illegal (g), and this even though the 5 & 6 Vict. c. 102, enacted "that all payments made before, during, or after an election, on account of a voter having voted or refrained, &c., or being about to vote or refrain," should be deemed bribery. In the Southampton case, 2 P. R. & D. 52, the Committee held such payments to be legal, it having been proved that the payments made to the voter for his travelling expenses, loss of time, and subsistence, barely covered his outlay.

The Corrupt Practices Act does not specifically mention such payments; and the words of the 2nd section of that Act, "on account of any voter having voted or refrained," &c., are the same as those in the 5 & 6 Vict. c. 102; under which statute the Southampton case decided such payments to be legal.

Cooper v. Slade, 6 E. & B. 447.-At the election for Cambridge in 1854, Lord M. and Mr. S. were candidates. The decision mainly turned on a letter which was written to an out-voter, and which was in the following form: "Sir.-The Mayor having appointed Thursday for polling, &c., you are earnestly requested to return to Cambridge, and record your vote in favour of Lord M. and Mr. S. Yours truly, C. B. (Chairman). Your railway expenses will be paid." The Court of Exchequer Chamber held that there was no evidence of the defendant having authorized the letter; that the letter itself, if authorized by him, was no evidence of a conditional promise; and, consequently, that the payment by the defendant to the out-voter of his travelling expenses after the election was not "corruptly" made within the Act.

The House of Lords reversed this decision on all points of fact, 27 L. J., Q. B., 449, without impugning the law as laid down by the Exchequer Chamber. Acc. Coventry, 1 O'M. & H. 105. Horsham, Feb. 1876.

IN THE BRIBER

The law was, that the unconditional payment of travelling Travelling expenses either before or after the election was not illegal, expenses.

Tindal, C. J., said to the jury, "It will be for you to say as to the sums paid to the several voters, whether they are paid really and bona fide for travelling expenses and travelling expenses only, or were paid to induce them to give their votes, The question is, whether any part was paid as a bonus over and above the actual expenses of the party" (see Ipswich, W. & D. 181). "You are to say whether the money was honestly paid merely for travelling expenses." Stroud, 2 O'M. & H. 179, acc. And the fact that both parties are agreed that neither would take objection to such payment is immaterial. Stroud, 2 O'M. & H. 180.

(g) Worcester, 3 Doug. 239; Worcester, K. & O. 248; see contra, Durham, 2 Peck. 178; and Lord Mansfield's opinion in the Wor cester case, 3 Doug. 239; Mr. Harrison's opinion in note to K. & O. 248; and per Alderson, B., in Bayntun v. Cattle, 1 M. & R. 265; see also Newport, 13 Journ. 112; Boston, 1 Peck. 434; Barnstaple, ibid.

1% THE BRIBER

Uneon-li

tional jayment of

In counties.

In boroughs.

BRIBERY.

Upon the construction of this statute." said Mr. Baron Alderson, in delivering the judgment of the Court. we are of opinion that a promise to a voter of his travelling expenses conditionally on his coming and voting for the promisor is within the first-cited part of the enactment" (to induce a vcter to vote). but that a promise of travelling expenses not so conditioned is not." (Acc. Bolton. 2 O'M. & H. 144.) An unconditional promise of travelling expenses to a voter to go to the place of polling, with leave to him to vote or not as and how he likes, seems to us certainly not a promise of money to induce the voter to vote. being neither a promise with that view nor directly calculated to cause it. This construction is confirmed by the 3rd section, which must have a corresponding meaning to the 2nd, and which certainly would include a voter contracting for travelling expenses for his vote, or his agreement to vote, and would exclude the mere unconditional receipt of these expenses."

