legislate upon, decide, and control local and subordinate matters pertaining to its respective locality. name. Webster says, a city is a corporate town; a town or collective body of inhabitants, incorporated and governed by particular officers, as a mayor and aldermen. In Mitchell v. Franklin County, 25 Ohio St. 154, it is said that the word city" in this state imports a municipal corporation." In New Orleans v. Clark, 95 U. S. 654, it is said: "A city is only a political subdivision of the state, made for the convenient administration of the government. It is an instrumentality with powers more or less enlarged according to the requirements of the public, and which may be increased or repealed at the will of the legislature." See also Wooster v. Plymouth, 62 N. H. 208; Payne v. Treadwell, 16 Cal. 223. "A city or town is a compact community, with its city or town council, its committee on streets and alleys, and its street commissioner," etc. Wheeling v. Campbell, 12 W. Va. 36; Meyer v. Lincoln, 33 Neb. 572. "Town" Construed to Include City. (See also Town.)-In State v. Glennon, 3 R. I. 278, it was held that the word "town in a statute regulating the sale of intoxicating liquors might be construed to include a city. The court said: "Town is the generic term used in this country, as embracing all kinds of municipal corporations which have the right to make police rules or regulations, controlling all persons and things within certain specified limits. In this sense of the word, a city is a town. is a municipal corporation, possessing all the powers of other municipal corporations, with such additions and limitations as are contained in the charter which gives it existence as a city." It The Constitution of New Jersey provided that the legislature should pass no private or local laws regulating the internal affairs of towns or counties. It was held that the word "towns" in this provision included cities. The court said: Mr. Tomlyn, in his law dictionary, under the title Town,' says: 66 Under the name of a town or village, boroughs, and, it is said, cities, are contained, for every borough or city is a town.' Lord Coke, in 1 Inst. 116, showing the capaciousness of the term, has this language: And it appeareth by Littleton that a town is the genus, and a borough is the species.' Bouvier's definition of the word city is, a town incorporated by that name.' These authorities suffice to show that the term in question is sufficiently elastic to take in, when put to some of its uses, the institution denoted by the term city. Van Riper v. Parsons, 40 N. J. L. 4. See generally the title STATUTES. of the legislature, as referring to the same place, see Murphy v. Waycross, 90 Ga. 36. Same Variance. - In Harvey v. Osborn, 55 Ind. 542, it was held that the fact that the certificate to a deposition showed it to have been taken at the city, instead of at the town, of O., as specified in the notice of such taking, was no cause for suppressing such deposition. The court said: "A town is not always a city, but a city is always a town. Webster's definition of a city is that it is a large town, an incorporated town." Same-Appeal Bonds. In Elma v. Carney, 4 Wash. 419, the court held that the term incorporated cities within a statute excusing such cities from filing a bond upon appeal, applied to all municipal corporations; and therefore that towns were not required to file bonds on appeal. City Purposes. (See also the title MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.) — Within the provision of the Constitution of New York that no county, city, or town shall incur any indebtedness except for county, city, or town purposes, it has been held that the lighting of the streets and public places was a city purpose. Hequembourg v. Dunkirk, 49 Hun (N. Y.) 551. Improvements for the common and general benefit of all the citizens fall within the term "city purposes." People v. Kelly, 76 N. Y. 488. So, in People v. Kelly, 76 N. Y. 475, it was held that this provision did not prohibit the cities of New York and Brooklyn from acquiring the stock of the Brooklyn Bridge Company, the purpose of the act being to extinguish the corporation and to authorize the two cities to complete the construction of the bridge. City Officers. (See also the titles MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS; PUBLIC OFFICERS.) In Burroughs v. Eastman, 93 Mich. 436, it was held, where the charter of a city enumerates and provides for the officers of the city, that, when the statute refers to the city officers, it means only those officers provided for by the charter. So, in State v. Kiichli, 53 Minn. 147, it was held that the president of the city council was not an officer of the city. Volume VI. 2. A city is a large number of houses and inhabitants established in one place.1 CIVIL. (See also CRIMINAL.) — Pertaining to a city or state, or to a citizen in his relations to his fellow-citizens or to the state; as, civil rights, civil government. Pertaining to an organized community; reduced to order; subject to government; as, civil society.3 The term "civil" is often used as opposed to "military." 