 Met. (Mass.) 615; 3 Barb. 49: 14 Ohio, 364; 3 La. An. 441; Sedgw. Dam. 468. f-4 Met. (Mass.) 49; 6 La. An. 495; 23 Penn. St. 384; 5 N. Y. 493; 15 Ge 349: 15 Ill. 550; 20 Ohio, 415; 3 Ohio St. 201; Exch. 343.

does not exonerate the master from liability of negligence of a servant in a different employ

ment.

There is no right to damages where there is no wrong. It is not necessary that there should be a tort, strictly so called-a wilful wrong, an act involving moral guilt. The wrong may be either a wilful, malicious injury, or one committed through mere motives of interest, as in many cases of conversion of goods, trespasses on land, etc.; or, it may consist of a mere neglect to discharge a duty, with suitable skill or fidelity, as where an officer is held liable for the escape of his prisoner, or a carrier for neglect to deliver goods; or a simple breach of contract, as in case of refusal to deliver goods sold, or to perform services under an agreement; or it may be a wrong of another person for whose act or default a legal liability exists, as where a master is held liable for an injury done by his servant, or apprentice, or a railroad company for an accident resulting from the negligence of their engineer. But there must be something which the law recognizes as a wrong, some breach of a legal duty, some violation of legal right, some default or neglect, some failure in responsibility, sustained by the party claiming damages. For the sufferer by accident, or by the innocent or rightful acts of another, cannot claim indemnity for his misfortune; it is called damnum absque injuria(a loss without a wrong), for which the law gives no remedy. The obligation violated must also be one owed to the plaintiff. The neglect of a duty which the plaintiff had no legal right to enforce gives no claim to damages. Thus, where the postmaster of Rochester, New York, was required by law to publish lists of letters uncalled for in the newspaper having the largest circulation, and the proprietors of the "Rochester Daily Democrat" claimed to have the larg. est circulation, and to be entitled to the advertising, but the postmaster refused to give it to them, it was held that no action would lie against him for the loss of the profits of the advertising. The duty to publish in the paper having the largest circulation was a duty not owed to the publisher of that paper. It was imposed upon the postmaster, not for the benefit of publishers of newspapers, but for the advantage of persons to whom letters were addressed, and they alone had a legal interest to enforce it.h

ASSESSMENT of damages is made by the court through its proper officer or clerk, where it is a mere matter of calculation; in other cases it must be done by the jury.

DAMAGE FEASANT are those injuries committed by animals belonging to one person upon the land of another, by feeding, treading

-15 Ohio, 659; 11 Pick. 527; 11 M. & W. 755; 10 Met. (Mass) 371; 13 Wend. 261. h-11 Barb. 135; see also 17 Wend. 554: 11 Pick 526. 1-3 Bl. Comm 6; Co. Litt. 142, 161: Com. Dig. Pl (3 M. 26.) j-19 Barb. 461; 9 Cush. 228; 16 B. Mon. 577; 22 Conn. 74: 27 Miss. 68 10 Ga. 37; 20 Id. 428, 6 Rich. 419: 1 Cal. 33, 363; 5 Id. 410: 11 Gratt. 697. k-See 3 Abb. Pr.

down the grass, corn, or other productions of the soil.i

DOUBLE OR TREBLE damages are in some cases allowed by statute. In these cases the actual damage doubled or trebled, and not assessed like double or treble costs.

EXCESSIVE OR INADEQUATE. Even in that large class of cases in which there is no fixed measure of damages, but they are left to the discretion of the jury, the court has a certain power to review the verdict, and to set it aside if the damages awarded are grossly excessive or unreasonably inadequate. The rule is, however, that a verdict will not be set aside for excessive damages unless the amount is so large as to satisfy the court that the jury have been misled by passion, prejudice, ignorance, or partiality.) But this power is very sparingly used; and cases are numerous in which the courts have expressed themselves dissatisfied with the verdict, but have refused to interfere on the ground that the case did not come within this rule. As a general rule, in actions of tort the court will not grant a new trial on the ground of the smallness of damages. But they have power to do so in a proper case; and in a few instances in which the jury have given no redress at all, when some was clearly due, the verdict has been set aside.

In cases where there is a fixed legal rule regulating the measure of damages, it must be stated to the jury upon the trial. The failure to state it correctly is ground of exception. And if the jury disregard the instructions of the court on the subject, their verdict may be set aside. In so far, however, as the verdict is an honest determination of the questions of fact properly within this province, it will not, in general, be disturbed."

