Statement as to time when offense was committed. Statement Construc tion of in an the offense less than, or different, from buying the stolen property.-People vs. Montejo, 18 Cal., p. 38. An indictment charging a Tax Collector with having in his possession, with intent to circulate, and with actually putting in circulation and issuing licenses other than those authorized by law, does not charge two offenses.— People vs. De la Guerra, 31 Cal., p. 459. An indictment which charges an assault and battery only as part of, or the mode of executing a fercible arrest and abduction, does not charge two separate offenses.-People vs. Ah Own, 39 Cal., p. 604. An indictment for rape, charging the offense and assault to commit it, does not charge two offenses.-People vs. Tyler, 35 Cal., p. 553; see, also, People vs. Valencia, April Term, 1872. If the indictment charges two offenses the objection is waived, unless it is taken by demurrer.-People vs. Garnett, 29 Cal., p. 622; People vs. Conner, 17 Cal., p. 354; People vs. Burgess, 35 Cal., p. 115. 955. (§ 242.) The precise time at which the offense was committed need not be stated in the indictment; but it may be alleged to have been committed at any time before the finding thereof, except where the time is a material ingredient in the offense. NOTE.-See note to Sec. 959 of this Code. 956. (§ 243.) When an offense involves the commission of, or an attempt to commit, a private injury, and is described with sufficient certainty in other respects to identify the act, an erroneous allegation as to the person injured, or intended to be injured, is not material. NOTE.-Where on the trial for an assault with intent to inflict bodily injury the proof shows a misnomer as to the party injured, the variance is not immaterial, unless there be in the case other circumstances sufficient to identify the offense.-People vs. McNealy, 17 Cal., p. 332. 957. (§ 244) The words used in an indictment words used are construed in their usual acceptance in common indictment. language, except such words and phrases as are defined by law, which are construed according to their legal meaning. NOTE.-People vs. Littlefield, 5 Cal., p. 355. 958. (§ 245.) Words used in a statute to define a public offense need not be strictly pursued in the indictment; but other words conveying the same meaning may be used. NOTE. In charging an offense it is not necessary to follow strictly the language of the statute; words conveying the same meaning may be used.-People vs. Potter, 35 Cal., p. 110. Words used in a statute need not be strictly pursued. 959. (§ 246.) The indictment is sufficient if it Indictcan be understood therefrom: 1. That it is entitled in a Court having authority to receive it, though the name of the Court be not stated; 2. That it was found by a Grand Jury of the county in which the Court was held; 3. That the defendant is named, or, if his name cannot be discovered, that he is described by a fictitious name, with a statement that his true name is to the jury unknown; 4. That the offense was committed at some place within the jurisdiction of the Court, except where the act, though done without the local jurisdiction of the county, is triable therein; 5. That the offense was committed at some time prior to the time of finding the indictment; 6. That the act or omission charged as the offense is clearly and distinctly set forth in ordinary and concise language, without repetition, and in such a manner as to enable a person of common understanding to know what is intended; 7. That the act or omission charged as the offense is stated with such a degree of certainty as to enable the Court to pronounce judgment upon a conviction, according to the right of the case. Note.-Subd. 1.-See Sec. 950, and note. Subd. 2.-The term of the Court is well stated in the indictment, when the day on which the indictment was found is given.-People vs. Beatty, 14 Cal., p. 566. ment, when sufficient. Subd. 3.-See Sec. 950, and note. Subd. 4.-Charging the commission of an offense at a certain city and county which are within the jurisdiction of the Court, is sufficient.-People vs. Lafuente, 6 Cal., p. 202. An indictment for murder which charges the offense to have been committed in the City and County of San Francisco is sufficient to give the Fourth District Court jurisdiction.-People vs. Robinson, 17 Cal., p. 363. When property has been stolen in one county and carried into another, the jurisdiction of the offense is in either county.-People vs. Robles, 29 Cal., p. 421; People vs. Garcia, 25 Cal., p. 531. If the offense charged consists of one transaction occurring partly in one county and partly in another, the indictment must state the facts.-People vs. Ah Own, 39 Cal., p. 604. The jurisdiction over offenses committed between the time of the passage of an Act cre,ating and the organization of a new county is in the old county.-People vs. McGuire, 32 Cal., p. 140. An accessory must be indicted and tried in the county where the offense of the accessory was committed.People vs. Hodges, 27 Cal., p. 340; see, also, People vs. Stakem, 40 Cal., p. 599. Subd. 5.-If the offense is charged to have been committed on a particular day, which day was anterior to the finding of the indictment, there is no necessity for the averment that the offense was committed before the finding of the indictment.-People vs. Lafuente, 6 Cal., p. 202; People vs. Littlefield, 5 Cal., p. 355. Subds. 6 and 7.-STATEMENT OF THE ACT OR OMISSION GENERALLY.-The substantial facts necessary to constitute the crime must appear in the indictment with such certainty as will enable a man of ordinary intelligence to understand what is intended, and to enable the Court to pronounce a proper judgment; but the facts need not be stated with the particularity required at common law.