4 In Burch v. Hardwicke, 30 Gratt. (Va.) 24, the chief of police of a city was held to be an officer of the state, and not of the municipality in which he exercised his office. See also the title STATES. City Council. See the titles MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS; ORDINANCES. Number of Inhabitants. The Code of Virginia provides that the word city shall be construed to mean a town containing a population of five thousand and more. In Roche v. Jones, 87 Va. 484, it was held that where other sections of the code use the word city, the term does not apply to a town which has less than five thousand population. City Warrants. See the titles MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS; MUNICIPAL SECURITIES. 1. Vicinity. Society of Cincinnati's Appeal, 154 Pa. St. 630. In that case it was held that where a fund was started to erect a monument in the city of Philadelphia, the site of the monument need not be within the corporate limits of the city as they were at the time the fund was started, but that "the words descriptive of the site were used in their popular sense, to signify the city of Philadelphia as geographically and popularly understood, the coterminous built-up territory identified in the popular mind as the city, and expanding from time to time in accordance with the enlarged meaning of the term in the minds of the people." In Smith v. Sherry, 50 Wis. 210, it is said: "The idea of city or village implies an assemblage of inhabitants living in the vicinity of each other and not separated by any other intervening civil division of the state. And see Enterprise v. State, 29 Fla. 128, where it was held that an attempt to incorporate two distinct tracts of land as corporate territory under one government was unauthorized and void. See also the title MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS. 2. The word has a variety of applications; but in almost all one may readily trace the idea of the character, privileges, or peculiarities of the ancient citizen. Thus it is now used in opposition to what is military; again, in contrast with barbarous, uncivilized, or rustic; and in turn as the opposite of that which is ecclesiastical or priestly; and it may designate that which is for the individual in distinction from the government. But in all these uses it presents the citizen as the standard with which the other is compared. Abbott's Law Dict. 3. Webster's Dict. Civil and Criminal Jurisdiction Compared. In Landers v. Staten Island R. Co., 53 N. Y. 450, the court said: "The terms civil and criminal,' when used whether in reference to jurisdiction or judicial proceedings generally, have respect to the nature and form of the remedy and the cause of action or occasion Bacon's Abr., Actions, A." Civil Commotion. · See also the title See COMMOTION. · See CONTEMPT. Civil Imposition. See IMPOSITION. CASES. Civil Suits. See CIVIL SUITS, ACTIONS, or Civil Actions. See CIVIL SUITS, ACTIONS, or See DAY. Civil Disabilities. - See DISABILITY. See EFFECTS. - See LAW. 4. Cantwell v. Owens, 14 Md. 219. See the title MILITARY LAW. Civil Court Distinguished from Court Martial. In State v. Davis, 4 N. J. L. 354, the court said: "The first question which presents itself in the consideration of the case is, whether the proceedings of a court martial can be reviewed here on certiorari. The martial law has for its object the order, discipline, and duty of an army. It operates on the person to compel obedience. It extends to all in actual service, whether as soldiers by voluntary enlistment or as militia called out for a limited time. In countries which claim to be free, and of course in this country, it is prescribed by the supreme power of the state, and is sometimes called the rules of war.' In the execution of this law there are courts of various grades, and from the inferior there is an appeal to, or rather a revision of the sentence by, the superior, and ultimately by the commander in chief. But so long as they keep themselves within their jurisdiction, the civil courts cannot interfere. But if the legislature create a court which operates upon the persons and property of private citizens in civil