EXEMPLARY.

In actions for torts, strictly so called, where gross fraud or actual malice, or deliberate violence, or oppression appears, the jury are not confined to a strict compensation for the plaintiff's loss, but may, in assessing damages, allow a sum as a punishment of the defendant for his wrong committed upon the plaintiff. Such an allowance is termed "smart money," or 'exemplary," "vindictive," or "punitive' damages. They are assessed in one sum, with any allowance the jury may think proper to make as compensation for the actual loss sustained; and the whole sum is awarded to the injured party.

The propriety of allowing damages to be given by way of punishment under any circumstances has been strenuously denied in many cases, and the question has given rise to extensive discussion; but the weight of author

104; 5 Id. 272; 22 Barb. 87; 20 Mo. 272; 15 Ark. 345: 6 Texas, 352; 9 Id. 20; 16 Ill. 405; Cowp. 230; 2 Story C. C. 661; 3 Id. 1; 1 Zab. 183; 5 Mass. C. Č. 197. 1-1 Cal. 450; 2 E. D. Smith, 349; 4 Q. B. 917. m-12 Mod. 150; 2 Str. 940: 24 Eng. L. & Eq. Circumstances must show that the jury have acted under an improper motive n-Sedgw. Dam. 604.

ity is decidedly that such allowance in a suitable case is proper. But they should be carefully denied whenever the defendant is criminally liable to punishment for the wrong done, by indictment and fine, or otherwise.P

LIQUIDATED. Where there is an agreement between the parties for the doing or not doing particular acts, the parties may, if they please, estimate beforehand the damages to result from a breach of the agreement, and prescribe in the agreement itself the sum to be paid by either by way of damages for such breach.9

The sum named in an agreement as damages to be paid in case of a breach will, in general, be considered as liquidated damages, or as a penalty, according to the intent of the parties. The mere use of the words "penalty" or liquidated damages" will not be decisive of the question if, on the whole, the instrument discloses a different intent."

Such a stipulation in agreement will be considered as a penalty merely, and not as liquidated damages, in the following cases: Where the parties in the agreement have expressly declared it, or described it as a "penalty," and no other intent is deducible from the instrument; where it is doubtful on the language of the instrument whether the stipulation was intended as a penalty or as liquidated damages; where the agreement was evidently made for the attainment of another object or purpose, to which the stipulation is wholly collateral;" where the agreement imposes several distinct duties or obligations of different degrees of importance, and yet the same sum is named as damages for a breach of either indifferently; where the agreement is not under seal, and the damages are capable of being certainly known and estimated; where the instrument provides that a larger sum shall be paid, upon default to pay a lesser sum in the manner pre

scribed.

The stipulation will be sustained as liquidated damages in the following cases: Where

-To trace the discussion on this subject consult 13 Ala. (N. S.) 490; 27 Id. 678: 28 Id. 236; 15 Ark. 452: 3 Day, 477: 6 Conn. 508; 7 Id. 274; 10 Id. 384; 15 Id. 225, 267; 4 Ill. 373; 7 Id. 432; 16 Id. 283; 5 Ind. 322; 13 B. Mon. 219; 17 Id. 101; 2 Mart. 257; 7 La. An. 447: 1 Id. 292; 3 Mass. 546; 10 Id. 459; 15 Pick. 297: 21 Id. 378; 4 Cush. 273; 27 Miss. 68; 14 Mo. 104; 21 Id. 289: 10 N. H. 130; 3 Barb. 42, 651; 4 Wend. 113: I Abb. Pr. 289; 1 N. Y. 18; 3 Id. 191; 4 Id. 452; II Id. 356; Busb. 395; 6 W. & S. 15: 5 Watts, 375; 20 Penn. St. 85, 354; 23 Id. 424, 523: 3 Strobh. 425; 4 Id. 34; 8 Rich. 144; 2 Sneed, 456; 2 Texas, 460; 5 Id. 141; 9 Id. 358; 12 Id. 297: 3 Wis. 424: 4 Id. 67; 1 Cranch. C. C. 187; 1 Wash. C. C. 152; Wall. Jr. C. C. 164; 2 Mas. C. C. 120; 2 Story C. C. 1; 3 Wheat. 546; 10 Pet. 81; 13 How. 363, 447: 16 Id. 480; 2 Wils. 205; 3 Id. 18; 5 Saund. 442; 2 Stark. 282; 5 C. & P. 372; 13 M. & W. 47; 3 Am. Jur. 387; 5 Bost. L. R. 529; 10 Id. 49 2 Greenl. Ev. 523; 1 Kent Comm. (10th Ed.) 630, p-4 Cush. 273 5 Ind. 322; but compare 6 Texas, 266; 1 Cal 54: 18 Mo. 71; 1 Abb. Pr. 289; Duer, 247, 13 M. & W. 47; 5 Taunt. 442; 2 Stark, 282; 1 Murr. S. C. 15, 317, 428. q-1 H. Bl. 232: 2 B. & P. 335, 350; 2 Brown Parl. Cas. 431; 4 Burr. 2225; 2 T. R. 32. Story Eq. Jur. 1318; 6 B. & C. 224; 6 Bingh. 141; 6 Ired. 186; 15 Me. 273: 2 Ala (N. S.) 425; 8 Mo. 467.