The Committee in the Cambridge case. W. & D. 28 (in which case the sitting member adopted the form of letter used in Cooper v. Slade), and all the committees which sat subsequently during the session of 1857, adopted the view of the law and facts taken by the Exchequer Chamber, and held that the payment of travelling expenses did not avoid an election. Cooper v. Slade, as has been seen, was subsequently reversed by the House of Lords on the facts. By 21 & 22 Vict. c. 87, s. 1, the payment of money, or giving any valuable consideration to a voter for his travelling expenses, is forbidden ; but it is provided that the candidate, or his agent "for election expenses," may provide conveyance for voters for the purpose of polling, and not otherwise. In the Huddersfield case, W. & Br. 28, it was proved that the election agent had paid money to out-voters for their travelling expenses, although not till after unsuccessful attempts had been made to obtain passes from the railway company for the voters. The Committee held that, though an illegal payment, it was not bribery within the meaning of the Corrupt Practices Act. Carlisle, W. & Br. 92, acc. Lichfield, 1 O'M. & H. 28, Contra (semble), Maidstone, W. & Br. 57; Coventry, 1 O'M. & H. 110. See Peterborough, ante, p. 357.

With regard to boroughs, the 30 & 31 Vict. c. 102, s. 36, provided that "It shall not be lawful for any candidate, or any one on his behalf, at any election for any borough, except the several boroughs of East Retford, Shoreham, Cricklade, Much Wenlock, and Aylesbury, to pay any money on account of the conveyance of any voter to the poll, either to the voter himself or to any other person; and if any such candidate, or any person on his behalf, shall pay any money on account of the conveyance of any voter to the poll, such payment shall be deemed to be an illegal payment within the meaning of The Corrupt Practices Preven

tion Act, 1854,'" i.e., it was an illegal payment only to pay. the flyman, but bribery if paid to the voter who rode in the fly. Coventry, 1 O'M. & H. 110. But in the Salford case, ibid. 134, it was intimated, that any payment wilfully made in contravention of an Act of Parliament would avoid the election, though the point was not expressly decided. But in the Bolton case, 2 O'M. & H. 150, it was settled that it would not, for a violation of an Act of Parliament, which itself creates the offence and provides the penalty will not avoid an election," Stroud, ibid, 185, acc. In the Northallerton case, 1 O'M. & H. 167, it was held that the payment of travelling expenses after the poll without proof of any previous promise was not bribery.

Now, however, the Parliamentary Elections and Corrupt Practices Act, 1880, repeals s. 36 of 30 & 31 Vict. c. 102, so far as concerns the conveyance of voters within any borough, the result being that it remains illegal to pay for the conveyance of voters to the poll from without the borough, but is no longer illegal to pay for their conveyance within the borough. It is, of course, still illegal to pay the voter in either case; see ante, p. 325. (See copy of Bill at end of Appendix.)

IN THE

BRIBER.

With regard to payments made to voters for loss of time, in the Payment for Grantham case, 75 Journ. 443, the House resolved "that the loss of time. practice of paying money to out-voters at elections, &c., under colour of indemnifying them for loss of time, is highly illegal, subversive of the freedom of election, and tending to the most dangerous corruption ;" and see Ipswich, 1 Lud. 25. But this resolution appears to be merely declaratory of the law of Parliament, colourable payments always having been illegal; and in several cases, decided subsequently to the above resolution, such payments, bona fide made, and not colourable, have been upheld. Worcester, K. & O. 248; Southampton, 2 P. R. & D. 52; Salford, 1 O'M. & H. 141, ante, p. 363.

wages.

In the Stroud case, 2 O'M. & H., 181 it was held, that the pay- Payment of ment by the employer of the wages of his men on the polling day was not bribery, though as a rule they were not paid when they did not work, but it was shown to be an isolated case (otherwise an inference of a previous promise might have arisen), and it seems also, though the facts are rather meagrely given, that the wages of all were paid, quite irrespective of their political opinions and without inquiry into them-in short, it was a payment "of grace" only, and therefore not within the Act.

In the Liverpool case, 2 P. R. & D. 248, decided under the 5 & 6 Vict. c. 102, s. 20, small sums of five and four shillings were paid to several voters under the name of "the day's pay," and as " compensation for loss of time," and the Committee held such payments to be corrupt, though the sums were not larger than the daily earnings of such voters would have amounted to; nor was any

Payment

Agreement

to procure return,

BRIBERY.