-People vs. Dolan, 9 Cal., p. 576; People vs. Rodriguez, 10 Cal., p. 50; People vs. White, 34 Cal., p. 183; People vs. Thompson, 4 Cal., p. 238; People vs. Murphy, 40 Cal., p. 52; People vs. Williams, 35 Cal., p. 671. It is sufficient if the indictment charges the offense in the language of the statute. People vs. Dolan, 9 Cal., p. 576; People vs. Martin, 32 Cal., p. 91; People vs. Cronin, 34 Cal., p. 191; People vs. Savins, 14 Cal., p. 29; People vs. Phipps, 39 Cal., p. 326; see, also, Sec. 958 of this Code. If language used in the charging part of an indictment is capable of two interpretations without doing violence to its terms, only one of which imports a charge of larceny, the indictment is not good.-People vs. Williams, 35 Cal., p. 671. It is not necessary that the indictment should state in terms that the offense charged is a felony or misdemeanor. The legal appellation of the crime, as given in the statute defining the offense, must be stated.-People vs. War, 20 Cal., p. 117. Where the indictment fully sets forth the offense the word "feloniously" need not be used.-People vs. Olivera, 7 Cal., p. 403. If a statute, in defining an offense, enumerates a series of acts, either of which separately, or all together, may constitute the offense, all such acts may be charged in a single count in the indictment.People vs. Frank, 28 Cal., p. 507. If the statute enumerates several acts disjunctively which, separately or together, constitute an offense, the indictment, if it charges more than one of them, which it may do, and in the same count, must do so in the conjunctive. This rule has, however, no application where the words used disjunctively are synonymous.-People vs. Tomlinson, 35 Cal., p. 503. When the concurrence of several acts, or the doing of an act under particular circumstances, is necessary to constitute the offense, the indictment must state the acts or circumstances.-People vs. Murphy, 40 Cal., p. 52. An allegation charging the defendant as "Superintendent of Common Schools" is a sufficient description of the office, under the Act of April 6, 1863.-People vs. Doss, 39 Cal., p. 428; see, also, People vs. Potter, 35 Cal., p. 110. An indictment under the eighty-ninth section of the Crimes and Punishment Act (Sec. 783 of this Code) for an offense committed on a vessel on her voyage in the inland waters of this State, must set forth all the facts, giving the extra territorial jurisdiction under the section.-People vs. Dougherty, 7 Cal., p. 395. An allegation in an indictment descriptive of the identity of what is legally essential to the defense, cannot be rejected as surplusage.-People vs. Myers, 20 Cal., p. 76. A bare negative qualification need not be averred, but must be relied on as matter of defense on the trial.-People vs. Nugent, 4 Cal., p. 341. The allegation of a day within the period of limitation is material whenever the offense is subject to limitation.-People vs. Miller, 12 Cal., p. 291. Matter avoiding the Statute of Limitations must be set out in the indictment whenever it would otherwise appear that the offense is barred.People vs. Montejo, 18 Cal., p. 38. CORPORATE NAME, HOW AVERRED.-People vs. Schwartz, 32 Cal., p. 160; People vs. Potter, 35 Cal., p. 110. COMPANY OR PARTNERSHIP NAME, HOW AVerred. See this note under the head "Larceny;" People vs. Schwartz, 32 Cal., p. 160. STATEMENT OF THE ACT OR OMISSION IN PARTICULAR CASES.-ALTERING BRANDS.-An indictment forwhich charges the property as that of an estate, is not good; it should charge that the animal belongs to a particular individual, or that the owner is unknown. ARSON.-See notes to Secs. 447, 451, 452, 454, of this Code. An averment that the defendant" feloniously, willfully, and maliciously did burn and cause to be burned," is sufficient without the statement in this respect that the defendant "set fire."-People vs. Myers, 20 Cal., p. 76. The averment must be direct as to the ownership of the property burned; therefore an indictment which contains two averments as to the ownership of a dwelling house, either of which without the other is good, but which are repugnant to each other, is demurable.-People vs. Myers, 20 Cal., p. 76. An indictment charging that the defendant "did on a certain day burn or caused to be burned a certain dwelling house," is bad.-People vs. Hood, 6 Cal., p. 236. ASSAULT WITH A DEADLY WEAPON.-The weapon or instrument is the gist of the offense, and must be alleged and found.-People vs. Vanard, 6 Cal., p. 562. An indictment accusing the defendant of “ an assault with a deadly weapon with intent to inflict upon the person of another a bodily injury, there appearing no considerable provocation therefor," sufficiently designates the offense.-People vs. War, 20 Cal., p. 117. The indictment should allege that the weapon was deadly, or state such facts as necessarily show that it was deadly.-People vs. Jacobs, 29 Cal., p. 579. An indictment charging the offense in the following language is insufficient: "In and upon one A. B. feloniously did make an assault with a deadly weapon, to wit: a pistol, loaded with powder and ball, with intent then and there to kill A. B. without any just cause or provocation, but with an abandoned and malignant heart." It is not direct and certain as to the offense charged, and it would be difficult to determine from it whether it intends to charge an assault with intent to commit murder or an assault with a deadly weapon.-People vs. Urias, 12 Cal., p. 326. ASSAULT WITH INTENT TO COMMIT MURDER.An indictment is sufficient if it charges that the defendant feloniously assaulted A., with a pistol loaded with |