n.

B. & P. 340, 350, 360; 1 H. Bl. 227; 1 Camp. 78;

the agreement is of such a nature that the damages are uncertain, and are not capable of being ascertained by any satisfactory and known rule; where, from the tenor of the agreement, or from the nature of the case, it appears that the parties have ascertained the amount of damages by fair calculation and adjustment." MEASURE OF.

BILLS OF EXCHANGE AND PROMISSORY NOTES. See GENERAL STATUTES.

CARRIERS. Upon a total failure to deliver goods, the carrier is liable for the value of the goods at their place of destination, with interest, deducting the freight. Upon a failure to take the goods at all for transportation, he is liable for the difference between the value at the place of shipment and at the place of destination, less his freight; or, if another conveyance can be found, the difference between the freight agreed on with the defendant, and the sum (if greater) which the shipper would be compelled to pay another carrier. Upon a delay to deliver the goods, the plaintiff is entitled to an indemnity for his loss incurred by the delay, taking into account any fall in the market occurring between the time when the property should have been delivered by the carrier, and the time when it actually was. See title BAILMENTS, ante.

CONTRACTS. Where a contract prescribes price to be paid, the compensation recoverable for a part performance will be measured by the contract price if practicable, and not by the actual value of the services or goods, etc., furnished.

Where a vender of real property fails to convey according to his contract, a distinction is taken, in many cases, growing out of the mo tive of the party in default. If he acted in good faith and supposed he had good title and could convey, the purchaser's damages have been limited to the amount of his advance, if any, interest and expenses of examining the title. But in case of a wilful and fraudulent refusal to convev, the purchaser has been held

7 Wheat. 14; 1 McMull. 106; 2 Ala. (N. S.) 425; 5 Met. (Mass.) 61; 1 Pick. 451; 4 Id. 179; 3 Johns. Cas. 297: 17 Barb. 260; 24 Vt. 97. t-3 C. & P. 240; 6 Humph. 186; 5 Sandf. 192; 24 Vt. 97; 16 Ill. 475. u-11 Mass. 488; 15 Id. 488; 1 Brown Ch. 418. v-6 Bingh. 141: 5 Bingh. (N. C.) 390; 7 Scott, 364; 5 Sandf. 192; but see 7 Johns. 72; 15 Id. 200; 9 N. Y. 551. W-2 Barn, & Ald. 704; 6 Barn. & C. 216; 1 M. & M. 41; 4 Dall. 150; 5 Cow. 144. X-5 Sandf. 192, 640; 16 Ill. 400; 14 Ark. 329. y-2 T. R. 32; 1 Alc. & N. Ir. 389; 2 Burr. 2225: 10 Ves. Ch. 429: 3 M. & W. 535: 3 C. & P. 240; 8 Mass. 223; 7 Cow. 307; 4 Wend. 468; 5 Sandf, 192; 12 Barb. 137, 366; 18 Id. 336; 14 Ark. 315; 2 Ohio St. 519. Z-2 Story Eq. Jur. & 1318; 2 Greenl. Ev. 259: 1 Bingh. 302; 7 Conn. 291; 11 N. H. 234; 6 Blackf. 206; 13 Wend. 507; 17 Id. 447; 22 Id. 201; 26 Id. 630; 10 Mass. 459: 7 Met. (Mass.) 583; 2 Ala. (N. S.) 425; 14 Me. 250. a-See title "BONDS, NOTES, AND BILLS," and GENERAL STATUTES. b-12 S. & R. 186; 8 Johns. 213; To Id. 1; 14 Id. 170; 15 Id. 24; 14 Ill. 146; 24 N. H. 297; 1 Cal. 108; 10 La. An. 412; 5 Rich. 462; 9 Id. 465; 17 Mass. 62. C-10 Watts, 418; 4 N. Y. 340; 1 Abb. Adm. 119. d-12 N. Y. 509; 22 Barb. 278; but see 19 Barb. 36. e-2 W. Bl. 1078; 10 B. & C. 416; 86 B. 133; 2 Wend. 399: 4 Denio, 546; 6 Barb. 646; 20 N. Y. 140; 2 Bibb. 415; 1 Litt. 358; 9 Md. 250; 11 Penn. St. 127.

entitled to the value of the land with interest.