evidence given to show that such payments had been the primary motive in deciding their votes. But it appears from one of the resolutions of the Committee, that, from the disposition of the polling places, every voter might have polled without any such interruption of his employment as to occasion the loss of wages, And without any necessity for refreshment. See ante. p. 357 n. (g) Ave, Deconport, Min., 5 May, 1866, in which case 70 voters for the witting member, who were employed in the Royal Dockyard, and were allowed by the Government to be absent half a day, (which was shown to be amply sufficient) for the purpose of polling, without loss of wages, received a fortnight after the election 10%, each at one of the sitting member's committee rooms. No previous contract was proved, but the money was paid as for Tons of time by a person who received it from a partner of the agent of the witting member. The sitting member denied all knowledge of it, but the Committee avoided the election. And in Nimpson v. Veend, L. R. 4 Q. B. 626, it was held that a promise of remuneration for loss of time was an offer or promise within the meaning of the 17 & 18 Vict. c. 102, s. 2. Staleybridge, 1 O'M. & 11 66 Muatings, ibid. 220, acc. But payments for loss of time in attending at the Registration Court are not primâ facie bribery. Teunton, 1 O'M. & 11, 183; Hastings, ibid. 217.

As to payments for subsistence during the election, it was substantially decided in the Southampton case, 2 P. R. & D. 52, that Buch payments (under the 5 & 6 Vict. c. 102), were legal; at least this sum paid to the voter included a sum for subsistence, and no objcction was raised on that head; contra, Liverpool, 2 P. R. & D. 248, under the special circumstances of that case, supra. And see Maidstone, W. & Br. 57.

But these payments, it would seem, will not, since the Corrupt Practices Prevention Act, under any circumstances, and even if bona fide made, be legal, though they may not be corrupt. The 23rd section of that Act, after reciting that doubts had arisen as to whether the giving of refreshment to voters, on the day of nomination or polling, be or be not according to law, has declared Buch giving, whether in kind, by ticket, or money, to be illegal, and subjects the giver to a penalty of forty shillings. See ante, p. 326. By the third and fourth clauses of the 2nd section,

4. EVERY PERSON WHO SHALL,

In consequence of any such gift, loan, offer, promise, procurement, or

Procure

Engage

agreement,

the return of any person,
the vote of any voter,

IN THE BRIBER.

Agreement to procure return.

Promise to procure

Promise to endeavour to procure

shall be guilty of bribery.

These clauses are intended to replace the repealed Act of 49 Geo. 3, c. 118, and are directed against the more wholesale traffic in votes which, in a small constituency, amounts to a purchase of a return. The 49 Geo. 3, c. 118, prohibited only the more direct forms of dealing, as the giving or promising of "money, reward, office," &c., upon agreement to procure the return, and imposed a pecuniary penalty on the giver only where he held office under the Crown. The successful candidate was liable to lose his seat, but he escaped personally with entire impunity. The present statute adds to the prohibited means of corruption, loans, offers, &c., promises to endeavour to procure reward, &c., and subjects all parties to such transactions to the penalties imposed by the Act.

In the Barnstaple case, 2 P. R. & D. 386 (h), it was proved that the sitting member L. entered into an agreement with one C. in the following terms: "I will pay the sum of 4007. and the sum of 1,000l. within a week after the election at B." C., it appeared, had been very active in a commission of inquiry held for the borough, under 15 & 16 Vict. c. 57, and in averting its threatened disfranchisement, and had incurred expenses to the amount of 1,4007. in so doing; it was in respect of this bill of costs that the above agreement was made. C. swore that it was no part of the understanding that he should endeavour to procure L.'s return, but the Committee held Mr. L.'s election void. It should be mentioned that L. had availed himself of the privilege of a witness not to criminate himself, and had declined to be examined (i). See the cases decided under the repealed statute, 49 Geo. 3, c. 118, and quoted ante, p. 239, which are still authorities.

(h) This case was decided since the Corrupt Practices Act; but the agreement under which the election was avoided was made, it appears from the report, on the 8th of August, 1854, whereas the Act was not passed till the 10th, two days later. The Committee, however, thought the agreement void by the Common Law of Par liament, and that the 49 Geo. 3, c. 118, was merely declaratory of the common law. Ex relatione, Butt, Q.C., chairman.

(i) Where a corrupt agreement to return A. is alleged; but, in the event, B. becomes a candidate in A.'s place, evidence of such agreement can be given before the candidature of B. commenced. Dover, W. & Br. 126.