life, even though the court should be composed of military officers, yet still it is a civil court; it is a court too of inferior jurisdiction, the proceedings of which may be brought up and examined in the supreme court of judicature of the state. It is true that whole cities or districts may, on great emergencies, from the necessity of the thing, be declared to be under martial law, and be subjected to all the rules of war by a military commander; and in that case the power of the civil courts is wholly superseded. But no such thing has yet taken place in New Jersey. The court then, whose proceedings are before us, being a court constituted by statute, and acting against the private citizen by way of fine to punish for neglect of military duty, and not acting at all upon the person to compel obedience, must, I think, be considered as a civil and not as a military court. And if so, its proceedings are the proper object of examination here, as are also those of all other inferior jurisdictions. After looking into the return made to this writ, I shall only observe, that the proceedings here complained of were had in time of war. They were, no doubt, thought to be justified by the exigency of the occasion. must examine them as lawyers. The judgment of fine against the plaintiff is professedly founded upon the general orders of the commander of the brigade, and not upon the act of the legislature. The general, after stating in his general orders, that the law of the state is not explicit as to the mode of imposing and recovering fines from those who have refused to obey their country's call, says he thinks it But we 35 his indispensable duty to issue those orders; and thereby he requires the captains of companies to ascertain those who were delinquent under the general orders of August, 1812, and April, 1813, and to fine them indiscriminately in the sum of fifty dollars each. It is true that the act says, any person neglecting or refusing to perform his tour of duty, when called, shall pay a fine not exceeding fifty dollars. But it constitutes no court to judge of this neglect, or to impose this fine; and the general has undertaken to supply this defect by his general orders, constituting a court of his own. Now, I believe it is a clear principle, that when the law imposes a penalty or sets a fine, it must be adjudged of, sued for, and recovered in the known and established courts of law having cognizance thereof; and according to the usual course of such courts, unless some other tribunal be expressly created and appointed for that purpose; and that whether the penalty or fine be given to general or special, public or private uses. I apprehend, therefore, there was a mistake in the general's creating this new court, and in giving this new jurisdiction to the captains under his command. But, in this case, even the general order was not pursued. captain did not impose the fine as appears by the record, but what is called the battalion court of appeal' imposed it. They say in the return, The court, not considering the excuse a lawful one, fined him [the defendant below], according to general orders, in the sum of forty-nine dollars and seventeen cents.' The proceedings, therefore, in my opinion, are altogether irregular, and must be set aside." See also the titles MARTIAL LAW; MILITARY LAW. 4 Volume VI. The CIVIL DAMAGE ACTS. BY PHILIP P. WELLS. I. THE STATUTES, 36. 1. Nature and Scope, 36. 2. Rules of Construction, 37. 3. Notice Not to Sell, 38. 4. Differences in the Several Statutes, 39. II. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE STATUTES, 40. 1. Generally, 41. 2. The Sale of Intoxicating Liquor, 41. 3. Liability for Lawful and Unlawful Sales, 42. 4. No Liability in the Absence of Intoxication, 43. 5. Injuries Arising from Habitual Intoxication, 43. 6. All Contributors to the Intoxication Are Liable, 44. IV. THE WRONGDOER WHAT PERSONS ARE LIABLE, 48 2. Owner of the Premises, 49. 3. Surety on the License Bond, 50. V. THE INJURY, 51. 1. Generally, 51. 2. Injuries to the Person, 51. 3. Injuries to Property, 51. 4. Injuries to Means of Support, 52. 6. Care of Intoxicated Person, 55. VI. THE PERSONS INJURED 1. Dependents, 56. 2. Kinsmen, 57 3. Strangers, 57. WHAT PERSONS MAY SUE, 56. 4. Contributory Fault, 57. VII. DAMAGES RECOVERABLE, 59. 2. Actual Damages, 59. 