SALES. Where the seller of chattels fails to perform his agreement, the measure of damages is the difference between the contract price and the market value of the article at the time and place fixed for delivery. The same rule applies as to the deficiency where there is a part delivery only. Where, however, the purchaser has paid the price in advance, the purchaser is allowed the highest market price up to the time of the trial. Where the purchaser refuses to take and pay for the goods, the seller may sell them fairly, and charge the buyer with the difference between the contract price and the best market price obtainable within a reasonable time after the refusal. Where the goods are delivered and received, but do not correspond in quality with a warranty given, the vendee may recover the difference between the value of the goods delivered and the value they would have had if they had corresponded with the contract.

See GENERAL STATUTES.

MITIGATION of damages is often effected by matters which are no answer to the action itself, but which may often be given in evidence to reduce or diminish the amount of the penalty or punishment.

NOMINAL. Whenever any act injures another's right, and would be evidence in future in favor of a wrong-doer, an action may be obtained for an invasion of the right without proof of any specific injury.1 And whenever the breach of an agreement, or the invasion of a right, is established, the law infers some damage, and, if none is shown, will award a trifling sum; as, a penny, one cent, six and a quarter cents, etc. Thus, such damages may be awarded in actions for flowing lands; injuries to commons 'trespass to lands;" neglect of official duties, in some cases;" breach of contract; and in many other cases where the effect of the suit will be to determine a right.p

SMART MONEY. See EXCESSIVE, EXEMPLARY, OR INADEQUATE DAMAGES, above. UNLIQUIDATED DAMAGES. See LIQUIDATED DAMAGES, above.

Date. See TIME.

Daughter. See DESCENDANTS.

Daughter-in-Law. See DESCENDANTS.
Day. See TIME.

Day-Book. See ACCOUNTS.

Days of Grace. See BONDS, NOTES, AND Bills.

De Bene Esse. See PRACTICE.

De Facto. See PRACTICE.

Declaratory. See STATUTE Law.
Decree. See PRACTICE.

Dedication. See HIGHWAY: REAL PROPERTY.
Deduction for New. See MARITIME LAW.
Deed. See CONVEYANCES, "Deeds."

Deed Poll. See CONVEYANCES, "Deeds."
Defamation. See SLANDER.

Defeasance. See CONVEYANCES, "Mortgages."
Defect. See PLEADING.

Defence. See PLEADING; PRACTICE; TORTS.
Defendant. See PRACTICE.

Defensive War. See MILITARY LAW; WAR.
Deficit. See ACCOUNTS.

Degrading. See SLANDER.

Del Credere Commission. See AGENCY; AGENTS.

Deliberation. See CONTRACTS.

Delirium Febrile. See MEDICAL LAW.
Delirium Tremens. See MEDICAL LAW.

Delivery. See CONVEYANCES, "Deeds:" MEDICAL LAW.

Delusion. See MEDICAL LAW.

Demand. See CONTRACTS; PRACTICE.

Dementia. See MEDICAL Law.

Demise. See CONVEYANCES, “Leases.”

Demurrage. See BAILMENTS.

Demurrer. See PLEADING; PRACTICE.

Denial. See PLEADING.

Departure. See MERCANTILE LAW; PLEADING. Deposit. See BAILMENTS.

Deposition. See EVIDENCE.

Deputy. See OFFICE AND Officer.
Descent. See HEIRS.

Description. See CONTRACTS.

Desertion. See CRIMINAL LAW; MILITARY

LAW.

f-6 B. & C. 31; 1 Exch. 850; 6 Wheat. 109; Hardin. 41; 2 Bibb. 40, 434; 9 Leigh. 111. g-5 N. Y. 537: 12 id. 41: 3, Mich. 55; 6 McLean C. C. 102, 497: 4 Texas, 289; 12 Ill. 184. h-16 Q. B. 941. i-1 Wms. Saund. 346, a; 28 N. H. 438; 13 Conn. 269. j-14 Ill. 301; 4 Denio, 554; Sedg. Dam. 47. K-2 Story C. C. 661; 1 Rawle, 27; 12 Me. 183; 28 N. H. 438. 1-2 East. 154. m-24 Wend. 188; 2 Texas, 206; see 4 Jones, 139. 11

Disjunctive Allegations. See PLEADING. Disorderly House. See CRIMINAL LAW. Disseizin. See REAL PROPERTY.

Dissolution. See CONTRACTS; PARTNERSHIP;

PRACTICE.

Dissuade. See CRIMINAL LAW.

Distress. See PRACTICE.

Distribution. See PRACTICE.

5 Met. (Mass.) 517; 12 Id. 535; 1 Denio, 548; 27 Vt. 563; 23 Id. 306; 12 N. H. 341. 0-1 Duer, 363: 2 Hill (N. Y.) 644; 5 Id. 290, 505; 6 Md. 274. p-2 Wils. 414; 12 Ad. & E. 488; 2 Scott (N. R.) 390; 13 Conn. 361; 20 Mo. 603; 28 Me. 505; 19 Miss. 98; 2 La. An. 907; and see, in explanation and limitation, 10 B. & C. 145: 14 C. B. 595; 1 Q. B. 636; 18 Id. 252; 22 Vt. 231; i Dutch. 255; 14 B. Mon 330; 5 Ind. 250; 6 Rich. 75.

Divorce. See MARRIAGE.

Docket. See PRACTICE.
Documents. See EVIDENCE.
Dollar. See MONEY.
Domestics. See PERSONS

DOMICIL. See EVIDENCE; DEATH: PRACTICE. DOMICIL is that place where a man has his true, fixed, and permanent home, and principal

establishment, and to which, whenever he is absent, he has the intention of returning.

Domicil may be either national or domestic. In deciding the question of national domicil, the point to be determined will be in which of two or more nationalities a man has his domicil. In deciding the matter of domestic domicil, the question is, in which subdivision of a nation does a person have his domicil. Thus, whether a person is domiciled in England or France would be a question of national domicil; whether in Norfolk or Suffolk county a question of domestic domicil. This distinction is to be kept in mind, since the rules for determining the two domicils, though frequently, are not necessarily the same.

Legal residence, inhabitability, and domicil are generally used as synonymous ; but much depends on the connection and purpose. Two things must concur to establish domicil. These two must exist, or must have existed, in combination. There must have been an actual residence. The character of the residence is of no importance; and if it has once existed, mere temporary absence will not destroy it, however long continued ; as, in the case of a soldier in the army. And the law favors the presumption of a continuance of domicil.) The original domicil continues till it is fairly changed for another, and revives with an intention to return.1 This principal of revival, however, does not apply where both domicils are domestic. Mere taking up residence is not sufficient, unless there be an intention to abandon the former domicil; nor is intention

a-Lieber Encyc. Am.; 10 Mass. 188; 11 La. 175; 5 Met. (Mass.) 187; 4 Barb. 505; Wall Jr. C. C. 217; 9 Ired. 99: 1 Texas, 673; 13 Me. 255; 27 Miss. 704; 1 Bosw. 673. b-See 2 Kent Comm. 449; Story Confl. Laws, 39, et seq.; Westlake Priv. Int. L. 15; Wheat. Int. L. 123, et seq. e-1 Bradf. Surr. 70: 1 Harring. 383: Spence, 328; 2 Rich. 489; 10 N. H. 452; 3 Wash. C. C. 55; 15 M. & W. 433; 23 Pick. 170; 5 Met. (Mass.) 298; 4 Barb. 505; 7 Gray, 299. d-1 Wend. 43 5 Pick. 231; 17 Id. 231; 15 Me. 58. e-8 Ala. (N. S.) 159; 4 Barb. 504; 6 How. 163; Story Conf. L. 44: 17 Pick. 231; 27 Miss. 704; 15 N. H. 137. f-11 La. 175: 5 Met. (Mass.) 587, 20 Johns. 208; 12 La. 190; 1 Binn. 349. -8 Me. 203; 1 Speer's Eq. 3:5 Eng. L. & Eq. 52. h-7 Clark & F. Ho. L. 842; 13 Beav. Rolls, 366; 43 Me. 426; 3 Bradf. Surr. 267: 29 Ala. (N. S.) 703: 4 Texas, 1873 Me. 455; 8 Id. 103 10 Pick. 79; 3 N. H. 123; 3 Wash, C. C. 555. i36 Me. 428; 4 Barb. 522. j-5 Ves. Ch. 750; 5 Madd. Ch. 379 5 Pick. 370; 1 Ashm. 126; Wall. Jr. C. C. 17; 1 Bosw. 673; 21 Penn. St. 106. K-5 Ves. Ch. 750, 757; 5 Madd. Ch. 232, 370; 10 Pick. 77. Story Conf. L. 481, a n. ; 8 Ala (N. S.) 169; 13 ld. 58; 18 Id. 367; 2 Swanst. 232; Texas, 673; Woodb. & M. C. C. 8; 15 Me. 58; Wall. Jr. 11; 10 N. H. 156. 1-1