3. Exemplary Damages, 60. VIII. EVIDENCE, 62. CROSS-REFERENCES. For matters of PROCEDURE, see 4 ENCYCLOPÆDIA OF PLEADING AND PRACTICE, P. 542. For other matters of SUBSTANTIVE LAW and EVIDENCE related to this subject, see the following titles in this work: DAMAGES; DEATH BY WRONGFUL ACT; EXEMPLARY DAMAGES; HABITUAL DRUNKARD ; INTOXICATING LIQUORS. -- I. THE STATUTES 1. Nature and Scope. In many of the United States statutes have been enacted, known as the Civil Damage Acts, giving to persons suffering injuries resulting from the intoxication of any person an action against those who furnished the liquor causing such intoxication. As a general rule, any person may, under these statutes, have an action for injuries directly inflicted upon him by an intoxicated person, or indirectly resulting from the latter's intoxication, when the liquor which caused or helped to cause the intoxication was furnished by the defendant.1 Common Law. The action is entirely a creature of the statutes, for at common law it was not actionable to give or sell intoxicating liquors to a strong and able-bodied man, unless the relations of buyer and seller were affected by other peculiar conditions, or by peculiar rights of third persons which might be injuriously affected thereby.3 2. Rules of Construction- To What Localities Applicable. These statutes are general and apply to all localities not specially exempted by their terms.1 No Extra-territorial Effect Not Retroactive. But they have no extra-territorial effect, nor are they retroactive. 5 In What Sense Penal. It is often said that they are penal in their nature, but this is in general with reference to the fact that they recognize wrongs and provide remedies unknown to the common law, from which it is argued that they should be strictly construed. Strictly speaking, they are generally not penal, but it is otherwise in those states where the damages are limited in amount and are to be recovered as a penalty.9 Liberal Construction to Effect Their Purpose. Nevertheless, they are directed to the suppression of a great evil, and should not be emasculated by too narrow a construction, 10 and in practice the courts, without extending their meaning to cases manifestly not within their terms, have, within these limits, given them a liberal construction to effect their beneficent purpose. 11 3. Struble v. Nodwift, 11 Ind. 64. Thus, where one intoxicated person attached burning paper to the clothes of another in a saloon, whereby the latter was severely burned, the saloon keeper was held liable for the injury on the ground that it was his duty to protect his customers from such assaults. Rommel v. Schambacher, 120 Pa. St. 579, 6 Am. St. Rep. 732. One Who Made a Slave Drunk and unable to care for himself, in consequence whereof the slave died from exposure to inclement weather, was held liable to the master for the injury to his property. Harrison v. Berkley, I Strobh. L. (S. Car.) 525, 47 Am. Dec. 578. Action by a Husband for Selling Drugs to Wife.In Holleman v. Harward, 119 N. Car. 150, it was held, on common-law principles, that one who, despite the warnings of a husband, persists in selling intoxicating drugs to the latter's wife, knowing that she buys them for use as a beverage, whereby she contracts a habit destructive to her mental and physical faculties, and causing loss to the husband of her companionship and services in the household, is liable in damages to the husband for injuries so sustained. See also Hoard v. Peck, 56 Barb. (N. Y.) 202. 4. To What Localities Applicable. - Wightman v. Devere, 33 Wis. 570. 5. No Extra-territorial Operation. The owner of property in Vermont which is injured by a resident thereof while intoxicated by liquor purchased and consumed in New York, cannot recover in the latter state from the seller of the 6. Not Retroactive. Therefore, evidence of sales before the passage of the act is inadmissible. Dubois v. Miller, 5 Hun (N. Y.) 332. 7. In What Sense Penal. - Freese v. Tripp, 70 Ill. 496; Meidel v. Anthis, 71 Ill. 241; Fentz v. Meadows, 72 Ill. 540; Kellerman v. Arnold, 71 Ill. 632; Hayes v. Phelan, Hun (N. Y.) 733; Schneider v. Hosier, 21 Ohio St. 110. 8. Reinhardt v. Fritzsche, 69 Hun (N. Y.) 565. 9. Sackett v. Ruder, 152 Mass. 397. The Repeal of Such a Statute destroys all rights vested under it unless expressly saved. Curran v. Owens, 15 W. Va. 208. 10. Mead v. Stratton, 87 N. Y. 493, 41 Am. Rep. 386. 11. Liberal Construction to Effectuate Their Pur 177. pose Georgia. Belding v. Johnson, 86 Ga. Illinois. Schroder v. Crawford, 94 Ill. 357, 34 Am. Rep. 236; King v. Haley, 86 Ill. 106, 29 Am. Rep. 14; Shugart v. Egan, 83 Ill. 56, 25 Am. Rep. 359; Schmidt v. Mitchell, 84 Ill. 195, 25 Am. Rep. 446. Indiana. Collier . Early, 54 Ind. 559; English v. Beard, 51 Ind. 489; Krach v. Heilman, 53 Ind. 517: Backes v. Dant, 55 Ind. 181; Mulcahey v. Givens, 115 Ind. 286; Schlosser v. State, 55 Ind. 82; Barnaby v. Wood, 50 Ind. 405. Iowa. Woolheather v. Risley, 38 Iowa |