of constituting domicil alone sufficient, unless accompanied by some acts in furtherance of such intention. A subsequent intent may be grafted on a temporary residence.P Removal to a place with an intention of remaining there for an indefinite period, and as a place of fixed present domicil, constitutes domicil, though Both there be a floating intention to return. inhabitantcy and intention are to a great extent matters of fact, and may be gathered from slight indications. The place where a person lives is presumed to be the place of domicil until facts establish the contrary."

Domicil is of three kinds: 1, domicil by birth; 2, domicil by choice, and, 3, domicil by operation of law. The place of birth is the domicil by birth, if at that time it is the domicil of the parents. If the parents are on a journey, the actual domicil of the parents will generally be the place of domicil. Children of ambassadors, and children born on seas, take the domicil of their parents. The domi. cil of an illegitimate child is that of the mother; of a legitimate child, that of the father. The domicil by birth of a minor continues to be his domicil till changed. Domicil by choice is that domicil which a person of capacity, of his free will, selects to be such. Residence by constraint, which is involuntary by banishment, arrest, or imprisonment, will not work a change of domicil. Domicil is conferred in many cases by operation of law, either expressly or consequentially. Children born in foreign lands of parents who are at the time citizens of the United States, have their domicil of birth in the United States.a

The domicil of the husband is that of the wife. A woman on marriage takes the domicil of her husband, and the husband, if entitled to a divorce, may obtain it, though the wife be actually resident in a foreign State. But, if entitled to a divorce, the wife may acquire a separate domicil, which may be in the same jurisdiction The domicil of a widow remains that of her deceased husband until she makes a change. The domicil of the ward

Curt. Eccl. 856; 19 Wend. 11; 8 Cranch, 278; 3 C. Rob. Adm. 12; 3 Wheat. 14; 8 Ala. (N. S.) 159: 3 Rawle, 312; 1 Gall. C. C. 275; 4 Mass. C. C. 308; 8 Wend. 134. m-5 Madd. Ch. 379; Am. L. Cas. 714. n-1 Speer's, 1; 6 M. & W. 511; 5 Me. 143; 10 Mass. 488; Curt. Eccl. 856; 4 Cal. 175; 2 Ohio, 232: 5 Sandf. 44. 0-5 Pick. 370; 1 Bosw. 673; 5 Md. 186. p-2 C. Rob. Adm. 322. q-2 B. & P. 228; 3 Hagg. Fccl. 374. r-17 Pick. 231; 4 Cush. 190; 1 Met. (Mass.) 242; 5 ld. 587; 1 Sneed, 63. S-2 B. & P. 228 : 2 Kent Comm. 532. t-Story Confl. L. 46; 2 Hagg. Eccl. 405; 5 Texas, 211. See 10 Rich. 38. -5 Ves. Ch. 750; Westl. Priv. Int. L. 17. V-Story Conf. L. 2 48. w-Id. 45; 35 Me. 411; 8 Cush. 75. See Westl. Priv. Int. L. 19. Where the place of birth is said to be their domicil at common law, Cald. 559. X-2 Hagg. Eccl. 405: 1 Binn. 349. y-1 Binn. 349; 3 Zabr. 394; 8 Blackf. 345. Z-Story Confl. L. 47: 3 Ves. Ch. 198, 202 11 Conn. 234; 5 Texas, 211; 1 Milw. 191. a-10 Rich. 38. See 26 Barb. 383. b-9 Bligh. Ho. L. 83, 104: 2 Stock. 238; 29 Ala. (N. S.) 719.) C-2 Clark & F. Ho. L. 488; 1 Addis, 5, 19; 1 Dowl. 117; 2 Curt. Eccl. 351. See, also, 15 Johns. 121; 1 Dev. & B. 583; 11 Pick. 410; 14 d. 181; 2 Strobh. Eq. 184. d-Story Conf. L. 46; 18 Penn. St. 17.